Department of Geography

Representation of terror attacks in Swiss media

GEO 511 Master's Thesis

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Summary

Building on scholarship in *critical geopolitics*, which has engaged with the changed discourses in the so-called ‘post-9/11’ era, the aim of this master thesis is to understand how *geopolitical imaginaries* might have altered in the presence of the new ‘terror’ actor IS and the recent European attacks. Adding to debates in critical geopolitics, I particularly look in what ways the imaginaries involve *othering* processes. As I want to strengthen this type of research in non-Anglophonic contexts, I analyse five popular German-language media of Switzerland (*20 Minuten*, *Blick*, *Die Weltwoche*, *SRF Tagesschau*, *Tages-Anzeiger*). I consider news reports in the aftermath of five European attacks between the period 2015 – 2016 which received a lot of attention in media and have been related to ‘Islamic terrorism’. I analyse the news reports with a discourse analysis, the main methodology in critical geopolitics. In my approach, I pay attention to methodological transparency and focused on different linguistic characteristics and rhetorical means such as metaphors or various forms of building difference.

While in the news reports the main enemy image is clearly ‘Islamic terrorism’, there is another contrasting ‘other’ represented that can be categorised as ‘right wing populism’. Both of them are regarded to threaten the ‘western-European’ societies as they are supposedly profiting from each other. Generally, the ‘in-group’ of ‘western-European’ societies are very prominent in the news coverage of the attacks since their values and principles of ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, etc. are contrasting these opposing groups. In more culturalist informed texts such as *Die Weltwoche*, the main ‘in-group’ can be characterised as a ‘western-European’ culture which builds the counterpart of an ‘Arabian-Islamic’ culture. In such discourses, the religion of Islam is viewed as having a predisposition for ‘terrorism’. Contrary to the imaginings of most news reports of the mainstream media, Muslims are distinctly differentiated from the attackers.

I show that various, sometimes even contradictory ‘inside and outside’ imaginaries are at work in the news coverage in relation to the ‘terror’ threat. In some news reports, the attackers are represented as ‘soldiers’ of a hostile army abroad named IS, which is trying to invade Europe. But there also exist imaginings which view IS as a network with different cell structures in European countries. Sometimes the attackers are regarded as ‘homegrown’, ‘marginalised’ and ‘radicalised losers’, without having direct contact to IS. Additionally, in European cities, there are districts represented as parallel societies of an ‘Arabian-Muslim’ culture. These districts are characterised as poor, high on crimes and migrants. Consequently, these districts are seen as places where ‘terrorism’ thrives.

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I. Introduction

1. Aim of research and research questions

It was as early as the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001, as it was claimed that we now live in "the age of terror" (e.g. Talbot & Chanda 2011). The September 11 attacks and the following so-called 'War on Terror' (WoT) in Middle Eastern countries marked a significant shift in 'western' geopolitical imaginaries (see Debrix 2008: 69 – 70; Luke 2003: 231). Such imaginaries were reinforced by bombings in public transport system of the European cities Madrid (2004) and London (2005). 'Terrorism', related to a radicalised Muslim ideology, became one of the major topics in media and public debates (see Hörschelmann 2008: 142). Furthermore, discourses around 'terrorism' and the 'War on Terror' opened a wide field for (academic) literature (see Debrix & Lacy 2009: 2). Among them, scholarship in *critical geopolitics* has been engaging with these changed *geopolitical imaginaries* in this often called 'post-9/11' era (e.g. Hörschelmann 2008, Luke 2003, Oslender 2013).

The emergence of IS[1] in 2014 however brought a new dynamic into play. Not only had IS become a powerful geopolitical actor who holds large territories in Syria and Iraq under their control, but also the group had been using new media as a strategy to spread their message, to build global networks of support and to demonstrate their violence to a worldwide public. Furthermore, attacks in Western Europe were frequently carried out in the name of IS and in many of them, IS claimed responsibility. Even though 'terrorism' is not a new phenomenon in Europe[2], the type of attacks, respectively the 'terror' practises have changed (see Husy 2017). For example, the perpetrators often use cars or trucks as weapons and the main target are mostly random civilians (see ibid.).

[1] In this thesis, I came across the question how I should name this group. Former presidents such as François Hollande (France) and Barack Obama (United States of America), leaders in the Middle East or Muslims worldwide name them 'Daesh' because this short form deriving from Arabic delegitimise them as a result of the negative connotations of the word (see Irshaid in BBC 2015). Otherwise, to use their full, self-given name, 'Islamic state', is sort of an acceptance of their proclaimed statehood and therefore, a reproduction of their power. I do not want to position myself in that debate but I need a term to name them. As sort of a middle ground, I chose to use the short form, IS.

[2] For example, assaults, which have been conducted by the Red Army Faction in Germany in 1970s and 1980s (see Husy 2017).

Even though Switzerland has not yet been targeted in such an attack, I, as a Swiss citizen living in Switzerland, perceive that novel questions in media, political and public discussions and everyday speech led to heated debates. Questions such as: Where are these 'terror' actors coming from? Have the perpetrators grown up in European countries or are they invading Europe from the 'outside'? What is the role of Muslims living 'here' and do Muslims have to take responsibility for such attacks? In the context of this new and ongoing dynamic, it seems likely that geopolitical imaginaries have altered since the earlier stages in this so-called 'post-9/11' era. However, only a few scholars have caught up on geopolitical imaginaries in relation to these very recent events so far. Therefore, out of the perspective of critical geopolitics, I want to contribute to this research field. I aim to understand what kind of geopolitical imaginaries are at work in the context of the recent European 'terror' attacks, if they are changing in reference to new phenomena and actors and how they frame these attacks. Since I expect to find a lot about the construction of groups and enemy images, I aim to analyse geopolitical imaginaries with a focus on *othering* processes, one of the main debates in critical geopolitics.

As studies on geopolitical imaginaries are often concentrated to Anglophonic contexts, I also want to expand this type of research to other geographical contexts. I chose to set my focus on the representation of 'terror' attacks in Swiss media. I selected a diverse field of Swiss, German-language media outlets (*20 Minuten*, *Blick*, *Die Weltwoche*, *SRF Tagesschau*, *Tages-Anzeiger*) which I will analyse by the method of a discourse analytical approach, the main methodology in critical geopolitics.

My research question and the sub-questions I aim to answer are as follows:

In what ways do the geopolitical imaginaries at work in the discussion of the recent European 'terror' attacks (2015 – 2016) in popular Swiss media (20 Minuten, Blick, Die Weltwoche, SRF Tagesschau, Tages-Anzeiger) involve othering processes?

(i) Which enemy images are produced in the context of the attacks and how are they built?

(ii) How are different categories of 'Muslim' produced in the context of the attacks and in what ways is othering underlying their construction?

(iii) What types of 'inside – outside' imaginaries concerning the threat of 'terror' attacks in Europe are at work and how do they conflict with each other?

(iv) Which types of 'in-groups' underlie the representation of the 'terror' attacks and how is opposition to others involved within them?

(v) Which contestations of political responses to these events for Swiss domestic policy are discussed in the media?

This thesis is relevant as media produces and reproduces geopolitical imaginaries that legitimise and mobilise (geo)political actions, policies or practises (e.g. see Hülsse & Spencer 2008: 57; Merskin 2004). For example, Van Dijk (2006: 369) argues that once people's attitudes on 'terrorism' are influenced, it takes little for people "vote in favour of anti-terrorism policies". Consequently, the representation of 'terror' attacks is not just a matter of words, but rather can have direct or even violent implication on people. My research aims to understand which sort of discourses and imaginaries might underlie the various political responses.

However, setting limitations to my research, I have to emphasise that a single 'origin' of a discourse is impossible to detect (see Hülsse and Spencer 2008: 579 – 580). Therefore, I will not be able to trace a direct connection from a (re)produced imaginary in the media to a certain political reaction which has been considered or implemented. Additionally, I do not intend to claim that the (selected) media are necessary reflecting the opinions and imaginaries of its readers and of Swiss society in general or vice versa. I also do not claim that all geopolitical imaginaries shared by Swiss society are inherent in the news coverage of the attacks.

This thesis is split into five major parts, which includes fourteen chapters altogether. In this first part, ***"I. Introduction"***, I already explained my aim of research and outlined my research questions. Also in this part, in chapter *"2. Background: The new geopolitical actor IS"*, I will introduce the background of my research topic, including the 'WoT', the emergence of IS and their structure and I will provide an overview of the many assaults which happened in relation to this new actor.

In the next part, ***"II. Theoretical framework"***, I will outline the theoretical lenses I will use for my research. First, in chapter *"3. Critical geopolitics and its main concepts"*, I will show how the theoretical perspective of critical geopolitics understands the relationship between knowledge, politics and power and I will present the main concepts of critical geopolitics: *geopolitical imaginaries* and *discourses*. In chapter *"4. Secondary concepts"*, I will specify further concepts which are related to critical geopolitics and are also important for my own research: *Popular geopolitics* and the role of media representation, *othering* and *orientalism* and also *enemy images*. In chapter *"5. Geopolitical imaginaries of 'Islamic terrorism' in the 'post-9/11 era'"*, I will present the state of the art on relevant geopolitical imaginaries in the 'post-9/11' era, including *Islamophobia*, the enemy images of *'Islamic terrorism'* and contested *'inside and outside' imaginaries* in relation to these contexts.

In part ***"III. Methodical approach"***, chapter *"6. Approaching discourse analysis"*, I will present how I approach discourse analysis for my own research and what *linguistic characteristics* and *rhetorical means* I will use as access points to analyse underlying discourses

and imaginaries. In chapter *"7. Object of study and text corpus"*, I will reason my particular sample of Swiss media. Additionally, I will show which attacks I will analyse, why I chose them and I will also outline more details on the selected events. Furthermore, I will explain how I compounded my text corpus - the data that I will analyse.

In part ***"IV. Results"***, I will present my results of the discourse analysis. This part has five chapters, which are arranged in the order of the sub-questions that I have presented earlier in this chapter: *"8. The construction of enemy images"* (i), *"9. The production of categories of 'Muslim'"* (ii), *"10. 'Inside and outside' imaginaries in relation to 'Islamic terrorism'"* (iii), *"11. Types of 'in-groups'"* (iv) and *"12. Contestations on political responses"* (v).

Finally, in part ***'V. Conclusion'***, in chapter *"13. Geopolitical imaginaries and othering at work"*, I will revisit my main research question and I will summarise and synthesise the most relevant findings with the state of the art I have outlined in chapter 5. There, I will also show what I contributed to research on geopolitical imaginaries and othering processes and I will thematically give recommendations for further research. At the end, in chapter *"14. Critical reflection and methodological discussion"*, I will discuss the methodological challenges I have faced, I will make a critical reflection on my results and I will give practical recommendations for further discourse analytical research in similar fields.

2. Background: The new geopolitical actor IS

2.1 From the 'War on Terror' to the declaration of the 'caliphate'

The organisation IS has evolved during the era of the 'War on Terror' (WoT) (also labelled as the 'Global War on Terror'/ 'GWOT'), which started after the September 11 attacks (see Cockburn 2016). US-president George W. Bush first used the term 'WoT' nine days after the attacks (see Roberts 2005: 113). This event marked the beginning of a military campaign with the goal to eliminate global 'terror' (see ibid. 113 - 115). In the same year, US-led coalitions started military operations against the militant Taliban group and the network al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (see Cockburn 2016). In March 2003, US-led coalitions set their focus on Iraq, the state that George W. Bush called a part of the "axis of evil" which is "arming to threaten the peace of the world" (see Merskin 2004: 171).

The military campaign of the 'WoT', which arrived to eliminate 'terrorism', has been object of critique from different experts. For example, journalist and Middle East expert Patrick Cockburn (2016: 2) argues that there have existed "many fault lines in the Arab and Islamic world", e.g. "those between Shia, Sunni and Kurds", or between countries which have been in favour of US politics and those who have been opposed of them. According to Cockburn, the invasion and the occupation of the US troops unleashed these conflicts. Cockburn argues that the invasion "destroyed Iraq as a united country and nobody has been able to put it back together again" (ibid. 3). David Kilcullen, author and counterinsurgency expert, claimed that "[t]here undeniably would be no ISIS if we had not invaded Iraq" (see Dearden in *The Independent* 2016). Stephan Husy (2017), Ambassador-at-Large for International Counter-Terrorism on the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, argued that the many violations of the *International humanitarian law* in the 'WoT' produced more terrorists than eliminating them.

The beginning of IS can be traced back to the year 2004 (see BBC 2015 c). One year after the start of the US invasion in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to the founder of the militant Sunni Islamist organisation al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden (see ibid.). Zarqawi created the group *al-Qaeda in Iraq* (AQI) and his organisation took advantage of the political situation of the region which can be characterised by the long-established conflict lines between the minority Sunni Arab community and the Shia-led government (see BBC 2014; BBC 2015 c), but also by the overall socio-political chaos that existed since the invasion of Iraq (see Muir in BBC 2016). Many young Sunnis joined AQI and strengthened its position in Iraq. The group played a major role during the insurrection against the US troops (see BBC 2015 c). In 2006,

when Zarqawi died by a US air strike, AQI became part of the newly created umbrella organisation *Islamic State in Iraq* (ISI) (see ibid.). In the following years, US troops as well as *Sahwa* (also known as *Awakening councils*), a Sunni Arab tribesmen organisation which rejected the methods of ISI, steadily weakened ISI (see ibid.).

In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a former US detainee, became the leader of ISI and started to rebuild the capabilities of its organisation (see ibid.). In 2011, when the *civil war* started in *Syria*, ISI engaged indirectly in the conflict at first (see Tran in *The Guardian* 2014). ISI member Abu Muhammad al-Joulani, who received support and funding from Baghdadi, created the organisation *Jabhat al-Jabhat al-Nusra* in Syria (see ibid.). Al-Nusra, which according to Cockburn (2016: 11) differs little in terms of behaviour or ideology from ISI, quickly became one of the strongest rebel groups in the Syrian war (see Tran in *The Guardian* 2014). Supposedly, Baghdadi wanted to gain power over al-Nusra through the expansion of ISI operations in Syria, but disagreements over strategy and ideology led to clashes between the groups (see ibid.). Additionally, the *first Libyan civil war* had also impacted the events in Syria. After the collapse of the Lybian government in 2011, many rebels who had fought against President Muammar Gaddafi and his loyalists travelled to Syria and joined existing militant groups which were fighting against the government of Bashar al-Assad or even created new formations (see Wehrey & Al-Rababa'h 2015).

In April 2013, Baghdadi announced the fusion of the Syrian and Iraqi forces with the formation of the *Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant* (ISIS) (see BBC 2015 c). However, Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda repudiated this move and Aiman az-Zawahiri, the successor of Osama Bin Laden, called for the return of ISIS to Iraq (see Tran in *The Guardian* 2014). Nevertheless, some members of al-Nusra split from their group and helped Baghdadi to remain in a position of power in Syria (see ibid.).

It was June 2014 when ISIS captured Mosul, the second largest city of Iraq, with little resistance (see Muir in BBC 2016). Cockburn (2016: 341) named this event "an earthquake in the politics of Iraq and Syria". In the same month, ISIS forces moved southwards into the direction of Iraq's capital Baghdad, overruning many cities and towns while killing ISIS' objectors and threatening to eradicate the Shia people and other religious and ethnic minorities (see BBC 2015 c). For example, on 12 June 2014 in a military air installation in Tikrit named Camp Speicher, ISIS executed approximately 1,700 Shia Iraqi Air Force recruits and buried them in mass graves (see Cockburn 2016: 343; Muir in BBC 2016). On 30 June 2014 ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi formally announced the establishment of a 'caliphate' with the generic title *Islamic State* (IS) (see BBC 2015 c). He named himself the 'caliph' of their 'state',

whose territory back then was "larger in size than Great Britain" (Cockburn 2016: 344). The group set their sights far beyond territories in Syria and Iraq as they wanted to expand globally (see Muir in BBC 2016). Although "many Sunni leaders inside and outside Iraq have criticised" (Cockburn 2016: 344) the declaration of the 'caliphate', IS still held appeal "for millions young Sunni men for whom the political and economic status quo promises nothing but joblessness and poverty" (ibid.). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi called for all Muslims "to pledge allegiance to the Islamic state" (ibid.) and dismissed the legitimacy of any other Muslim rulers in the world.

Regarding the ideology of IS, journalist Graeme Wood states in his essay *"What IS really wants"* (2015) that IS is not just another new Islamist fundamentalist group or jihadist formation, but rather he views IS as a "religious group with carefully considered beliefs". Wood claims that even though IS has attracted many "psychopaths and adventure seekers", much of what the group does is in fact a coherent interpretation of the Quran: "The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic." IS has the intention to return "civilization to a seventh-century legal environment" and ultimately to bring "the apocalypse". In accordance with their ideology, IS "requires territory to remain legitimate, and a top-down structure to rule it" which stands in contrast to the operation network of al-Qaeda. Further, Wood claims that their practises such as the crucifixions and beheadings are part of medieval tradition, which IS brings to the 21st century. However, the claims of Graeme Wood have been contested. For example, Islam scholar Caner Dagli (2015) responds to Wood's essay by claiming that "ISIS does not take the texts seriously" but rather they "search for text snippets that support their argument, claim that these fragments are reliable even if they are not, and disregard all contrary evidence".

2.2 IS

While IS is a relatively small force by its numbers of fighters, they have a reputation of operating in a very brutal fashion (see BBC 2014), which helps them to discourage adversaries (see Tran in *The Guardian* 2014). Additionally, analysts stated that, contrary to the Iraqi troops, IS fighters have been "highly motivated, battle hardened and well-equipped" (ibid.). Their weapons include not only small arms and heavy weapons but also armoured vehicles and tanks, which they captured from the Syrian and Iraqi armies (see BBC 2015 c). After the capture of Mosul, many "Shia women and children have been killed" and "Shia shrines and mosques have been blown up" (see Cockburn 2016: 350). Cockburn (350) argues that being identified as Shia "in Sunni rebel-held parts of Iraq and Syria (…) has become as dangerous as being a Jew (…)

in Nazi-controlled parts of Europe in 1940". In December 2014, Cockburn noted that under the increased pressure of opposing military forces, IS became "even more repressive and violent" against the ones "who resist its rule". For example, they executed many members of the Albu Nimr tribe in Iraq (see ibid. 372).

In its controlled area, IS has implemented a strict interpretation of the Sharia: "[W]omen are forced to wear full veils, public beheadings are common and non-Muslims are forced to choose between paying a special tax, converting or death" (BBC 2015 c). Women are not allowed to leave their house without the accompaniment of a male relative (see Cockburn 2016: 385). Also, some minorities such as the ethnic group of Yazidis have been reduced to slaves and can be bought and sold (see ibid. 385).

A year after the proclamation of the caliphate, IS had affiliates in eleven countries and has hold territory in five of them (including Syria and Iraq) (see Husy 2017). Even though IS is not internationally recognised as a state, the militant group is well organised and has internally a similar structure as a state (see BBC 2015 c). The organisation runs schools, courts and services, overhauled by their own precepts, laws and rules (see ibid.). IS established their own departments including in finance, agriculture, education, transport, health, welfare and so on (see Muir in BBC 2016). In Raqqa, the organisation even created "a consumer protection authority for food standards" (BBC 2015 c). IS is believed to be the world's wealthiest militant group (see ibid.). A great amount of their money comes from private donations (see Husy 2017). But IS also has access to the resource of fossil oil and fund themselves by selling it (see ibid.). Additonally, IS sells antiquities which they have stolen from the territories they hold up or occupy (see ibid.).

Contrary to other militant groups, IS does have media competence and uses the channels of social media to send out their messages and build networks of supporters and followers (see ibid.). With the usage of these types of media, IS spreads fear worldwide (e.g. in the form of videos of executions). Additionally, it also helps to recruit new members globally (see ibid.). According to Husy, their propaganda reached and inspired thousands of people abroad, who ultimately decided to travel to Syria and Iraq to join IS. These foreign volunteer fighters are coming from a variety of countries, but according to the study of the *Soufan Group* (December 2015), most foreign IS volunteers come from France, Germany, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and the UK (see Muir in BBC 2016). Many fighters who wanted to join IS have entered Syria via Turkey (see Cockburn 2016: 365). Several international observers have criticised the so-called 'jihadis highway', which has been an easy access route, since the Turkish government has not done much to stop them from crossing their borders (see

ibid. 365). Nevertheless, in March 2017, Husy stated that the propaganda production as well as the numbers of foreign volunteers had decreased since the rise of IS in 2014 – 2015.

Since August 2014, the US-led coalition (Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Jordan, Netherlands and the UK) "has conducted more than 11,300 air strikes against IS targets in Iraq" (BBC 2017 b). In Syria, the US-led coalition (here: Australia, Bahrain, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the UK) started air operations in September 2014. In 2017, they have been carried out 14,200 strikes (ibid.). Even though Russia has not been part of the coalition, they started air campaigns in Syria in September 2015. During 2016, IS lost almost a quarter of its territory (see ibid.). Especially in northern Syria, Kurdish-led forces reclaimed a good number of towns and cities. In July 2017, US-backed Iraqi forces recaptured Mosul (see Georgy in *Reuters* 2017). Even before that, IS had started to engage in a more guerrilla type of warfare since there are becoming more under pressure of different military and paramilitary forces (see ibid.). IS conducted many major attacks in Syria and Iraq, e.g. on 3 July 2017 two coordinated car bombings in Baghdad (Iraq) led to more than 300 deaths (see Sims in *The Independent* 2016) or on 9 June 2017, 30 people have been killed in a suicide bombing in Karbala (Iraq) (see McKernan in *The Independent* 2017). Besides these two examples, many more attacks in the name of IS have been carried out, especially in Iraq.

2.3 Assaults outside Iraq and Syria in the name of IS

Since the declaration of their 'caliphate', a number of attacks happened outside Iraq and Syria in the name of IS. Although IS claimed responsibility for many of the assaults, it is difficult to determine to which degree the attackers had direct contact with IS, if they just had been inspired by them or even if IS just untruthfully claimed responsibility. In this section, I list a couple of the attacks outside of Syria and Iraq, which are assumed to be related to IS. I am not trying to present a thorough list, but rather I want to give an overview of IS-related attacks up to today. In chapter 7.2, I reason the choice of the selected attacks and I also summarise what happened in these events.

On 18 March 2015, 3 persons took hostages in the Bardo National Museum in Tunis, Tunisia (see Yourish et al. in the *The New York Times* 2016). This incident ended with 24 deaths. A shooting happened on 26 June 2015 at a tourist resort in the near of Sousse, Tunisia (39 deaths) (see ibid.). Bombings have been conducted on 20 March 2015 in a mosque in Sana'a, Yemen, (142 deaths), on 12 November 2015 in Beirut, Lebanon (43 deaths) and on 23

July 2016 in Kabul, Afghanistan (more than 80 deaths) (see ibid.). IS also claimed to be responsible for the crash of the Metrojet Flight 9268 from Russia which happened in Egypt on 31 October 2015 (224 deaths) (see ibid.). On 10 and 18 December, suicide bombing killed dozen of Yemeni soldiers in the near of Aden, Yemen (overall more than 100 deaths) (*The Guardian* 2016) and on 16 February 2017, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a crowded Sufi shrine in Karachi, Pakistan (more than 90 deaths) (see Raza Hassan in *Reuters* 2017). In North America for example, on 31 October 2017, a person who allegedly was inspired by IS drove a pickup into cyclists and pedestrians in lower Manhattan (New York City), United States of America, resulting in 8 deaths (see *The Guardian* 2017).

Within Europe especially in Turkey several attacks occurred. For example, bombings happened on 20 July 2015 in Suruç (33 deaths), on 10 October 2015 in Ankara (102 deaths) and on 12 January 2016 in Istanbul (14 deaths) (see Yourish et al. in the *The New York Times* 2016). On 28 June 2016, a shooting and a suicide bombing occurred at Atatürk Airport in Istanbul (45 deaths) (see Palazzo & Winch in *The Telegraph* 2016). On the 1st of January 2017, a shooting was conducted in Istanbul (39 deaths) (see Yourish et al. in the *The New York Times* 2016).

In Western Europe, during the attack on the editorial office of the satirical weekly newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* on 7 January 2015 in Paris, 12 people have been killed. IS claimed to be responsible for the shooting and bombing on 13 November 2015 in Paris (France) on a variety of sites (137 deaths) and the bombings in Brussels on 22 March 2016 (32 deaths) (see BBC 2015 d; 2016 a; 2016 b). On 14 July 2016 in Nice (France), on 19 December 2016 in Berlin (Germany) and on 7 April 2017 in Stockholm (Sweden) trucks were driven into crowds of people, leading to the death of 86, respectively 12 and 4 people (see BBC 2016 c; 2016 d; BBC 2017 c). Other attacks with vehicles happened in London (United Kingdom) on 22 March 2017 and on 3 June 2017, resulting in 5 respectively 6 deaths (see BBC 2017 a; BBC 2017 e). On 22 May 2017, a suicide bomber blew himself up and killed 22 civilians in the Manchester Arena (United Kingdom) while people were leaving a concert (see BBC 2017 d). Other attacks with vehicles happened from 17 – 18 August 2017 in Barcelona (Spain) and added up with 16 deaths (see BBC 2017 f). While ‘terror’ attacks are not a new phenomenon in Europe, the emergence of suicide attacks is new (see Husy 2017).

In the following part (*“II. Theoretical framework”*), I will present the theoretical lenses which I will use for analysing the news coverage of the attacks in Europe. First of all, I will introduce critical geopolitics, which will be my main perspective of doing research for this thesis.

II. Theoretical framework

3. Critical geopolitics and its main concepts

3.1 Critical geopolitics

This thesis belongs to the research field of *critical geopolitics*, which is a *constructivistic* and *poststructuralistic* orientated subfield of *political geography* (see Nissel 2010: 11). The thinking of constructivism helped to establish critical geopolitics as it understands ‘reality’ as socially constructed rather than an objective matter (see ibid. 10). Poststructuralism was influential in constituting critical geopolitics since this intellectual tradition assumes a fluent and unstable character of *meaning* (see Glasze & Mattissek 2009: 32 – 33), implicating that meaning has to be constantly (re)produced and becomes a site of political contestation (see Nissel 2010: 13).

Scholarship in critical geopolitics focuses on the relationship between *(geographical) knowledge*, *politics* and *power* (see Wastl-Walter 2008: 580; Moisio 2015: 225). From a critical geopolitics perspective, the production of knowledge is always embedded in power relations (see Nissel 2010: 12 – 13; see also in chapter 3.2). This becomes evident as classical geopolitics uses geographical ‘knowledge’ to produce legitimation, guidelines, reasoning, etc. for geopolitical practises of national states which includes territorial expansions or militarised invasions (see Wastl-Walter 2008: 580; Reuber 2012: 160 – 162). However, the research field of critical geopolitics was established as a *critical* approach to the phenomenon of geopolitics (see Redepenning 2007: 91) in which knowledge is assumed to be contingent (see Müller 2008: 327 – 328, 334) and embedded in situated and subjective ‘realities’ (see Wastl-Walter 2008: 580). *Geopolitics* itself is understood as a “set of socially constructed, rather than naturally given, practices and ideas” (Agnew & Corbridge 1995: 5). Consequently, geopolitical categories such as ‘nationality’, ‘border’ or ‘state’ are not taken for granted, but are brought into question and considered from a critical perspective (see Reuber 2012: 164).

Two of the main concepts in critical geopolitics are *discourses,* sets of representations, narratives, concepts, images and terms through which social ‘reality’ is constructed (see in chapter 3.2), and *geopolitical imaginaries,* which are constructed notions and visions on local, regional and global power configurations, identity, history, etc. (see Buitrago et al. 2016: 5, 8 – 10; see in chapter 3.3). Studies in critical geopolitics examine how in everyday life, politics,

research and in media geopolitical imaginaries and discourses are constructed and reproduced and how they are mobilised in (geo)political arguments, debates and conflicts (see also Reuber 2012: 163 – 164). The objects of study are mainly the "various modes of *representation*" (Dittmer 2010: 274) contained in linguistic constructs such as newspaper articles, speeches, official documents, discussions etc., but also in visual representations such as images, maps, cartoons and so on (see Dittmer 2010: 275; Nissel 2010: 13; Reuber 2012: 163).

3.2 Discourses in critical geopolitics

In critical geopolitics, discourses can be defined as "a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constructed, social relations established and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible" (Campbell 2009: 166). In a similar way, Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew (1992: 192) conceptualised discourses in the early days of the research field of critical geopolitics as "sets of capabilities people have, as sets of socio-cultural resources used by people in the construction of meaning about their world and their activities". Fundamental for such conceptualisations was the work of poststructuralist philosopher and historian Michel Foucault (1926 – 1984). He emphasised that knowledge is produced in discursive processes in which meaning is attached to 'things' (Foucault 1978: 34 cit. in Kirchhoff 2015: 77; Ó Tuathail & John Agnew 1992). Discourses "are never static but are constantly mutating and being modified by human practice" (see Ó Tuathail & John Agnew 1992: 193). Even though discourses are always altering floatingly, they can also shift abruptly (see Reuber 2012: 201 - 202), e.g. the change of geopolitical discourses after the September 11 attacks (see chapter 5). According to political geographer Jason Dittmer (2010: 274), the so-called *discursive turn* has opened "new dimensions within human geography". In line with this, critical geopolitics focuses on how discourses reproduce and construct the ways of understanding the world, social relations, identities, etc. in respect of their embeddedness in power relations (see also Nissel 2010: 12 – 13; Wastl-Walter 2008: 580)

Concerning the mentioned embeddedness of discourses in power relations, I emphasise the reciprocal influence and mutually interwovenness within the triangle of *discourse*, *power* and *text*, respectively *language*[3]. Language, as social practise, constitutes the social world (see

[3] Coming from a critical geopolitics perspective, text does not only concern written or spoken language, but also images and other form of signs (see also Dittmer 2010: 275). However, the focus in my research is written language.

Dittmer 2010: 275; Kirchhoff 2015: 74), but at the same time, the language in use is influenced by the discourses at work. Discourses are "both constitutive and constituted" (see Jørgensen & Phillips 2010: 61). Foucault claimed that power is "always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse" (see Ó Tuathail 1998: 4). For example, this becomes apparent as discourses involve the understanding of what is 'wrong', what is 'right', or what can be said in society and what not (see Jäger 2004: 423). Closing the loop within the triangle of *discourse*, *power* and *language*, I underline that language is not an "innocent instance" (Reuber 2012: 166) but rather a powerful ability in constructing knowledge and social 'reality' (see Wintzer 2014: 98).

3.3 Geopolitical imaginaries

John A. Agnew (2010: 571) states that the disciplinary field of critical geopolitics mainly focuses on "how visual images (particularly maps), language (political rhetoric, analogies, and metaphors), and political performance (economic and political practices relating [for example to] currencies and military deployments)" are combined to produce so-called *geopolitical imaginaries*. In recent years, critical geopolitics produced a number of analysis on geopolitical imaginaries in various societal and spatial contexts (e.g. Atkinson 2000, Chaturvedi 2001, Woodward & Jenkings 2012). However, for many scholars the general concept of geopolitical imaginaries itself is neither defined nor explained. Therefore, in this section, I propose a conceptual framework of geopolitical imaginaries, which is mainly based on the work of Buitrago et al. 2016.

The study of geopolitical imaginaries is about how "certain places and spaces are constructed, characterized, and embedded into views of the world" (Buitrago et al. 2016: 11). Geopolitical imaginaries are constituted on notions of local, regional or global configurations of power (see ibid. 5) and contain visions of (national) identity, history, traditions etc. (see ibid. 8 – 10). Also, the study of geopolitical imaginaries can reveal "underlying political, social, economic, and cultural struggles of seemingly natural geographical assumptions" (ibid. 13). In a metaphorical sense, the concept of geopolitical imaginaries are lenses "that pool different images/perceptions of the world" (see ibid. 12).

There is neither one dominant geopolitical imaginary worldwide nor an infinite number of different geopolitical imaginaries at one time at work (see Reuber 2012: 233). Rather, there exist many different, sometimes even marginalised, imaginaries all around the world (see Dittmer 2010: 274), which are embedded in regional-societal structures. In some cases,

geopolitical imaginaries are "mobilized vis-à-vis each other" (ibid. 274) for particular (geo)political agendas and practises (e.g. *Containment*-politics in the Cold War; see Reuber 2012: 176). Further, imaginaries can change, expand to other regions, circulate, intersect or hybridize with each other (see Buitrago et al. 2016: 12). Some geopolitical imaginaries have to a greater or lesser extent a more global acceptance, making their influence hegemonic (e.g. the *Cold War* imagination; see Reuber 2012: 173 – 177).

Geopolitical imaginaries are present in "how collectives (or in some cases individuals) understand themselves in relation to others, and how their political decisions are influenced by assumptions about places and spaces" (Buitrago et al. 2016: 13). Therefore, differentiations of 'the national self' from 'the alien other' (in variety of societal contexts) are reflecting geopolitical imaginaries (see Chaturvedi 2001: 157). Accordingly, many "geopolitical considerations are about the formation of enemy images which are based on a geographical distinction between 'our [democratic] land' and an alleged barbarian [or tyrannical] land" (Buitrago et al. 2016: 10). By concluding this chapter, I underline that many geopolitical imaginaries rely on othering processes and the construction of enemy images what I will address in chapter 4.2 and 4.3.

4. Secondary concepts

4.1 Popular geopolitics and the role of media representation

According to Gearóid Ó Tuathail, there are three types of geopolitics: *formal, practical,* and *popular* geopolitics (see Ó Tuathail & Dalby 1998: 5). These types of geopolitics can be linked to the various actors which (re)produce geopolitical discourses. *Formal geopolitics* focuses on the production of knowledge of 'traditional' geopolitical actors such as heads of states, politicians, think tanks or academics (see Ó Tuathail 1999: 110 - 112). Therefore, the objects of research are strategic studies, geopolitical doctrines, bureaucratic reports, etc. (see Reuber 2012: 167). In *practical geopolitics,* the focus of research lies on the everyday geopolitical practise and strategy of the state. As foreign policy is linked to its geopolitical reasoning, the objects of study are political speeches, state actions, diplomatic practises, etc. (see Ó Tuathail 1999: 113 – 117; Reuber 2012: 167). In *popular geopolitics,* the main actors of (re)producing geopolitical discourses are media and popular culture (see Dittmer & Dodds 2008: 439 – 440). As the goal of this thesis is the deconstruction of the representation of 'terror' attacks in newspapers and TV news, the perspective of popular geopolitics seems relevant in addressing this intention.

Popular geopolitics emphasises the fundamental and powerful role of (mass) media in the construction and stabilisation of certain geopolitical discourses and imaginaries (see Dittmer 2005: 79; Hülsse and Spencer 2008: 579 – 580; Ridanpää 2009: 731). In the first instance, media provides a public space for discourses (see Keller 2004: 211). As media also observes comments, criticises and filters social 'reality', they become both stage and protagonist of public discourses (see ibid. 211). But the influence of popular culture is not only limited to supposed 'facts' in TV news or newspapers articles, but also expands to movies, books, comics etc. as they transmit 'knowledge'. For example, reading a superhero comic book such as *Captain America* is not an "'innocent' cultural practice" (Ridanpää 2009: 731) but rather reproduces "national identities and geopolitical scripts" (ibid. 731). In addition, for the representation of minority religious groups or ethnicities, popular culture plays a crucial role as they provide 'information' where 'knowledge' of many people is fragmentary (see Saeed 2007: 448). Consequently, media are able to establish group-identities or stereotypes (see ibid. 448).

Regarding the relation between media and its audience, I argue that these two agencies mutually influence each other. Modern mass media influence the perception of reality and awareness of its audience to a great deal (see Niehr & Böke 2004: 328), on the contrary,

newspapers, movies and TV news try to meet the needs of its audience (see Niehr & Böke 2004: 328; Kirchhoff 2015: 15). Therefore, media are regarded as a place where hegemonic discourses and counter discourses are constantly interwoven (see Kirchhoff 2015: 15).

Going further, Hülsse and Spencer (2008: 579 – 580) explain that a single 'origin' of a discourse (e.g. the discourse on 'terrorism') is impossible to identify. This means that a discourse does not just evolve from a single media outlet or from political elites. Even though Hülsse and Spencer emphasise that journalists and editors do have agency by themselves, they also argue that media is not a "unique discourse detached from other sources" (ibid. 580). Rather, the content in media is intertextually linked to other media, government reports, political speeches, statements of citizens, experts, etc. (see ibid. 580). The media actors (editors, writers, producers, etc.) are not necessarily trying to build their own 'manipulative' layer of interpretation of reality but rather they are using the same societal 'knowledge' as other actors do (see Keller 2004: 211 – 212).

The media have a crucial role as they can help to legitimatise and mobilise (geo)political actions, policies or practises. For example, George W. Bush's naming of the "The Axis of evil" (2002) or using the label of 'War on Terror' (2001) helped to establish the imagination of a 'Middle-eastern threat' which further helped to legitimise the military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq (e.g. Merskin 2004; Puar & Rai 2002). Therefore, the discourses in TV news, newspapers etc. are not just 'text and images' in a sphere of no consequences but rather they support (geo)political practises which even can have violent effects on certain groups or individuals.

4.2 Othering and orientalism

Othering is a discursive process in which "a dominant *in-group* ('us', 'the self') constructs one or many dominated *out-groups* ('them', the other)" (see Staszak 2009). *Otherness*, the result of the othering processes, is built through the stigmatisation of imagined differences in relation to the representing subject (see ibid.). Therefore, otherness is the negation of the own identity (see ibid.), or vice versa the own identity is constructed by telling how the other is (and the self is not). Consequently, othering often comes along with asymmetric power relations (see Gregory 1994: 105; Staszak 2009).

Such *'us-and-them'* distinctions can be accompanied by a "division of space into 'our' place and 'their' place" (Dalby 1991: 274) which can be found at any scale level (see

Mamadouh & Bialasiewicz 2016: 129). Consequently, othering has not only a cultural but also a spatial component as it differentiates between ‘here’ and ‘there’ (see Dalby 1991: 274; Gregory 1994: 170). The ‘own’ place has a certain emotional attachment for the representing subject (see Dijkink 1996: 11). The division of what is meant to be *inside* and what is meant to be *outside* is responsible for “politico-spatial inclusion and exclusion” (Moisio 2015: 225), which for example can be found on territorial boundaries. In line with this, Simon Dalby (1988: 418) argues that “[t]he exclusion of the Other and the inclusion, incorporation and administration of the Same [is] the essential geopolitical moment”, making othering a crucial part of many geopolitical imaginaries.

The root of the othering concept goes back to post-colonial studies of Edward Said and his popular work *Orientalism* (1978). The concept of orientalism denotes that the “view of the ‘orient’ [is] based on a particular imagination” (see Al-Mahfedi 2011: 10) which is produced by ‘a western culture’. According to Said, this knowledge production of the ‘orient’ is in fact just a European construct. The ‘orient’ was (and still is) represented as a romanticised place of the ‘strange’, ‘alien’, ‘aberrant’ and ‘inferior’ (see Al-Mahfedi 2011: 10; Lazar & Lazar 2009: 103). Not claiming that these imaginaries of orientalism are ‘false’ or ‘made-up’, Said states that they are only a certain perception of the representing subject (see Al-Mahfedi 2011: 10), but which are often understood as being ‘impartial’ and ‘true’ (see Nurullah 2010: 1021). Going further on the thought that the ‘west’ made the ‘orient’ as its ‘other’ (see ibid. 1021), Said claims that ‘Europe’ or the ‘occident’ only became a distinctive category by encountering the ‘orient’ (see Said 1978 in: Nurullah 2010: 1023). By building the ‘western’ identity as ‘normal’, ‘superior’ and ‘virtuous’ (see Lazar & Lazar 2009: 103), Europe gave “its own cultural and intellectual” dominance over Islamic cultures (see Nurullah 2010: 1024). Such orientalistic imaginaries have been used by Europe to legitimise colonial and imperialistic ambitions (see Said 1978 in Buitrago et al. 2016: 9).

With the development of post-colonial studies, postmodern and queer analyses, othering became a great issue in human geography (see Staszak 2009: 2) and was adopted in critical geopolitics (e.g. Chaturvedi 2001, Dalby 1991, Moisio 2015). Derek Gregory (1994) and his work *“Geographical imaginations”* evolved Said’s concept in the context of the discipline of geography. With geographical imaginations, Gregory describes “the ways in which we spatially represent and make sense of places both near and far away” (Mamadouh & Bialasiewicz 2016: 129). These so-called imagined geographies always contain “sustain[ed] images of ‘home’ as well as images of ‘away’ or ‘abroad’” (see Al-Mahfedi 2011: 9). Gregory showed that

geography, with its constructions of difference and distance, "is implicated in our cultural judgments" (ibid. 6) and therefore can legitimise violence against the 'other' people (ibid. 6).

In his work *"The Colonial Present"* (2004), Gregory emphasised the persistence of Orientalism or othering processes: "Orientalism itself never loosened its grip on the modern colonial imagination" (Gregory 2004: xiv). Gregory (ibid. xiv) illustrates that "wars in Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq confirm [that] Orientalism is still abroad: emboldened and aggressively exorbitant". Geopolitical imaginaries based on othering processes are not only existing between the 'orient' and the 'occident'. Such dichotomisations for example also have been constructed between the 'West' and the 'East' or the 'North' and the 'South' (see Dalby 1991: 273), or even on much smaller scales.

4.3 Enemy images

The process of othering stands in a strong relation to the construction of *enemy* and *friend images*. An enemy image can be defined as a "culturally influenced, very negative and stereotyped evaluation of the 'other'" (Fiebig-von Hase 1997: 2). This 'demonisation' of others can help seeking "some kind of purity for the self" (Chaturvedi 2001: 149), but a common enemy can also serve to "distract attention and divert aggression and energy toward a common threat" (Merskin 2004: 159). The 'common' refers to the own 'in-group', while the enemy builds the 'hostile' or 'alien other', respectively the 'out-group'. The 'friend', who is contrasting the enemy, is often built as the 'good' force who fights "a mortal combat against 'Evil' ones" (Tarchi 2002: 22, cit. from Ferrari 2007: 605). Frequently, characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, culture, age, nationality or appearance are used to build differences between the 'friend' and the 'enemy' and "to stimulate resentment toward other groups" (Merskin 2004: 159). Enemy images are "reinforced and reinvigorated via the words of political opinion leaders and mass media representations" (ibid. 158). Tarchi (2002: 22, cit. from Ferrari 2007: 605) argues that "politics, when taken in its essence, reduces itself to a contraposition between 'Friend' and 'Enemy'" (ibid.). To no surprise, enemy images can also be used to legitimate certain (geo)political actions (e.g. in the 'war on terror', see chapter 5.2).

Among others, the adaption of friend and enemy images into the field of political theory goes back to Carl Schmitt (1888 – 1985). Schmitt engaged with these two terms and tried to find their 'true meaning' (see Soběhart 2008: 312). He regarded the 'enemy' as a public enemy of the state (*hostis*) and not an enemy or opponent of an individual (*inimicus*) (see Schmitt 1991

[1932]: 29). He argued that if politics is reduced to its core you will find the fundamental categories of friend and enemy (see Schmitt 1991 [1932]: 26) and that the 'true' meaning of the state is to define who the enemy and who the friend is (see Soběhart: 313). He stated that the enemy does not necessarily have to be 'evil', 'ugly' or an economical rival (see Schmitt 1991 [1932]: 27), but it suffices that the enemy is just 'other' or 'alien'. In regard who the friend is, Schmitt stayed vague in his definitions (see ibid. 315).

More recently, Spillmann and Spillmann (1997: 50 – 51), historians and scholars in conflict studies, contributed to research on enemy images. They characterized the construction of enemy images on the following six processes: *Negative anticipation* (1): Everything that the enemy does or did or will do, becomes "attributed to destructive intentions toward one's own group" (ibid. 50 – 51). *Putting blame on the enemy* (2): The source of the current negative condition is because of the existence of the enemy. *Identification with evil* (3): The enemy has the intention of destroying the value system of oneself. The value system of the enemy is built by the negation of the one's own value system. *Zero-sum thinking* (4): Everything that is good for the enemy is bad for the one's own group, and vice versa. *Stereotyping and deindividualization* (5): "Anyone who belongs to the enemy group" (ibid. 51) is in fact an enemy. *Refusal to show empathy* (6): There are no commonalities between the self and the enemy and no information or facts can change this perception.

5. Geopolitical imaginaries of 'Islamic terrorism' in the 'post-9/11' era

5.1 Geopolitical discourses of a 'new world order' and 'post -9/11' era

The terms *'new world order'* and *'post-9/11'* both belong to the type of contemporary geopolitical imaginaries, which derived out of 'western' (academic) context and are mainly influenced by discourses of a fragmented and conflicted world order (see Reuber 2012: 178). Since the 1990s, scholars have been denoting the contemporarily geopolitical constellation as the 'new world order' (see Lazar & Lazar 2009: 100). The discourse of the 'new world order' emerged for a couple of factors. First, the end of the Cold War and the "dissolution of the Soviet threat" have been interpreted as "the triumph of liberal ideology" (ibid. 102). Second, these events led to the discursive superpower status of the United States of America which no longer had to fear the other superpower's response (see Cockburn 2016: 3) and the US wanted to retain their status through "countering global aggression and the maintenance of a western liberal-democratic internationalism" (Lazar & Lazar 2009: 102). Third, 'new' threats have emerged and been articulated (see ibid. 102), namely 'tyrannical regimes' or 'Islamic terrorism'.

Concerning the term 'post-9-11', it was just in the aftermath of the attacks on the 11th of September 2001, when the 21st century was proclaimed as the *"The Age of Terror"* (Talbott & Chanda 2001). 9/11 became symbol of the beginning of a 'new' historical period which "led to a fundamental change in the nature of international security" (Baker-Beall 2014: 212 – 213). The common assumption was that "the world had changed" (ibid. 213), as the 'western' states are supposed to face a 'new' type of threat (see ibid. 214). This 'new' threat is claimed to be different because "religiously inspired groups such as Al-Qaida (…) [which] unlike the politically motivated groups of the past, are perceived to be concerned primarily with killing as many people as possible" (ibid. 225). Because of that, political scientist Francis Fukuyama (2002: 28) claimed that Al-Qaeda had "the power to wreak immense damage on the modern world", and argued that "even if it represents only a small number of people, it raises real questions about the viability of our civilization". Among others, international security scholar James Der Derian (2002) or political scientist Aaron Winter (2010) divided history into a 'pre-9/11' and a 'post-9/11' era. This 'post-9/11' era has been dominated by discourses of the 'War on Terror' and the danger of 'radical Islam' (see Debrix 2016: 85) leading to a "(geo)political encounter between security politics and terror/terrorism" (ibid. 12) and the accentuation of the central enemy figure, 'Islamic terrorism' (see in chapter 5.2).

However, from a constructivist and poststructuralist perspective, terms such as 'post-9/11' or 'New World Order' have to be questioned. One the hand, I have to emphasise that not only such geopolitical imaginaries come from a 'western' context, but also have been mainly dominant in 'western' societies (see Reuber 2012: 182, 189). This also means that in other geographical contexts, there exist different geopolitical imaginaries (see Husseini de Araújo 2011; Reuber 2012: 182, 189), which might even refuse notions of 'post-9/11' or 'New World Order'. Additionally, the idea that a 'temporal rift happened' hides that political decisions such as to engage in the 'War on Terror' is human-made, and not an unavoidable consequence of a certain situation (see Croft & Moore 2010: 821). Voices critical of these terms explain that there exist many consistencies regarding wars and conflicts between the divided eras (see Kirchhoff 2015: 20). Therefore, I will put 'post-9/11' in quotation marks, to emphasise the social constructedness by using that term.

5.2 Enemy image of 'Islamic terrorism'

'Terrorism' is a major topic in the 21st century and dominates public discussions as well as headlines in media. Not surprisingly, the rise of IS in the last couple of years again intensified the news coverage on the topic of 'terrorism' (see De Cock & Kok 2016: 175). Coming from a critical geopolitics perspective, Francois Debrix (2016: 7) states that 'terror' and the following security responses became an important part in the contemporary (geo)political assemblage of the 'post-9/11' era. According to Richard Jackson, a number of 'terrorism' studies have emerged after 9/11 (2007: 394). Jackson, who is a scholar of critical terrorism studies, points out that along with discourses of "climate change, human rights, global poverty and arms proliferation", 'terrorism' became "one of the most important political discourses of the modern era" (ibid. 394). Jackson claims that today, 'terrorism' like 'democracy', 'justice' or 'freedom' has the function of a "primary term for […] central narratives" (ibid. 394) which are articulated in political and public debates as well as everyday speech (ibid. 394). Thus, Jackson states that the term itself is mostly unquestioned "in its meaning and usage" (ibid. 394).

The term 'terrorism' derived from the old French word 'terreur' meaning 'to frighten' (see Blain 2016: 27). The first time 'terrorism' or 'terrorist' entered the English lexicon was in 1795 during the French Revolutionary Era (see Oxford English Dictionary). As a result, the terms of 'revolution' and 'terror' have been in a close connection right after the revolts. Later, the concept of 'terrorism' became a polyvalent category "employed to interpret political violence

by society, the demos or people, savages, the dangerous classes and social movements" (Blain 2016: 26). The new concept was serviceably as it allowed to differentiate between "legitimate political violence by the state from illegitimate political violence" (ibid. 26).

Viewing 'terrorism' from a critical geopolitics perspective, the social constructedness of the phenomenom has to be emphasised. For example, Hülsse and Spencer (2008: 571) argue that 'terrorism' or the 'terrorist actor' "is a product of discourse" rather than a material fact. They state that "[i]n particular, it is the discourse of the terrorists' adversaries that constitutes terrorist motivations, strategies, organizational structures and goals" (ibid. 571). Also coming from a critical geopolitics perspective, Oslender (2013: 373) explains that 'terror' is a "strategy of war" which generates a "profound sense of fear among local populations" and transforms places into "spaces of fear". Because of this discursive power, 'terrorism' is mutually entangled with the mass media (see Featherstone et al. 2010: 173 – 175). Since it is a part of an overall strategy, in the era of mass media, the 'terrorists' are able to spread fear by reaching many people globally very quickly.

'Radical Islam', also referred to 'jihadism', was in the 'post-9/11' era quickly linked to 'terrorism'. Establishing the notion that 'Islamic terrorists' pose an 'existential danger' for the 'democracies' of the 'western world', it became the dominant enemy image in 'western' societies (see Jackson 2007). The 'Islamic terrorist' is not represented "as the representative, of a particular political point of view" (Featherstone et al. 2010: 181) but as the 'deviant' of the system. Historically, the enemy image of 'Islamic terrorism' has its roots in "a long tradition of cultural stereotypes and deeply hostile media representations and depictions of Islam and Muslims" (Jackson 2007: 400; [4]). However, the current understanding of the discourse of 'Islamic terrorism' mostly comes from "assumptions, theories and knowledge" (ibid. 398) of (western) academic terrorisms studies, largely having emerged after the 9/11 attacks and gaining popularity in recent years (ibid. 398). This again underlines the entanglement of knowledge, geography and power, which I have outlined in chapter 3.1.

As explained in chapter 4.3, the construction of enemy images is strongly related to othering practises. For example, Blain (2016: 57) points out that contemporary representations of (Islamic) 'terrorists' are constituted on the binary of civilized – terrorists, freedom – tyranny, rational – extremist, peace loving – murderous/savage. Similarly, Simon Dalby (2003: 67) states that practices of othering escalated quickly in the context of the 9/11 attacks, when discourses of 'Islamic fundamentalism' and the rhetoric of 'jihad as the practice of evil' began

[4] In chapter 5.3, I will illustrate the history of the representation of Muslims and Arabs.

to dominate public debates. Jackson argues that such discourses "construct and maintain national identity, primarily through the articulation of a contrasting, negative 'other' who defines the Western 'self' through negation" (Jackson 2007: 420).

Jackson criticises the term of 'Islamic terrorism' as unhelpful because "it lumps together an extremely diverse set of groups, cells, movements and individuals" (ibid. 413) and is laden with "unacknowledged assumptions and embedded political-cultural narratives" (ibid. 395). For example, "many Islamist groups have rejected violent struggle as a strategic necessity due to theological or pragmatic reassessment" (ibid. 414) and there exists a full body of research that confirms that not all "varieties of 'Islamism' and 'Islamic fundamentalism'" are "antidemocratic or incompatible with secularism and modernity" per se (ibid. 414). By constructing 'Islamic terrorism' as an 'existential threat' for 'western' societies (ibid. 425), the narrative of the 'civilised', 'modern' and 'free world' fighting against the 'terroristic villain' became the normalisation and legitimation of the 'War on Terror' (see Blain 2016: 70) and reified "a particular kind of political and social order" (Jackson 2007: 425).

But even in the 'post-9/11' era, primary enemies have varied. The first key 'other' or the centre of such 'anti-western forces' were Osama bin Laden, the fundamentalist political movement Taliban and the 'terror' network Al-Qaeda. Later during the 'War on Terror', Iraq's president Saddam Hussein and his 'tyrannical regime' became the number one enemy image (see Ferrari 2007: 605; Lazar & Lazar 2009: 100). Today, IS has become the "new of face of terror" (Debrix 2016: 12) and some regard them as the "greatest terror threat ever" (Kundnani 2014: 291).

This new actor IS received the role as the 'barbaric', 'archaic', 'savage', or 'primitive' 'other', antagonising the 'modern', 'developed', 'enlightened' and 'morally advanced' 'West', which once more is reaffirming the geopolitical superiority of the 'western' societies (see Debrix 2016: 91) and reproduce the geopolitical imaginary of a fragmented and conflicted word order. Debrix goes further and argues that the IS 'jihadists' became 'agents of horror' (see ibid. 86). Their beheadings in front of a global audience are seen as the new mark of 'radicalism' or 'jihadism' (see ibid. 86). They "are meant to shock" the 'western world', and "judged by the reactions […] they often succeed" (ibid. 86). Debrix claims that IS is not only represented as just fighting a war "against the West but against humanity as a whole" (ibid. 86). However, as I outlined in the introduction of this thesis, the geopolitical imaginaries taking shape in relation to this new 'terror' actor IS needs further research, which this thesis aims to contribute to understand.

5.3 The Muslim Other and Islamophobia

While the previous chapter concerned the enemy image of the 'Islamic terrorist', in this section I show how the 'Islamic terrorist' became closely identified with Islam and Muslims communities per se. The attacks of 9/11 led to a large amount of newspaper articles with references to Muslim or Islam in British newspapers (see e.g. Baker et al. 2013: 20). Such trends also have been observed in the Swiss press (see Schranz & Imhof 2002) and have continued even ten years after 9/11. Among others, scholar in Criminal justice Michael Welch claims that 'scapegoating of Islamic individuals' and assumptions such as 'Muslims equal terrorists' still have persisted (see Welch 2012: ix). Political journalist Edwy Plenel (2016: 11) argues that in France Muslims have become the "face of the enemy within".

In the 'post-9/11' era, Muslims have often been represented as a homogenous group of which their 'Muslimness' stands in the centre of their identity (see Abadi et al. 2016: 39). Also, "Islam has publicly been associated with terrorism, and Muslims as terrorists" (Nurullah 2010: 1022). This is also discernible in the construction of the enemy image of 'Islamic terrorism' as it links the act of 'terrorism' with the religion of Islam. In 'western' popular culture such as mainstream or mass media, movies, series, talk shows, or cartoons, Muslims have been often represented as "uncivilized, anti-modern, anti-democratic, and terrorists, fundamentalists, radicals, militants, barbaric, and anti-western" (ibid. 1022). All Muslims have been constructed "as Arab and all Arabs as terrorists" (Merskin 2004: 158), making them the 'evil other' (see Morgan & Poynting 2012; Manan 2008: 111; Nurullah 2010: 1022; Poole & Richardson 2006). Building on such stereotypes, any violent incidents by individuals, fundamentalist or extremist movement in Islamic countries have been ascribed to Islam (see Nurullah 2010: 1022). Regarding the perceived tensions (e.g. debates on headscarf, halal meat etc.) between Islam and the 'West', they are often understood as part of "an antagonistic and mutually exclusive relationship, or fundamental incompatibility" (Mertens & De Smaele 2016: 13). Such notions also make Muslims living in Europe as a perceived excluded category of Europe.

To denote such systemic discrimination, prejudice, and harassment against Muslims and the religion of Islam, the term *Islamophobia* has been employed (see Akbarzadeh & Smith 2005: 2; Nurullah 2010: 1028). For example, Sociologist Chris Allen (2005) argued that a type of racism emerged which is not based on colour but on religion and culture: "While racism on the basis of markers of race obviously continues, a shift is apparent in which some of the more traditional and obvious markers have been displaced by newer and more prevalent ones of a cultural, socio-religious nature" (Allen 2005: 49). Islamophobia often comes along with the

imagination that the Muslim minorities in the 'western' states refuse to integrate and undermine national values (see Morgan & Poynting 2012: 2; Plenel 2016: 35) or even are "using the cover of liberal democratic freedoms to subvert liberal democracy" (Morgan & Poynting 2012: 2; see also Plenel 2016: 35).

Even though Islamophobia became very dominant in the 'post-9/11' era, its rhetoric has been existing before (see Kumar 2012: 135). The discursive strategy of orientalism (see Said 1978) has a long tradition of being the 'core' of a "universalised western moral order" (Lazar & Lazar 2009: 100) in which the 'Arab/Muslim' is 'othered' (ibid. 100). For example, long-established orientalist scholarship on 'Arabs' or the 'Middle east' were responding to events such as the Munich kidnapping (1972), the oil crisis (1973) or the Iranian revolution (1979) (see Jackson 2007: 399). The range of these cultural representations portrays Muslims from 'mystic-exotic' (such as in the traditional orientalist literature) to 'violent', 'fanatic', 'terroristic' and 'threatening' (see ibid. 400). In the 1990s, during and after the first gulf war, the numbers of representations of Islam in 'western' Media has grown. In 1993, Islam studies scholar Akbar Ahmed argued "that many Muslims voiced concern of the negative representation of Islam and Muslims by the Western media" (Ahmed cit. in Saeed 2007: 444).

Very influential was the controversial book of the political scientist Samuel Huntington (1927 - 2008), named *"The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order"* (1998), which "reproduced a number of orientalist claims" (Jackson 2007: 399). Huntington divided the world into fixed cultural-religious entities and claimed that in the future a conflict between the 'Islamic world' and the rest will be predominant (see Reuber 2012: 184 - 185) and regarded Islam as pre-programmed for fanaticism (see Kundnani 2014: 57). Political writer and culture and communication researcher Arun Kundnani (2014: 10) explains that "Muslims became what Samuel Huntington described as the 'ideal enemy', a group that is 'racially and culturally distinct and ideologically hostile".

According to Kundnani (ibid. 57 – 59), two different perspectives on 'radicalisation' are dominant in Great Britain and the United States of America: *culturalist* and *reformist*. Culturalists claim that the problem of 'terrorism' lies in the religion of Islam itself while disregarding social, geographical, economic, political, or historical contexts (see ibid. 57 – 59). For example, Kundnani ascribes Samuel Huntington's perspectives as culturalist thinking. On the other hand, reformists see the problem in radicalism and Islamic fundamentalism (see ibid. 65 – 69). During the (ongoing) 'War on Terror' this approach continued. 'Extremism' is regarded either as "religious fanaticism of Islam itself", which is the perspective of culturalists, or as a "political ideology of Islamism", which is the perspective of reformists (ibid. 69).

Contrary to culturalists, reformists tend not to homogenise all Muslims, but differentiate them on a binary between 'good'/ 'moderate' and 'bad'/ 'extremist' (see Featherstone et al. 2010: 176). Kundnani argues that culturalists claim naiveté by the reformists, because they are "thinking governments can bring about cultural change in Muslim communities" (see Kundnani 2014: 87), while at the same time, underestimating the 'infiltration' of Muslims (see ibid. 87). He criticises both perspectives, as he claims that they both assume that there is a "true meaning of Islam" (ibid. 84) and share the "discourse that defines Muslims as a problem" (ibid. 84).

5.4 (Contested) 'inside and outside' imaginaries concerning 'terrorism'

The threat of 'terrorism' in the 21st century in the background of the 9/11 attacks (2001) or the bombings in the public transport system of Madrid (2004) and London (2005) led to the contestation of long established 'inside and outside' imaginaries in the 'western' world as 'our' perceived safety 'here' started to look fragile. Questions such as "who is a friend and who is an enemy?" or "where is the enemy coming from?" emerged. This resulted in the construction of different sub-discourses in public discussions and media that also generated academic reception. Some of the very influential one's, I will present in this section.

The *'lone wolf'* metaphor is used to describe a perpetrator of an assault who operated without contact or help from an organisation or command structure, but might have been inspired by a certain ideology (see Spaaij 2010: 856). Terror attacks conducted by 'lone wolfs' is a phenomenom which was already known in the 19th and 20th century. Its name and surrounding discourse however only came into prominence in the late 1990s. White supremacists Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis used this term for their belief that small cells of 'terrorists' or so-called 'lone wolfs' are more difficult to track down than traditional 'terrorism' (see ibid. 859). Unsurprisingly, the term 'lone wolf' itself is contentious as it might glamorise this type of 'terrorist' activity. Moreover, the term "is a construct of the media and of radical political actors themselves, rather than a social science concept or legal terminology" (Spaaij & Hamm 2015: 168). Still the label of 'lone wolf' crossed over to mainstream media, public debates and into research. Political scientist Bruce Hoffman (2003: 439) for example states that the "the traditional way of understanding terrorism and looking at terrorists based on organizational definitions and attributes in some cases is no longer relevant". Increasingly, "lone individuals with no connection with or formal ties to established or identifiable terrorist organizations are rising up to engage in violence" (Hoffman 2003: 439). Kundnani (2014: 22 –

23) criticises that in cases where the perpetrators of an attack have been identified to be 'white', they were often categorised as crazed, mental-ill 'lone wolfs' or 'far right patriots' while people with a Muslim background are meant to be driven by their 'alien' ideology.

The term *'homegrown terrorism'* denotes the 'terror threat' of citizens who have been 'radicalised' in the country they grew up and/ or in a foreign country where they travelled to (e.g. to Syria, Iraq, etc., see Husy 2017). According to Kundnani (2014: 118), this sub-discourse evolved**,** after the killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004 and the attacks in London's public transport system on 7 July 2015. Kundnani (ibid. 65) argued that "[i]n Madrid, Amsterdam, and London, for the first time, 'homegrown' Muslim terrorists were carrying out acts of violence against fellow citizens". Slightly differently, Kumar (2012: 160) noticed this shift from a perceived threat of 'terrorists' from another country to a 'homegrown' problem has happened in the United States of America in 2009 (see Kumar 2012: 159 – 160). 'Homegrown terrorism' is often represented as a product of the failure of Muslim immigrants to integrate into 'western' societies as they are claimed to persist on their own separate religion and ethnic entity (see Kundnani 2014: 121). Because the second generation see themselves as outsiders in the state they are living, 'radicalisation' of young Muslims is viewed as likely (see ibid. 121). The discourse of 'homegrown terrorism' contests established geopolitical imaginaries as the enemy is not regarded as coming from the outside but from the inside.

Another sub-discourse which emerged in (political) debates concerning 'terrorism', is often labelled as *'trojan horse'*. This metaphor is either used to describe the imagination that 'the' Islam (as homogenous unity) tries to take over ('western' state) control from the inside (see Poole 2016: 33) or that (uncontrolled) immigration poses a danger for Europe (see Kundnani 2014: 245), implying that 'terrorists', disguised as refugees, are invading Europe to attack it from the inside (see ibid. 245). According to Fran Cetti (2010: 58), scholar in the field of asylum and Europe, asylum seekers or forced migrants have been connected to the enemy image of the 'Islamic terrorist'. Because of that, "the perception of the threatening nature of the 'alien'/ 'outsider' at the border" (ibid. 58) has been intensified. This has resulted in the representation of the 'asylum seeker' as a security issue thus making the protection of borders the legitimate reaction (see ibid. 59). Therefore, the discourse of 'terrorism' rearticulated and reinforced the binary entities of 'included' and 'excluded'; "citizens with privileged legal identities" (ibid. 70) and those without: the 'asylum seeker' or 'illegal immigrant'.

In line with the geopolitical imaginary that 'Islam' wants to take over Europe, the metaphor *'Eurabia*' has been used to illustrate that Europe is in danger of becoming (or already is) an 'Arab colony' (e.g. critically referred by Kundnani 2014: 247; Bangstad 2013). Bangstad (2013:

369) argues that authors of the so-called 'Eurabia genre', e.g. Bat Yeʾor (2005) (pseudonym for Gisèle Littman) or Hallgrim Berg (2007), claimed that 'the' Muslims use immigration and high fertility rates as strategies to achieve this goal. Bat Yeʾor (2005 cit. in Kundnani 2014: 247) also claimed that there exists a 'secret plan' between "European politicians and civil servants" (Kundnani 2014: 247) with the aim to bring 'Muslim migrants' into their country, ultimately leading to the subjugation of Europe (see ibid. 247). The enemy in such literature, but also the enemy image of nationalistic movements such as the so-called 'identitarian movement' are not just 'radical Islamists'. Rather ordinary Muslims are viewed as the 'dangerous, alien other' (e.g. Berg cit. in Bangstad 2013: 375). This thinking implies that Europe has to defend its cultural and traditional roots and heritage against 'the' Islam or otherwise, Europeans become subordinated (see Bangstad 2013: 372).

How 'inside and outside' geopolitical imaginaries concerning terrorism can shift and how they can have direct impact on geopolitical practise is illustrated by Hülsse and Spencer (2008). They analysed the terrorism discourse in the German tabloid newspaper *BILD* after the 9/11 attacks and the time during the 'War on Terror', including the Madrid (2004) and the London bombings (2005). They argued that after the 9/11 attacks, the perpetrating actors and the group Al-Qaeda were first constructed as part of a hostile military organisation with a rational-bureaucratic, hierarchical structure by using denotations and metaphors such as 'terrorist army', 'death troops' etc. After the Madrid attacks however the representation of Al-Qaeda changed gradually. With metaphorical terms such as 'murderous strategy', 'criminal assault', 'suspects', 'assassins' etc., Al-Qaeda was more often referred as a criminal organisation (see ibid. 582). Hülsse and Spencer (576) explain that although "the discourse certainly does not mirror any kind of 'reality' or 'truth' about the organization", the representation of 'terrorism' or Al-Qaeda in the 'western' discourses is not detached from Al-Qaeda itself (see ibid. 576). Coming from this constructivist perspective, language has "transformed Al-Qaeda from a military to a criminal actor" (ibid. 583). The war-and –army reference built the actor as a threat from the outside, while the connotation of Al-Qaeda as 'criminals' made them more to an enemy within (ibid. 584). Hülsse and Spencer (586) argue that the 'external military threat' frame "makes the use of one's own military to confront the threat" a logical consequence. Compared to the representation of "Al-Qaeda as something internal and criminal" makes the use of a "judicial response" conclusive, e.g. in the form of "counter-policies such as house searches or online computer searches, the detainment of suspected terrorists, tough anti-terror laws or the tapping of phones" (ibid. 586).

However, the latest events such as the emergence of the new geopolitical actor IS in Syria and Iraq, the refugee crisis of 2015 – 2016 or the many attacks in Europe (often in the form of suicide attacks with the goal to kill as many innocent citizens as possible) might have further contested the established geopolitical imaginaries or has even shifted them. This is why I want to examine if the imaginaries in Swiss media have changed and if so, I what way they changed and which (political) consequences they are enabling. In the following part, *(“III. Methodical approach”*), I will show how I conceptualise discourse analysis in regard for my research project. Later in this part, I will reason my selection of media outlets and what news reports of which events I will include for my analysis.

III. Methodical approach

6. Approaching discourse analysis

6.1 Discourse analysis in human-geography and critical geopolitics

To answer my research questions, I use *discourse analysis*, a methodology which "enjoyed considerable attention in human-geographical research" (Mattissek 2007: 37) in recent years and is the main methodology of critical geopolitics (see Müller 2008: 323). There exists a diverse set on discourse analytical approaches across different research fields or disciplines (see Feustel & Schochow 2010: 7; Gee 2014: ix; Keller et al. 2004: 10). However, most of the approaches are strongly influenced by the works of Michel Foucault (1973, 1974, 1988), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), or Judith Butler (1991) (see Mattissek 2007: 38; Dzudzek et al. 2011: 175). Studies in critical geopolitics mostly derive from poststructuralist theories on discourses (see Dittmer 2010: 277). For example, Foucault's perspectives on the 'unity' of power and knowledge and that ontologies are not pre-given, but rather established in discursive processes (see ibid. 277, 279), have been adopted into discourse analyses of critical geopolitics studies.

Discourse analysis employs a linguistic analysis that considers language in relation to historical, social and political contexts (see Baker et al. 2013: 20). From a poststructuralist perspective, discourse analytical research aspires to grasp the reproduction of social 'reality' of a particular societal setting (see also Glasze & Mattissek 2009: 11 – 14, 32 – 33; Mattissek 2009: 279). Therefore, the goal is not to find out what is 'real'/ 'false' or what is 'right'/ 'wrong' in a particular (spoken or written) text, but rather to deconstruct common social 'truths' and to demonstrate how 'knowledge' is built. The focus lies on changes in collective mind-sets, which are called *discursive breaks* (see e.g. Mattissek 2009: 289). The objects of study are texts in a variety of forms. This includes for example, books, newspapers, journals, official documents, but also oral interviews, public speeches, discussions or visual representation such as movies, images, maps and so on.

6.2 Challenges in doing discourse analysis

Power and knowledge stand in a strong relationship (see chapter 3.2) and researchers stand not outside of that relationship (see also Nissel 2010: 12 – 13; Lossau 2000: 165) as they have a pivotal role in shaping, shifting and reproducing discourses[5]. This becomes obvious through the fact that discourse analysts investigate language, but they must use language to express their results of research (see Billig 2008: 783). In addition, the description of a discourse is unavoidably a reproduction of it. Consequently, I emphasise that self-reflexivity is important at any stage while doing discourse analyses.

In discourse analytical scholarship, there is no shared approach of 'doing discourse analysis' (e.g. referred by Feustel & Schochow 2010: 8; Müller 2010: 3; Schwab-Trapp 2004: 169). For example, Jennifer Milliken (1999: 226) states that "[t]here has (…) been strikingly little examination of appropriate methods and criteria for discourse study". On the other hand, it would be impractical to have one shared approach because the research design has to fit the specific object of study, the research question and the theoretical assumptions (see Gee 2014: ix). However, many discourse analytical scholarships are lacking of an actual explanation of how the particular analysis has been done (e.g. claimed by Dittmer 2010: 279; Hülsse 2003: 216). Coming from a critical geopolitical perspective, Klaus Dodds (2001: 473) has argued that "[m]ethodologically, critical geopolitics has been very disappointing" and Martin Müller (2010: 3) has called for "more transparency in using discourse analysis as a methodology". Similarly, Iris Dzudzek et al. (2011: 176) emphasised that it is important to make every step of the analysis plausible for the reader.

6.3 The approach to discourse analysis and its limitations used in this thesis

Even though many discourse analyses lack an actual description of how the analysis has been conducted, literature on discourse provides a wide set of very different techniques for engaging with text. As meaning and 'truth' often lies 'between the lines', subtext has to be especially taken into account in the analysis (see Hülsse 2003: 227). Gee (2014: 12) states that attention has to be paid to the written text, but also to what is not said, "but is still assumed to

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[5] In some academic debates, critical geopolitics has been criticised as the researchers point to underlying power relations in which seemingly 'objective' knowledge is embedded, but by doing so they take themselves a role as 'neutral' critique 'from the outside' (see Nissel 2010: 20).

be known or inferable”. For example, ‘things’ which are not explained, connotations, ‘gaps’ can reveal pre-supposed knowledge, implicit assumptions and underlying discourses (see Höhne 2004: 396). Many of the practical discourse analytical approaches are concerned with different *linguistic characteristics* or *rhetorical means* as they are regarded to reveal underlying social ‘realities’, unquestioned ‘truths’, hidden power relations or “discursive constitution of identities” (Mattissek 2007: 37). Picking up from discourse analytical literature on linguistic characteristics and rhetorical means, I will bring into focus how exactly I approached the data and came to my findings. That means I put an emphasis on the *transparency in methodology*.

For my thesis, I do not claim that there is one dominant discourse (or set of discourses) operating across all the selected media outlets and neither do I claim that in each media outlet there are different, distinguishably discourses at work. As Richard Jackson (2007: 402) explains: “Discourses are never completely uniform, coherent or consistent”. In a similar way, John Law (2010: 150 - 153) uses the term “empirisches Durcheinander” (empirical mess) for explaining that ‘reality’ or even the representation of ‘reality’ is chaotic, incoherent or ambiguous (see Law 2010). Concerning my data that means that I will find an assemblage of discourses and sub-discourses, which can but do not have to work across different media. Further, there will be tensions, inconsistencies or even contradictions, which also might appear in the same issue or even by different speaker in the same article (see Jackson 2007: 402). Jackson (402 – 403) illustrates: “The important point is not that each text uniformly expresses all the main narratives in the same way, or even that they necessarily agree with all of them.”

Regarding the (in academic literature contested) relationship between discourses and ‘reality’, I do not claim that there exists no such thing as ‘reality’ or that discourses are “completely independent of reality” (see Hülsse & Spencer 2008: 584). This becomes apparent in an attack such as in the *Bataclan* concert hall in Paris (November 2015) in which life or death was at stake and the event itself was “very real” (ibid. 584). Nevertheless, such events are interpreted in a certain way and depending on the discourses at work, the interpretations vary (see ibid. 584 - 585). Such events in return (can) shape the discourses (see for example the shift of geopolitical imaginaries after the 9/11 attacks, explained in chapter 5.1). As Hülsse and Spencer (585) put it straight: “[D]iscourse and our experience of empirical events feed into each other: they are mutually constitutive”. Summarising my intention of my analysis, I am not interested in ontologies of ‘truth’ concerning the ‘terror’ attacks but rather my focus lies on the construction and the effects of discourses surrounding these events.

6.4 Linguistic characteristics and rhetorical means as access points

In this chapter, I will present the different linguistic and rhetorical means which I used as tools for analysing the data. I will explain in detail how these particular linguistic characteristics or rhetorical means are working and why they are useful to access underlying discourses and imaginaries. Additionally, I also point out what kind of risks have to be anticipated while working with them.

Metaphor

A metaphor is a phenomenon which relates "one thing (target domain) to another (source domain)" (Ferrari 2007: 611). The *target domain* represents the new phenomenon, which we try to comprehend and therefore, is reduced to the characteristics (expressions, meaning, visualisations, etc.) of the *source domain*, the phenomenon which is familiar to us (see Wintzer 2014: 106; Niehr & Böke 2004: 330). Until the 1980s literature studies often regarded a metaphor as a decorative substitute for the proper term (see Wintzer 2014: 105). New approaches and theories on the role of metaphors have emerged (see Hülsse 2003: 218; Wintzer 2014: 105). Nowadays it has become more common to look at metaphors as they are working similar to a cognition process (see Hülsse 2003: 219: Wintzer 2014: 105). When something new confronts us, we use our own established knowledge and concepts to describe it (see Hülsse 2003: 219). We take the already established meaning of a known term and detach this meaning (and its name) to the new 'thing' (see ibid. 218). In other words, we project our known frames to the new and unknown context in order to make the new and unknown context comprehensible (see ibid. 219).

Metaphors exist in a variety of forms and linguistic studies came up with different schemes in categorising them. For example, you can categorise metaphors as *metaphors of space* (e.g. 'container', 'periphery'), *metaphors of threat* (e.g. 'ticking bomb', 'explosion'*), metaphors of movement* (e.g. 'flow', 'spread'), *personifications* (the phenomenon is represented as it has human agency, e.g. "France doesn't want any of that", "the city is under shook"), *metaphors of body parts and organs* (e.g. "he's her right hand", "the head of the team", "she's heartless") and so on (see also Wintzer 2014: 112).

Coming from a constructivist perspective, metaphors are regarded to have a 'crucial role' in producing social 'reality' (see Hülsse 2003: 213 – 214; Hülsse & Spencer 2008: 571). Therefore, they are a useful and popular research object for discourse analytical studies (see Kirchhoff 2015: 12). In fact, several discourse analytical research projects only focus on how

particular metaphors are (re)producing social ‘reality’ (e.g. Charteris-Black 2006; Hülsse 2003). The fundamental idea is that the reconstruction of the meaning of metaphors in a text reveals the discourse(s) operating behind them. The referred object or phenomenon in its metaphorical form (e.g. ‘barbaric killers’) is shown in a specific light and some of its aspects are overdrawn (see Niehr & Böke 2004: 330), revealing how the phenomenon is interpreted (see ibid. 330).

Metaphors are not individual, but rather they are social and collective figures (see Wintzer 2014: 107) and are regarded to produce a ‘common sense’ on particular topics in a society. According to Hülsse (2003: 220), every discourse is embedded in a particular limited set of metaphors, which helps to stabilise the discourse (see Wintzer 2014: 107). The variation of these different metaphors inside many discourses is low (see Schäffner 1996 cit. in Hülsse & Spencer 2008: 578). Consequently, engaging in a particular discourse without using the associated types of metaphors is not possible (see Doty 1993). Metaphors help to constitute discourses by defining how something has to be interpreted, what is taken for granted and what is politically incontestable (see Hülsse 2003: 224). For this reason, Hülsse (225) argues that the use of particular metaphors have the effect of making corresponding actions and practises possible and others not. As I explained in chapter 5.4, Hülsse and Spencer (2008) showed how the usage of militarised metaphors by describing perpetrators of an attack (e.g. ‘terrorist army’, ‘death troops’) enables different responses if they are represented as ‘criminals’. Of course you cannot draw causal relations from the usage of a particular metaphor to a specific (political) response. Metaphors ‘only’ make particular actions or practises visible, while others are not even brought into the field of vision. Or to put it in other words: metaphors simply enable an action but they do not cause them (see Hülsse 2003: 225).

According to Hülsse (ibid. 219 – 220), some metaphors become habituated in certain time after their invention. This means that the metaphor (for the phenomenon) itself is no longer associated with its source domain but rather the word becomes the specific and distinctive term of the phenomenon (ibid. 219 – 220). Going along in that process, the habituated metaphor loses its overdrawn, colourful, visualising meaning that has once connected the phenomenon with its origin. ‘Skyscraper’ or ‘table leg’ are such terms in which the literal meaning (skyscraper: ‘something’ that scrapes the sky) is faded. These days, a ‘skyscraper’ rather just relates to a very tall building with multiple floors. These so-called *dead metapho*rs (see ibid. 219) do not bring great insights into the (re)production of discourses as their former meaning became detached from its source domain. Transferring that into discourse analytical research, it is important to be aware that there is no point in interpreting every metaphor. Rather, by

analysing dead metaphors, you are running the risk of over-interpretation (see Wintzer 2014: 110).

Nominalisation and passive phrase

Nominalisation is a process in which a verb or adjective is converted "into a noun or a multi-noun compound (e.g. discover → discovery, solve → solution)" (Baker 2006: 153). According to Fowler et al. (1979, cit. in Billig 2008: 785), the use of noun phrases over the verb or adjective form is ideologically influenced. For example, in the (fictional) newspaper headline *"The Attack on the Governor"*, by using the nominalised form ('the attack') over the verb form ('to attack') the agent of the attack does not need to be named (see Billig: 785). Such deletion of agency can also be made by using passive phrases. For example, the headline *"The Attack on the Governor"*can be rephrased as *"Governor attacked"* (see ibid. 785).

Nominalisation is another process of reifying. By switching from a verb to a noun form, the described process (e.g. *"the aggressor attacked"*) turns into an entity ('the attack') (see Billig 2008: 786). Consequently, the existence of this entity is assumed, thus transforming a process into given and unquestioned 'fact' (see ibid. 786). Accordingly, nominalisations are used to convey "that present social arrangements are objective, unchangeable things" (see Fowler at al. 2008 cit. in Billig 2008: 786). To complete "the transformation of processes into entities" (Billig 2008: 786) the reified concepts in form of nominalisations are used as subjects. The nominalised entities become agents and 'work' on their own (see ibid. 786). The phrase "market-forces demand that global cities attract high-skilled labour" for example disguises that human agency actually lies beyond market-forces and humans demand that global cities attract high-skilled labour (see also ibid. 786). Consequently, using nominalised entities as agents normalises the described process.

In regard of doing discourse analysis on geopolitical imaginaries in relation to the recent 'terror' attacks in Europe, I will look into the use of particular nominalisations and passive phrases. For example, it can be asked if particular issues in their nominalised form are presented as uncontested and given 'facts' or which human agents of described processes are not named? Although this methodological tool is certainly useful for doing research on discourses, I have to critically address that myself and other discourse analysts often use the same type of language in approaching the research object we want to investigate. For example, the term 'nominalisation' is by itself the nominalised form of the verb 'to nominalise' or the use of passive voice in academic texts gives the notion of being 'more scientific' (see also Billig 2008). The implications by using such type of language can for example be that the findings appear to

be more unequivocal and universal even though the findings only apply to the specific research context. Therefore, I underline that the own language has to be used self-reflective.

Argument

Argumentation analyses are especially useful to find out what implicit knowledge and discourses are predominant in a societal context (see Dzudzek et al. 2011: 180; Wintzer 2014: 116). From a discourse analytical perspective, the point of an argumentation analysis is not to find out if an argument is factually 'right' or 'wrong' or even convincing but rather in which underlying collective symbols, stereotypes, rationalities, unquestioned truths, pre-suppositions, etc. the argument is embedded (see Niehr & Böke 2004: 333; Wintzer 2014: 116 - 117). The object of study are texts in written forms, e.g. newspapers, documents, official statements, etc., or transcripts of spoken language such as of movies, TV shows, interviews (see Felgenhauer 2009: 262). By doing argumentation analysis, one only focuses on specific parts or phrases in the texts which seem to be relevant in regard of the research topic (see Dzudzek et al. 2011: 180). Felgenhauer (2009: 276) adds that it makes sense to integrate an argumentation analysis into a broader discourse analysis, which is what I will do.

The philosophers Chaïm Perelman and Luci Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958 [2004]: 271) categorised arguments by the ways of how the arguments try to build persuasion (see Wintzer 2014: 117 – 118). For example, *cause and effect arguments* refer to a (real or imagined) causal connection between a matter A (cause) and a matter B (effect) (see Wintzer 2014: 118). This causal connections means that if A happens, B will be effected. But how is that useful for an argumentation analysis? An argument can be built on an appeal for a desired condition (e.g. 'less criminality', which represents B). The actions (e.g. 'less migration', 'more surveillance', 'better education', etc., which represents A), that are proposed to get to the desired condition B, reveal an implicit pattern of thinking of the arguing subject such as *"migrants lead to criminality"*. Another way of persuasion is the reference to *authority* (see ibid. 120). Authority can be represented by a variety of agents: researchers or experts *("according to the leading experts in the field of ..."*), state authorities *("the premier minister views this act as an act of provocation ..."*), transcendental or religious 'agents' (*"Because God said so ..."*), and so on. Such references to authority can reveal power (-knowledge) relations. Other types of arguments are references to *examples*, *metaphors*, *analogies*, *role models*, etc. (see ibid. 118). All such references compare a known coherence to an unknown situation (see ibid. 118). Deriving from these comparisons, reactions and responses, specific conditions become more favourable or less desirable. Further, by doing an argumentation analysis it is important to pay close attention to

what is justified and what not. Something that is taken for granted or is regarded as 'normal' does not need to be justified (see ibid. 103). Again, such 'gaps' can lead to underlying discourses.

An influential methodological concept to detect argumentation structures comes from philosopher Stephen Toulmin (1922 – 2009) (see Dzudzek et al. 2011: 180). Toulmin's model (see *figure 1*) is a useful tool for empirical analyses of arguments (see ibid. 180). According to Toulim (1958), arguments are composed of two explicit components: the *data* and the *claim* (the latter is sometimes referred as *conclusion*) (see Dzudzek et al. 2011: 180). The data is a 'fact' which supports the claim. Between the data and the claim, there is a 'logical' link named *warrant*, which is not explicitly written or spoken. Another part, named *backing*, supports (or backs) the warrant. The backing part contains premised knowledge, normative rules, background information etc. The backing part is not and does not need to be explained as its contained type of knowledge is unquestioned. Therefore, discourse analysts are interested in the backing and warrant part, - the unsaid elements of the argument (see Felgenhauer 2009: 267).



Figure 1: Toulmin's argument model. The model is illustrated according to Felgenhauer (2009), who was inspired by Toulmin (1958). Own example.

Difference relation

In this section, I present how linguistic difference relations (e.g. opposites, dichotomies, binaries, antonyms, antagonisms, contradictions, etc.) can be used as tools for a discourse

analysis (see also Jeffries 2010). It would be impractical to look at all of these mentioned linguistic manifestations of difference relations in detail since some of them are very similar to each other and a couple of them can even be used almost synonymously. After all, that does not tell much about how to use them for discourse analysis. However, important in approaching these difference relations is that in poststructural theories, identities are assumed to be built on (the construction of) difference (see Glasze et al. 2009: 306; Höhne 2013: 401; Reuber 2012: 195). For analysing othering processes, which is one of core concepts of this thesis, the focus on such difference relations is a helpful analytical tool. Difference relations are entangled in the relation of the ‘own’ and the ‘other’ identity (see also Glasze et al. 2009: 306 – 308). Further, as I have shown in chapter 4.2, such mentioned othering processes often come along with a spatial or geographical differentiation (e.g. ‘here’ – ‘there’) (see Mattissek 2009: 284).

Höhne (2003) proposes the concept of *“semantische Strickleiter”* (semantic ladder) to show how underlying difference and equivalence relations in a text can be used to uncover discursive patterns (see *figure 2*). For doing so, the text has to be analysed in regard to opposing elements, e.g. which can be contained in personal pronouns (e.g. ‘we’ – ‘them’), spatial- or geographical references (e.g. ‘here’ – ‘there’) or opposing attributions (e.g. ‘modern’ – ‘archaic’, ‘rich’ – ‘poor’, ‘aggressor’ – ‘victim’, etc.) (see ibid. 401 – 404). To illustrate the discursive pattern of analysed texts, the different oppositional elements are set next each other in a horizontal axis. The vertical axis represents the equivalence relations. Accordingly, the different elements or characteristics, which in the text are represented as belonging together (e.g. ‘man’, ‘masculine’, ‘rational’), are set below each other. Just as I outlined in chapter 4.2, the representation of the ‘other’ can reveal how the representing subject sees itself. This assumption becomes useful in building a semantic ladder, as ‘gaps’ (what is not explicitly said) in the text can be filled with the counterpart of an explicit element (e.g. ‘young’ → ‘old’) (see Germes & Glasze 2010: 219).



Figure 2: Semantic ladder of the migration discourse in Germany. According to Höhne (2003: 408), shortened.

6.5 Further considerations and procedure in this thesis

As I stated previously, discourse analytical studies provide a wide set of very different tools for doing a discourse analysis. By starting to engage with the data, I paid attention to a variety of linguistic mechanism and rhetorical means and selected the ones, which emerged to be most fruitful concerning my research focus (metaphors, nominalisations and passive phrase, arguments, difference relations). I have to emphasise that I do not aspire to present a comprehensive set of tools (what even would be an almost impossible task of doing so) and neither can these tools be isolated from each other. For example, many opposites (e.g. 'savage' – 'civilization') are also metaphors, arguments are using metaphors to build persuasion (*"... and nobody wants a 3th World war"*) or antagonisms are represented in nominal forms (e.g. 'darkness' – 'light').

Further, I want to underline that not every finding in the text can necessarily be drawn back to the tools of text analysis I have previously introduced. Sometimes even the presence (or a constant repetition) of a specific frame can be revealing and reversely, it can be telling if a certain frame is not written but still is underlying in the text. Also, the *polyphonic structure* in a text can be insightful (see Mattissek 2009: 286 – 290). The polyphonic structure refers to the different 'speakers' in texts (what also includes voices of speakers which are not explicitly named) and how they interact with each other (see ibid. 286 – 290). Questions which can be asked are for example: Who gets a platform to speak and what role do they represent (e.g. expert, politician, victim, perpetrator, opinion leaders)? Are their positions presented as controversial, wrong, or are they even refused? What other voices are underlying in the text? Finally, I want to highlight that the layout or the visual appearance is also influential in producing social 'reality'. For example, headlines of newspaper, positioning of images and text, etc. have a selective character as they reveal what is seen as important and what is not (see Höhne 2004: 396). As it becomes clear, a methodological founded approach is a useful asset. However, a certain openness in approaching the data is also necessary.

Hereby, I will outline how I proceeded in the actual discourse analysis. In a first attempt, I went through the selected data with focusing on text passages which concern my specific research topic. I highlighted the different linguistic characteristics and rhetorical means which are present in those passages and made first interpretations in regard of answering my research questions. After I went through the data, I reviewed my research questions and modified them in accordance with what I learnt from going through the data. In a next step, I conceptualised different frames (e.g. 'homegrown terrorism', 'role of IS', 'enemy images', 'Muslim

categories', etc.), which derived from the research questions and the data. In a second iteration, I went through the texts again but paid close attention to the shape these frames have, in which contexts these frames are used and mobilised and which differences between the different media outlets and the events in regard to these frames emerge. In a next step, I focused on the micro-level, which means I analysed how the particular linguistic characteristics and rhetorical means reveal underlying discourses. To put it in other words, I interpreted what type of meaning a specific metaphor is reproducing or on what type of implicit knowledge an argument is based on. Afterwards, I considered my results on the macro-level, meaning that I analysed them in regard to a broader societal, political and historical context in which the texts are embedded. On a final note, by narrating and describing my engagement with the data, I aim to contribute on more methodological transparency by doing discourse analysis.

7. Object of study and text corpus

7.1 Selection of media outlets

I selected a representative sample of various Swiss media outlets, which have a large audience in the German-speaking part of Switzerland (see also in *table 1* and *table 2*) and therefore, I assume that they could be powerful in shaping and reflecting popular geopolitical discourses. This sample of media includes the daily newspapers *20 Minuten*, *Blick* and *Tages-Anzeiger*, the weekly magazine *Die Weltwoche* and the daily television news format *SRF Tagesschau*. Further, I made sure that the media outlets vary in the reputation of their reliability and that they are owned by different media companies or associations. Because all but one of these media outlets have a more or less centre-orientated political position (see Longchamp 2013), I additionally chose to include *Die Weltwoche*. This magazine regards itself as a "counter voice against the mainstream" (Köppel 2017) and is politically orientated to the right (see Longchamp 2013), but still is popular and has a large audience. In the following part, I provide background information to every media outlet I selected and why I consider them as relevant for my research project.

Table 1: Numbers of copies and readers of paid, German-language Swiss daily newspapers. Only the largest titles are included. Note: *Die Weltwoche* as a weekly magazine is not taken into account in this table.

Name	**Numbers of copies (including E-papers)** (WEMF 2016)	**Audience** (WEMF 2017)
Tages-Anzeiger	157,323	461,000
az Nordwestschweiz	155,716	385,000
Blick	143,499	519,000
St. Galler Tagblatt	122,868	279,000
Luzerner Zeitung	120,239	295,000
Neue Zürcher Zeitung	115,510	265,000
Berner Zeitung	100,088	341,000

Table 2: Numbers of copies and readers of free, German-language Swiss daily newspapers.

Name	**Numbers of copies** (WEMF 2016)	**Audience** (WEMF 2017)
20 Minuten (excluding the versions of the French- and Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland)	442,994	1,363,000
Blick am Abend	270,984	592,000

20 Minuten

The daily newspaper *20 Minuten* is a free commuter newspaper and distributed from Monday to Friday on over 150 train stations in Switzerland. This outlet has also publications for the Italian-speaking part (*20 minuti*) and the French-speaking part (*20 minutes*) of Switzerland. The German-language edition has about 1,363,000 readers and a circulation of 442,994 copies (see WEMF 2016; WEMF 2017), making it by far the most read daily newspaper in Switzerland. This is why it is essential to include this newspaper in the media sample for this thesis. The first edition of *20 Minuten* was printed in 1999 and since 2005, the newspaper is owned by *Tamedia AG*, which is the largest private media company of Switzerland. Among many others, *Tamedia AG* owns the newspapers *Tages-Anzeiger*, *24 heures*, *SonntagsZeitung* and *Berner Zeitung*; the popular Swiss online marketplaces *ricardo.ch* and *tutti.ch*; the real estate portal *homegate.ch*; the family magazine *Schweizer Familie*; the local broadcasting channels *TeleZüri*, *Radio 24* and *Radio Basilisk* as well as many more platforms and outlets. According to Künzler (2012), commuter newspapers such as the *20 Minuten* have a broad selection of themes and topics. The topics are presented in short texts with many press agency reports.

Blick

Blick has a circulation of 143,329 copies and reaches 519,000 readers which is the largest audience of any other paid Swiss daily newspaper (see WEMF 2016; WEMF 2017). Not only do the large audience and numbers of copies make *Blick* a relevant media outlet for this analysis, but this newspaper is also the main *Boulevard* or tabloid journalism newspaper of Switzerland (see Udris et al. 2017). Tabloid journalism such as *Blick* make use of bold and conspicuous headings, large-sized photos and pictures to catch the reader’s attention (see Beck et al. 2012:

18 – 19). The content is often speculative, emotional, personalised, sensational and the reliability is limited (see ibid. 18 – 19).

Blick was founded in 1959 and is nowadays published every day from Monday to Saturday, while *SonntagsBlick* is published only on Sundays. Since 2008, *Blick* has a sister paper which is the free commuter magazine *Blick am Abend*. The media group *Ringier AG* owns them both. Among many others, *Ringier AG*'s Portfolio includes the newspapers and magazines *Le Temps*, *Glückspost* and *Schweizer Illustrierte*. *Ringier AG* also owns the two private radio stations *Energy Zürich* and *Energy Bern* and is a shareholder of the Swiss TV programming of the channel *Sat.1*. According to a study of media scholar Roger Blum, the political orientation of *Blick* is left-liberal (see Longchamp 2013) or centre-left (see Müller 2014: 225). The left-liberal political orientation might surprise as many of the very popular tabloid newspapers such as *BILD* (Germany), *Daily Mail* (United Kingdom) or *The Sun* (United Kingdom) are regarded as conservative (according to *eurotopics*, an European press review, published by the *Federal Agency for Civic Education* of Germany).

Tages-Anzeiger

With 149,368 copies, this newspaper has the largest circulation of any paid Swiss daily newspaper (see WEMF 2016) and reaches an audience of 457,000 readers (see WEMF 2017). *Tages-Anzeiger* is regarded as a reliable source of information and quality press (see Olfermann 2017: 64). I include *Tages-Anzeiger* for my analysis since it represents a newspaper with a good reputation, while still distributing a large number of copies to a big audience.

Tages-Anzeiger is published every day from Monday to Saturday. The first edition of *Tages-Anzeiger* was founded in 1893 and it was the first Swiss newspaper that did not have affiliation with a political party (see Knüsel 2012: 32). However, today the political stance of *Tages-Anzeiger* can be characterised as centre-left (Müller 2014: 225). Same as *20 Minuten*, *Tages-Anzeiger* is owned by the media company *Tamedia AG*.

SRF Tagesschau

Tagesschau is the main TV news program of the state-supported broadcasting association *SRG SSR* (*Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft; Swiss Broadcasting Corporation*). For this daily news program, on average an audience of 610,000 people tune in which is a market share of 47.5% (see Widmer 2017), making it after the weather forecasting show *Meteo* the most watched TV program in Switzerland. Because of that, this news format is indispensable to include it for my research (see SRF 2017).

SRG SSR was founded in 1931 and has several different Radio and TV channels such as *SRF 1*, *SRF 2*, *SRF info*, *Radio SRF 1*, *Radio SRF 2 Kultur*, *Radio SRF 3*, *RTS un*, *RTS deux*, *RSI LA 1*, *RSI LA 2*. The main edition of *Tagesschau* is broadcasted every day at 19:30 o'clock on the channels *SRF 1* and *SRF info* and has a length of approximately 25 minutes. Other editions are broadcasted at 12:45 (weekends at 13:00), a short version at 18:00 and *Tagesschau Nach*t at midnight. The very first edition of *Tagesschau* was broadcasted in 1953. From a political stance, *SRF* is centre-orientated (see Longchamp 2013).

Die Weltwoche

The weekly magazine *Die Weltwoche* has about 225,000 readers and a circulation of 61,889 copies (see WEMF 2016; WEMF 2017). *Die Weltwoche* was founded in 1931 as a weekly newspaper. However, it has been published as a magazine since 2002. *Die Weltwoche* is politically right orientated (see Longchamp 2013), which means they emphasise the solo effort of the national state and the preservation of 'traditional' values and they are also often sceptical towards globalisation and take critical stance on immigration. *Die Weltwoche* sees itself as state-sceptical, as a counter voice "against the mainstream" and as willing to debate "controversial topics" which allegedly other newspapers do not risk to do so (see Köppel 2017). According to sociologist Linards Udris (2011: 88), in recent times *Die Weltwoche*'s political orientation can be categorised as right-conservative and right-populistic. The magazine is owned by *Weltwoche Verlag AG*. Since 2001, publisher and chief editor is Roger Köppel. As of October 18 2015, he is also a representative of the national-conservative and right-wing political party SVP (*Schweizerische Volkspartei*, Swiss People's Party) in the *National Council* of Switzerland. Because of the combination of an overall very different political position to the other media outlets and its popularity, the inclusion of *Die Weltwoche* in the research sample is a valuable addition.

7.2 Selection of the events

As I aim to understand how the recent attacks in Europe in the context of the new 'terror' actor IS are represented in Swiss media, I will use news reports in the aftermath of major events in Europe in relation to 'Islamic terrorism'. Therefore, I looked for events in the period between the rise of IS in June 2014 up to the point when I started my research in February 2017. As I do

not have time and space to go into detail on every incident related to 'Islamic terrorism', I had to make a selection which events are most useful and relevant for my research focus.

Because Turkey's belonging to Europe is discursively disputed and the country is often characterised as the borderland between a 'European' and a 'Middle Eastern' world (see Lossau 2001), I assume that events from Turkey are represented differently in Swiss media as for example attacks which happened in France or Germany. Even though it would be an interesting question if, respectively how, attacks in 'Western' Europe and attacks in Turkey are represented differently, this is not what I am aiming to do. Since my focus of research is to find out how the 'European' (respectively what is understood as 'European') attacks in Swiss media are represented, I exclude attacks that happened in Turkey as this would make my research project much more complex to engage with. It is important to note that I do not aim to replicate such common geopolitical imaginaries in which Turkey does not belong to Europe.

Since I want to focus on the attacks which I assume to be most influential in shaping or reflecting geopolitical discourses, I selected the following events: the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks on 7 January 2015 in Paris (France), the several attacks on 13 November 2015 in Paris, the attacks on 22 March 2016 in Brussels (Belgium), the attack on *Bastille Day* on 14 July 2016 in Nice (France), and the Christmas market attack on 19 December 2016 in Berlin (Germany). The attacks received a lot of attention in Swiss media and have been the page-one story. So it can be speculated which factors led to the circumstance that these five events have received large attention in Swiss media. The reasons for this attention might be that these attacks led to a large number of civilian deaths (all in double figures) or that the attacks have been carried out in an especially 'brutal' fashion, leading to spectacular news stories. As smaller events such as the shooting in Copenhagen (Denmark) from 14 to 15 February 2016 (three deaths, five non-fatal injuries) and the stabbing in Magnanville (France) on 13 June 2016 (two deaths) did not receive as much attention in Swiss media, I do not include them in my research sample. In the following short sections, I summarise the happenings of the selected events.

2015, January 7: Paris, France (see BBC 2015 a; BBC 2015 b)

On Wednesday 7 January 2015, at 11:30 local time, a black car drove up to the building in which the office of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* is located. Two masked and armed men left the car and entered the building. The maintenance staff at the reception were forced to tell the men where the office of *Charlie Hebdo* was. The gunmen shot the caretaker of the building and forced one of the magazine's cartoonists to enter the code for the newsroom in which a weekly editorial meeting was held. The gunmen started firing, which led to the death

of the editor of the magazine, his police bodyguard, four cartoonists, three editorial staff workers and a guest who was attending the meeting. The shooting lasted about five to ten minutes. As the perpetrators were leaving the crime scene, the police arrived. The gunmen started firing on the police vehicle and managed to escape in a getaway car. Driving a couple of hundred metres, the perpetrators hit a police officer in an exchange of fire. Then, one of the gunmen approached the wounded police officer and shot him at very close range. Afterwards, the perpetrators left their car three kilometres from the *Charlie Hebdo* office. There, they continued their escape with another hijacked car. On the same day, police started a massive manhunt in Paris and its suburbs.

At 10:30 of the following day, the two perpetrators robbed a petrol station near Villers-Cotterets, located in the north-east of Paris. Later on the same day, the public was informed that arrest warrants have been issued for the brothers Said (34) and Cherif Kouachi (32). In the morning of 9 January, Said Kouachi was wounded by the police in a shootout after the brothers hijacked another car. A high-speed chase began, which ended near the commune Dammartin-en-Goel. There, the brothers holed up in the building of a printing firm, while the police surrounded them. At 17:00, the brothers exited the building and began firing at police. In an exchange of fire, they were shot to dead by the police. Altogether, the attackers killed twelve people and injured several others.

In connection to the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, other assaults happened near Paris. In the evening of January 7, Amedy Coulibaly, a man who was a close friend to the Kouachi brothers, shot and wounded a jogger in Fontenay-aux-Roses. In the morning of January 8, he killed a police officer and wounded a street sweeper with a semi-automatic rifle in Montrouge. Finally, on January 9, he took hostages in a kosher supermarket at Porte de Vincennes and demanded that the police let the Kouachi brothers go. There, he killed four more people before being shot by police during a siege of the supermarket.

2015, November 13: Paris, France (see BBC 2015 d; BBC 2016 b)

On the evening of Friday 13 November 2015, eleven gunmen and suicide bombers hit several sites in Paris nearly simultaneous: the concert hall *Bataclan*, several entrances of the football stadium *Stade de France* and several busy restaurants and bars. The attackers killed 130 people while 368 people survived with injuries (see RTE 2015; Marcus in *CBS* 2015). The perpetrators worked in three coordinated teams and launched six distinct attacks.

While the national football teams of Germany and France were playing in *Stade de France*, a first bomb detonated at 21:20 outside the stadium. A man who was wearing a suicide belt,

tried to enter the stadium but security guards noticed the belt and prevented him of getting into the stadium. In reaction, he detonated the explosives which caused the death of himself and of a passer-by. At 21:30, another man detonated his suicide vest after he failed to enter the stadium at a different entrance. A third suicide bomber blew himself up on a fast-food store near the stadium at 21:53. The latter two explosions only caused the death of the bombers.

In the 10th arrondissement, attackers started firing with semi-automatic rifles at *Le Carillon* bar at 21:25. Afterwards, they turned around and shot in direction of the restaurant *Le Petit Cambodge* across the street. On that scene, fifteen people were shot dead while seventeen people were severely injured. At 21:32, a gunman started firing at people in the *La Casa Nostra* pizzeria and *Cafe Bonne Bière* in the 11th arrondissement, resulting in five deaths and eight severely injured victims. Four minutes later, two gunmen started shooting at people of the *La Belle Equipe* bar in the 11th arrondissement. Here the perpetrators killed nineteen people, while nine others survived after being hospitalised. At 21:40, a suicide bomber blew himself up at the restaurant *Le Comptoir Voltaire*. One other person was severely injured from the explosion.

The biggest attack of the evening happened at the sold out concert at the *Bataclan* venue which has a capacity of 1,500 seats and is located on Boulevard Voltaire in the 11th arrondissement. The attack began at 21:40 and ended twenty minutes after midnight. While the Californian rock group *Eagles of Death Metal* was playing, three attackers, who were wearing suicide belts and were armed with Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, entered the hall and started to shot at the crowd. Many people fled through the emergency exit, while others found a way onto the roof. Later, when the police stormed the building the perpetrators blew themselves up or were shot by police. 89 people died on the scene and more than 99 others were hospitalised with injuries.

Afterwards, IS claimed responsibility for the attacks. Eight of the eleven perpetrators died at those different crime scenes. However, the alleged head of the perpetrators named Abdelhamid Abaaoud, fled and was killed in a police raid on 18 November 2015 in Paris suburbs of Saint-Denis. In March and April 2016, the police arrested the two remaining suspects, named Salah Abdeslam and Mohamed Abrini. Immediately after the attacks, France declared a *state of emergency* (French: *état d'urgence*), giving special powers to the executive body of the state. The *state of emergency* was extended several times but ended on 1 November 2017. At the same time, a new law came into effect, "which is meant to give police more tools to fight violent extremism" (Osborne in *The Independent* 2017).

2016, March 22: Brussels, Belgium (see BBC 2016 a)

In the morning of Tuesday 22 March 2016, suicide bombings at Brussels airport and on a metro station in the city centre caused 32 deaths (excluding the perpetrators) and 340 injured victims (see Chrisafis et al. in *The Guardian* 2016). At 7:58 local time, two suicide bombers blew themselves up in the check-in area of *Zaventem* international airport. According to the authorities, the bombs exploded only moments between each other at different ends of the departure area. Witnesses stated that people ran away from the first explosion to the main entrance where the second bomb detonated shortly after. At 9:11, at the *Maelbeek* metro station in close proximity of different EU institutions such as the *European Commission* headquarters or the *Council of the European Union*, another bomb went off. The suicide bomber let the bomb explode in the middle carriage of a three-carriage train that was just leaving the platform.

In the aftermath, a taxi driver stated to the police that he had driven three men with large bags to the airport in the morning of the attack. According to the driver, because it was not enough space in the car, he had refused to take one of the large bags. Later in the investigations, the police forces detected a nail bomb at the address the taxi driver gave them. Shortly after the attacks, IS claimed responsibility. Allegedly, the five people that have carried out the attacks in Brussels also have been connected to the Paris attacks in November 2015. Three of the perpetrators died as suicide bombers. The other two have been arrested on 8 April 2016.

2016, July 14: Nice, France (see BBC 2016 c)

In the evening of Thursday 14 July 2016, a truck was deliberatively driven into the crowd on the sea *Promenade des Anglais* of Nice, where about 30,000 people were celebrating *Bastille Day* holiday. The attack began at 22:30 local time, after the fireworks had ended. The driver was zigzagging for about two kilometres and intentionally tried to hit people. After the police managed to stop the vehicle, the driver left the truck and fled for hundreds of metres. The driver repeatedly fired his gun at the police officers, but was killed by the police in the end. The attack resulted in 87 deaths and about 458 non-fatal injuries (see BNO News 2016). Afterwards, the driver was identified as 31-year-old Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel. In 2005, Mohamed moved from Tunisia to France and was living in Nice. He was married in France and became the father of three children. However, the couple got divorced. Before the attack, Mohamed was unknown to security services. On 11 July, he rented the truck from a rental company in a town close to Nice named Saint-Laurent-du-Var. During the attack, he was carrying two replica assault rifles and an automatic pistol.

Shortly afterwards, France’s *state of emergency* was extended and an intensification of airstrikes in Syria and Iraq against IS were announced. IS claimed to be responsible for the attacks as the militant group stated: “He did the attack in response to calls to target the citizens of the coalition that is fighting the Islamic State” (*Amaq Agency* in BBC 2016 c).

2016, December 19: Berlin, Germany (see BBC 2016 d)

At 20:14 on Monday evening of the 19 December 2016, a truck was intentionally driven into the crowd of a Christmas market, located at the Breitscheidplatz in central Berlin. The driver accelerated the truck to approximately 64 kilometres per hour and drove about 50 to 80 metres through the market until the vehicle stopped by its automatic braking system. Several witnesses claimed to have seen the perpetrator fleeing into direction of the Tiergarten Park. One the same evening, the police arrested a suspect which turned out to be the wrong person. He was released in the following day.

During the attack, 12 people have been killed and 56 injured. IS claimed responsibility shortly afterwards. In the passenger seat, the dead body of Lukasz Urban was found. He was the actual driver of the truck and highly likely became victim of the hijack on Monday afternoon. According to the police, he was stabbed and shot with a pistol. On 21 December, the police made public that they found documents of the suspect. The alleged perpetrator was identified as Anis Amri, a 24 years man who was born in Tunisia. In 2015, he sought asylum in Germany, but his application was rejected. According to post-mortem autopsy, he frequently used drugs. The announcement of the leading suspect led to a Europe-wide manhunt. On 23 December 2016 in Milan, Italy, Anis Amri’s car was stopped by the police for a routine check. As the two Italian police officers asked to provide his documents, Anis began firing, but was killed in the shootout.

7.3 Text corpus

While consulting the news reports of the selected attacks, I realised that especially in the first days of the news coverage, the events have been the page-one story but only a couple of days afterwards, the coverage becomes rapidly less. Therefore, I assume that these early reports might be most influential in shaping or reflecting geopolitical discourses, which I aim to understand. As I noticed that by far the largest amount of reports concerning the attacks is made between the first two or three days afterwards, I choose to include the *earliest three days* of the media coverage following the events in order to get a manageable text corpus for my analysis.

Because the frequency of the publications/ broadcastings is different within my set of selected media (see in the appendix: *"Text corpus"*), the dates of the first three days of the new reports after the events are not necessarily congruent between the different media. As my aim is not to overrepresent or underrepresent a particular media outlet, I did not set a date as a line for the news to analyse but rather I just consulted the earliest three days of coverage of every media outlet. Since *Die Weltwoche* is the only media outlet which is only published weekly, I will always include the first magazine after the attacks. In the table in "*Text corpus"* in the appendix, I presented the actual text corpus which I will use for my discourse analysis. Because those events dominated the headlines in the selected issues, the coverage is usually broadened among several pages and articles, respectively in the case of *SRF Tagesschau* among several segments, comprising the main news feed, different background reports, expert interviews, opinion articles, editorials, etc., which I will all include for my analysis.

IV. Results

The following five results chapters (8 – 12) are arranged according to the order of the sub-questions of this thesis (i, ii, iii, iv, v). For the citation of text passages of the news I analysed, I use short forms (e.g. TA-2-3). In appendix *"Text corpus"*, I present all the media coverage I selected for my analysis with their specific short forms.

8. The construction of enemy images

(i) Which enemy images are produced in the context of the attacks and how are they built?

8.1 'Islamic terrorism'

In line with the literature of the 'post-9/11' era, the enemy image of *'Islamic terrorism'* is the dominant figure in all the news I analysed. As I pointed out in chapter 5.2, the term of 'Islamic terrorism' links the act of 'terrorism' with the ideology or the political movement of 'Islamism'. The representation of 'Islamic terrorism' compromises different related and associated terms and concepts such as 'extremism', 'jihadism', 'radicalism', 'Salafism', 'Wahhabism', etc. and their impersonated actors such as 'radicals', 'extremists', 'Salafists', 'terrorists' and so on. These terms and concepts are used in a very flexible way. This means that specific definitions of these different categories are rarely given and the use of them often seems to happen in a random manner.

As I mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the attacks happened in the context of the emergence of the "new face of terror" (Debrix 2016: 12), namely the organisation IS. Not surprisingly that in many articles IS represents very much 'the' 'Islamic terrorist' respectively 'the' enemy itself. However, the relationship between IS and the attackers of the events I examined is a contested one and will be discussed in detail in chapter 10. This chapter rather focuses on the enemy image of the 'Islamic terrorist' in general which can but does not have to stand in a relation to the 'terror' actor IS.

As I pointed out in chapter 4.3, *deindividualisation* is one of the characteristics in building an enemy image (see Spillman & Spillman 1997: 51). In my analysis, I found processes of deindividualisation in the use of nominalisations, personifications and other metaphors. An especially dominant role in the media coverage have the two nominalisations "the terror" ["der Terror"] or "the terrorist" ["der Terrorist"] which both homogenise the enemy image as a

unitary entity. The ‘terrorist’-actor is a pre-construction since the whole represented identity is based on the assumed ‘fact’ that the person is indeed a ‘terrorist’. So it can be questioned if a person really has conducted an act of terror, but it cannot be disputed that a ‘terrorist’ is terrorising. Additionally, ‘terror’ or ‘terrorism’ is used as personifications what results in the take over of agency, e.g. “terrorism is in our Midst” [“der Terrorismus ist mitten unter uns” Blick-1-2] or “Terrorism has come closer” [“der Terror ist nähergekommen” TA-5-3]. By setting ‘terror’ as a subject, the phenomenon, respectively the ‘threat’ or the ‘problem’, starts to exist without any agents and does not simply disappear if the person who committed an attack is caught, shot, imprisoned etc.

I found the process of deindividualising the enemy in metaphors relating to natural disasters and natural processes which also attach additional meaning to the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’. For example, “avalanche of terror” [“Terrorlawine” TA-3-1] or “wave of terror” [“Terrorwelle” TA-5-2] both implicate that ‘terror’ has the unstoppable power of such natural catastrophes or processes. Similarly, ‘terrorism’ is labelled as a “plague” [“Der Terrorismus ist eine Plage” Johann Schneider-Ammann, President (2016) of the *Swiss Confederation*, in SRF-4-1] representing terrorism as uncontrollable calamity which threatens to tarnish or even to eliminate the whole society. Another metaphor which is used to describe ‘terrorism’ is ‘sprawl’ [‘wuchern’ TA-5-3]. This metaphor implies that ‘terror’ is spreading in a very fast and uncontrollable way such as weed (see Duden c, “wuchern”).

Spillmann and Spillmann (1997: 51; see chapter 4.3) also named the *identification with evil* and *negative anticipation* as characteristics of the construction of an enemy image. They pointed out that the enemy image is opposed of the “highest values” of the own group and the enemies actions are based on “destructive intentions” towards the own group (see ibid. 50 – 51). The ‘Islamic terrorists’ are in the news coverage regularly attributed as ‘coldblooded’ [‘kaltblütig’], ‘cruel’ [‘brutal’], ‘barbaric’ [‘barbarisch’], ‘evil’ [‘böse’] or ‘hateful’ [‘hasserfüllt’]. These attributions point to imaginaries of a civilisation-barbarism binary whereas the ‘democratic’, ‘liberal’, ‘western’ society represents the morally superior counterpart. The representation of the ‘Islamic terrorists’ destructive intentions towards their ‘own’ society is omnipresent in the attacks’ media coverage. For example the ‘Islamic terrorists’ are presented as “sworn enemies of our civilization” [“geschworene Feinde unserer Zivilisation” TA-1-1] which hate ‘our’ way of living with ‘democracy, human rights, freedom of religion, diversity, popculture, the way of handling of sexuality’ [“Die Attentäter von Paris hegen einen Hass gegen unsere Art zu leben: Demokratie, Menschenrechte, Religionsfreiheit, Vielfalt, Popkultur, unseren Umgang mit Sexualität” Ahmed Mansour, represented as an expert

of Islam, in 20Min-2-1]. The attack on the civilians is therefore often represented as an actual attack on the 'western' way of living and their values [e.g. "Die barbarischen Attentate von Paris sind ein Angriff auf den westlichen Lebensstil" Blick-2-2]. In such notions, there are broader geopolitical imaginaries of othering at play, which will be discussed more specifically in chapters 10.1 and 10.2.

By illustrating contrasts, it is stressed that the attributed identity of the 'Islamic terrorists' is the pure moral and ethical opposite of the (societal) identity of the representing subject. For example, it is emphasised that the victims of the attacks had fun, were happy and peaceful, enjoyed themselves, were celebrating, etc. just in the moment before the attack had happened, which can be seen in statements such as "traces of a vehicle rampage through a festive, tranquil crowd" ["Spuren einer Horrorfahrt durch eine weihnachtlich gestimmte, friedliche Menschen-menge" SRF-5-1] or "A tragic paradox. The victims of this attack were people celebrating liberty, equality and fraternity." ["Es ist ein tragisches Paradox. Die Opfer dieses Angriff waren ausgerechnet Menschen, die die Werte Freiheit, Gleichheit und Brüderlichkeit feierten." Donald Tusk, President (2016) of the *European Council*, SRF-4-1]. In line with this, it is also assumed that the attackers "hate happy people" ["Hass auf glückliche Menschen" TA-5-2]. The places or geographical settings where the attacks happened often embody those values the 'Islamic terrorists' are represented to be opposed to, e.g. "they brought (…) their religious hatred into the city of love" ["sie trugen (…) ihren religiösen Hass in die Stadt der Liebe" Blick-2-2], "the evil inside the bay of angels" ["Das Böse in der Engelsbucht" TA-4-1]. Consequently, dramatic binaries of 'love and hate', 'angels and evil' and so on are built.

Further, metaphors relating to 'death' and 'horror' are constructing the enemy image of the 'Islamic terrorist', e.g. "A new generation of terrorists is causing death and horror worldwide." ["Eine neue Generation von Terroristen sorgt weltweit für Tod und Horror." WW-3]. The attackers are for example named "killer" ["Killer" 20Min-2- 3] or "death squad" ["Todeskommando" Blick-2-1] and they conduct "atrocities" [e.g. "Gräueltaten" Blick-1-1; "Schreckenstaten" TA-1-1], "bloody deeds'" [e.g. "Bluttat" WW-3] or "unholy acts" [e.g. "unselige Tat" Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany (2016), in SRF-5-1]. Further, the attacks are represented as "nightmare" ["Alptraum" TA-4-1], "dread" ["Grauen" SRF-3-1], "horror" ["Horror" TA-2-3] or "haunting" ["Spuk" TA-4-1]. Consequently, in the media coverage of the attacks, the 'Islamic terrorist' often becomes not only the opposing evil *other*, but moreover an inhuman agent of *horror* and *death* (see also *figure 3*), what Debrix (2016: 86) has similarly observed in regard to the representation of IS (see chapter 5.2).

Figure 3: Agents of horror and death. Headline translated: *"Here, he disposes bodies like garbage"* Blick-2-2. Abdelhamid Abaaoud was supposedly the planer of the Paris November 2015 attacks. That he 'disposes bodies like garbage' highlights his 'inhuman' identity.

8.2 'Right wing populism'

In the mainstream media (*20 Minuten*, *Blick*, *SRF Tagesschau*, *Tages-Anzeiger*), an additional 'other' has a dominant role in the news coverage after the attacks and is represented as a threat for the 'western' societies. This imagining can be shown with the following passage: "The Western world is facing a twin threat (…) that wants to advance the radicalisation of our society. The West must now defend freedom against foreign and domestic enemies" ["Die freie westliche Welt sieht sich einer doppelten Bedrohung gegenüber (…) die die Radikalisierung unserer Gesellschaft vorantreiben wollen. Der Westen muss nun die Freiheit verteidigen gegen innere und äussere Feinde" Blick-1-1]. This opposing other comprises right-wing politicians, parties, 'radicalists', 'extremists', 'populists', and others. Because the identities of these various groups are represented in a very similar manner, I categorise them in this thesis as *'right wing populists'*. To be more specific, this category includes political parties such as AfD (*Alternative für Deutschland*, Germany), *Front National* (France), *Party for Freedom* (Netherlands) and their respective politicians Frauke Petry (AfD), Marine Le Pen (Front National), Geert Wilders (Party of Freedom) etc., but also political movements, opinion leaders and far right-minded people in general and so on. By going through the data, it became clear that after every attack the mainstream media referred to such 'right wing populists' by criticising them for their (attributed) *xenophobic*, *provocative* and *islamophobic* takes or by warning the reader from their inappropriate or wrong reaction. While it is a stretch to regard the 'right wing populists'

as an enemy image on the same level as the 'Islamic terrorists', they are clearly represented as a contrasting 'other' which is dangerous for the 'democratic, 'western' societies.

The identity of the different 'right wing populists' likewise is also built on metaphors. For example, the metaphor "arsonist" ["Brandstifter", e.g. in reference to the AfD in TA-5-3] means that particular ideas are fire (see Kirchhoff 2015: 257) and threaten to spread and burn 'everything' down. Consequently, the ignition of the fire has to be stopped. The 'right wing populists' actors are also named "agitators" ["Scharfmacher" e.g. in reference to the Front National in TA-1-1], "political firebrands" ["politischen Hitzköpfen" Blick-1-1] or "polemic baiters" ["polemische Hetzer" e.g. in reference to the Front National in TA-1-2]. Such metaphors relate to a (negatively regarded) political course of building tension, confrontation or a hostile atmosphere etc. (see Duden a, "Hetze, die"; Duden b, "Scharfmacher, der"). Similarly as the enemy image of the 'Islamic terrorist', they are attributed with hate, e.g. "Islam-hater" ["Islamhasser" Blick-1-3], and again, the power of their hate is illustrated with metaphors relating to a natural disaster, i.e. the "tsunami of hate" ["Tsunami des Hasses" in reference to the Front National in TA-1-3].

Othering takes a large role of the representation of the 'right wing populists'. Arguments such as "It's not diversity that destroys our societies, it's the fear of diversity" ["Es ist nicht die Vielfalt, die unsere Gesellschaften zerstört, sondern die Angst vor der Vielfalt" TA-3-2] imply that *diversity* (in this context: cultural and religious diversity) is seen as a 'good' and 'desirable' value of the society which the 'right wing populists' are not sharing or even threaten to obliterate. Similarly the argument "The FN (Front National) has always ignored the sublime ideals of the Republic, notably equality and fraternity, by making the destinction between 'paper Frenchman' and 'real Frenchman'" ["Die FN foutierte sich immer schon um die hehren Ideale der Republik, vorab um Gleichheit und Brüderlichkeit, wenn er zwischen 'Papierfranzosen' und 'Franzosen der Scholle' unterscheidet" TA-1-3] emphasises the importance of *fraternity* and *equality*, principles which are implicitly presented as true and unquestionable values and which the Front National are supposedly not sharing. Remarkably, the argument targets a discrepancy of the Front National as fraternity and equality are seen as noble and traditional values of the French Republic, but the Front National, which stresses what is 'real' French (e.g. see 'paper Frenchman'), is represented of refusing them. Further difference is built by emphasising that 'right wing populists' are opposed to *open* and *multicultural* societies [e.g. "politischen Kräften, die offene, multikulturelle Gesellschaften ablehnen" TA-4-1] or by stressing the fear that France loses 'its values' of *tolerance*, *world-openness*, *creativity*, etc. which have featured France in the past ["Für die französische Gesellschaft steht sehr vieles

auf dem Spiel. Insbesondere die Weltoffenheit, die Toleranz, die Frankreich ja auszeichnet. Die Gefahr besteht nun, dass sich Frankreich selber zurückzieht, dass es sich gegenüber dem Fremden, Auffälligen, Schrägem, Kreativem verschliesst. Das wäre dann ein grosser Verlust für diese Nation" special correspondent Michael Gerber in SRF-2-1].

That the 'right wing populists' are seen as sort of an adversary is also revealed in the saying 'the terror plays into the hand of the populists' [e.g. "Der Terror (…) spielt auch anderswo Europas Populisten in die Hände" TA-3-1]. The saying 'playing into the hand of' is a metaphor which refers to the logic of a card game what typically is a zero-sum game (what is good for one player is bad for the other player and vice versa). Zero-sum games are one of the characteristics of an enemy image which Spillmann and Spillmann (1997: 51) illustrated. Accordingly, what is good for the enemy is bad for the own, meaning that success of the 'right wing populists' is bad for the representing subject. Additionally, the metaphor of 'playing into the hand of' hints that the thinking 'right wing populists are dangerous for European societies' stands in strong connection to an assumed interplay between them and the 'Islamic terrorists' which chapter 8.3 will address.

Concerning Switzerland, it could have been expected that the right wing political party SVP (*Schweizerische Volkspartei*, Switzerland), is also represented as an opposing other in the same manner such as the AfD or FN etc. Even though it is certainly the case that in the news coverage of the mainstream media (especially in *Blick* and *Tages-Anzeiger*) the SVP and their members are often criticised for their political reactions, statements or their takes in general etc., it seems as if they are still regarded as part of the socio-political system. This could be revealing in regard to imaginaries which Swiss society might have on an 'exceptional' role and position of Switzerland in comparison to other European countries (see also 11.3).

8.3 'The spiral of violence'

I chose the title of this chapter, 'the spiral of violence' ["Die Spirale der Gewalt" Blick-2-1], for illustrating similar narratives, which were omnipresent in the news coverage of the mainstream media after the attacks (see a visualisation of this narrative in *figure 4*). 'The spiral of violence' stands for the interplay between the enemy images of the 'Islamic terrorists' and the 'right wing populists' which are both presented as 'extremists' who are mutually profiting from each other, e.g. "Extremists of both sides have profited (from the attack)" ["Die Profiteure (des Anschlags) waren die Extremisten beider Seiten" TA-1-1].

On one hand, the ‘right wing populists’ are regarded as profiting from the ‘terrorists’. This is for example illustrated by the saying “grist to the mill of Marine Le Pen” [“Wasser auf die Mühlen von Marine Le Pen” TA-4-1]. This metaphor implies that the political course of the Front National only works when such attacks occur and it is just the fear of people and not the ‘good’ politics of the party what make the Front National successful. This is for example also emphasised by representing Marine Le Pen and the Front as the “winner of the crisis” [e.g. “Die einzig sichere Krisengewinnerin sei aber Le Pen” TA-2-1]. Or similarly, it is claimed that “Islam-haters in France seize the opportunity” [“Islam-Hasser nutzen in Frankreich die Gunst der Stunde” Blick-1-3]. In the context of the ‘terrible’ and ‘horrific’ attacks (where everybody else is represented as mourning and showing ‘solidarity’ with the victims), to emerge as a winner and to pursue the own political agenda seems inappropriate and inglorious.

On the other hand, the ‘Islamic terrorists’ are represented as profiting from the ‘right wing populists’ as they are just a part of the ‘Islamic terrorists’ overall plan in which the ‘right wing populists’ promote hate against Muslims in the ‘western societies’ that leads to more supporters and ‘soldiers’ for the ‘Islamic terrorists’. For example, this narrative can be found in the following passage: “One who extends the fight against Islamism into the fight against Islam is playing with fire. It is a strategy of IS to polarise western society. (…) The goal is to alienate Muslim communites in the west in turn to radicalise them” [“Wer den Kampf gegen Islamismus zu einem Kampf gegen den Islam als Religion ausweitet, spielt mit dem Feuer. Es ist die Strategie des IS, die westlichen Gesellschaften zu polarisieren. (…). Das Ziel sei, die muslimischen Gesellschaften im Westen zu entfremden und zu radikalisieren” 20Min-2-2]. Or similarly: “It is a stated goal of IS terrorists to eliminate western grey areas, where Muslims and non-Muslims are able to coexist harmoniously. The IS wants the world to be black and white, to have true believers on one side and heretics on the other. Precise (terror) attacks are supposed to stir up hatress towards Muslims. The bigger this hatred the more discrimination and the more recruits to take up Jihad” [“Es ist erklärtes Ziel der IS-Terroristen, Grauzonen im Westen zu beseitigen, in denen Muslime und Nicht-Muslime friedlich miteinander leben. Der IS will eine Welt in Schwarzweiss, hier wahre Gläubige, dort Ungläubig. Gezielte Anschläge sollen den Hass auf Muslime schüren. Je grösser dieser Hass desto mehr Diskriminierung und desto mehr Rekruten ziehen in den Dschihad” Blick-3-1].



Figure 4: 'The spiral of violence'. The narrative of an interplay between 'Islamic terrorists' and 'right wing populists' which threatens the society is part of the the representation of the 'terror' attacks in the mainstream media.

In this context, metaphors such as *polarisation*, *spiral of violence*, *world of black and white*, *eradicating grey zones*[6] or *centrifugal forces* are all illustrating the imaginary that the 'western' societies are under the serious threat of falling apart or collapsing in consequence of an assumed increased extremism and radicalisation of thinking. However, such narratives and imaginaries cannot be taken for granted. For example, one might question if it is really the case that organisations such as IS or the perpetrators of the attacks had this particular strategy in mind while conducting the assaults. Also, it can be asked if far right minded parties such as the Front National really are the 'winners' of such events. Nevertheless, I am not aiming to prove or disprove such imaginaries but rather I wanted to point out in this chapter how certain narratives are constructed.

[6] In IS' English-language magazine 'Dabiq', the group called for the "The exstinction of the gray zone", which is seen as the "space inhabited by any Muslim who has not joined the ranks of either ISIS or the crusadors" (Lalami in *New York Times* 2015). IS sees these Muslims as "hypocrItes" as they supposedly do not 'join a side'. Lalami states that many Muslims all around the world live in this so-called 'grey zone': living between different cultures, having friends of different religions, etc. Lalami claims that these Muslims become often the target of hate crimes when fear exists and politicians "with fiercy rhetorc" further diminish this 'grey zone'. Lailani regards the 'grey zone' as form of resistance against this polarised thinking.

9. The production of categories of 'Muslim'

(ii) How are different categories of 'Muslim' produced in the context of the attacks and in what ways is othering underlying their construction?

9.1 Differentiation of 'Islam' and 'Islamic terrorism'

In most of the news coverage I analysed I have found a tendency of differentiating between a large homogenous group of 'good', 'moderate' Muslims and the attackers (which from a broader perspective represent the enemy image of 'Islamic terrorists'). Difference is built with a variety of methods. Very often it is pointed out that representative bodies of Islam (e.g. associations, organisations, etc.), 'Arabian' states or 'normal' Muslim citizens (meaning that their role as Muslims is foregrounded) dissociate themselves from the attacks, e.g. "Muslim circles distance themselves clearly from the Paris attacks." ["Muslimische Kreise distanzieren sich klar von diesen Anschlägen in Paris." SRF-1-1]. Further, the mainstream media (*20 Minuten*, *Blick*, *SRF Tagesschau*, *Tages-Anzeiger*) emphasise that many Muslim people are the victims of 'terror' themselves, e.g. "The murdered police officer himself was a practicing Muslim." ["Der ermordete Polizist war selbst praktizierender Muslim" 20Min-1-2] or "The large majority of the victims of islamistic terrorism are Muslims" ["Die grosse Mehrheit der Opfer des islamistischen Terrors weltweit sind ja Muslime" Daniel Cohn-Bendit, French-German politician, in TA-4-1]. This circumstance can be interpreted as building a counter argument against the imaginary of a 'clash of cultures', in which 'the' Muslims are fighting Christians (see chapter 5.3), as the 'Muslim attacker' also kill other Muslims. In line with this, it is also remarkable how often it is highlighted that Muslims are expressing empathy for the victims, e.g. "We are praying to God for the deaths on Friday" ["Wir beten zu Gott für die Toten vom Freitag" Samir, citizen of Paris, Blick-2-1]. Overall, in the way of differentiating between 'the' Muslims and the attackers, respectively between Islam and 'Islamic terrorism', I found two related imaginings, which will be discussed in the following sections.

One of the two imaginings is that the attackers are represented as part of Islam, but solely as 'bad' minority of it (see *figure 5*), e.g. "But 99 percent of all believers are not fanatics and can handle jokes at the expense of their god." ["Aber 99 Prozent aller Gläubigen sind keine Fanatiker und können mit Witzen über ihren Gott umgehen" TA-1-1] or "The peaceful moderate Muslim majority is faced by a marginal islamistic minority" ["Der friedfertigen, moderaten muslimischen Mehrheit steht eine gewaltbereite, randbeständige islamistische

Minderheit gegenüber" WW-1]. So it is claimed that 'bad' Muslims, are interpreting Islam and the Quran in a 'wrong' or in a too radical way, e.g. "Of course he has to do with Islam insofar that he interprets Islam in a radical way." ["Natürlich hat er mit dem Islam zu tun, insofern er den Islam auf eine radikale Art und Weise interpretiert" Daniel Cohn-Bendit in TA-4-1].



Figure 5: Imagining that 'Islamic terrorists' are a 'bad' minority of Muslims.

The other imagining is that Islam and 'terrorism' are represented as two mutually exclusive categories (see *figure 6*). Especially Muslim citizens (again, meaning that their 'Muslimness' is foregrounded) have room to speak and they are stressing that the attackers by no means can be viewed as Muslims, e.g. "I am Muslim, not them" ["Ich bin Muslim, nicht sie" Messoud, citizen of Paris, in Blick-2-1]. Instead of viewing the attackers as Muslims, it is claimed that they rather should be viewed as criminals, murders, etc. [e.g. "Die Attentäter seien 'Kriminelle keine Muslime', sagt der Geistliche Chabbar Taieb" Blick-1-3; "Das sind Mörder, keine Muslime." Ali, citizen of Paris, headline of an article in Blick-2-1, see *figure 7*]. Similarly, state authorities are quoted by emphasising that the attacks have nothing to do with religion: "That's why I wish to say that terrorism and jihadism have nothing to do with religion." ["Deshalb ist es mir ein Anliegen zu sagen, dass Terrorismus und Dschihadismus nichts mit Religion zu tun haben." Nicoletta della Valle, *Directorate of Federal Office of Police* (Switzerland), in Blick-2-3].



Figure 6: Imagining that 'terrorism' and Islam are two mutually exclusive categories.

Further, the attack itself is presented as non-Islamic because 'Islam is a religion of peace' [e.g. "diese Art von Handlung ist nicht islamisch" Reinhard Schulze, represented as Islam expert, in SRF-1-1; "Der Islam ist eine Religion des Friedens" anonymous citizen of Paris in SRF-1-3]. The other way around, distance between the attacks and the religion of Islam is built by portraying the 'terror actor' as a person with such a lifestyle that supposedly does not fit to to a 'real' practising Muslim', e.g. "Jihadists are almost never religious (…). Combat-ready radicals do not pray, they drink, they have girlfriends." ["Jihadisten sind so gut wie nie religiös (...). Die kampfbereiten Radikalen beten nicht, sie trinken, haben Freundinnen" Olivier Roy, represented as French Islam expert, in TA-4-2]. Also, it is pointed out that the 'dangerous people' (meaning 'Islamists' or 'terrorists') cannot be found in mosques ["Wie kann man die gefährlichen Leute finden, bevor sie töten? 'In den Moscheen jedenfalls nicht.'" Olivier Roy in TA-4-2].

Figure 7: Large and bold headline, translated "They are murders, not Muslims" Blick-2-2, highlighting the mutually exclusivness between the attackers and Muslims.

In some articles the complete differentiation between Muslims and 'Islamists'/ 'terrorists' is not seen as a current but rather as a necessary final state. This call can for example be found

in the following phrases: “Muslims worldwide need to ostracize terrorists from their communities.” [“die Muslime in aller Welt müssen die Terroristen in ihren Reihen ausgrenzen.” Blick-1-1], or “All preachers and imams in Switzerland need to clearly signal that violence has no place in Islam.” [“Alle Prediger und Imame in der Schweiz müssen nun klar signalisieren, dass Gewalt keinen Platz im Islam habe.” Mustafa Memeti, Imam, in 20Min-2-1]. Accordingly, in some articles ‘the’ Muslims are asked to take direct action to exclude ‘the extremists’ from their own: e.g. “We have to encourage the Muslims to proceed against jihadists” [“Wir müssen Muslime ermutigen, gegen Dschihadisten vorzugehen.” Blick-2-3], “She (Valentina Smajli) believes Muslims in Switzerland have an obligation: ‘Associations need to ensure that extremists do not find room within their organisation’” [“Sie (Valentina Smajli) sieht die Muslime in der Schweiz in der Pflicht: ‘Die Verbände müssen nun dafür sorgen, dass Extremisten keinen Platz innerhalb ihrer Reihen finden’” Valentina Smajli, *Forum für einen fortschrittlichen Islam* (Switzerland), in 20Min-1-1]. It is even demanded that ‘the’ Muslims take responsibility for such events: “They [the Muslims] have to actively fight and remove the ulcur of Islamism in their own ranks.” [“Sie müssen aktiv dafür sorgen, dass das Geschwür des Islamismus aus ihren Reihen bekämpft und beseitigt wird.” WW-1]. Here, the metaphor of an ‘ulcer’ illustrates the ‘unwanted’, ‘growing’ and ‘ugly’ character of ‘Islamism’ and the necessity to cut it off.

What becomes striking is that such demands of taking responsibility build ‘the’ Muslims as a homogenous and friendly group, but which is also a distinct from the ‘western’ Christian-Jewish’ majority society (viewed as the ‘in-group’ by the representing subject). This is for example noticeable in the phrase: “We defend our Muslim neighbours” [“Wir verteidigen unsere muslimischen Nachbarn” René Lüchinger, chief editor, in Blick-1-2]. The metaphor of ‘neighbour’ illustrates closeness and friendship but also differentiates between ‘us’ (the ‘main society’, the people living in ‘our’ house) and ‘them’ (‘the’ Muslims which are seen as neighbours). This reveals the imagination that ‘the’ Muslims are welcome ‘here’ (in context: ‘western’ or ‘European’ societies) but still are seen as a distinct other.

To conclude this chapter, I want to reiterate that both types of building difference between the ‘good Muslims’ and ‘terrorists’ are at work in all of the different mainstream media I examined and sometimes both imaginings are even coexistent or interwoven in the same article. In regard to *Die Weltwoche*, there are articles which have the tendency of building a clear difference between ‘Islam’ and ‘terrorism’. Yet there is mostly a dominant discourse at work that regards Islam as predispositioned for ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’, which is the topic of the next chapter.

9.2 The roots for 'terrorism' in the religion of Islam

Next to the differentiation between 'Islamic terrorists' and 'good Muslims', I found an imagining which regards the roots of an 'Islamism problem' (at least to some extent) as inherent in the religion of Islam and therefore refuses notions such as 'it has nothing to do with Islam' ["Die Zauberformel 'Das hat doch nichts mit dem Islam zu tun' zieht nicht mehr" WW-1]. In line with this, 'the' Muslims have to review the *'problems'* of their holy texts ["Es ist an der Zeit, dass die Muslime die Probleme ihrer heiligen Texte aufarbeiten" WW-1].

This imagining also appears in the representation of IS (which sometimes represents the enemy image itself, see chapter 10.1). IS is viewed to use "ancient Islamic methods" to strive for the mastery of the 'western world' ["Der islamische Staat strebt die Beherrschung des Westens an. Dabei wendet er ur-islamische Methoden an." WW-2]. In line with that, publicist Graeme Wood, paraphrased in *Die Weltwoche*, points out that what is preached and taught by IS is in fact a consistent interpretation of the Quran [e.g. "Aber was im IS gepredigt wird und gelehrt werde, leite sich aus einer kohärenten und sogar akademisch abgestützten Interpretation des Islam ab." WW-2]. Likewise, his rhetorical and tautological question of "What is more Islamic than a governmental entity whose head ideologies are Salafists and whose role models are Jihadists, who are exclusively guided by the origins of Islam?" ["Was ist islamischer als ein staatliches Gebilde, dessen Chefideologen Salafisten und dessen militärische Vorbilder Dschihadisten sind, die sich ausschliesslich an den Ursprüngen des Islam orientieren?" ibid.] reveals the vision that there exists a 'true meaning' of Islam which is indeed the fundament of the 'horrific', 'cruel' and 'repressive' practises of IS.

Accordingly, the attackers are represented as "fanatic Muslims" ["fanatische Muslime" WW-5] who kill ["Non-Muslims (…) wrong- or not enough believing Muslims." ["Nichtmuslime oder (...) falsch- oder zu wenig rechtsgläubige Muslime" WW-5]. By naming the attackers 'Muslims', it becomes apparent that their *Muslimness* is viewed as the centre of their identity. In naming their victims 'non-Muslims' or 'not enough believing Muslims', it is stressed that this difference is the reason for the attack. This also implies that a more believing Muslim is a more dangerous Muslim.

A predisposition of Islam for 'terrorism' is argued by pointing out differences between the religion of Islam and Christianity. For example, Martin Grichting, *Vicar general of Diocese* Chur (Switzerland), emphasised that the founder of Christianity, Jesus, choose to make himself the victim for the people [Blick-3-2]. This 'fact' stands supposedly in contrast to Islam in which 'Muhammed called for violence to enlarge his realm' ["Der Gründer des Christentums hat sein

Reich nicht mit Gewalt verbreitet, sondern ist selbst am Kreuz zum Opfer von Gewalt geworden" ibid.]. Following that argument, Christians have no religious legitimation in using violence, while Muslims have ["Anders die Moslems: Wenn sie religiös motivierte Gewalt üben, folgen sie dem Gründer ihrer Religion der zum Töten aufgerufen hat." ibid.]. In line with this, 'the' Muslims have more difficulties to recognise the state's monopoly on the use of force and violence. Drawing a conclusion, Grichting claims that "European governments will have to force an acceptance of the state's monopoly of violence from the members of this religion. Those who do not accept or trangress can not stay in Europe." ["Die europäischen Staaten werden deshalb von jedem Angehörigen dieser Religion, der bei uns leben will, ein Bekenntnis zum staatlichen Gewaltmonopol verlangen müssen. Wer es nicht ablegen oder dagegen verstösst, kann nicht in Europa bleiben." ibid.]. Remarkably, the idea that all 'Muslims' should have to demonstrate their loyalty to the 'European-western' values or otherwise they have to 'go', separates all the millions of Muslim European national citizens from their majority society.

Another argument within the thinking that Islam has a predisposition for 'terrorism' is the notion that 'radical Islam' can give a criminal lifestyle meaning ["Weil der radikale Islam einem Leben zwischen Gewalt und Gesetzesbrüchen einen Sinn geben kann" Nicolas Dhuicq in WW-1]. So does French politician Nicolas Dhuicq argue that Islam, contrary to Christianity, legitimises the use of violence for a 'good', respectively a religious cause: "His lifestyle starts making sense, the evil he does turns to good. To rob may be bad but to donate it for the construction of a mosque makes the money pure, halal." ["Sein Lebensstil (der des Täters) bekommt Sinn, das Böse, das er tut, wird zum Guten. Geld zu rauben ist zwar an sich böse, doch wenn er das Geld für den Bau einer Moschee spendet, wird es rein, halal." ibid.]. Of course his argument also implies that Islam (contrary to Christianity) justifies killing people if it is for a 'good cause'.

Viewing the roots for 'Islamic terrorism' as overwhelmingly in the writings of the religion itself can be seen as the continuation of culturalist thinking which does not pay attention to social, geographical, economic, political, or historical factors but rather sees the 'problem' in cultural 'facts' (see chapter 5.3). Among the media outlets I examined, it became apparent that such imaginings are mostly existent in *Die Weltwoche*. However, similar imaginings can be found in other news outlets and but also a couple of articles in *Die Weltwoche* differentiate between 'good' and 'bad Muslims'. This again confirms that a coherent allocation of imaginaries and discourses in media is hardly identifiable.

10. ‘Inside and outside’ imaginaries in relation to ‘Islamic terrorism’

(iii) What types of ‘inside – outside’ imaginaries concerning the threat of ‘terror’ attacks in Europe are at work and how do they conflict with each other?

With recent attacks in Europe that mostly targeted civilians, questions on the ‘origin’ of ‘terrorism’ emerged. Where are the attackers coming from and if, respectively how exactly they are connected with the new ‘terror actor’ IS, have become some of the main questions asked in the news coverage of these events. In response to these questions, different narratives and imaginaries have been accentuated in media.

Before elaborating the various ‘inside and outside’ imaginaries which are at work in the news coverage of the ‘terror’ attacks I analysed, I have to underline that these imaginaries are not as unconnected from each other as they are presented in the following sections. Rather, I found a clutter of different imaginaries and narratives which in some cases are related, but in others clash heavily with each other. Occasionally particular imaginaries are even acknowledged but repudiated while simultaneously counter imaginaries are built. I must stress that these diverse imaginaries and narratives cannot be easily allocated to distinct media outlets. Thus, it is sometimes the case that even the same media outlets produce conflicting imaginaries. After all, I argue that these different imaginaries and narratives enable different political responses, which I will also briefly touch on in the following sections.

10.1 The attackers as ‘soldiers’ of ‘hostile foreign army’

In this chapter I present the imaginary that the attacks in Europe have been executed by soldiers of IS which represents a ‘hostile foreign army’ threatening to invade and conquer Europe. According to this imaginary, IS, which also embodies the enemy itself, is viewed as a uniform single actor with a hierarchic command structure. From the *outside* of Europe, they planned the attacks as part of a full strategy of war in order to weaken Europe, e.g. “Of course the attacks of last Friday are a form of warfare. (…) They follow a strategic agenda.” [“Selbstverständlich sind die Anschläge vom letzten Freitag eine Form von Kriegsführung. (…) Sie folgen einer strategischen Agenda.” WW-2]. This imaginary is at least on some occasions part of any media outlet I analysed, but was very prominent in *Die Weltwoche*.

The assumption that the events are directly connected to IS can for example be identified when the attacks are labelled as ‘IS-terror’ or the attackers are named ‘IS-terrorists’, respectively ‘IS-fighters’, e.g. “hundreds of IS-fighters in Europe” [“Hunderte IS-Kämpfer in Europa” headline in 20Min-3-2]. Here the assumption that the attackers are trained soldiers of IS lies inseparably in their name. In consequence, the question whether the perpetrators are connected to IS becomes redundant because their affiliation to IS is not represented as a possibility or supposition but as a given fact.

Further, the imagined relation to IS can be detected in how the claim for responsibility by IS[7] is put into context. For example, is the claim is repudiated, questioned or taken as a given fact? Remarkably, in the events of the Paris November attacks and to some extent in the Brussels attacks, the claim for responsibility in the analysed media is mostly not questioned but rather seen as a ‘truth’, e.g. “The terrorist militia of IS which claimed responsibility for the attacks, (…) Now it attacks targets in France directly. They want to hit society as a whole.” [“Die Terrormiliz Islamischer Staat (IS), die sich zu den Angriffen bekannte, (...) Jetzt greife er direkt Ziele in Frankreich an. Sie wollen die ganze Gesellschaft treffen.” Reinhard Schulze, represented as Islam Expert, paraphrased in 20Min-2-1]. In contrast, in the news coverage of the events of Nice and Berlin, the direct affiliation is scrutinised or even repudiated, e.g. “The IS-leadership hadn’t actually planned and ordered the actions.” [“Wirklich geplant und befohlen hatte die IS-Führung die Taten jedoch nicht.” TA-5-3]. So it can be speculated that because several shooters and suicide bombers (instead of single actors) have conducted the Paris November and the Brussels attacks, a hierarchic command structure is more likely to be assumed. Nevertheless, taking the claim for responsibility as a granted ‘fact’ also helps to build the imaginary of IS as an opposing unitary actor.

The often accentuated idea that ‘Europe’ or the ‘West’ is at ‘war’ and the attacks itself are a manifestation of it, builds implicitly the imaginary that the threat of assaults is a matter of the existence of a hostile foreign enemy called IS, e.g. “But Europe needs to become more involved in the war against IS.” [“Aber Europa muss sich auch im Krieg gegen den IS stärker engagieren.” Daniel Cohn-Bendit, French-German politician, in TA-4-1] or “Of course the attacks of last Friday are a form of warfare.” [“Selbstverständlich sind die Anschläge vom letzten Freitag eine Form von Kriegsführung.” WW-2]. Remarkably, the metaphor of a ‘third world war’ is used a couple of times, e.g. “And the indication to a possible third World War

[7] With the exception of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks in Paris (January 2015), IS claimed responsibility in every other event I analysed.

may open the West's eyes." ["Und der Hinweis auf einen möglichen dritten Weltkrieg öffnet im Westen vielleicht die Augen." Blick-2-1]. Certainly, the metaphor of a 'world war' comes along with horrific connotations to Nazi Germany, a regime which in the eyes of most had to be stopped and defeated. Therefore, using the metaphor 'world war' can be interpreted as an argument for a war against IS, respectively as an argument for the destruction of IS.

In this imaginary, IS is not only presented as an enemy abroad but also as a territorial actor threatening to invade Europe. For example: "This is the enemy the West is dealing with: a small empire with a big vision written in blood. The war against IS is far from over." ["Das ist der Gegner mit dem es der Westen zu tun hat: ein kleines Reich mit einer grossen Vision, geschrieben in Blut. Der Krieg gegen den IS ist noch lange nicht zu Ende" Blick-2-1] or "IS (…) clearly wants to conquer the whole world" ["Der IS (…) will ausdrücklich die ganze Welt erobern" Olivier Roy, represented as French Islam expert, in TA-4-2].

In *Die Weltwoche* it is even claimed that IS has already enlarged their territorial presence in Europe, e.g. "IS has long extended its presence from Sweden to Germany to Spain." ["Der IS hat seine Präsenz längst von Schweden über Deutschland bis Spanien ausgedehnt" WW-3]. Also constructing the notion of a hostile army abroad, a big topic in the news coverage is that fighters of IS are preparing for an invasion in Europe, e.g. "The terrorist militia of IS has sent (…) 400 trained fighters for possible attacks to Europe." ["Die Terrormiliz Islamischer Staat hat (…) 400 ausgebildete Kämpfer für mögliche Anschläge nach Europa geschickt" 20Min-3-2]. In line with this, it is claimed that "In the Near and Middle East (…) extremists are systemically cultivated." ["Im Nahen und mittleren Osten (...) werden Attentäter systematisch herangezüchtet" WW-1], what metaphorically illustrates the 'Middle East' as manufacturing facilities of 'Islamic terrorists'. Similarly, *Blick* names the state-like formation of IS in the Middle East as 'the dark heart of the terror' ["Islamischer Staat: Das finstere Herz des Terrors" headline in Blick-2-1], thus setting the spatial origin of 'terrorism' to a place lying outside of Europe. Overall, such notions also implicate that the 'terror' is not an issue originating from 'western' societies.

Additionally noticeable is that only in *Die Weltwoche* the term 'caliphate' is used in an uncritical manner[8]. To represent the 'caliphate' as an uncontested fact reinforces the imaginary of a uniform state-like force which threatens Europe. So it is also claimed that "In fact, the caliph has to go to war at least once per year or otherwise, he would lose his legitimacy." ["Der

[8] In other media outlets quotation marks or modifiers such as "so-called" or "self-proclaimed" are used to distance themselves from the term 'caliphate'.

Kalif muss nämlich mindestens ein Mal pro Jahr in den Heiligen Krieg ziehen, da er sonst seine Legitimität verlieren würde." WW-2]. Certainly, this statement also constructs the belligerent character of a 'hostile regime', implicating that its pure existence will always lead to invasion and war.

Presenting driving forces behind the attacks as an outside state-like organised enemy, it enables particular political responses. For example, the destruction of IS in the Middle East becomes inevitable. Going along with this, the national state (meaning Switzerland or other European countries) is called to strengthen its security in 'times of war' [e.g. "In Kriegs- und Krisenzeiten verstärkt der Staat die Sicherheit. Mögliche Angreifer müssen es merken." WW-2].

10.2 'The border crossers': refugees, jihadist returnees and 'IS invaders'

Concerning 'inside and outside' imaginaries in relation to the 'terror' attacks, the role of different 'border crossers' such as refugees, 'jihadist' returnees and 'IS invaders' is a big debate in the news coverage. While in all media 'jihadist' returnees are depicted as a potential threat to the 'European-western' societies, the role of refugees is much more questioned. Happening during the time of the refugees crisis from 2015 – 2016, on several occasions in the news reports of the attacks, media discussed if, respectively how these groups (e.g. jihadist returnees, refugees, IS invaders, etc.) pose or do not pose a threat for European countries.

Relating to the metaphor of a *'Trojan horse'* (see chapter 5.4), a very popular narrative is that in order to invade Europe IS strategically plants their fighters on refugee routes by disguising them as refugees. For example: "the terrorist militia of IS wants to send fighters on the migrant route (…)" ["die Terrormiliz Islamischer Staat Kämpfer auf die Flüchtlingsroute schicken will (…)" TA-2-3] or "Infiltration of IS-terrorists, disguised as migrants" ["Einsickern von IS-Terroristen getarnt als Migranten" WW-3]. Even though this narrative does not view every refugee as a 'terrorist', refugees in general become a security problem for Europe. Especially in *Die Weltwoche* but also occasionally in the other media I analysed, refugees or immigrants are overall closely related to the threat of 'terror'. Metaphors are often used for building this notion. Relating to the attacks, it is for example claimed that "Muslim migration to Europe is a social time bomb." ["Die islamische Migration nach Europa ist eine soziale Zeitbombe." WW-4]. Here, the metaphor of 'social time bomb' implies that 'western' societies

will collapse if they let more Muslim migrants into the country[9]. This imagining is further built by metaphorical labels such as “terror-migrants” [“Terror-Migranten” WW-3], which again relates ‘terrorism’ to migrants. Also, the metaphor of “army of immigrants” [“Heer der Immigranten” WW-4] builds immigrants as an unitary homogenised group, which is more invading European countries instead of immigrating.

In some cases however I also found that media outlets acknowledge the existence of narratives that fighters of IS are invading Europe and repudiate them, e.g. “The routes of refugees are supposed to be exceptionally dangerous. ‘It would be risky and atypical for combatants to travel to a Greek island in a migrant boat.’” [“Die Wege der Flüchtlinge seien ausgesprochen gefährlich. ‘Es wäre risikoreich und untypisch, dass Personen mit Kampfauftrag sich in einem Flüchtlingsboot auf eine griechische Insel übersetzen.’” *Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution* (Germany) in TA-2-1].

In a similar way as the differentiation of Muslims and ‘terrorists’ (see chapter 9.1), especially in *Tages-Anzeiger* it is sometimes emphasised that refugees have to be differentiated from ‘terror’: “But in its whole they have nothing in common. To the contrary: Many refugees themselves have fled from IS.” [“Aber in ihrer Gesamtheit haben sie nichts miteinander zu tun. Im Gegenteil: Viele Flüchtlinge sind ja selber vor dem IS geflohen.” Daniel Cohn-Bendit, French-German politician in TA-4-1]. Going further, it is even assumed that IS strategically wants to discredit asylum seekers because the refugees are fleeing from them [“Womöglich war es Teil des Plans der mutmasslichen Hintermänner im Islamischen Staat (IS), die Asylsuchenden zu diskreditieren. Schliesslich fliehen diese vor dem Terror der Islamisten in Syrien” TA-2-1].

The imaginary of this ‘outside-threat’ in which ‘terrorists’ disguise themselves as refugees to invade Europe, calls for a particular set of political reactions which occasionally can be identified in the news (see also chapter 12.1). For example, *Die Weltwoche* calls for stricter immigration policies and border control in face of the perceived threat coming from outside: “Yet noone dares to state the obvious: ‘We must stop this immigration.’” [“Das Naheliegende wagt trotzdem keiner laut zu sagen: ‘Wir müssen diese Zuwanderung stoppen.’” WW-4] or “The example of France teaches: Western states mustn’t allow mass immigration of Muslims. They can not manage the consequences.” [“Das Beispiel Frankreich lehrt: Westliche Staaten dürfen keine Masseneinwanderung von Muslimen zulassen. Sie bewältigen die Folgen nicht.” WW-2].

[9] Certainly, this also connects ‘terrorism’ closely to Muslims in general, see chapter 9.2.

10.3 'The enemy inside alien districts'

In this chapter I present the imaginary of 'alien', 'terrorism'-associated districts within European cities. The population of these 'other' districts is regarded to live outside the control and force of the national state and therefore, the 'enemy within', respectively 'homegrown terrorism' can 'thrive' [e.g. "Der Feind im Innern" headline in TA-1-2; "einheimische Islamisten" TA-1-2]. Such districts are often named 'parallel societies', building an understanding that a separate societal structure exists within a 'majority society'. These districts are also regularly named 'problem districts' and are often characterised as 'notorious' or 'dangerous'. Even though these districts are mentioned concerning several different countries, particularly in relation to Belgium and France (often in relation to the so-called 'banlieus'), the notion of such 'alien' districts is inherent in the news reports I analysed. But in the news coverage of the events of the Paris (November 2015) and Brussels attacks, the district *Molenbeek* in Brussels becomes the centre of 'homegrown terrorism'. So is Molenbeek for example also named "terror district" ["Terror-Quartier" WW-3].

Remarkably many metaphors portray these districts as places where 'Islamism' or 'Islamic terrorism' emerges. For instance, metaphors of heat[10] such as 'focus point' ["Brennpunkte" TA-3-1], 'Islamistic hotspot' ["Islamistischen Hotspots" TA-3-1] and 'trouble spot' ["Unruheherden" WW-1] build the notion that *burning* conflicts (always in relation to Islamism) exist in these spatially concentrated areas. But the metaphor which has been mostly used in the news I analysed to describe these districts is 'stronghold', respectively 'Islamist stronghold' [e.g. "Islamisten-Hochburg" Blick-2-2]. In this context, this metaphor illustrates the districts as isolated, fortified places of an enemy.

In the news coverage, these mentioned areas become containers for all different sorts of 'social problems'. For example, the districts are represented as 'decayed' and 'miserable' [e.g. "Elend in den Vorstädten" WW-1; "das heruntergekommene Brüsseler Viertel Molenbeek" 20Min-1-1] and its inhabitants are viewed as 'poor' ["Molenbeek ist einer ärmsten Gegenden Belgiens" correspondent Sebastian Ramspeck in SRF-2-3]. Further, it is accentuated that many people live in subsidised housing, drug abuse and dealing is common and criminal and unemployment rates are high. Young people are presented to have no perspectives in life, e.g. "Molenbeek, where youths from immigrant families, who've been radicalised and without

[10] The word for word translation from German would be 'burning point' [Brennpunkt] or 'trouble strove' [Unruheherd] which both relate to heat.

perspective, live." ["Molenbeek, wo perspektivlose und radikalisierte Jugendliche aus Einwanderfamilien leben." TA-3-1]. Furthermore, it is even claimed that there exist 'no-go-areas' ["No-Go-Zonen" WW-3]. In line with this, *Die Weltwoche* calls such districts 'ghettos', e.g. "France is not going to get rid of the ghettoes of North African immigrants easily." ["Frankreich wird die Gettos der nordafrikanischen Einwanderer nicht so schnell los" WW-1]. Here the metaphor of 'ghetto' connotes the notion of unwanted and geographically separated places of ethnic minorities (in this case North African people). Moreover, the underlying point of this argument is that these areas are regarded as highly problematic which stands in close relation to their populations.

In all the media I analysed, it is emphasised that such areas have high concentration of migrants, e.g. "migrant-suburbs" ["Migranten-Vorort" Blick-2-3] and that Muslim migrants are the dominant population group, e.g. "40 percent of the population of Molenbeek are Muslims. In Belgium as a whole this religious group makes up 6 percent." ["40 Prozent der Bevölkerung in Molenbeek sind Muslime. In ganz Belgien macht diese Religionsgruppe 6 Prozent aus." Blick-2-2]. It is also stressed that the integration of migrants has failed here, e.g. "failed integration of a section of North African immigrants and their offspring." ["missglückte Integration eines Teils der nordafrikanischen Einwanderer und deren Nachkommen" TA-4-1]. Remarkably, it is highlighted that their inhabitants wear hijabs, that the butchers only sell halal meat or that the signs of some shops are inscribed in Arabic [e.g. "muslimische Metzgerei mit Halal-Fleisch" Blick-1-1; "einen Bäcker, der seine Waren in Arabisch anschreibt" Blick-1-1]. Overall, such descriptions can be interpreted as markers of an 'Arabian-Muslim culture', also implicating that the 'European culture' is alien in these districts (see also *figure 8*). In line with that, *Die Weltwoche* even names Molenbeek as "little Morocco" ["Klein Marroko" WW-3]. It is for example claimed that two young 'Belgian-Moroccan' women had to close their bakery because their clientele did not want to be served by women not wearing hijabs ["(…) zwei junge Belgomarokkanerinnen, die einst eine Bäckerei führten, aber zusperrten, weil die Klientel nicht mehr von Frauen ohne Kopftuch bedient werden wollten." TA-2-2]. Remarkably, the compound of 'Belgian-Moroccan' qualifies their citizenship, constructing their identity as both belonging to the 'in-group' of a 'western-European' nationality ('Belgian') but also as part of 'foreign' group/ origin ('Moroccan'). Altogether, this can all be seen as means of building *difference* between European 'majority societies' and an 'Arabian-Muslim' parallel society, living inside European states.



Figure 8: WW-1, caption translated: *“Two civilisations: Muslims at the prayer in Paris”*. The man in the foreground is walking through Paris and looks at many Muslims praying on the ground. Even though he is supposedly European or French (“Two civilisations”), he looks like the ‘alien’ or the minority in this scene.

These districts are also presented as places where the state holds little control. It is even claimed that the state does not know what is actually happening inside these districts. Consequently, such districts are seen as a ‘haven for terrorists’ [e.g. “Rückzugsort und Ruheraum für Attentäter und potenzielle Terroristen” TA-2-2; also accentuated in the cartoon in *figure 9*]. This notion is also built by metaphors of ‘substrate’ or ‘hotbed’ which implicate that the ‘natural conditions’ are ideal for ‘extremism’ or ‘terrorism’ [e.g. “Es ist der perfekte Nährboden für Extremismus”; Blick-2-2; “Terrorismus-Brutstätte” TA-2-2]. In line with such plant and growth metaphors, it is stated that ‘hate’ and ‘terror’ can ‘thrive’ in Molenbeek [“BLICK im belgischen Molenbeek, wo Hass und Terror gedeihen” Blick-2-2].

Figure 9: TA-2-1: The popular cartoon figures characters Tintin and Snowy ("The Adventures of Tintin"), who are regarded as symbols of the city of Brussels, are represented as two *blind* pedestrians in Molenbeek. There are not able to realise that there are 'terrorists' in the background who are preparing the attacks.

Even though 'Islamic terrorism' is regarded as an 'internal problem' [e.g. "Der Terrorismus ist mitten unter uns." Blick-1-2; "Frankreich sieht den Terrorismus vor allem als ein internes Problem" TA-1-2], these 'othered' districts are still not seen as part of a 'French', 'Belgian' or 'European' society. To that effect, this imaginary implies that despite 'terrorism' is 'homegrown', the phenomenon is something which is *not* originating from a 'western-European culture' but rather the result of 'Muslim-Arabian parallel societies'. Implicitly, in such news reports the call is underlying that European states have to regain political but as well cultural presence in these areas in order to 'solve' the problem of 'terrorism'.

10.4 'Cells and networks'

Very prominently in all news reports of the mainstream media (*20 Minuten*, *Blick*, *SRF Tagesschau*, *Tages-Anzeiger*) and on some occasions in articles of *Die Weltwoche*, IS is represented as an international operating *network* [e.g. "Dschihadisten Netzwerk" WW-3] with *cells* ["Terrorzelle" Blick-2-1] in various geographical places, e.g. "IS is not a state but a network" ["Der IS ist kein Staat, sondern ein Netzwerk." Reinhard Schulze, presented as an

Islam Expert, in 20Min-2-1]. In accordance with this imaginary, the attackers are viewed as part of this network, e.g. “It’s obviously a matter of a large, widely connected terrorist network that struck in the name of IS. There and here.” [“Es handelt sich ganz offensichtlich, um ein grosses, weit verzweigtes Terrornetzwerk, dass im Namen des Islamischen Staates zugeschlagen hat. Hier wie dort.” correspondent Sebastian Ramspeck in SRF-3-2]. The notion of network-cell structures can be viewed as the linkage between imaginaries of ‘homegrown Islamic terrorism’ and a threatening ‘Islamic’ state-like force abroad, meaning that IS executes power in European countries by being connected to such cells structures, e.g. “This network of connected, dynamic and semi-autonomous cells stress the influence of the terrorist militia in Europe.” [“Dieses Netzwerk miteinander verbundener, agiler und halbautonomer Zellen unterstreichen den Einfluss der Terrormiliz in Europa.” 20Min-3-2].

Still, the level of organisation within these network-cells structures is disputed. In some news reports, the ‘cells’ are represented as autonomous structures operating without a direct connection to other cells or a hierarchical framework, e.g. “This enemy has no country, no leader, no standing army. It‘s a loose network of killers.” [“Dieser Feind hat kein Land, keinen Anführer, keine reguläre Armee. Es ist ein loses Netzwerk aus Killern.” Blick-2-3] or “There is no one organisation or one network.” [“Es gibt nicht die eine Organisation oder das eine Netzwerk.” Bruno Schirra, journalist, in SRF-3-2]. In other reports though, it is emphasised that the cells are not isolated [e.g. “keine isolierte Zelle” WW-3] but rather are part of a larger, connected ‘whole’.

These different notions can also be identified in the metaphors applied. For example, it is stated that IS uses a “franchising concept” [“Franchisekonzept”TA-5-3], implicating that IS gives the ‘permission’ for ‘everyone’ to conduct attacks under their name, despite not having a direct contact to the organisation. Differently, other metaphors relating to business models such as “branch” [“Ableger” TA-2-3; “Zweigstelle” WW-2] or “subsidiary” [“Filliale” TA-1-3] which implie that there exists a ‘parent company’, respectively a superordinate agency (meaning IS) that gives orders. Further, the metaphor of ‘hydra’ is used to illustrate that it is difficult to operate against this network structure, e.g. “If IS is eradicated in one place, ‘then they have cut off one head of the hydra that will grow somewhere else (…)’” [“Werde der IS an einem Ort zerstört, ‘dann haben sie der Hydra einen Kopf abgeschlagen und der Kopf wächst woanders nach (…).’” Reinhard Schulze in 20Min-2-1]. The ‘hydra’, the serpentine monster in Greek mythology who regrows new heads if one is cut off, builds the notion that if a ‘terror’ cell is eradicated, new ones will emerge in other places. But that also implicates that the ‘cells’ (the heads of the hydra) belong to one entire acting body.

10.5 'Lone wolves'

In the news reports of the attacks of Nice and Berlin[11], the mainstream media asserted that the attacker acted without any direct affiliation to an organisation. Particularly, the term 'lone perpetrator' ['Einzeltäter'] was very dominant in the news coverage, e.g. "The new threat of lone perpetrators" ["Die neue Gefahr der Einzeltäter" headline in 20Min-4-3] or "There is an increasing number of single perpetrators that have radicalised themselves who do not have direct contact to Al Qaida or IS." ["Es gibt aber vermehrt Einzeltäter, die sich selbst radikalisieren, die keinen direkten Kontakt haben zur Al Kaida oder zum IS." Blick-5-2]. Also, the metaphor of 'lone wolves' [e.g. "einsame Wölfe" TA-2-1], which is regularly employed in terrorism studies (see chapter 5.4), is occasionally used in the news coverage to illustrate that the perpetrators acted on their own. In line with this, the attackers are often seen as young, rapidly radicalised 'losers' or 'outsiders' [e.g. "isolierte Versager" WW-1; "die Verlierer unserer Gesellschaft" Blick-2-1; "in Kürze radikalisiert" 20Min-4-3], which either acted on their own or in cells of like-minded people in similar situations. Overall, their identity is characterised as 'frustrated', 'lonely', 'marginalised', 'secluded' or even as 'depressive'. So it also claimed that they have a 'weak identity' ["schwachen Identität" Kurt Spillmann, represented as security expert, in SRF-3-1] or they are labelled as "Good-for-nothing" ["Taugenichts" Blick-4-2], implicating that they are predisposed to become radicalised.

However, in some news reports the notion that the attackers are 'lone wolves' without perspectives is repudiated. For example, *Die Weltwoche* uses the term 'lone perpetrator' in a cynical way: "After Berlin noone will be able to speak with a clean conscience of regrettable but isolated incidents, that have nothing at all to do with the 'protection-seeking' masses who fled to Germany. (…) For months single perpetrators have been assaulting women all over the country, raping and killing them." ["Nach Berlin wird niemand mehr guten Gewissens von bedauerlichen Einzelfällen reden können, die rein gar nichts mit der Masse der nach Deutschland geflüchteten 'Schutzsuchenden' zu tun hätten. (…) Einzeltäter überfallen seit Monaten überall im Land Frauen, vergewaltigen oder töten sie" WW-5]. Here, *Die Weltwoche* distances themselves from the term 'lone perpetrator', but the magazine also clearly views refugees as a source of crime and the 'terror' attacks (see also chapter 10.2).

As I have indicated in the previous sections, the applied 'inside and outside' imaginaries enable a particular set of political responses. Of course the imaginary that the 'terrorists' are

[11] In my sample, the attacks of Nice and Berlin are the only two events which have been conducted by one person.

soldiers of a foreign hostile army makes different political reactions conclusive as if the attackers are represented as marginalised outsiders of one's own society without any perspectives in life. In the latter case, it can be speculated that improvement in education, political programs against unemployment or policies on integration are seen as the appropriate political intervention. For example, *Tages-Anzeiger* explains in the context of the Paris November 2015 attacks that "actually there hasn't been a policy of integration since the 70s." ["eigentlich habe es seit den 70er Jahren keine Politik der Integration gegeben" TA-2-2], what implicitly says that integration has to improve in order to tackle the problem of 'terrorism'.

11. Types of 'in-groups'

(iv) Which types of 'in-groups' underlie the representation of the 'terror' attacks and how is opposition to others involved within them?

In the following chapters, I will present different types of 'in-groups' which are articulated in the news coverage of the attacks. But first I want to point out that these presented types of 'in-groups' are often very much interwoven and different 'in-groups' can co-exist even in the same text.

11.1 The 'western-European' societies

In almost every article in the news coverage of the attacks, the 'in-group' of the 'western' society, respectively a European society (also named 'the West', 'the western world', 'Europe', etc.), is accentuated. These 'western-European' societies are attributed as 'civilised', 'democratic' and 'free' and are also opposing the 'barbaric', 'tyrannical' and 'cruel' enemy. This geopolitical imaginary is for example identifiable in assertions such as "freedom against tyranny" ["Freiheit gegen Tyrannei" TA-1-1] or "barbarism which concerns all Europeans" ["Eine Barbarei, die alle Europäer trifft" Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the *European Commission* (2015), in TA-1-1]. The aim of this chapter is to show how this main 'in-group' in the news coverage of the attacks is built. As it becomes apparent in the following sections, the construction process of this 'in-group' is either about defining 'the common' within the own group or about building difference to what is outside the group.

Who is included in the 'in-group' can for example be detected by the pronoun structure: e.g. "*All of us*, *society*, *we* need to defend these liberties by all means." ["*Wir alle*, *die Gesellschaft*, *wir alle* müssen diese Freiheiten mit allen Mitteln verteidigen" Simonetta Sommaruga, President of the *Swiss Confederation* (2015), in SRF-1-1]. As the representing subject (Simonetta Sommaruga) addresses a Swiss audience, but the attacks did not occur in Switzerland, it can be assumed that 'our society' comprises the people of Switzerland but also the people of Paris (respectively the place where the attacks occurred). In a similar manner, the notion "an attack on *our* society" ["Ein Angriff auf *unsere* Gesellschaft" 20min-2-1] implies that 'our society' encompasses Swiss as well as French citizens. More explicitly, 'we' is directly linked to Europe in the following statement: "That was not the last Islamic attack in *Europe*.

We’re going to have to live with this terror for years, if not decades.” [“Das war nicht der letzte islamistische Anschlag in *Europa*. *Wir* werden auf Jahre wenn nicht Jahrzehnte hinaus mit diesem Terror leben müssen.” Blick-3-1]. Similarly, the call that ‘*we*‘ must ‘defend the achievements of the western world’ [“Verteidigung der Errungenschaften der *westlichen Welt*, für die *wir uns alle* einsetzen müssen” 20min-1-1] or the announcement that “*Europe* shows itself as unified (…) *we* will fight terrorism” [“*Europa* zeigt sich geschlossen. (…) *wir* werden den Terrorismus bekämpfen” Blick-2-1] defines ‘we’ geographically and builds the imaginary of a ‘western-European’ society.

Personifications and other metaphors also establish ‘in-groups’ as a ‘thing’ or an idea as a unitary actor. Notably often ‘Europe’, in the form of a subject, is represented to act and have emotions like a human being, e.g. “at midday today Europe silences” [“heute Mittag schweigt Europa” Blick-2-1], “Europe is mourning” [“Europa trauert” SRF-2-1], “Europe is shocked” [“Europa steht unter Schock” 20Min-3-1]. Also, the metaphor of ‘link in the chain’ illustrates a ‘connected whole’, which assumedly represents the ‘western-European’ states [“Die Jihadisten haben das schwächste Glied in der Kette erwischt” Guido Steinberg, represented as Middle Eastern expert, in TA-3-3]. In the context of the attacks in Brussels, the city is often represented as the ‘heart’ of Europe, e.g. “after Paris the terror hits the capital of Europe in its heart” [“Nach Paris trifft der Terror das Herz Europas” Blick-3-1]. In naming Brussels the heart, Europe becomes its whole body.

Further, the ‘in-group’ of a ‘western-European’ society is built by emphasising the collective emotional reaction to the events. It is striking how often people of the cities where the attack occurred, but also people of Switzerland, are presented as mourning about the deaths or by showing ‘solidarity’ with the victims, e.g. “hundreds are mourning in Zurich” [“Hunderte trauern in Zürich” Blick-2-1], “Silence for solidarity: 800 people met on the Sechseläutenplatz” [“Schweigen in Solidarität: 800 Menschen kamen auf den Sechseläutenplatz” Blick-2-1]. Additionally, statements of showing empathy such as “Je suis Charlie” or “Je suis Bruxelles” are highlighted and collective symbols, e.g. public buildings in the national colours of the country where the attack occurred, are depicted. All of them convey the similar impression that ‘we’ are all part of one society and therefore, have to stand together.

In all of the media outlets, the ‘terror’ attacks are not only viewed as an attack on the targets, the victims or infrastructure and so on, but also as an actual attack on the whole ‘western-European’ societies and its values, their way of thinking and living, etc., e.g. “In one point there exists consensus. The barbaric assaults in Paris are an attack on the western way of living” [“In einem Punkt herrscht Einigkeit. Die barbarischen Attentate von Paris sind ein

Angriff auf den westlichen Lebensstil." Blick-2-1] or "Massacres by Islamists are directed at open society." ["Massaker der Islamisten gilt der freien Gesellschaft" 20min-2-1] (see also *figure 10*). In that regard, the role of authorities and politicians is remarkable as they are often quoted by giving this particular interpretation of the events, e.g. "attack on the civilised world" ["Angriff auf die zivilisierte Welt" Barack Obama, president of the USA (2015), in TA-2-1] or "attack on the freedom of opinion and the freedom of press" ["Angriff auf Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit" *Angela Merkel*, Chancellor of Germany (2015), in 20min-1-1].

Figure 10: Large and bold headline, translated *"Attack on our freedom"* Blick-1-1. People are shown mourning and showing 'solidarity' with the victims of the *Charlie Hebdo* attack in January 2015. Implicitly, 'our freedom' concerns the value of the 'western-European' societies which are viewed to have been attacked by the 'terrorists'.

These accentuated values are seen as fundamental and indispensable for constituting the 'western' or 'European world', e.g. "freedom of opinion is an *essential part* of a democracy" ["Meinungsfreiheit gehöre zu den *Grundlagen* einer Demokratie" Simonetta Sommaruga paraphrased in 20Min-1-1], "the *basic values* of the free world" ["die *Grundwerte* der freien Welt" 20Min-1-1] or "the democracy and the *fundamental values*" ["die Demokratie und *fundamentalen Werte*" Charles Michel, Prime Minister of Belgium (2016), in SRF-3-1]. Accordingly, these values should by no means be questioned or disputed which can for example be identified in the following passages: "Freedom of opinion cannot be disputed" ["Meinungsfreiheit ist nicht verhandelbar" Reinhard Schulze, represented as Islam expert, in

SRF-1-1] or “unalterable positions” [“unabdingbare Positionen” Georg Kohler, philosophy professor, in 20min-1-1]. In the context of the attacks, it is also stressed that these values are in danger of being overthrown and therefore have to be defended, e.g. “we need to defend these liberties by all means” [“wir alle müssen diese Freiheiten mit allen Mitteln verteidigen” Simonetta Sommaruga in SRF-1-1]. Aside from that, these values are regarded as help for coming through the ‘crisis’ of ‘terror’, e.g. “Attack on our liberal values, our joy of life, our individualism. An attack which needs to be met by *holding onto* these values.” [“Angriff auf unsere freiheitlichen Grundwerte, unsere Lebensfreude, unseren Individualismus. Eine Attacke, der es zu begegnen gilt, indem man genau diesen Werte *festhält*.” TA-4-1].

The enemy images (e.g. ‘Islamic terrorist’ or to some extent ‘right wing populists’) also play an important role since they build opposition to the ‘in-group’. For example, the ideology of IS is presented as the ‘ultimate break with the western world’ [“Seine Ideologie ist momentan das radikalste Produkt auf dem Markt des totalen Bruchs mit der westlichen Welt” Olivier Roy, represented as French Islam expert, in TA-4-2]. Further, the reason that ‘they’ attack ‘us’ is simply attributed to the ‘fact’ that ‘they’ have an ‘anti-western ideology’ [“Wir haben es deshalb mit einer antiwestlichen Ideologie zu tun, die gar keinen konkreten Anlass braucht, um uns zu bekämpfen” TA-3-3]. Additionally, the notion that “violence will always lose against democracy and freedom” [“Die Gewalt wird immer verlieren gegen die Freiheit und die Demokratie” Matteo Renzi, Prime Minister of Italy, in Blick-1-1] puts violence in an oppositional relation to democracy and freedom, also implicating that the own group, the ‘western’ or ‘European’ society, has the ‘good’ values inherent while refusing violence (which is seen as a ‘negative’ characteristics).

Bringing this chapter to a conclusion, the ‘in-group’ of the ‘western-European world’ on the one hand is built on equivalence relations which emphasise a shared set of supposedly good values, characteristics, ways of thinking and living, etc. within the own group. On the other hand, the ‘in-group’ is also constructed by telling how the enemy is as the enemy image is represented to have the oppositional set of values, characteristics, and ways of thinking and living inherent. These geopolitical imaginaries with its oppositional elements and equivalence relations can be built into a semantic ladder (see *figure 11*) in which the side of the ‘western-European’ society represents the morally superior part.

western-European societies	—	**opposing others**
civilised, developed	—	barbaric
freedom of opinion & speech	—	oppression
democracy	—	anarchy & tyranny
constitutional law & human rights	—	lawless & without principles
peaceful	—	polemic & combative
fighting with words	—	fighting with weapons
respect, tolerance & diversity	—	intolerance
solidarity & empathy	—	violent & cruel

Figure 11: Semantic ladder of the geopolitical imaginary of the ‘western-European’ societies and their ‘opposing others’ which can be embodied by different groups such as ‘Islamic terrorists’, ‘IS’, or in some cases even by ‘right wing populists’ (derived from all the media I analysed).

11.2 The ‘West’ as a counter-image to the ‘Arabian-Islamic’ world

In more culturalist informed texts such as in *Die Weltwoche*, the ‘western-European’ world is seen as a superior counter-image to negatively attributed ‘Islamic-Arabian’ civilisation (see *figure 12)*. According to this geopolitical imaginary, the two distinct civilisations not only stand in antagonistic relation but also (threaten to) collide. This way of thinking is illustrated in following statements for instance: “So there are two civilizations that stand opposed.” [“Es gibt also zwei Zivilisationen, die sich feindlich gegenüberstehen.” Nicolas Dhuicq, French politician and represented as Islam expert, in WW-1] or “hate against the occident” [“Hass gegen das Abendland” headline in WW-4].

One of the imagined differences between these civilisations is that the ‘Islamic world’, contrary to the ‘Christian-Jewish occident’ [WW-1], missed the age of *‘enlightenment*’ [“Der wesentliche Unterschied liegt in der Aufklärung, welche die islamische Welt schlicht verpasst hat” WW-4]. Because the ‘Islamic world’ missed this ‘progressive’ stage, divine predestination dominates over self-responsibility, benefice exists instead of market and the system is feudalistic instead of democratic [“Aufklärung bedeutet: Eigenverantwortung statt göttliche Vorbestimmung, Trennung von Religion und Staat, Wettbewerb statt Pfründe, Demokratie statt

Feudalherrschaft.” WW-4]. Accordingly, with this imagined development, the ‘western world’ was able to gain scientific, cultural and economic supremacy [“Die Aufklärung war der Schlüssel zur wissenschaftlichen, kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Übermacht des Abendlandes.” WW-4] which supposedly led to envy and hate by the ‘Islamic’ civilisations [“Hinter dem islamistischen Hass gegen Abendland verbirgt sich viel Neid” WW-4].

As an opposite to the ‘western world’, the ‘Arab world’ itself is presented as ‘archaic’, ‘fragmented’ and ‘belligerent’, e.g. “In the conflict regions of the Middle East ancient biblical battles rage.” [“In den Krisenregionen des Nahen Ostens toben jahrtausendealte biblische Auseinandersetzungen.” WW-2]. Statements such as “in dispute since thousands of years” [“Im Streit seit Jahrtausenden”, headline in WW-2] imply that ‘they’ are not developing civilisations. The hatred of Jews is seen as the only consensus between the ‘fragmented’ and ‘belligerent’ ‘Arabs’ what also makes ‘hate’ as one of the core characteristics of their represented identity [“Der Erbfeind (die Juden) aus dem Alten Testament wird von den Arabern so leidenschaftlich gehasst, dass dieser Hass vermutlich seit je als die einzige belastbare Konsensgrundlage unter den in sich fast ebenso heftig zerstrittenen Arabern bezeichnet werden darf.” WW-2]. Additionally, metaphorical terms such as “ritual act” [“Ritualhandlung” WW-2] or “blood feud” [“Blutsfehde” WW-2] underline the represented ‘archaic’ and ‘violent’ character of ‘the Arabs’. In line with this, they also claim that “All attempts of the West to establish order in this hopeless confusion have consecutively failed.” [“Alle Versuche des Westens, in diesem heillosen Durcheinander Ordnung zu schaffen, sind folgerichtig gescheitert.” WW-2]. Not only do such notions illustrate the ‘Arab world’ in a backwardly way, but it also reveals that they think ‘Islamic-Arabian’ civilisation stands below of its superior counter-part, the ‘West’.

Aside from that, the imaginary that the ‘Islamic-Arabian’ civilisation threatens to overtake the ‘West’ can be identified in the following argument: “It may be true that militant Islam is on the rise in certain regions of the EU, because the West has lost its Christian roots and cultural identity.” [“Es mag ja stimmen, dass der militante Islam in manchen Regionen der EU Auftrieb bekommt, weil dem Westen ein Bewusstsein seiner kulturellen Identität und seiner christlicher Wurzeln abhandengekommen ist.” WW-2]. This argument reveals the thought that cultures are unitary entities, colliding with each other. In line with the logic of a zero-sum game, the loss of one culture will be the success of the other. Therefore, this argument implies that the ‘West’ has to maintain their ‘cultural roots and identity’ or otherwise, the ‘militant Islamic culture’ will come in and take over. Further, headlines such as “Or you are getting exterminated” [“Oder man wird ausgerottet” based on a quote of Nicolas Dhuicq, French politician, in WW-1] help to establish the existence-threatening character of the ‘Islamic-Arabian’ culture.

As a consequence, it is claimed that "[e]specially with difficult to integrate cultures one must target modest immigration goals." ["Man muss gerade bei schwierig zu integrierenden Kulturen eine massvolle Zuwanderung anpeilen." WW-1], implicating that a higher number of Muslims in European countries will lead to more problems. Similarly, the argument "The immigration of Muslims in the West must be restricted radically. Terror is also a product of intractable social tensions." ["Die Zuwanderung von Muslimen in den Westen muss radikal begrenzt werden. Der Terror ist auch ein Produkt von unlösbaren sozialen Spannungen." WW-4] reveals the imagining that there exist insurmountable differences between cultures and the separation of them is the only solution to avoid clashes.

western-European culture/ civilisation	—	**arabian-Islamic culture/ civilisation**
occident	—	orient
Christianity, Judaism	—	Islam
civilised & developed	—	archaic & backwardly
freedom & equality	—	opression
democracy	—	feudalism
united	—	fragmented & belligerent
peaceful and merciful	—	violent & prone to terrorism
self-responsibility	—	divine predestination

Figure 12: Semantic ladder of the geopolitical imaginary of two opposing cultures/ civilisations: a 'western-European' and an 'arabian-Islamic' culture/ civilisation (mostly derived from articles in *Die Weltwoche*).

The mainstream media (*20 Minuten*, *Blick*, *SRF Tagesschau*, *Tages-Anzeiger*) sometimes acknowledge this existence of geopolitical imaginaries of a 'clash of civilisations', but oppose them. This can be identified in the following argument for instance: "The goal of terrorists is to sow and instigate hatred in the West against Muslims all over the world and this would strengthen them (…) the jihadis of IS do depict this as a war of the West against Islam." ["Für die Terroristen ist ein Ziel im Westen Hass zu säen und den Hass anzustacheln, gegen alle Muslime dieser Welt und das würde sie dann darin bestärken (...) die Jihadisten des IS stellen dies ja als Krieg des Westens gegen den Islam dar" special correspondent Pascal Weber in SRF-2-1].

Simultaneously, the mainstream media sometimes help to build the imaginary of cultural-religious entities with the ‘in-group’ of the ‘western-European’ culture. This can for example be identified in the following argument: “But most of the victims of such atrocities are still the moderate, differently minded or differently religious Muslims in modern Arab societies.” [“Dabei sind die meisten Opfer solcher Schreckenstaten nach wie vor gemässigte, anders denkende oder glaubende Muslime in den sich modernisierenden arabischen Gesellschaften” TA-1-1]. That argument reveals the imagining that the ‘Arabian’ societies are not as advanced as the ‘western’ societies. But in contrast to more culturalist’ imaginaries, the gaps are presented as possible to overcome. Also, the call that “the event should not widen the ditch between the cultures and religions” [“die Tat darf den Graben zwischen den Kulturen und Religionen nicht vertiefen” TA-1-1] implicates that there *exist* distinct different cultures and religions (assumedly referring to a ‘western-European’ and an ‘Islamic’ culture). Nevertheless, it is also stressed that these differences should not become bigger.

11.3 Switzerland and its exceptional role

Next to the ‘western-European’ societies, the Swiss media I analysed accentuate *Switzerland* itself as an ‘in-group’, what is particularly related to underlying imaginaries that Switzerland is exceptional within Europe. In the mainstream media, imaginaries of the ‘in-group’ Switzerland are often implicitly at work, whereas *Die Weltwoche* is more explicit in telling what Switzerland brings into the debates in the context of the attacks. In general, in the news I analysed, the ‘in-group’ Switzerland is mostly built on constructing difference to other European countries. In this short section, I want to show how such imaginaries come into effect in the representation of ‘terror’ attacks.

Even in the face of the ‘terror’ attacks, Switzerland is still regarded as a secure, stable and well prepared country, e.g. “Switzerland with its ‘very stable and peaceful security position.” [“Die Schweiz mit ihrer ‘sehr stabilen und ruhigen Sicherheitspolitischen Situation.’” *Federal Intelligence Service* (Switzerland) paraphrased in TA-1-2] or “Switzerland is prepared” [“Die Schweiz ist vorbereitet” headline based on a quote of Nicoletta della Valle, *Directorate of Federal Office of Police* (Switzerland), Blick-2-1]. Although all the media outlets emphasise that a ‘terror’ attack in Switzerland cannot be ruled out, Switzerland is generally presented as more secure in comparison to other European countries [e.g. “Die Anschlagsgefahr ist hier kleiner als in den Nachbarsländern.” TA-5-2]. Likewise, it is often stressed that Switzerland is

'not a primary target' [e.g. "kein primäres Ziel" TA-5-2; "kein Hauptziel" TA-2-1; "kein erstrangiges (…) Ziel" Blick-3-1]. In the news reports after the attacks, state authorities of Switzerland are often getting room to stress that the security situation in Switzerland remains safe, e.g. "The federal agency states the security situation hasn't greatly changed since the attacks." ["Bundesbehörde sagt, die Sicherheitslage hat sich nicht stark verändert mit den Anschlägen" *Federal Council* reporter Hanspeter Forster in SRF-2-2] or "No clear evidence for a direct threat to Switzerland." ["Keine konkrete Hinweise für eine direkte Bedrohung in der Schweiz." Isabelle Graber, *Federal Intelligence Service* (Switzerland), SRF-4-1].

Neutrality, which is regarded as one of the most important, and traditional principles of Swiss foreign policy (see Möckli & Spillmann 2000), is also accentuated in the news coverage of the attacks. In fact, neutrality is seen as one of the main reasons why '*we*', Swiss society, are supposed to be securer than other societies, e.g. "Because of our reserved foreign policy and neutrality *we* are not a principal target." ["*Wir* sind wegen der zurückhaltenden Aussenpolitik und Neutralität kein erstrangiges Ziel" Mauro Mantovani, ETH-docent, Blick-3-1] or "But *we* are not entangled in a war and do not take sides" ["Aber *wir* sind in keinen Kieg verwickelt und ergreifen nicht Partei" Blick-1-3]. Accordingly, especially *Die Weltwoche* stresses how important it is to stay with this value in the face of the recent events, e.g. "Switzerland has to stay neutral" ["Die Schweiz muss neutral bleiben." WW-2].

Further, as I have already touched on in chapter 8.2, I identified manifestations of Switzerland's exceptional position within Europe since Switzerland's right wing political SVP is not represented as an 'opposing other' in the manner of 'right wing populists' of other European countries (e.g. AfD, Front National, etc.). Even though the SVP and their members are often criticised for their political takes or the way they are doing politics, it seems as if they are still viewed as an integrated part of the political and societal system, while the AfD or the Front National are seen as deviants of 'the' society.

On a similar note, concerning imaginaries of 'alien' districts in European cities where 'terrorism' 'thrives' (see chapter 10.3), Switzerland is presented as being exceptional because such districts are supposedly not existing 'here'. *Die Weltwoche* makes that very explicit: "Let's look at France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany: here, parallel societies have formed. (…) These are frightening symptoms of failed integration. The acute risk of dilapidated ghettos does not yet exist in Switzerland." ["Schauen wir auf Frankreich, Belgien, die Niederlande und Deutschland: hier haben sich Parallelgesellschaften gebildet. (...) Das sind Schreckenssymptome einer gescheiterten Integration. Die akute Gefahr verwahrloster Gettos gibt es in der Schweiz noch nicht" WW-1] or "So far Switzerland has managed to prevent

transgressions like those in France and Germany with its immigration policy." ["Die Schweiz hat es bisher mit ihrer Einwanderungspolitik geschafft, Missstände wie die in Frankreich oder Deutschland zu verhindern" WW-1]. However, in the analysed reports, the Swiss mainstream media often point to such 'parallel societies' and related problems in other countries, whereas they never mentioned this type of districts in Switzerland, implying that this phenomenon does not exist 'here'[12].

[12] Even though the mainstream media acknowledge that in Switzerland Islamism exists, at least in the news I analysed, it is not brought up that there are 'Islamist-cells' or 'IS-cells' structures in Switzerland. However, *Die Weltwoche* takes the position that in Switzerland indeed 'Islamist' cells exist. For example, they are labelling the (controversial) association named *Islamic Central Council of Switzerland* (ICCS) as "terror-fans" ["Terror-Fans" headline in WW-2]. Or further, they are claiming that the *An-Nur* mosque in Winterthur (Switzerland) is an "IS-fan club" ["IS-Fan-Klubs in Winterthur" WW-2], respectively an 'IS-Cell' ["IS-Zelle in Winterthur" headline in WW-2].

12. Contestations on political responses

(v) Which contestations of political responses to these events for Swiss domestic policy are discussed in the media?

In reaction to the ‘terror’ attacks, in the analysed news, a wide set of political responses in foreign policy (e.g. airstrikes or ground forces against IS in their territories in Syria and Iraq, etc.) and in domestic policy (expansion of border protection, stricter immigration policies, surveillance systems and measures, etc.) have been mentioned, proposed, suggested, demanded, or contrary, repudiated. Many of the political reactions to the attacks became an object of contestation. In an exemplarily way, I want to present two of the main debates regarding Swiss domestic policy responses to the ‘terror’ attacks which have been accentuated in the media: The debate on internal or external borders and the debate on security or freedom.

12.1 Debate on internal and external border

In line with imaginaries that ‘terrorism’ is an ‘outside’-problem (e.g. infiltration of IS-soldiers on refugee routes), the role of border protection became a disputed topic in the Swiss media reports of the attacks. All reviewed media outlets acknowledge that a demand to strengthen the national states border control exists and therefore, the ‘open borders’ between Switzerland and EU countries (Schengen Agreement) are under threat to become abandoned, e.g. “Politicians ask for more control: Off to the border.” [“Politiker fordern mehr Kontrolle: Ab an die Grenze.” headline in Blick-2-2] or “After the assault, the call for more control at the internal borders might be strengthened.” [“Nach dem Anschlag dürfte der Ruf nach mehr Kontrollen an den Binnengrenzen lauter werden” TA-2-1]. The border regime itself is regarded to have reached its limit, especially in relation to the refugee crisis, e.g. “the system could come to its limits soon - that is already reality abroad.” [“das System könnte bald an seine Grenzen stossen - im Ausland bereits Realität” SRF-2-2]. However, some of the speakers in the analysed media see it as overdue that the internal borders between the national states are getting more protection while others see it as a loss of an achievement.

As consequence of the attacks, some media (mostly *20 Minuten* and *Die Weltwoche*) demand more security at the borders to prevent that ‘terrorism’ comes to Switzerland, e.g. “Two of the terrorists might have come to Europe as refugees” [“Zwei der Terroristen sind möglicherweise als Flüchtlinge nach Europa gelangt” 20Min-2-1]. For example, *Die*

Weltwoche claims that ‘open borders’ give IS quite ‘a lot of freedom’ [“Offene Grenzen (…) geben den IS-Aktivisten schon ziemlich viel Freiraum” WW-3], implicating that IS is making operations which needs the movement of people across the borders. Especially in relation to the refugee crisis, *Die Weltwoche* sees ‘the reintroduction of border controls’ as long overdue [“Die Wiedereinführung von Grenzkontrollen ist angesichts der Migrationsmisere in Europa überfällig.” WW-2]. In line with such notions, it is often claimed that Switzerland has not enough border guards to manage the contemporarily situation, e.g. “There is a lack of border guards.” [“Es fehlt an Grenzwächtern.” 20Min-2-1].

In contrast, other media (especially *Tages-Anzeiger*) mostly repudiate the idea of expanding the security measures on the internal borders, which would mean that the Schengen-agreement would have to be abandoned, e.g. “It would be certainly wrong to question Schengen now” [“Es wäre aber sicher falsch, jetzt Schengen in Frage zu stellen” TA-2-1]. For example, arguments are that the expansion of border checks would lead to high costs on infrastructure and personnel and cause a lot of traffic, but also that it would lead to an isolation (of Switzerland). So it is argued that it is the actual goal of the ‘terrorist’ that Europe isolates itself [“Ein Europa, das sich abschottet und in Angst erstarrt, ist das Ziel der Terroristen” TA-3-1]. In line with this, it is argued that ‘a fragmented Europe’ would be even ‘blinder’ and therefore it would be less protected against ‘terrorism’ [“Ein Europa, das zerfällt und sich fragmentiert wäre noch blinder und ungeschützter gegenüber dieser Bedrohung” TA-3-1]

Tages-Anzeiger also acknowledges that open borders make European countries vulnerable [e.g. “Diese Freiheit und die Offenheit der Räume macht Europa verletzlich, wie der jüngste Terroranschlag in Paris in Erinnerung ruft” TA-2-1]. However, instead of stressing the protection of the national borders, *Tages-Anzeiger* suggests that Europe should expand the protection of the *external* borders of the EU, e.g. “Additionally, the control on the Schengen external borders should be expanded.” [“Zudem sollen die Kontrolle an den Schengen-Aussengrenzen verbessert werden.” TA-1-2]. Generally, the different reactions by facing the European ‘terror’ attacks reveal different underlying discourses and positions of the particular media outlet. While *Tages-Anzeiger* accentuates that Switzerland collaborates politically with the EU, *Die Weltwoche* emphasises the solo effort of the national state.

12.2 Debate on security versus freedom

Remarkably, in all the media outlets I analysed I found the debate on *security* and *freedom*, principles which are represented as being in an oppositional, respectively in a ‘trade-off’ type of relationship. That means that it is not possible for a state or a society to have both of these principles at a maximum level. Either a society has more security (e.g. in the form of the expansion of intelligence agencies, surveillance systems and measures, patrols by police and military, etc.) by giving up some of its liberties, or a society has freedom to a full extent but is more susceptible to become the target of attacks.

Facing ‘terror’ events these two supposedly ‘oppositional’ principles, security and freedom, become objects of contestation. Swiss media discuss which of these principles is more important and consequently, what approach Switzerland (and other European countries) should pursue, e.g. “More security or more freedom?” [“Mehr Sicherheit oder mehr Freiheit?” Kurt Spillmann, represented as security expert, in SRF-1-1] or “Weighing up individual liberties against collective safety.” [“Abwägen zwischen individuellen Freiheitsrechten und kollektiver Sicherheit.” TA-4-1]. Consequently, this debate is often represented as a dilemma that the ‘western-European’ societies face under the threat of ‘Islamic terrorism’, e.g. “Exactly this point will plunge Western societies into a dilemma.” [“Genau dieser Punkt stürze westliche Gesellschaften ins Dilemma.” Amichai Magen, represented as strategy expert, in WW-2].

In most news reports, the mainstream media (*20 Minuten*, *Blick*, *SRF Tagesschau*, *Tages-Anzeiger*) emphasise that the principles of freedom and in some cases the *rule of law*, are more important than security and therefore, have to be given preference, e.g. “It’s always about freedom in society.” [“Es geht stets um die Freiheit der Gesellschaft” TA-1-1]. Thus, the mainstream media in the context of the attacks underline the importancy that security will not undermine freedom or the rule of law, e.g. “This cannot lead to the sacrifice of constitutional principles.” [“Dies darf aber nicht dazu führen, dass deswegen rechtsstaatliche Prinzipien geopfert werden.” TA-4-1]. In many news reports of the mainstream media, it seems as if they are responding to an underlying voice of an unnamed speaker who wants to expand security on the cost of liberties.

The mainstream media argue that ‘free democracies’ will always be vulnerable to an extent and only non-democratic or despotic systems are secure to a maximum degree, e.g. “Maximal security only in dictatorships” [e.g. “Maximale Sicherheit nur in Diktaturen” Kurt Spillmann in SRF-1-1] or “there is no full protection of an open and democratic society” [“eine offene und demokratische Gesellschaft ist nicht völlig zu schützen” Blick-3-1]. In line with this, it is also

argued that even if there would be more security, it is not possible to avoid everything, e.g. “But it will never be possible to protect every metro station, every public space or every cinema.” [“Es wird aber nie möglich sein, jede Metrostation, jeden öffentlichen Platz oder jedes Kino zu schützen” TA-3-1]. Further, that the attacks could happened despite many security measures is seen as proof that more security would not make society safer, e.g. “Security apparatus already massively enhanced (…) still it came to dreadful attacks.” [“Sicherheitsapparat bereits massiv ausgebaut (...) trotzdem ist es am letzten Freitag in Paris zu diesen schrecklichen Anschlägen gekommen” special correspondent Michael Gerber in SRF-2-3]. Arguments against the expansion of surveillance and security measure are also built by metaphors and symbols. For example, the figure of a ‘surveillance state’ [‘Überwachungsstaat’] is used on several occasions. Here, this figure is used rhetorically to symbolise a horror scenario of a state that constantly monitors the life of its citizens in detail.

Another argument against more surveillance and security measures is that the actual goal of the ‘terrorists’ is to make people fear so that they begin to change their way of living and therefore, give up their liberties. For example, this argument can be identified in the following statements: “As soon as we change intentions and adapt our way of life to terrorism, IS or al-Qaida have won.” [“Sobald wir wegen des Terrors beginnen, unsere Pläne zu ändern, unsere Art zu leben anzupassen, haben der IS oder al-Qaida gewonnen” Simon Bennett, represented as security expert, TA-4-1] or “Certain measures restrict our own lives and this pleases the terrorists.” [“Gewisse Massnahmen schränken unsere eigenes Leben ein und das freut die Terroristen.” James Alan Fox, represented as penologist, in TA-1-3].

Even though *Die Weltwoche* also acknowledges this imagined ‘trade-off’ relationship between security and freedom, this magazine takes the counter position by expressing that ‘security’ has to be preferred, e.g. “Security has to again move up in our list of priorities.” [“Die Sicherheit muss auf den Prioritätenlisten wieder nach oben wandern.” WW-1] or “The protection of the citizens belongs to the first category.” [“Der Schutz der Bürger gehört in die erste Kategorie.” WW-1]. In line with this, it is stated that in the ‘war against the terrorists’, ‘particular liberties’ have to be limited [“Oft sei es unerlässlich, im Krieg gegen Terroristen gewisse Freiheiten einzuschränken.” WW-2]. Also, *Die Weltwoche* claims that there exist ‘security gaps’ in Europe, which the ‘IS-terrorists’ make us of [e.g. “Raffiniert nutzen die IS-Terroristen Sicherheitslücken aus, die sie in Europa ausgemacht haben.” WW-3]. Consequently, the state needs more tools and financial support to provide security for society [e.g. “Man muss dem Staat die nötigen Instrumente geben.” WW-1; “Mehr Geld, mehr Personal” WW-2].

In a similar manner as the mainstream media, *Die Weltwoche* seems to counter an underlying voice of an unnamed speaker, but here this speaker prefers freedom over security. Thus, *Die Weltwoche* argues that freedom can only be guaranteed if security exists [e.g. “Es gibt keine Freiheit ohne Sicherheit.” WW-1]. Correspondingly, ‘to respond against this form of terrorism’ Europe has to reconsider their positions on ‘personal liberties’ [“Um diese Form von Terrorismus zu begegnen, sei der Stellenwert zu überdenken, den Europa der persönlichen Freiheit einräumen wolle.” Moshe Ya’alon, Israel Defense Minister, paraphrased in WW-2]. As if *Die Weltwoche* is countering the claim that more security will reduce democracy, the magazine states: “A democracy (…) must be able to defend itself” [“Eine Demokratie (…) muss sich verteidigen können.” Amichai Magen, represented as strategy expert, in WW-2].

Concerning the polyphonic structure (see chapter 6.5), it seems that the media are almost in an implicit *dialogue* with each other by arguing about the preference of security or freedom in ‘western-European’ societies, given the recent ‘terror’ events. Even though I have shown that the different media have clear tendencies what the ‘right’ approach should be, it is not the case that the takes of the particular media are uniform. For example, in *Tages-Anzeiger*, the newspaper which usually stresses freedom over security, Guido Steinberg (represented as Middle Eastern expert) claims that “There is no way around learning who would potentially turn dangerous. This is why we need powerful intelligence services.” [“Es führt kein Weg daran vorbei, möglich früh zu erfahren, wer gefährlich werden kann. Dafür braucht man starke Nachrichtendienste (...)” Guido Steinberg in TA-3-3]. This again shows that the media are not uniform in their opinion, takes or discourses.

V. Conclusions

13. Discussion on geopolitical imaginaries and othering

In this chapter, I will discuss the topic of my thesis, *the representation of 'terror' attacks in Swiss media*, from a broader picture. For doing so, I will summarise the most striking results of my discourse analysis on geopolitical imaginaries in Swiss media in relation to the European 'terror' attacks and synthesise it with the theoretical framework of imaginaries on 'Islamic terrorism' in the 'post-9/11' era, which I established earlier in the thesis. I show my contributions on the research topic and what could *thematically* be addressed in future research. In relation to my own research, I will make a conclusion on othering processes in the analysed news reports. And finally, I will briefly discuss the differences of the broader underlying discourses in the media I analysed. As a reminder, this is the main question that guided me through the whole research process: *In what ways do the geopolitical imaginaries at work in the discussion of the recent European 'terror' attacks (2015 – 2016) in popular Swiss media (20 Minuten, Blick, Die Weltwoche, SRF Tagesschau, Tages-Anzeiger) involve othering processes?*

In my research, the enemy image of 'Islamic terrorism' was very much the container for various types of negatively associated and related concepts such as 'radicalism', 'fundamentalism', 'Salafism', etc. These concepts are merged to one 'evil and threatening' entity which in the mainstream media (*20 Minuten*, *Blick*, *SRF Tagesschau*, *Tages-Anzeiger*) also have been strictly differentiated from 'good' Muslims. I have shown that on many occasions the enemy image of 'Islamic terrorism' is very much embodied by IS. IS often became practically a synonym for 'Islamic terrorism' and vice versa. This new geopolitical actor named IS is the continuation of key 'others' such as the fundamental movement of Taliban, the 'terror' network Al-Qaeda or 'tyrannical regimes of dictators', which have characterised the 'post-9/11' era. Similarly as Debrix (2016) stated, I identified that IS is not only represented as an 'evil' adversary but rather as inhuman agents of 'horror' and 'death'. Expanding on that, it can be argued that the repudiation of a 'human character' of the enemy enables and legitimises other, respectively more rigorous or 'inhuman' political responses.

More surprisingly was that in the news coverage of the mainstream media, there was another 'opposing other' represented: A broad group which I categorised as 'right wing populists'. Similar as 'Islamic terrorists', this group is also represented as threatening to the

('in-group' of) 'western-European' societies by being willing to destroy their unimpeachable values. Concerning imaginaries on 'Islamic terrorism', these 'right wing populists' have a pivotal role since both groups are viewed to interplay and mutually profiting from each other ('the spiral of violence').

While 'right wing populism' has been a large topic in academic literature such as in political science (e.g. Müller 2017), it seems as if this debate has not been given much attention in critical geopolitics. As I conclude that 'right wing populism' is currently a very important topic in media (and assumedly also in public discussions), critical geopolitics could expand in this research field. Further research can be made from different angles. On the one hand, it would be interesting to analyse geopolitical imaginaries *on* 'right wing populism'. For example, in what other ways 'right wing populists' are viewed to threaten the 'western-European' societies? It would also be insightful to find out if such imaginings and narratives (such as the interplay between 'right wing populism' and 'Islamic terrorism') are existent in media contexts of other European countries. On the other hand, geopolitical imaginaries of 'right wing populists' (respectively those who are claimed to be 'right wing populists') on various debates such as migration, the role of security and borders, etc. could be analysed in further research.

In regard to 'inside and outside' imaginaries, I have pointed out that Hülsse and Spencer (2008) identified a shift from the representation of Al-Qaeda as a 'military actor' to a more 'criminal actor' in the 'post-9/11' era. However, in my analysis I rather identified a clutter of different, sometimes even contradicting 'inside and outside' imaginaries in relation to 'Islamic terrorism'. Following the representation of the 'terrorist' actor as militaristic, I showed that in some cases in Swiss media the perpetrators have been presented as soldiers of a hostile IS-army, trying to invade Europe. In other cases however, the perpetrators have been represented as 'marginalised and radicalised losers', who grew up in the 'own' country and without direct contact to IS. But most remarkable concerning 'inside and outside' imaginaries was that 'alien' districts in European (but not Swiss) cities are characterised as poor, with high rates of crimes and unemployment are supposed to have an 'Arabian-Muslim' culture inherent. This is intriguing because in such imaginings, 'homegrown terrorism' is still not originating from the 'own' but rather from an 'alien' culture. This type of othering on a smaller scale could certainly be an interesting topic to address in further research. The reason for the existence of these different imaginaries could be that the media do not know what to make out this new phenomenon IS and consequently, the underlying discourses vary. Since IS lost more power and territory in Syria and Iraq in the year 2017, this could also have affected the imaginaries on 'Islamic terrorism' and would be an interesting topic to follow-up in the future.

After all, in the Swiss media I analysed, I came across several layers of othering. The 'in-group' of 'democratic', 'civilised', 'tolerant' or 'developed' *'western-European' societies* was most prominent and is to a large part defined by building difference to opposing 'out-groups': 'Islamic terrorists' and 'right wing populists'. Differently, in more culturalist informed texts (mostly *Die Weltwoche*) I identified an 'in-group' of a *Christian(-Jewish)* '*western-European' civilisation/ culture* which is differentiated from an 'archaic', 'backwardly' or 'belligerent' *'Islamic-Arabian' civilisation/ culture*. This is a more classical form of othering as two inherently different cultures with clearly defined *geographical belonging* are colliding with each other. Such imaginaries can be viewed as a continuation of traditional *orientalism* thinking, in which the 'western' civilisation is viewed as morally and culturally superior. Overlapping with these mentioned layers of othering, *Switzerland* itself is represented as an 'in-group' and differentiated from other European countries, by emphasising the *exceptional role* of the own group. Learning from that, I emphasise that even though there exist broader (known) 'in- and out-groups' ('western-European' societies, culture etc.), there still can be different, overlapping layers of othering at work. Therefore, I underline that critical geopolitics has to pay attention to the various, specific geographical contexts in which othering takes place. Concerning Switzerland, an analysis of geopolitical imaginaries on Switzerland's exceptional role in Europe (e.g. in relation to Switzerland's neutral foreign policy or not being member in the EU, etc.) could be a topic for further research projects, which of course should not be limited to news reports on 'terror' attacks.

Concerning the media I analysed, even though the mainstream media are very different outlets regarding their form and reputation on quality, it was surprising that the underlying imaginaries at work are often very similar. Relating to Kundnani's (2014) two perspectives on Islam in public discussions, culturalist and reformist (outlined in chapter 5.3), the mainstream media have the tendency of having reformist discourses inherent as the debate on Muslims and 'Islamic terrorism' takes place on the binaries of 'good', 'moderate' Muslims, and all the rest of 'bad' Islam such as 'fundamentalism, 'extremism', 'Salafism', 'Wahhabism', etc. Contrary to this, most discourses underlying in *Die Weltwoche* can be viewed as culturalist as this magazine views the roots of 'Islamic violence' and 'Islamic terrorism' as inherent in their religion, respectively the culture of Islam itself. On the whole, it became particularly clear that *Die Weltwoche* understands cultures as unchangeable, grown entities which are determining the social word. Nevertheless, I have again to emphasise that these are only tendencies which do not have to apply for all reports of the particular outlets.

14. Critical reflection and methodological discussion

As my aim was to contribute on more methodological transparency in conducting discourse analysis, I will now discuss the challenges I have faced by doing research and which strategies I used to overcome them. Additionally, I will make a critical reflection on my methodological approach and I will give practical recommendations for further discourse analytical research on similar topics.

Concerning the limits of my research, I have to point out that I am not able to draw specific differences or continuations on geopolitical imaginaries from the earlier stage of the 'post-9/11' era to today's imaginaries in the presence of the new geopolitical actor IS. My empirical results on geopolitical imaginaries are based in a Swiss media context, whereas literature on ('western') geopolitical imaginaries in the earlier 'post-9/11' derives from research in geographically broader, often Anglophone contexts. Nevertheless, as the theoretical literature often relates to more 'western' discourses in general and 'Switzerland' sees itself as a part of 'western-European' societies (what also became apparent in my research), it can be assumed that there are many similarities and overlaps between these geographical settings. Therefore, I was able to point to broader differences and continuations on geopolitical imaginaries in the novel context which I elaborated in chapter 13, e.g. that IS represents the 'new face of terror' or that there exist various, even conflicting 'inside and outside' imaginaries of the 'terror threat'.

Going further, it is also telling that there is a huge amount of research made on the discourses in the 'post-9/11' era in Anglophone contexts, whereas there is not much research conducted in this field in other geographic contexts such as Switzerland or Germany[13]. However, this thesis showed that (geographical) discourses are very much situated in specific contexts. For example as I elaborated earlier, 'western-European' 'in-groups' are just one form of othering and there exist also imaginaries of Switzerland's exceptional role within Europe. Because of such differences, I postulate that critical geopolitics has to pay attention to these various contexts in which knowledge is situated.

Regarding the representation of the several events I analysed, it is difficult to see if an actual shift of discourses happened from the earlier 'terror' events (Paris January 2015 attacks) to the last attack I included for my research (Berlin December 2016 attacks). Even though I

[13] Similar observations have also been made by political geographer James Sidaway (2008: 44 – 45) who noted that critical geopolitics mainly has been interrogating with English-language material whereas other geographical contexts are often marginalised.

noticed the tendency that a direct connection to IS is increasingly questioned, this circumstance could also depend on other factors. For example, how many perpetrators have been directly involved and how well organised and coordinated the perpetrator(s) have seemed to be, could have influenced if a 'terror' event is presented as an attack conducted by 'soldiers of IS,' or contrary, presented as an attack of marginalised 'losers'. It was generally difficult to draw definite conclusions from the comparison of the different events because external factors were also influencing the news coverage. I also had hoped that the amount of coverage in the news will reveal more about patterns of (shifting) geopolitical imaginaries. Soon I realised that was not possible. For example, the events in Nice in July 2016 only received a fraction of the news coverage compared to events in Paris (January 2015 and November 2015 attacks). Even though this is an indication of a process of normalisation, the main reason for the lesser amount of news coverage of the Nice attacks might well be that the Turkish *coup d'état* attempt on 15 July 2016 (on day after the Nice attacks) just drew media attention away. As in the meantime several further attacks have happened in Europe, this larger sample of events would help to find out if a process of normalisation is taking place in media what could be addressed in further research.

Additionally, I am not able to tell what specific imaginaries people living in Switzerland may have as opposed to those elsewhere. Although I have emphasised that the discourses in media do not stand outside of discourses in society (as editors, journalists, authors etc. are part of the society as well), it might still be the case that in Swiss society other imaginaries co-exist next to imaginaries which are articulated in the selected media. For addressing this discrepancy in further research, it would be interesting not only to look at how Swiss media represent the attacks but rather to look directly what imaginaries and discourses the Swiss population have beyond the Swiss media. One idea would be to analyse comments of online articles or on social media platforms or do interviews with the inhabitants of Switzerland. That would tell if there are very different, respectively even counter discourses in the population at work, which researchers should be aware of when dealing with discourses in media. Still, I have to underline that the inclusion of *Die Weltwoche* was a very relevant addition in my sample. It became clear that on many cases this magazine produces and reflects many discourses which I did not, respectively only barely find in other media.

Discourse analysis is an interpretative process and therefore, researchers run the risk to *over-interpret* their data, respectively they run the risk of seeing in the data what they *want* or what they *expect* to see. In order to avoid over-interpretation, I discussed difficult cases with other people, not necessarily people coming from a human geography perspective. Another strategy against over-interpretation was to ask myself: "How could it be told differently?" or

"what effect would the same representation have in a different context?". For example, I asked myself if it really is of relevance that the media highlight the death of Muslims in the attacks. But as the emphasis of their 'Muslimness' would not make 'sense' in another context, I thought that there has to be an implicit notion underlying (see chapter 9.1). In line with this, it helped to 'take' a different set of 'lenses' for avoiding over-interpretation. After finding a certain pattern, I felt the risk of only seeing this particular pattern in the following text. For example, as I have shown, *Die Weltwoche* often had very different notions and opinions on various objects such as the role on security and freedom in 'our' society. With the purpose of not falling in the same routine of seeing only the differences between *Die Weltwoche* and other media, it sometimes helped to focus on the similarities between this magazine and the other media. For example, since I quickly I found the pattern that *Die Weltwoche* emphasises 'security' over 'freedom', I reversely tried to find passages in which *Die Weltwoche* underlines the importance of 'freedom' over 'security' as most of the other media did. As I did not find anything, I was sure that it was not just my preconception, which found the pattern in the first place. After all, it is important to be aware of such preconceptions and it certainly helps to make them explicit or it even helps if the researchers declare how they tried to overcome them. Consequently, this all helps to make discourse analysis more transparent.

Regarding the analytical 'tools' I used, it was helpful to have a diverse set of linguistic characteristics and rhetorical means for 'scanning' texts. Metaphors and the various forms of building difference proved to be most useful in my research as access points for the underlying imaginaries in the texts. Even though I used some pictures of the news I analysed to underline some of my findings, I mainly focused on linguistic characteristics and rhetorical means in written text. Nevertheless, as expected, it was principally tabloid journals such as *Blick* that made great use of pictures and large headlines to produce social 'reality'. Therefore, for further research on the representation on 'terrorism', the inclusion of discourse analytical image analysis would be a revealing addition.

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Appendix

Text corpus

Text corpus for discourse analysis. In brackets: short names of the different issues which I used for the quotation in this thesis.

	Blick (newspaper)	**Tages-Anzeiger** (newspaper)	**20 Minuten** (newspaper)	**SRF SRG - Tagesschau** (TV news show)	**Die Weltwoche** (magazine)
Frequency of publication	*Every weekday*	*Every weekday*	*From Monday to Friday*	*Everyday*	*Weekly*
Events	**Full news coverage of the dates below**				
2015, 7 Jan. Paris, France.	*2015, Jan. 8* (Blick-1-1) *2015, Jan. 9* (Blick-1-2) *2015, Jan. 10* (Blick-1-3)	*2015, Jan. 8* (TA-1-1) *2015, Jan. 9* (TA-1-2) *2015, Jan. 10* (TA-1-3)	*2015, Jan. 8* (20Min-1-1) *2015, Jan. 9* (20Min-1-2) *2015, Jan. 12* (20Min-1-3)	*2015, Jan. 7* (SRF-1-1) *2015, Jan. 8* (SRF-1-2) *2015, Jan. 9* (SRF-1-3)	*2015, 15. Jan.* (WW-1)
2015, 13 Nov. Paris, France.	*2015, Nov. 16* (Blick-2-1) *2015, Nov. 17* (Blick-2-2) *2015, Nov. 18* (Blick-2-3)	*2015, Nov. 16* (TA-2-1) *2015, Nov. 17* (TA-2-2) *2015, Nov. 18* (TA-2-3)	*2015, Nov. 16* (20Min-2-1) *2015, Nov. 17* (20Min-2-2) *2015, Nov. 18* (20Min-2-3)	*2015, Nov. 14* (SRF-2-1) *2015, Nov. 15* (SRF-2-2) *2015, Nov. 16* (SRF-2-3)	*2015, 19. Nov.* (WW-2)
2016, 22 Mar. Brussels, Belgium.	*2016, Mar. 23* (Blick-3-1) *2016, Mar. 24* (Blick-3-2) *2016, Mar. 26* (Blick-3-3)	*2016, Mar. 23* (TA-3-1) *2016, Mar. 24* (TA-3-2) *2016, Mar. 26* (TA-3-3)	*2016, Mar. 23* (20Min-3-1) *2016, Mar. 24* (20Min-3-2) *2016, Mar. 29* (20Min-3-3)	*2016, Mar. 22* (SRF-3-1) *2016, Mar. 23* (SRF-3-2) *2016, Mar. 24* (SRF-3-3)	*2016, 24 Mar.* (WW-3)
2016, 14 July Nice, France.	*2016, July 16* (Blick-4-1) *2016, July 18* (Blick-4-2) *2016, July 19* (Blick-4-3)	*2016, July 16* (TA-4-1) *2016, July 18* (TA-4-2) *2016, July 19* (TA-4-3)	*2016, July 18* (20Min-4-1) *2016, July 19* (20Min-4-2) *2016, July 20* (20Min-4-3)	*2016, July 15* (SRF-4-1) *2016, July 16* (SRF-4-2) *2016, July 17* (SRF-4-3)	*2016, 20 July* (WW-4)
2016, 19 Dec. Berlin, Germany.	*2016, Dec. 20* (Blick-5-1) *2016, Dec. 21* (Blick-5-2) *2016, Dec. 22* (Blick-5-3)	*2016, Dec. 20* (TA-5-1) *2016, Dec. 21* (TA-5-2) *2016, Dec. 22* (TA-5-3)	*2016, Dec. 20* (20Min-5-1) *2016, Dec. 21* (20Min-5-2) *2016, Dec. 22* (20Min-5-3)	*2016, Dec. 20* (SRF-5-1) *2016, Dec. 21* (SRF-5-2) *2016, Dec. 22* (SRF-5-3)	*2016, 22 Dec.* (WW-5)

Details of the analysed media

20 Minuten, 2015, January 8. Edition: Bern.

20 Minuten, 2015, January 9. Edition: Bern.

20 Minuten, 2015, January 12. Edition: Bern.

20 Minuten, 2015, November 16. Edition: Bern.

20 Minuten, 2015, November 18. Edition: Bern.

20 Minuten, 2016, March 23. Edition: Bern.

20 Minuten, 2016, March 24. Edition: Bern.

20 Minuten, 2016, March 29. Edition: Bern.

20 Minuten, 2016, July 18. Edition: Bern.

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20 Minuten, 2016, July 20. Edition: Bern.

20 Minuten, 2016, December 20. Edition: Bern.

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Personal declaration

Personal declaration: I hereby declare that the submitted thesis is the result of my own, independent work. All external sources are explicitly acknowledged in the thesis.

Matthias Frösch, January 24, 2018