



Fencing In, Keeping Out:

Seasonality and Enclosures in the Okakarara Area, Namibia



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Cover photos:

tl: Waterpoint

tr: Traditionally dressed Herero woman

bl: Farmer in caddle *krual*

br: Fence

src: Author, taken in October 2016



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Zurich** ^{UZH}

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Summary

This master thesis looks at fencing practices and processes on communal land in the climatic variable area of Okakarara in Namibia. Communal land is government property that has been made available to previously disadvantaged Namibians. By providing land, the government aims to balance out inequalities such as unequal distribution of wealth and access to land that resulted from the country's colonial history. When Namibia became independent in 1990, 94% of Namibians shared 48% of the agricultural land under communal land tenure while 6% inhabited 52% of the agricultural farmland (Hunter 2004). In the years following independence, the government placed focus on land redistribution programs. However, the inequalities in wealth and land distribution can also be found on communal land: Different actors enclosed various sizes of communal land to graze their livestock exclusively. These fences are considered to be a reaction to changing livelihoods and a strategy to cope with climatic variability. Especially during the long dry seasons, communal pastures face fodder shortages, which are intensified by the high density of people and livestock. The fenced areas decrease the size of the communal pastures and put pressure on farmers, especially on those without fences. In 2002, the government passed the Communal Land Reform Act to legally regulate such camps on communal land. However, even today, farmers still fence off various sizes of land either with or without local, regional or national consent. Over the years, these camps have become a part of people's everyday resource practices. I am interested in enclosing processes and practices, how they influence access to pastoral resources and their effect on property relations. I therefore used a theoretical framework consisting of property, territory, access and exclusion to look at enclosure processes in the climatic variable area of Okakarara. I understand enclosures as the process of the mobilization of mechanisms of access and exclusion by actors to renegotiate property relations, which then stabilize in territories. Based on the conceptual framework, the thesis then illustrates how individual farmers and collectives enclose gardens, *keruals*, different sizes of camps, and villages. The actors mainly differ in their source of income, their capital and their place of residence. Depending on their background, these actors and collectives are able to mobilize one or multiple mechanisms of access and exclusion. The data collected in the Okakarara area further shows that the mechanisms require a tactical adaptation to seasonality. Actors are the most successful if they are capable to mobilize multiple mechanisms, if they can mobilize them vigorously to compensate for mechanisms they are not capable to establish and, especially, if they can mobilize capital and social relations, which my data identifies as the most effective access mechanisms. Moreover, since mechanisms of access and exclusion negotiate property relations, this thesis also analyzes how property relations stabilize in territories. The thesis contributes to existing research on enclosures. Insights gained from this thesis are of special interest in regards to the continuing negotiations about land tenures in Namibia, such as the upcoming National Land Conference and Land Bill. The empirical data for this thesis was collected from October to December 2016. The data is based on qualitative interviews with farmers involved in fencing practices, transect walks across the farms and satellite images.

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Abbreviations

AALS	The Affirmative Action Loan Scheme
CLB	Communal Land Board
CLR	Communal Land Registration
CLRA	Communal Land Reform Act
MLR	Ministry of Land Reform (until 2005: Ministry of Lands and Resettlement)
NAD	Namibia Dollar
NamWater	The Namibia Water Corporation
NRP	National Resettlement Programme
NUST	Namibia University of Science and Technology
RoN	Republik of Namibia
TA	Traditional Authorities

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1 Introduction

When Namibia became independent in 1990, the majority of the Namibians had high hopes for more equality. More than a century of colonization had caused inequality in the access and distribution of land and a divide in income and wealth. Much of this inequality originated in the colonial history of Namibia. In the 19th century, German colonialists seized land for their own agricultural and pastoral use. About thirty years later, South Africa annexed Namibia and the Apartheid regime found its way into Namibia. This resulted in the resettlement of native inhabitants into homelands. The homeland system enforced a segregation of different Namibian ethnical groups into reserves (Forrest 1994: 89). The land dispossessions and resettlements resulted in lasting inequalities throughout the population. Furthermore, it created a division of land ownership; commercial land, which is privately owned under freehold title and communal land, which is the government's property and provided to landless Namibians. «At independence in 1990, roughly 52 percent of agriculturally usable land was held under freehold title mostly by white landowners, while 48 percent fell within the communal areas» (Werner / Kruger 2007: 5, quoted from RoN 1991: 147). Thereby, at independence, declared communal areas – covering mainly the former areas of homelands – often were unutilized and undeveloped due to the lack of access to water.

In 1991, the *National Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question* aimed to address those inequalities in land distribution by discussing a land reform program (Werner / Odendaal 2010: 3). Four years later, the *Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act* came to life, with a purpose to benefit especially Namibian citizens who do not own or have access to land, primarily those who have been disadvantaged socially, economically or educationally in the past by discriminatory practices (Werner 2003: 7). The Act intended to increase the agricultural production and decrease poverty by redistributing privately owned, commercial land to the previously disadvantaged and landless farmers. Despite the development of multiple Land Reforms Acts, colonial caused inequalities in land distribution have lasting effects even today. Currently, still half of Namibia's population lives in communal areas, which cover 38% of the country's surface whereas a minority of 6% holds private rights to 44% of the surface (Mendelsohn et al. 2012: 3-5)¹. The high hopes of the Namibians for more equality in land distribution and wealth are not fulfilled yet.

Inequality in income, wealth and land distribution not only exists in comparison of communal compared to commercial land but also within the communal land itself. In Namibia, only 8% of the country receives at least 500mm of rain a year, a minimum amount required for dryland cropping. The rainfall also is very variable and thus not spread evenly and regularly during rain seasons (Werner 2003: 5, quoted from Brown 1993: 74). Due to consequences of this arid and semi-arid climate, the land is primarily used for cattle ranching and small stock farming. Since the country faces long dry or even drought seasons, large areas are needed to feed animals through the year. In the communal lands, a large amount of livestock providing the farmers' livelihoods has led to an intense usage and eventual degradation of the land. To overcome shortages in fodder caused by seasonality, individuals and groups started to fence off various sizes of communal grazing land and water points. Thereby, the access to resources shifted from multiple users to specific owners, enforcing a change in the land and resource use for the commoners. While the fences assure exclusive access to benefits, protect the livestock and reduce labor for the owner, they pressure farmers without fences and the remaining communal pastures.

This thesis contributes to the research on enclosing processes and practices in a climatic variable setting. It analyzes how fencing practices and processes on communal pastures in the Okakarara area influence the resource use. The area is inhabited by Hereros, an ethnic group with an origin in livestock farming. The

¹ The land remaining is split into land for national parks (17%) and declared urban areas (1%), which are shared by 42% of the population (Mendelsohn et al. 2012: 3-5).

this thesis explores the actors involved in enclosing practices and processes and therefore introduces three Herero farmers who inhabit three villages in this region. Their livelihoods are still fully or partly dependent on their cattle but monetary work of family members in town complement their income. The farming practices of the three Hereros are strongly influenced by fences. Different types of fences on one hand replace a herdsman by protecting and herding cattle and on the other hand also assure exclusive access to the resources inside it. Especially during the dry season, the farmers benefit from the grass stored inside the fences for when the cattle have fully grazed communal pastures. Farmers who can not afford to build a fence then have to withstand the consequences of enclosures. Even though the government regulates the sizes and locations of the fences, especially capital rich actors are able to fence off large parts of the communal land, which pressures others. The thesis discusses how various actors' influenced and are involved in building different types of fences, which fulfill various needs and functions in a climatic variable area. The gained knowledge of enclosure processes and practices is of significant interest, considering the upcoming Second National Land Conference.

1.1 Enclosure

I am interested in enclosing processes and practices and how they influence patterns of access to pastoralist resources and the property relations these resources entangle. Enclosure is historically understood as «the extinction of 'common rights' and the replacement of open or common fields, pastures and meadows with 'enclosed' fields free of such rights» (Shaw-Taylor / Vasudevan 2009: 191). The concept of 'common rights' has its origins in early modern Europe, especially England, where grazing areas and cultivated fields were shared by people with the rights to it held in common, replacing the usage of land as open fields. The term 'common' is misleading insofar as it is strictly regulated to who had access to the common land, it was not open to everyone and access was regulated by different actors. From the 1500s onward, due to diseases, overstocking and unregulated commons, people in England could not find value in commons since no progress in farming could be made (Shaw-Taylor 2001, Neeson 1996, Wordie 1983). Enclosure turned common land into private property, where the right for land use was exclusively held by the owner (Shaw-Taylor / Vasudevan 2009 :191). «Those owners whose claims for land or common rights were recognized by the enclosure commissioners appointed by parliament were given new allotments of land» (Shaw-Taylor 2001: 96). Tenants, on the other hand, were not legitimately considered to receive any type of replacement. Between 1750 and 1850, the parliamentary enclosures forced farmers into wage labor, since they were restricted to own at maximum two cows and were able to earn double the income by wage labor. Farming remained in the hands of capitalist tenant farmers (Shaw-Taylor 2001: 96).

While former enclosure research in England mainly focuses on the social work of a legalistic view, newer literature on enclosure (Blomley 2007; Jeffrey et al. 2012) took a different direction by pointing out the materiality of enclosure. The Canadian geographer Nick Blomley (2007) discusses the physical, symbolic and legal influence of material objects in the production of enclosure. By focusing on the meaning of hedges in enclosing processes in rural modern England, he reflects on the often contradictory and consequential accumulation of common property. In his work, the hedge simultaneously is a sign and material barrier. Like the fences on the communal pastures in Okakarara, they were built to privatize and exclude, which stands in opposition to the common property's right to be able to benefit and not be excluded. Thereby, he notes, that the hedge does not dispossess on its own terms. It works as a spatial discipline, which was materialized and enforced with the consequence of preventing forms of physical movement (Blomley 2007: 1-5). A well-known material to enclose is barbed wire. Netz (2004) illustrates the control the barbed wire had over animals, land and people. He describes how fences, for example, were used to colonize cows and land to conquer the west of the USA and how the wire was deployed to enclose land, for example as a strategy to cut mobility in wars or enclose humans like in Russia and Germany in concentration camps. In this way, the barbed wire (Netz 2004) or the hedge (Blomley 2007) is a social directive, meaning that «it drew from and helped produce an emergent set of social hierarchies that rested on developing conceptions

of private property» (ibid.: 5). Blomley further refers not only to the land as becoming private property but also the hedge being a private property (ibid.: 5). In this way, the hedge can «materialise private property's right to exclude» (ibid.: 16), which can also become a sign of opposition, when chopped (in case of the hedge) or torn (in case of the fences) down by commoners (ibid.: 16).

Fencing processes not only occurred in England but enclosed land, animals and humans around the globe. Especially in post-colonial states property relations are often not set since multiple actors are still competing over authority (Berry 2002, Lund 2008). In Indonesia, for example, companies enclose land of villages for vegetable oils and biofuel. In fact, over the last decades, the land used for palm oil production has doubled (McCarthy 2010). In Vietnam, due to the commercialization of shrimp farming in the 1980s and a reform in forest enterprise enclosure of former «open-access» areas lead to environmental segregation and increased poverty and landlessness in the area (Luttrell 2001). In southern China, due to enclosure of fisheries by capital rich fishers and capitalist players, since 1990, the young generation is forced into capitalist labor (Sugden / Punch 2014). But also in Central and South America, for example in Colombia, violent displacements of people by domestic and multinational companies over the last two decades occurred. In rural regions, the companies privatized land for oil and mining operations. The former peasants were forced to move to an urban environment to sustain their families (Gibbs 2013). The examples show, that enclosure processes are not a relic from the past but a current development in various countries around the globe.

In the 1970s, fences were also started to be used communal land in the Okakarara area. First with branches and later on with wire or barbed wire and wooden poles, individuals and collectives started to enclose both small and large areas of communal grazing land and water points. After Namibia's independence in 1990, the numbers of fences increased due to the hopes of the farmers of their fenced areas becoming their private land (Werner 2000). Various customary tenure regimes on local, regional and national level would all regulate the property rights in communal areas. The plurality of tenure regimes often results in a complexity of regulations. In combination with the uneven land tenure system of Namibia, the demand of the residents for private ownership, climatic variability, processes in farming and the often minimally controlled and governed remote areas enabled a misuse of the communal land. «Land is largely allocated by traditional leaders, but enclosures of communal land for private use without the consent of traditional leaders or government have occurred in parts of the country» (Werner / Kruger 2007: 5). By fencing off land, the access to resources shifted from multiple users to specific owners, enforcing a change in the resource use and mobility of the commoners.

The thesis does not consider the fencing practices and processes, which enclose communal pastures in the Okakarara area to result from a tragedy of the commons. The economic theory of the tragedy of the commons by Garrett Hardin (1968) describes, how scarce, unregulated, common resources are exploited by individuals of a community who act upon their self-interest rather than using the resource according to the collective well-being. The thesis follows Werner (2000: 248) who argues that enclosures in the area are the outcome of two processes: livestock production becoming more and more commercialized and new colonial land policies such as the weakening of the power of local authorities. Werner (ibid.: 249) therefore states, that enclosing processes on the communal land do not draw on Hardin's «tragedy of the commons» (1968) but are produced from the interaction of processes, which were characterized by «conflict among users and among different rights and competing uses in a situation of political and economic change» (Werner 2007: 249, quoted from Peters 1987: 177). Werner concludes that enclosure on the communal pastures in the area of Okakarara occurs from conflict between different groups rather than from an accumulating individual staying in competition with the commoners.

1.2 The Okakarara Area




Figure 1: The Okakarara Area (modified from Wikipedia² and Mendelsohn/Obeid (2002))

The fieldwork of the thesis was conducted in the Okakarara area. The area comprises the communal land within the Okakarara Constituency and is located in the Otjozondjupa region. The biggest town in the Okakarara area is also named Okakarara and has about 10,000 inhabitants. The town provides the inhabitants with some shops and governmental institutions such as ministries, schools and a hospital. Also the royal house, the family Kambazembi, is located there, who today are known as the traditional authority. Furthermore, some German-Namibian development projects settled in Okakarara (Förster 2010: 59). One of them is a German supported school named «steps for children», where I stayed during my fieldwork. Besides the small town Okakarara, the area consists mainly of communal land where many small villages with only a few households and some large villages, containing more than hundred homesteads, are situated. (Förster 2010: 58).

The communal area is a mainly *Otjibherero* speaking region. The Hereros are one among nine ethnic groups in Namibia³. Besides Okahandja and Katutura in Windhoek, Okakarara provides the most important center of Hereros in Namibia, whereas the fluctuation in all three places is high. While family members often leave to find work in Okahandja and Windhoek, their children stay with their grandparents in the villages on the communal land. Elderly or unemployed Hereros often return to their home village. Many families were settled to this area when it became the Waterberg reserve in 1924. Some families already inhabited the land before the war and returned to the same village after. Others settled in the proximity of new established boreholes, which were drilled by the government starting in the 1960s. (Förster 2010: 58).

The people in the area of Okakarara make their living mainly from livestock. Some farmers sustain themselves on sheep and goats or a handful of cattle while capital-rich households in the area own cattle herds of hundreds of animals comparable to the private, commercial farms in Namibia. The area between villages is used as grazing pastures for goats and cattle. Even though it is not legally allowed to own private property on the communal land, the area between the villages is often split between them and the land

² Wikipedia, 10 January, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Okakarara_Constituency (entered June 15, 2017)

³ Besides the Ovambo, Kavango, «White» Namibians, Damara, Nama, Caprivian, Busmen and Tswana.

fenced in by farmers (Förster 2010: 58). The area's surface is often covered by windblown sand, since it is located at the edge of the Kalahari Desert. On average, the area annually only receives between 350 and 450 millimeters of rain, especially during January and February (Mendelsohn / Obeid 2002). Even though many farmers we visited during fieldwork built a private vegetable and fruit garden, the soil is not fertile enough to do large-scale crop farming.

For this paper I chose to define the people as farmers, not pastoralists. The decision to use the term «farmer», widely used in research on communal lands (Adams et al. 1990; Stahl 2000), is based on three reasons: the methods of attaining an income, the homestead as their base and how they name themselves. The Oxford dictionary defines a farmer as being a «person who owns or manages a farm» (Oxford Dictionary a). A farm thereby stands for an «area of land and its buildings, used for growing crops and rearing animals» (Oxford Dictionary b). This reflects on the farmer's livelihood as mainly depending on their cattle for an income but complementing it with monetary jobs and growing crops for consumption. Furthermore, the majority of the farmers in the area of Okakarara do own fences, inside which at least some of the animals are staying. This leads to the second reason; the location. Pastoralism is a specific form of farming, which places focus on herding and breeding cattle, involving «the maintenance of self-sustaining herds in pastures» (Konczacki 2014: 2). Pastoral people thereby either live nomadically, moving with their cattle from one place without participating agriculture or half-nomadic, switching between farming and herding. When a farmer holds a small amount of livestock on farmland, it is not considered to be pastoralism (Konczacki 2014: 2). The cattle in Okakarara area are held on the communal land. Some people in the region only own a small amount of animals or have other sources of income. In addition, the cattle are at least partly contained with fences and on land «belonging» to one or multiple farms, where the people are settled. To include people with different sources of income who own a farm in the area of Okakarara into my research, the term «farmer» appeared to be the more accurate choice for my research. I define a farmer as a person who does farming because farming is the «land-based, human-managed production of food and fibre by the transformation of seed into crops and/ or the raising of livestock» (Guthman, 2009: 240). Finally, during my interviews, the people referred to themselves, as well as to their neighbors as farmers. Based upon their own perception and definition, I chose to pick this term for my thesis, which provided the most important reason for my choice.

1.3 Research Question

This master thesis intends to prevent an understanding of the fencing processes and practice of demarcation on communal pastures in the area of Okakarara. I therefore explore who the actors involved in fencing processes are and what motivations they have to build a fence. To gain, control or maintain access to resources, the actors are mobilizing access mechanisms, which I intend to explain. Furthermore, I analyze the spatial consequences of these mobilizations by illustrating various types of camps and village structures. I then discuss the influence of seasonality on the mobilization of mechanisms, property relations and territories.

I follow the main research question:

How do fencing practices and processes of demarcation on communal pastures influence the property relations in the climatic variable setting of the Okakarara area in Namibia?

I will approach the main research question through four sub questions. The sub questions aim to deepen the understanding of enclosing processes and practices and their impact on access to beneficial resources and networks of property relations.

- 1) Who are the actors who claim rights to natural resources and land and when did they claim these rights?
- 2) How do mechanisms of access affect resource use and how are they influenced by seasonal conditions?
- 3) What is the impact of seasonality on the resource use and how does it change through fencing?
- 4) What are the spatial consequences and how do they condition property relations?

1.4 Thesis Architecture

After Chapter 1 introducing the topic, Chapter 2 unfolds the theoretical framework. It uses the theory from property and territory in order to reflect on how property relations stabilized in territories. The thesis further benefits from understanding mechanisms of access and exclusion and how these mechanisms are mobilized to renegotiate property relations. This provides a frame to unpack enclosure conceptually.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology. To understand how, why and by whom land is enclosed as well as the influence on access to land and property relation formed over it commands a qualitative approach. The chapter first outlines my research strategy, describes how I entered the field and discusses the methods used for the collection of data and its analysis. In a final part it reflects on my position in the field as well as the limitations and challenges that occurred during the fieldwork.

Chapter 4 gives a more detailed overview of Namibia's history and the Hereros' background and position within Namibia's history. Furthermore, it provides information on the land tenure system in Namibia, especially focusing on the rights on communal land. The background information contributes to a base to understand the contextual frame within which the enclosures take place.

Chapter 5 introduces three farmers who live on the communal land in the area of Okakarara. It gives insight into their livelihoods, access to land and water and strategy to cope with the seasonality. It further presents two different village structures and illustrates the consequences of those structures. The chapter provides information on actors and their ability to control, maintain and gain access to land as well as the spatial consequences of this ability.

Chapter 6 addresses the processes and practices of enclosure. It reflects on the functions of the fences and how their purpose changes in the different seasons. It then describes different periods of fence making in the past and the farmers who enforced different processes of enclosures. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the influence of the fences on the resource use. The consequences of owning a fence or being excluded from the benefits and land of fenced areas become apparent.

Chapter 7 investigates into the regulations regarding access to water and land. It analyzes different norms, agreements, regulations and laws of access and examines how they came to be, how they are used and changed. This provides insight into the stabilization of property relations and the territories they stabilize in. It further reflects on the satisfaction with those regulations of access and the consequences for different actors. In conclusion, the regulations of access to water and regulations of access to land are compared and discussed in regards to how they could be profiting from the other.

Chapter 8 analyzes. It compares the conceptual framework from Chapter 2 to the empirical data in Chapter 5 to 7 and reflects on their consistency. Drawing on the social units in the property theory it outlines what actors were found to be involved in fencing practices. It then picks up on the mechanisms of access and exclusion and discusses how they can be found in the field and what mixtures are affective to influence access, especially under climatic variable conditions. In the final section the chapter analyzes how property relations are stabilized in territory and their spatial consequences.

Finally, Chapter 9 draws a conclusion on the thesis.

2 Unpacking Enclosure Conceptually

In the chapter I conceptualize enclosure practices and processes through the theory of property, territory, access and exclusion to provide an analytical frame. Various actors with different intentions are involved in enclosure practices and processes on communal pastures in the Okakarara area. How and to what extent they can benefit from the resources and land is depending on their access to them and the seasonality. The actors can have access to benefits whether or not they claim right to them. The Rain and dry seasons demand a regular adjustment of the resource use by the farmers. For example, if the grass on the pastures is becoming rare, they can claim access to fodder by investing their capital or fencing off land to exclusively store grass.

This initiates that the rain and dry seasons periodically demand tactical adaptation of mechanisms of access and exclusion. The actors mobilize such mechanisms of access to control, maintain or gain access to resources. In this way they draw on social relations and powers to influence practices and ideas of others (Ribot / Peluso 2003). Complementary, actors mobilize mechanisms of exclusion to gain powers that prevent people from benefitting either in order to maintain the current access to benefits, to cause others to lose their access to benefits or to ensure others will not develop access to benefits (Hall et al. 2011). As a consequence of such a tactical adaptation, property relations are renegotiated. Property relations are formed and given meaning by two social units such as individuals or groups over an object seen as valuable. Property relations between the two social units regarding the property object can be rights, duties, privileges or possibilities (von Benda-Beckmann / von Benda-Beckmann 1999). The property relations are stabilized in territory. Territory as a meaningful bounded space sets the property relations by constructing security through a sensed or materialized «inside» and «outside». At the same time, territory in many cases disempowers others by creating conflict and asymmetrical relations of independence (Delaney 2005). The way property relations stabilize in territories can then turn into the object of contestations, determining whether a certain mechanism of access or exclusion is effective or not.

2.1 Property

The fences in the Okakarara area convert communal land into private property. On communal land, the residents share land as a common property. Claims to communal land use are therefore not unlimited but determined by the state or society. Common property such as the communal pastures in the Okakarara area is the property of multiple individuals while the state enforces and creates the rights of these individuals. In this way common property is distinguishable from state property, which is understood as the right of an artificial person. Private property, on the other hand, allows individuals such as some of the farmers in the Okakarara area to exclusively use and benefit from their individual property (MacPherson, 1978: 4-6). They claim the rights to resources such as grass and natural pans filled with water. This impacts other farmers who are thereby excluded from benefitting from those resources. Fences form definite boundaries and create bounded spaces with multiple meanings such as gardens, where extra fodder for the own cattle is grown. Those meaningful, bounded spaces can be recognized as territories, a type of property. This chapter takes a closer look at the meaning and development of property and how property is a right to use and benefit from something. Combining property with space and meaning turns it into a territory. Drawing on this, the chapter then introduces territory as a way to emphasize property's initial spatial dimension.

In everyday language, property is understood as thing – a house, a car. In 1978, MacPherson defined property as a right, not a thing: «To have property is to have a right in the sense of an enforceable claim to some use or benefit of something, whether it is a right to share in some common resource or an individual right in some particular things». Property differs from possession by being a right in the sense of a claim that is enforced by society or the state, by custom or convention or law. This enforceable claim enables the holder to benefit or use something (MacPherson, 1978: 3). When someone enforces a claim, property becomes a political relation. The rights this person gains through the claims stand in relation to others. In

private property this includes the right to exclude other individuals from using it or benefiting from it. In contrast, on communal property, all the individuals claim the right not to be excluded from benefiting by other residents (MacPherson, 1978: 4).

For Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (1999) property needs a broader approach. They therefore outline an analytical property framework to analyze property relations. According to the authors, property can generally be understood as «the way in which relations between society's members with respect to valuables are given form and significance» (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006: 14). These relations are composed of social units, namely the holders of property rights, the property objects to which the social units hold the property rights and the relation between the social units regarding the property object. Social units consist of individuals, social groups, states or companies. While they may appear as a unit on the outside, they may obtain different attributes. For example, a social group can come to existence through their shared political interests while consisting of people with different genders and backgrounds. Moreover, property objects can have a material or immaterial character and be part of the natural or social environment while the conceptualization vary. Property objects are constructed to be of value to the social units. The relations between the social units regarding the property objects can be rights, obligations, duties, privileges or possibilities. Furthermore, the dimension of time sets a beginning and an end to the property relations: They have the duration the social units grant them and are able to last a social unit's lifespan (von Benda-Beckmann / von Benda-Beckmann 1999: 21). The authors propose to understand the temporal and spatial dimension of property as a «cover term that encompasses a variety of different arrangements, in different societies, and across different historical periods» (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006: 15).

This variety of different arrangements is conceptualized by understanding property as a twofold «bundle of rights», which von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006: 15) expanded by an additional two: «first to refer to the totality of property rights and duties as conceptualized in any one society and second, to refer to any specific form, such as ownership, which by itself can be thought of as a bundle» (ibid.: 15). Third, these arrangements can be conceptualized in the property object's bundle of rights itself or fourth, by looking at the many forms of property one social unit holds (ibid.: 15). In the Okakarara area, there are many examples of arrangements conceptualized through property to be found. Since grass as fodder for cattle is rather scarce, arrangements concerning the usage of this resource are necessary. In the establishment of such arrangements that organize and legitimize the use of the grass, many different bundles of rights are taken into account. For instance, those rights come from the Herero society: Headmen, for example, hold higher rights to land and to its distribution than other village residents. A second example is the different forms of rights concerning ownership of the land, the grass and the cattle but also other forms such as rights to inhabit the area and rights to build a fence come into play in the creation of the arrangements of property.

All cross-cultural variations of property relations become manifest in four often interwoven layers of social organization: the layer of cultural ideals and ideologies, the layer of legal institutions, the layer of social relationships and the layer of social practices (von Benda-Beckmann / von Benda-Beckmann 1999: 22). In any of those layers, the three elements of social relations namely the social units, property objects and rights and obligations can be conceptualized as a bundle of rights (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006: 15).

In the layer of ideologies and cultural ideas, these cultural conceptions shape the understanding of property rights as well as why, how and for what purpose they are used. It is possible for multiple and competing ideologies to coexist within one society. This multiplicity leads to the coexistence of multiple property rights, which can compete against each other and sometimes create disputes (von Benda-Beckmann / von Benda-Beckmann 1999: 30).

The second layer of legal regulations and legal pluralism is interfering with the first layer of cultural ideals and ideologies, since laws, legal concepts and obligations also are connected to the ideologies of a society. This second layer differs from the first though the narrower and more specific definition «of the property status of resources and the legal consequences in terms of rights and obligations» (von Benda-Beckmann / von Benda-Beckmann 1999: 30). These can include customary and religious laws. In the area visited for the interviews, the farmers are confronted with different sets of rights constructed at different scales leading to legal pluralism.

In the layer of social relationship, the focus lays on the actually existing social relations concerning property. Here, the functions of property can be opposite to laws made by the state and are found multifunctional. In this context, rights result from local power relations, the community or dependencies with social, economical or political character. In Namibia, these dependencies can often be found between neighbors or relatives: Since the farmers have to depend on each other in times of drought or resource shortage, they often do not report unauthorized actions.

Like the layer of social relationship, the fourth layer also focuses on one of the concrete existing functions of property: everyday social practices. In this paper's case this refers to the actual fencing. The farmers negotiate between different norms, laws, ideologies and relationships to claim rights to a specific part of the land. An example: One farmer told us that he is bothered by his neighbor's fence. However, his neighbor found a way to keep him from reporting the fence to the Royal House by letting him also use the grass within the fence. In this case, the neighbors found a way to not only strengthen their social relationship but also to create a business relation. As this example shows, farmers find a way to reproduce social norms through everyday property relation practices which rule out national property laws.

Considering the layers can be both sharply divided or interwoven and interconnected, the authors propose to see all the layers as equally important. This interrelation of the layers needs further analysis. Variations between and within the layers are produced in processes: «Change may be initiated at any specific layer, and that change then typically feeds back into other layers, leading to imbricate adjustments» (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006: 30). Von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006: 30) further point out that «social practices of various kinds create, maintain and change what property is, having differential effect at the level of ideologies, of legally institutionalized categorical property relations, and of concretized property relationship». The changes in property relations are either initiated through concrete or categorical practices. Concrete practices comprise the (inter)actions of mainly «concrete property objects, relationships, and rights, and [...] occur when people simply use, transfer, inherit or dispute a relationship with a property object» (ibid.: 30). Categorical property relations contain practices that reproduce and change categorical property rights and laws. It explains property law, discusses and disputes over it in interactions settings such as a court, parliaments or other institutions. Any initiated change in either the categorical or the concretized property relation results in changes the respective other, while the rapidity and the underlying factors differ. Due to these continuous interferences, processes of change should be understood as loops within the layers instead of a straight line (ibid.: 30-31).

Blomley (2010) further gives a deeper understanding of the geographies of property. He argues (2010: 216) that space is more than the ground on which lines are drawn and that law is exposed by this fragmentation. Space simultaneously maintains a network of entangled social relations between subjects staying in a permanent progress and reveals itself through diversity and flows. The production of individuated, bounded spaces requires cuts. Blomley (2010: 205-206) names two forms of cuts: The first form starts by changing the social relationship in ways that make property objects, in this case space, separable: «The production of property entails a process of pulverization whereby units (such as fish, ideas, genome, or land) are identifies, bounded and detached, and thus rendered legible and actionable» (Blomley 2010: 206). This is especially the case in the spatial understanding of processes of enclosure, where land is fenced in and others are excluded

from it. The second form of cuts refers to the understanding of space as a network of relations. Within the bounded space, the property owner «is individuated, imagined as a presocial, autonomous and distinctive subject, protected from others by the shield of rights» (Blomley 2010: 206). The owner thus becomes the master within his bounded space. (ibid.: 206).

Cutting implies interfering with the flows within networks of identity and matters of space-building processes. This may seem to lead to «impermanence and fragility of the spaces of property» (Blomley 2010: 207) but only if the ways such «cuts» organize and constitute the world in particular ways, becoming stabilized and sedimented, thus rendering durable and visible the social relations and exclusions constituted through property» (Blomley 2010: 207). Enduring relations and the crossing of the boundaries bears the greatest risk to property since this scrapes on the territories' foundation of being a bounded space and their «ins» and «outs» (Blomley 2010: 207).

Space produces the materiality of property. Through the spatial boundary, for example, a fence between two property-holders, property is territorialized. The production of boundaries asks for changes in the network of social relations, which as a consequence gives rise to tensions in the flows that exist within the property relations. Property is created through enactments – cuts of flows – which turn «wilderness» into an object of property and stabilizes claims (Blomley 2010: 210). In the Okakarara area, property is mostly enacted through fences and sometimes through oral agreements. They produce an inside and an outside and assure the farmers that no one else uses that part of the land. Blomley (2010: 210, 212), however, argues that cuts are actually uncertain, provisional and do not always have to become a property. In the Okakarara area, this is the case if the village's committee votes against the fence or when oral agreements are not respected due to other users in the area or animals. Cuts are always related to the location and property works as a means through which places are made and remade. Creating property bestows places with meaning, which in some cases means transcribing new meaning over the former (Blomley 2010: 212).

Besides creating space, producing property also creates territory. Delaney (2005: 14) defines territory as «a bounded social space that inscribes a certain sort of meaning onto defined segments of the material world». The inscribed meaning relates to territory's creation of an «inside» and an «outside» which are clearly separated. «Inside» and «outside» are parted by a line - a boundary. These boundaries can be physical such as fences or non-physical like boundaries enacted through language. In both cases, the boundaries are meaningful because they signify something. The meaning of a territory is thereby determined by the different types of social relationships the territory is connected with. Examples of meaning are «the specific terms of difference, limit, access, exclusion, the consequences attached to crossing a line» (Delaney 2005: 14). Territories differ in their duration, formality, intention and relevance and should be understood as «products of social practices and processes» (Delaney 2005: 15). These processes and practices are situated «within the realm of social practices» and are «produced under specific historical and social conditions» (Delaney 2005: 16). This also applies in the situation of the fences on the communal land. These fences are human made objects that form a part of the cultural change in which farmers become settlers on this specific land. Moreover, practices of the Herero, such as to acquire big herds, lead to the reorganization of space and amongst other things to territorialization through fences.

However, not every enclosed space is a territory. As discussed, one defining aspect of a territory is signification. A second aspect is that «the meanings it carries or conveys refer to or implicate social power» (Delaney 2005: 17). Power as a social phenomenon occurs in different forms and places, for instance symmetric or asymmetric powers and local or global powers. Territory is a material expression of power manifestations (Delaney 2005: 16). Signification and social power are connected: «In assessing the inscription of meaning to a space – or to the line defining the space and differentiating it from other spaces – one might reasonably inquire about power to create and assign these meanings in the first place» (Delaney

2005: 17). Referring to the visited area, erecting a fence generates the meaning of excluding others, limiting access to some and results in consequences for those ignoring the meaning of the fences.

Territory leads to both security and instability. Since territory is not only a bounded space but also a means to a purpose, it is solving problems or playing out strategies. Territories need communication and form classes of identity and difference also in the sense of determining what belongs «inside» and «outside». In this way, territory «may promote clarity and simplicity, and therefor certainty and predictability, and therefor peace, security and order, and therefor efficiency and progress» (Delaney 2005: 19). The opposite picture is visible by focusing on dynamics of power. Territory in many cases disempowers others by creating conflicts and asymmetrical relations of dependency. The contradiction between security and instability through territory can be explained with intention: Often, what a farmer intends to say with a fence leads to other consequences, which were not intended in the first place (Delaney 2005: 20).

Delaney (2005: 27) argues that territories are best recognized in the motions across the lines of a territory. Territories are not inflexible containers but should rather be understood through the movement of people and things from the inside to the outside, from the outside to the inside (Delaney 2005: 27). This applies to people travelling or the trading of things over state boundaries. In the Okakarara area, territory boundaries are set through fences. These fences only get crossed by the farmers owning the land or their workers, by cattle or small stock if the farmer allows it, by small animals or by small wildlife. The fences are rather fix and inflexible. Even thieves are not crossing the fences to steal. The only instance where the cattle start crossing to graze on the other side is if the fences are broken or down. In my understanding, the territories in the Okakarara area can be recognized through the movements along the lines rather than by their transgression. The fences impact patterns of motion of the people and the cattle by cutting their initial paths.

Elden (2010: 801) conceives territory as a political technology. He explains that a territory «needs to be interrogated in relation to state and space, and that its political aspects need to be understood in an expanded sense of political-legal and political-technical issues» (Elden 2010: 801). In this way, the term political technology «comprises techniques for measuring land and controlling terrain» (Elden 2010: 811). Painter (2010: 1105) then enlists such technologies that effect territory: regional strategies (e.g. economic, spatial, integrated), sub-national review, statistical measures, regional observatories, benchmarking studies, cartographic mapping, modeling a forecast, target-setting and auditing. According to Painter (2010: 1090), territories are an effect of such socio-technical practices because they are not an actual structure but come into existence through these practices (Painter 2010: 1090).

2.2 Access

The right to profit from benefits granted by the authorities does not automatically include the ability to profit thereof. This section therefore introduced the theory of access. Access theory analyzes why some actors profit in cases where they have the right to profit while others do not. Apart from property relations, social relationships thereby also enable or detain people from profiting. Furthermore, access can be controlled, maintained or gained which requires social actions of the actors, for example shifting benefits to someone who is in control. These social actions require structural and relational access mechanisms such as technology, markets, capital, social relations, identities and authority. The section further picks on the opposite of access: exclusion. Similar to access, exclusion is not only based on having or not having the rights to benefit but also based on powers that prevent people from benefitting. Such powers are employed to exclude others from profiting in order to keep the current access, to cause others to lose access to benefits or to ensure others will not get access to benefits. Similar to the mechanisms of access, exclusion is produced through powers of exclusions such as force, market, regulation and legitimation.

Analyzing access intends to «understand *why* some people or institutions benefit from resources, *whether or not* they have rights to them» (Ribot / Peluso 2003: 154). Ribot and Peluso (2003: 153) therefore propose to define access as «the *ability* to benefit from things». This, in turn, broadens the definition of property as «the *right* to benefit from things» by taking into account the different «social relationships that constrain or enable benefits from resource use» (Ribot / Peluso 2003: 153) such as material objects, institutions or symbols. Both definitions stress the term «benefit» and «are concerned with relations among people in regard to benefits or values – their appropriation, accumulation, transfer, distribution, and so forth» (Ribot / Peluso 2003: 155). Benefits are what different actors and groups of actors live on and negotiate over.

The difference between *rights* and *ability* simultaneously hints at the key distinctions between property and access. Ribot and Peluso (2003: 156) point out that «law (whether written or oral, formal or customary) can never completely delineate all the modes and pathways of resource access along complex and overlapping webs of power». For example, someone can have the right to use something and yet may not be able benefit from it. On the other hand, benefitting from resources does not in all cases imply the right to those benefits. Ribot and Peluso (2003: 155-156) therefore understand *ability* as the power of some to influence the practices and ideas of others. For example, agents can mobilize social relations to shape practices. Hence, access and property resemble each other in this regard. Power thereby is received as the practices of people, who are not necessarily attached to them: «These powers constitute the material, cultural and political-economical strands within the «bundles» and «webs» of powers that configure resource access» (Ribot / Peluso 2003: 154). Moreover, the positions of the actors towards the resources are dynamic in terms of time and geographical scale and are shifting with any changes of the strands. While some people or institutions hold those «bundles of power» to control access to resources others have to gain access through strands of those bundles (Ribot / Peluso 2003: 154).

Ribot and Peluso (2003: 159) distinguish oppositional social actions, namely actions of access control and actions of access maintenance. Access control describes the ability to moderate and have power over other people's access. Access maintenance, on the other hand, demands the expending of resources or powers to prevent an open access from closing. One way to achieve this consists of shifting benefits to the actors in control. The two social actions are «constitutive of relations among actors in relation to resource appropriation, management, or use» (Ribot / Peluso 2003: 159) and ensure consensus over meanings and values of resources. Controlling and maintaining access can be complemented by a third concept: gaining access. Gaining access aims to establish access where access has been denied before (Ribot / Peluso 2003: 159).

Maintaining and gaining access take place through mechanisms, means, processes and relations with the aim to control. To gain benefits, *right-based* and *illicit* access mechanisms can be used which are based on laws. As an example of right-based mechanisms, the Ribot and Peluso (2003:160) explain that having the property right to land while simultaneously also holding the strands of access to labor gives more value to the land rights. Access to labor could be denied if this would require a certain membership or social identity such as being a member of a village or belonging to a certain community like the Hereros. In this case, someone would be unable to benefit from the land rights (Ribot / Peluso 2003: 160). Right-based access mechanisms are legal when «sanctioned by law, custom or convention» to use resources or «illegal when benefits are obtained through illegal mechanisms» (ibid.: 161). However, ambiguity in overlapping systems of legitimacy come into place «where a plurality of legal, customary, or conventional notions of rights are used to make claims» (ibid.: 163). The plurality allows some actors to control, maintain or gain access. For illicit access the authors give the example of stolen products, which are only coming to their value through the access to markets (ibid.: 160).

Structural and relational access mechanisms such as «technology, capital, markets, knowledge, authority, social identities, and social relations» (Ribot / Peluso 2003: 165) form and influence access to benefit. In the Okakarara area, this means that the farmers increase their chance of benefiting from the land by mobilizing these mechanisms. Technology allows extracting or reaching resources through using tools. As examples the authors enlist fences, pumps and roads. Capital not only enables access to technology but also controls access through the purchase of rights. Moreover, capital maintains access by paying rents or fees to people who control access and gains access through, for example, legal or illegal sanctions or processes. Having wealth also influences status and power, which privileges access. Furthermore, to enter an exchange relation, it needs access to markets. This may include access fees, access to capital and access to different scales of markets. Actors who have access to labor and labor opportunities benefit from resources. Especially actors controlling the access profit at any stage of labor whereby those who want to maintain access to labor opportunities are dependent on them to gain resources. Hence, it is notable that actors in control of loans «can also affect labor control and the distribution of benefits from resources» (ibid.: 168). Also, access to knowledge influences access to benefits. It not only shapes discourses and frameworks of access but also creates labor opportunities or membership and enables access to authority. The authors point out that «privileged access to the individuals or institutions with the authority to make and implement laws can strongly influence who benefits from the resources in question» (ibid.: 170). Economic and social status thus influences access. Authorities can influence a plurality of jurisdictions while controlling for access, which highlights the importance of access through social identity. Social identity enables benefits through inclusion and exclusion of groups, characteristics, features, types of profession or place of birth of someone. Finally, all the examined access mechanisms are forms of social relations (Berry 1993) and access patterns must be conceived as a process since they change over time (Lund 1994, Berry 1993, Peluso 1996). These mechanisms often limit or complement each other and enable actors to control, maintain or gain access to resources.

Understanding the described flows, actions and mechanisms allows to follow the three steps for analyzing access by Ribot and Peluso (2003: 160): «1) identifying and mapping the flow of the particular benefit of interest; 2) identifying the mechanisms by which different actors involved gain, control, and maintain the benefit, flow and its distribution; and 3) an analysis of the power relations underlying the mechanisms of access involved in instances where benefits are derived» (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 160). Following these steps gives an understanding of access patterns, which describe why some can profit from benefits and resources such as land with or without owning the rights to them.

Hall et al. (2011) approached the issue of enclosure from the opposite side and looked at exclusion instead of access. The authors reformulated Ribot and Peluso's (2003: 153) definition of access as «the ability to benefit from things» into a definition of exclusion as «the ways in which people are prevented from benefiting from things» (Hall et al. 2011: 7). Thereby, they lay focus on the exclusion from profiting from land. Three processes of exclusion can be determined: First, excluding other users to keep the current access to land, second, losing access to land that was existing before and third, maintaining exclusion to prevent other people's access to land. In this a similar to Ribot and Peluso's (2003) understanding of access, the authors interpret exclusion «not just to the presence or absence of rights but to the broader array of powers that prevent people from benefiting from land» (Hall et al. 2011: 8). Focusing on the powers that keep out and the people kept out instead of the regulations creates awareness of the tension that arises from the permission of access to some while excluding others (Hall et al. 2011: 8). For example, building a fence provides extra food for one farmer during the drought but creates negative outcomes for other farmers such as making the grassland in the area scarcer. This, in turn, increases tensions about uneven access between the farmers. These side effects occurring together with the intended positive effect of exclusion are what Hall et al. (2011: 8) call exclusion's double edge.

Exclusion is produced by powers of exclusion. Those powers of exclusion such as the «interaction between regulation, force, the market and legitimation» (Hall et al. 2011: 4) can be understood similarly to the structural and relational access mechanisms of Ribot and Peluso and can be seen as an addition to them: First, regulation constitutes the conditions of the land use and the access to it. The regulation can be formulated by the state and by legal instruments, but can also be drawn up by other social bodies. Second, force involves threatening or practicing violence by state or non-state actors. Third, while Ribot and Peluso's mechanism of market lays focus on the exchange relations that take place, Hall stresses that the price as well as the urge to individualized land claims creates limits of access (Hall et al. 2011: 5). And finally, legitimation «establishes the moral basis for exclusive claims, and indeed for entrenching regulation, the market and force as politically and socially acceptable bases for exclusion» (Hall et al. 2011: 5). All those powers of exclusions could be found on the site of my research. For instance, the regulations of the communal land put the «possession» of land into perspective and determine the size of the camps the farmers are allowed to have (see Chapter 4).

Moreover, Hall et al. (2011: 13-14) lay focus on why people use enclosures and who those people are. They point out that the actors enclosing land do not necessarily have to be the state or large corporations but also smallholders. They argue that what they call «micro-enclosures» of smallholders «should not blind us to the facts that smallholders do not always engage in community-oriented defense of the commons, and that they often want private property land for themselves» (Hall et al. 2011: 14). In my research in the communal land in the Okakarara area the desire for private land was an often-discussed topic in the interviews and during transect walks. The farmers argued that having land to themselves enables them to invest in the land and their animals while they consider this effort as not as effective on shared, common property (see Chapter 6).

3 Methodological Approach

This chapter introduces the methodological framework used to analyze enclosure processes in the Okakarara area. It provides insight into the research design, how I entered the field and gained access to the farmers, it discusses the methods I chose for data collection and outlines how the data was analyzed. In the final section I reflect on my own position in the field and the limitations of my data. My research aims to understand the processes and practices of fencing, puts them in context and interprets them. In order to do so, it lays focus on the perceptions experiences of farmers concerning fencing. Therefore, an in-depth, qualitative approach was chosen and the research conducted interpretive and exploratory.

I chose the communal land in the Okakarara area as my research site for contextual and practical reasons. Before the Namibian's independence, the Okakarara area was a homeland called «Hereroland West». The indigenous group was enforced to live in this area, which implied a change in their way of life from nomadic to settled. Changes to their livelihood and political developments demanded adjustments from the people inhabiting the area. One strategy of adjusting to the changes is fencing. This legally, historically and culturally rich area provided a convenient base to study enclosure processes. I further considered multiple practical reasons in my decision. In Namibia, the distances between towns and villages are far and the roads often difficult to travel on. The proximity of Okakarara to Windhoek compared to the distance of other communal areas was a big advantage. Apart from the proximity, the paved road allowed me to visit my field two times while profiting from the exchange with helpful contacts in Windhoek and use the better infrastructure of the capital for further research. Moreover, I was able to make contact to actors from Switzerland already experienced with the region, which helped me to enter the field.

3.1 Research Design

In order to analyze the fencing processes and practices, the thesis aims to find involved actors and seeks to understand fencing practices and processes through access mechanisms and changing property relations in a setting characterized by long periods of draughts. Placing the main interest on the understanding of actions and interactions of various actors suggested choosing a qualitative approach. Qualitative methods assume that interactions are an interpretative process within which all actions are related to each other through the meaningful interpretation of what actors do or may do. In this way, social and communicative processes and their mutual interpretation of each other construct a social reality. Qualitative analysis thereby explores the processes of interpretation within certain interactions and interprets and reconstructs them (Matissek et al. 2013: 130). I further chose to do exploratory research seeking to generate an understanding and explore in-depth insights about the processes and situations rather than to verify hypotheses or give a final conclusive answer (Stebbins 2001).

To develop an in-depth understanding of the access mechanisms and property relation underlying fencing processes and practices in the area of Okakarara I chose multiple methods. As my research strategy, I combined semi-structured interviews with transect walks. This combination provided me with the farmer's narrations of the fencing situation and history in their villages, the access mechanisms and their social and economic situation and my own observations of the fencing and livelihoods during the transect walks. To complement the knowledge with spatial information, I additionally chose to analyze the villages I visited on satellite images. The satellite images were used as a means to overcome limitations in the spatial understanding occurring through the long distances in the field and the temperature, making those walks impossible.

3.2 Field Research

Fieldwork constituted the major source of data collection. The first few weeks of my stay in Namibia, I was based in Windhoek, where I established a network of social contacts, found a translator to accompany my fieldwork and organized my time in the field. During October and November 2016, I then conducted 22 interviews with farmers from villages located in the Okakarara area. The interviews were complemented by transect walks across their farms, gaining an insight into local livelihoods, fences, livestock and climatic variability. Additionally, I combined the data with satellite images of Google maps. These research methods were chosen according my research question. Choosing multiple methods, as seen in Chapter 3.1, thus best provided the data needed.

3.2.1 Entering the Field

Entering the field, I used different paths and methods to collect the data needed to answer my research question. Before starting the fieldwork, I accustomed myself to the Okakarara area and its residents. To do so, I familiarize myself with the region's history and geography through academic literature and read articles from Namibian Newspapers (The Namibian, New Era, Allgemeine Zeitung) to inform myself about current events on enclosures. In addition, I talked to and emailed with researchers from Namibia, Germany and Switzerland in person, via email or over the phone who generously allowed me to draw on their experience of doing research in this area. In Namibia, with contacts from the Namibia University of Science and Technology (NUST) and Namibian friends I established first contacts to the residents of the Okakarara region and to a translator fluent in Otjiherero. A first trip to Okakarara was very useful to organize my stay and deepen my understanding of the area and the people. I also used the trip to present myself to the town councilor, the regional councilor and a traditional authority and inform them about my research in the area. On the second trip, I conducted the interviews in the villages on the communal land in the Okakarara area accompanied by the translator. During field research, I used different methods to access the people I wanted to talk to, which will be introduced hereafter.

Sampling

For my study, I chose purposeful sampling. Therefore, I chose information-rich cases in order to learn more about the issue of enclosures (Patton 1990: 169). To capture information-rich cases for my study, I chose the maximum variation sampling. This strategy has the advantage of documenting «unique or diverse variations that have emerged in adapting to different conditions» (Patton 1990: 182) and it further «identifies important common patterns that cut across variations» (ibid.: 182). Information-rich cases in the context of my thesis were farmers who live on the communal land in the Okakarara area. In order to understand the impact of fences on farmers' resource use, I aimed to interview a variety of farmers with either no fences or with a small, middle or rather large fenced camp. To understand the processes of fencing and the property relations, I intended to talk to old and new fence owners. I did not specify what size or age I exactly meant by the categories, but left the decision to local residents of the Okakarara area. This provided me with the information on the people's perception of fence sizes and ages and the dimension.

Access to the interview partners was promoted by the regional councilor in Okakarara. Taking the advice of a Namibian researcher, I visited him during my first visit to honor the local procedures of entering a region, respectively a field. I introduced the councilor to my research and informed him about the variety of farmers I wished to talk to. The councilor offered me his help to gain access to the field and enlisted seven villages in the region where he advised me to conduct my interviews. By proposing the villages, the councilor acted as a gatekeeper, «holding the power to withhold access to people or situations for the purpose of research» (Miniechello et al. 1997, cited from De Laine 2000: 123). Community gatekeepers are defined as persons, «whose position in their community affords them formal or informal power to influence researchers' access to members of the study population» (Mack et al. 2005: 115). Mack et al. (2005: 6) advise researcher to work together with a gatekeeper to develop a plan on how to approach community members.

By conducting interviews in the village chosen by the regional councilor, I was aware of the influence of his decision on my data.

Arriving in the villages, I used the snowball method of sampling to identify cases of interest. This method «yields a study sample through referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest» (Biernacki / Waldorf 1981: 141). This way, the cases contain extensive information and are good examples for the study (Patton 1990: 183). Social actors furthermore assist in reaching target persons or hidden population who would otherwise be difficult to access. Hence, initial recruits are picked randomly from the population of interest (Goodman 1961; Noy 2008): In the villages, I started to ask a person I saw from the road to lead us to different fence owners. From there, I went on being led by the person I just conducted the interview with. This not only led me to the variety of fence owners, but also gave me access to remote farms, which are not visible upon entering the village area. As the study went on, I became increasingly aware of specific farmers I still needed to talk to in order to gain all the information needed to understand the fencing processes in the area.

I decided on the sample size by drawing on my interest of information needed to answer my research question as well as resources available within the timeframe (Patton 1990: 184). In qualitative research, purposeful strategies are used rather than methodical formulas. Following Patton's (1990: 185) advice, I set a minimum number and for reasons of comparability and substitutability decided to talk to a minimum of two farmers of each category (small, medium, large, no, a new, an old fenced camp). I then followed the approach of the Grounded Theory (Mey / Mruck 2009: 111; Glaser / Strauss 1998: 45) and kept reevaluating, which farmers I further wanted to talk to, to understand the processes and practices of enclosure in the area. Against the approach of the grounded theory, I did not intend to develop a saturated theory (Mey / Mruck 2009) due to the limited settings of this thesis.

3.2.2 In the Field

In the field, I used multiple methods for data collection. Using multiple methods had the advantage of drawing a fuller picture, adding up and completing information of my research topic rather than reproducing the same information (Nightingale 2009). This triangular between-methods approach (Denzin 2012, 1989; Flick 2007; Lüders 2008) provided a social, temporal and spatial comprehension of fences and fencing processes in the area building the base to answer the research question of this paper. During the fieldwork, I collected data by conducting 22 interviews with farmers in the Okakarara area followed by a transect walk across the farms. To complement the narrations, explanations and observations of the farmers during the interviews and the transect walk, I deepened my spatial and dimensional understanding of the area by overcoming limitations by satellite images of Google maps.

Interviews

Visiting the farmers, we started by doing in-depth, semi-structured, problem-centered interviews. Based on my research question, I prepared a guideline with the main topics I wanted my interview partners to discuss. I structured my guideline by starting with general questions about their everyday lives and the climate and narrowed the topic down to the fences as the interview went on. I thereby used a semi-structured approach and left room for changes in the path of the discussion, for explanations or open narratives apart from my guideline (Flick 2011; Lamnek 2010). This way, the discussion could move in a direction I did not expect or plan, which complemented my data. The problem-centered approach also gave me the opportunity to deepen the conversation by making further queries to specific problems, which in my case was the fencing, to preferably unbiased understand the interview partner's reality on it (Witzel 1982).

Upon approaching the farms, I respected the hierarchy within the family and primarily talked to the «head of the household», which in the majority of the cases was also the farm owner. When the owner was not at the farm, I talked to an other relative such as the son, the wife of the owner or, in rare cases, the workers. I

only questioned the workers, if they already worked at the farm for multiple years since they otherwise could not provide information as completely as needed. Even though, often multiple persons sat with us through the interviews, mostly only one person talked. It happened that other family members added comments, nodded or helped out with information if the main interview partner lacked this knowledge. I am aware that the presence of other individuals can influence a person's answer, opinion or thematic agenda. In the situation, however, I chose to not interfere with my interview partner's decision to have others accompanying them throughout interview. I further assumed that they felt more comfortable to have others around while talking to the translator and myself. Moreover, since the other people were mostly members of the same household, from the same family and shared background, the opinion would not be completely different from my interview partner's.

All the farmers we approached were friendly and welcoming and all of them agreed to an interview. One interview took between 30 and 90 minutes. With the consent of the interview partners, I recorded the conversations with my phone to fully save them and transcribe them later. I further took notes of my impressions of the atmosphere, the people attending and the farm in general. During the walks across the farm, with the farmer's agreements, I also took pictures to remember and compare different settings and variables during the data analysis. The 22 interviews were complemented by various talk with people from NUST, one minister from the Ministry of Agriculture in Okakarara and three officials plus multiple informal conversations with commercial farmers on farming, fencing, climatic variability and the situation on communal as well as on commercial farms. These interviews and talks were not specifically used in the thesis, but, following the grounded theory (see *sampling*), provided me with further background information on and different angles to my topic.

Translator

Most of the interviews were conducted with the help of a translator. The main language spoken by the Hereros in the Okakarara area is *Otjiberero*. Even though English is the official language in Namibia, only a few farmers in the villages I visited were able to speak it. To overcome this barrier, I worked with a translator. This, first, had the advantage for the farmers to be able to speak freely in the language they felt most comfortable in and, second, the advantage to have local guidance to overcome cultural differences. These include how to properly approach and talk to someone in a way that is considered to be polite and respectful. The role of a translator can therefore not be equalized to an instrument merely translating from one language to the other. The translator is an active member in the process and interferes through his own autobiography and analytical engagement (Temple 1997; Temple / Young 2004; Hussein 2009). Hence, researchers have to find a way to deal with this influence: «When translation is made visible and translators are embraced as valuable contributing members of the research team, we are better able to tap into the richness embedded in research data through multiple ways of knowing within and across cultures» (Wong / Poon 2010: 157). During the fieldwork I tried to become aware of the factors influencing the translation. One example of such a factor is the language itself. *Otjiberero* is very different from English and many words which exist in one language do not have an equal in the other language so alternative words and descriptions had to be found by the translator. Another factor is the translator's origin in the region of research. Some farmers we met already knew his family, him or the village where he was from, all of which came with a certain bias. I learned about such factors primarily in conversations and discussions during the hours spent together in the car driving to the villages. I further tried to be attentive to always remove any uncertainties by asking questions, multiple times if needed. After the fieldwork, I had a Namibian friend of mine who also speaks *Otjiberero* listen to a section of one interview. He confirmed to me that the translator made the effort to translate as good as possible. For the reason of awareness of the translator, I use the terms «we» and «us» throughout this thesis since the translator and I conducted fieldwork together.

Transect Walks

After the interviews, the farmer showed us around on their farm. The tour always started at the house, in front of which we always held the interview. At the end of the interviews, we always asked, if the farmer would give us a tour on his farm. We left the choice of destination to the farmer, which provided information on what they perceive as important on their farms. In most of the cases, we went to see either the kraals⁴ or the gardens. The farmers then always showed us their cattle. On the way there, we talked about the fences this particular farmer owns and the fencing situation in the area. Upon reaching the cattle, the farmers often started to talk about the animals' condition, the fodder situation in the field and the weather, the climate and its consequences. After walking a few meters along gardens, kraals, camps (if owned) and or a few steps into the open grazing spaces, we mostly ended our walk at the water station such as the borehole or the pipes. These transect walk, in my case accompanied by a study participant, (Lynch 1960; Benwell 2009; Carpiano 2009) «help reveal some of the place- and practice-based insights of participant observation without the intensity and time commitment ethnography demands» (DeLyser / Sui 2012: 297). It enables to talk about the spatial practices when observing them, which provides an understanding of the cause effect relationships (DeLyser / Sui 2012: 297).

I consider transect walks a very fruitful method for data collection. While walking and without being recorded, I perceived the farmers to be more open and talking more freely. The walks along the farms also helped to gain a deeper understand of the spatial dimension, soil and vegetation, the farming practices and resource use. The distances covered during the walks were not very far due to the heat, length and location of the fences and the uneven paths over sand and through bushes. The walks, therefore, were mainly across the farm and to the «beginning» of the fences near the homesteads. I further customized the length of the walk-along to the physical conditions and timeframe given by the farmers I accompanied. In average, they lasted between 15 to 45 minutes. To be able to recall the talks and my observations, I took notes and made sketches when returning back to the car or in the evening after returning to my accommodation in Okakarara.

Satellite Images

To understand the spatial dimensions and structures of fencing in the area, I complemented my field data with satellite images of Google maps. My thesis profited from the triangulation since the two methods of data collection «are then woven into a broad account to reveal larger spatial structures and deeper meanings about cultural landscape» (Jiang 2003: 226). The images thereby became identifiable through my own experience, knowledge of the geographic region and the fences and my perception (Lillesand et al. 2008: 188). Memorizing the farms and villages I visited during my time in the field, I recognized the houses, fences, the vegetation, animals and roads. Drawing on these familiar characteristics, I compared patterns such as arrangements, shape, tone, texture, reflections and shadows of objects (Lillesand et al. 2008: 191). While the corrugated iron of the roofs of houses was found quickly, recognizing fences was more difficult since they are rarely visible on the images. I therefor used my observation and knowledge of the field to developed different strategies to locate them anyway. For example, darker and brighter shades indicate the intensity of usage of the area and therefore a fence. Furthermore, paths or aisles can often be found along the fences, making it easier to identify them. Kraals could be found in front of the houses and were often darker than the surroundings due to the animals' dung. Boreholes can be spotted by their round tank and the paths leading to it from all directions. Knowing the starting points of the fences at the homesteads I visited let me retrieve the camps.

⁴ Small resting camps, where livestock is kept during certain times of the day.

3.3 Analyzing the Data

For the data analysis, I used multiple strategies with different purposes. Data analyzing techniques such as transcribing, taking notes, sorting the pictures and scratching maps helped me to sort and outline the data, gain an overview and was a first analyzing process. This was useful for the further steps of analysis. Moreover, I illustrated the data in mind maps, created and recreated codes with the coding tool MAXQDA, started to write and rewrite and do scratches. This part of the analyzing process helped me to structure the data and recognize connections, patterns and inconsistencies. In the following, I will explain some of the methods used for data collection in more detail.

Transcribing

I understand transcribing as a first step of analyzing, coding and arranging the data. I converted the spoken words from records into text. «Transcripts are needed to make fleeting conversational behavior permanently available on paper for scientific analysis» (Kowal / O'Connell 2004: 248). The creation of transcription thereby does not exactly illustrate on text basis what the person has said in the interview but should rather be seen as selective, theoretical, constructive processes (Kowal / O'Connell 2010: 440). To transcribe my interviews, I chose to lay focus on *what* the farmers answered rather than on *how* they said it. Since I used a translator to conduct the interviews, it was not possible to transcribe word by word what the farmers told us, only how the translator reproduced what they were saying. Since his English was not always that good, I chose to transcribe the meaning of what he said by reformulating, correcting and adjusting his words into full, understandable sentences (Mayring 2002: 91). By doing so, I made sure that I understood the meaning of the farmers' answers when listening to the record; what I consider to be closest to what the farmers meant. I further recognized that also the translator's way of stressing the words and the tone of his voice contributed to the meaning of what he said, which I would have lost by transcribing it word for word. By transcribing, I abstained to write down pauses, coughs or expressions of emotions, since those were expressions in the translator's way of talking. I considered them as not enough valid to draw a conclusion on the farmer's expressions and emotions. Meanwhile, I tried to cover the expressions and emotions of the farmers by taking notes during the interviews.

Being Creative: Notes / Mind Maps / Sketches / Satellite Images / Pictures

Using the notes, mind maps, sketches from the transect walks and from the satellite images and the pictures I took helped me to structure and outline the data. In a first step, I rearranged all the data according to the farms and villages where I collected the data. This step primary helped me to understand social and spatial relations. It allowed me, for example, to separate villages with a village fence from those without one and compare the different fencing practices and the underlying social structures between the villages. Sketches further helped me to simplify the satellite images to get a better and clearer understanding. Adding the pictures and notes I made during the fieldwork to the different interviews and spatial living situations complemented the sketches and helped me to catalogue details as well as the situations in general. Like my notes, pictures thereby are not objective; they take me back to the way I looked at things when I was there, which differs from others looking at the same picture (Harper 2004). The main part of analysis in this step was to bring together all the information in mind maps. This revealed which paths were fruitful and able to illustrate connections. Besides my data, the mind maps used other literature and theory to inspire and widen paths. The mind maps lay a base for the structuring of the thesis.

Coding with MAXQDA

In my thesis, I used coding as part of the analysis. While transcribing the data, I listened to it multiple times. In a next step, I rearranged the data and determined the paths and patterns I wanted to follow for my thesis. These steps of analysis can be seen as open coding: «Open codes serve to reduce the mass of largely textual data into manageable groupings» (Bowen 2008: 143). Drawing on this selection, I coded the data after the axial coding. This type of coding «aims to link categories with subcategories and asks how they are related»

(Charmaz 2014: 148). This specifies the characteristics or attributes and dimensions such as the location of a category (Charmaz 2014: 148). Through the axial coding, I developed subcategories, which deepened the paths evaluated before. These categories and subcategories were then further sorted temporally, spatially or thematically and later used as chapters and subchapters in my thesis. For the coding, I used the tool MAXQDA, which allowed me to easily evaluate, illustrate, mark and change the categories and subcategories developed in the mind maps.

3.4 Limitations of the Thesis

The methods chosen, the fieldwork, the data interpretation and the writing were confronted with different limitations, which will be outlined in this chapter. The first section reflects on my position in the field. Doing research is never objective; the researcher influences the outcomes through his or her gender, culture, age, beliefs, morals and values, which are inseparable from his or her actions. Even with the most distanced and structured methods, the position of the researcher influences the data at every step of the process. As researchers, we therefore «must recognize and take account of our own position, as well as that of our research participants, and write this into our research practice» (McDowell 1992: 409). Reflecting on the positions is considered as «a strategy for situating knowledge: that is, as a means of avoiding false neutrality and universality of so much academic knowledge» (Rose 1997: 306). Apart from my position in the field, the thesis faced limitation through the choice of methods, the language barrier, the resources and time available for fieldwork, as well as the climatic conditions which I am going to describe in the second section of the chapter.

3.4.1 Positionality

Doing research comes with the responsibility of reflecting one's the position within the field; especially, since my fieldwork was conducted on an other continent with cultural differences. Even though I knew Namibia from a previous trip, travelling to the small town of Okakarara and its surrounding villages by myself came with certain anxieties and unease. In advance, I was particularly concerned about the people's reactions to me as a European, considering the cruel history of Germans in this area. During my time spent in Okakarara, people often approached me with this topic, wanting to discuss the controversial compensation payments of Germany to the Hereros. While walking through Okakarara, I often found myself feeling guilty for the colonial history and uncomfortable with my privileged position coming back to this place for my research. During my time in the area, I learned to adjust to this situation and discuss these topics with the local people I met. In contrast to my earlier concerns of the local people feeling mistrust or anger towards me, while talking with some people in Okakarara who were able to speak English, I learned that they respected me for wanting to understand their history and being interested in their livelihoods.

As a young, blonde, European woman, travelling alone, I raised a lot of attention wherever I went. During my stay, I tried to adjust to this attention but I never felt completely comfortable with it. In the villages where we conducted the interviews this distance and feelings of being different were much smaller. Presumably, having the translator introduce me to them and explain the intentions of my stay decreased a lot of distrust and suspiciousness. I further assume that the intimate group of the farmer and possible neighbors or family members, the translator and me simplified the encounters and conversations. I believe that the farmers' curiosity and interest concerning my person were an advantage for me in finding interview partners. Not one of the farmers we approached refused to talk to us. For the interviews, I was always offered the best chair to sit on. For me this also came with discomfort. I assume the best chair is given to the guests. However, it should have been reserved for the translator since he was a male and older than me and not given to me simply because of my background. I tried to be aware of those feelings of guilt and discomfort and overcome them by accepting them and learning that they are a part of me. Moreover, while they pose an issue for me, they need not coincide with the perceptions and thinking of the people I met. Furthermore, I attempted to separate such feelings from the situation. I tried to overcome the feeling of

distance and inequality in the power relations by talking and discussing with the farmers, staying open minded, showing interest and respect and meeting them on a level of equality.

My position as a foreigner further came with the absence of language skills and a lack of cultural knowledge. Since the conversation was translated, emotional reactions to statements were delayed, which also influenced the characteristic of the conversations. The delay made it also more difficult for me to react to what they talked about and harder to follow certain paths in the conversation. I consider that the translation also influenced the trust, sympathy and feeling of getting to know the other person during the conversations, which in turn influenced the data. Also, the farmers often assumed circumstances of their «reality»⁵ to be normal and expected me to know them. For this reason, they sometimes wondered about the questions I asked. In these situations, the translator explained to them my lack of knowledge, how my understanding is different and how their situation is nonetheless interesting to me. Thereby, my foreignness had the advantage of having people be forgiving and understanding about my lack of knowledge of «normality».

Beside my position, the position of the farmers also influenced research. In some cases, I had the impression that the farmers answered what they expected I desired to hear. One farmer, for example, just built a fence in the «open space». At the same time, he expressed discontentment when discussing farmers who build such fences and asked for more control. Due to a certain amount of distrust, I also assume the farmers did not always talk as freely as they would talk to members of their community. In other cases, the farmers stressed their unfortunate situation to me. In these situations, I benefitted from the translation of their statement through the translator, which prevent that the interview was taken over by emotions.

3.4.2 Challenges and Limitations

Many challenges and limitations of my study occurred through my background, the methods I chose, the resources and time available and the climatic conditions. As discussed before, my cultural background lead to a certain barrier and my lack of language skills posed a challenge during the conversations. Furthermore, the methodology and different steps I chose for my research came with certain limitations. One such limitation, for instance, concerned the satellite images I used to complement my spatial knowledge of the villages: Not only was it difficult to recognize the fences on the images, but they also did not provide information on the social structures. For example, it was not always clear, which fence/s belong to which farm/s. Hence, I could only draw conclusions from the farms I visited myself while it was difficult to gain insight into social structures of the villages in general. In some cases, the farmers also accused their neighbors of having fenced in a large area, while the neighbors denied it. Since I could not understand the dimensions at the time, drawing on the satellite images was sometimes not revealing because of lacking ownership information of certain fences.

Moreover, the climatic conditions at the time we visited were one of the greatest challenges. Since we visited in the summer, even by leaving for the field early in the morning, the temperature rose over 30°C soon after the sun came up. During the interviews, it became hard to stay patient and focused after a while. The transect walks in the heat of the sun were physically challenging. Due to the conditions, we mainly focused on the farms and the entrance of the camps close to the houses rather than walking along the fences, which would have taken us multiple hours.

My study was further limited by the available resources and timeframe. To gain an overview of the enclosure processes and different variations of fences, I chose to visit multiple villages and found similar patterns within them. The variety, however, only allowed a small amount of interviews per village, which I partly overcame by adding spatial information from satellite images. With more resources and time, it would be possible to conduct interviews with more residents of more villages. Through this expansion, it would

⁵ In this thesis I assume that reality is always constructed and can not be fully reproduced through language.

become possible to outline the social and spatial village structures in more detail. Especially, extending the research to more remote areas in the «open spaces» would increase knowledge about involved actors, their livelihoods and enclosing processes.

4 Contextual background

The chapter provides an historical and legal background on enclosures on communal land in the Okakarara area. The first part thereby focuses on the history of the Herero. The indigenous group today inhabits the area of my study. In previous years, the pastoralist group migrated with their cattle from Angola to Namibia. When Germany colonized the country, many Hereros lost their lives in the Herero-German war. The remaining people were forced into «native reserves» which were established under the South African rule. After the independence of Namibia, the country's tenure system was divided into commercial and communal land. Commercial farms were held under freehold title, while the former reserves were converted into communal land as governmental property. Multiple Land Reform Acts were passed, aiming to redistribute the land, which is still characterized by imbalances from the country's colonial past.

4.1 The Hereros: A Pastoralist Community with a Colonial Past

The section illustrates the history of the pastoralist group of Herero. It is assumed that the *Otjiberero* speaking group migrated from Angola to Namibia's north and center. When the Hereros started moving to southern pastures, they became involved in disputes over land and cattle with other indigenous groups. In 1884, German settlers arrived and started to accumulate land. Under the German rule, the Hereros' pastures were cut and limited to a small area and the community abused. The conflicts between Hereros and the German force found its peak in the Herero-German war, when the majority of the Hereros were violently killed. When Germany was weakened during the First World War, South Africa invaded German South West Africa, which was how the country was named at the time. Under the South African Odendaal Commission, all ethnic groups, according to the apartheid regime, were forced into reserves such as the Hereroland (Werner 1993: 145-146). These reserves remained until Namibia's independence in 1990 and its special and social consequences are still noticeable today.

4.1.1 Hereros as Pastoralists

Much of the Hereros origin can only be presumed since it was rarely documented before the 19th century. The *Otjiberero* speaking group is assumed to have entered the Kaokoland in Namibia's north from southwestern Angola between 1550 and 1700 (Vedder 1934: 135). The reason for movement of the group can be found in violent conflicts and a major dry period in southern Angola (Miller 1997). Furthermore, early forms of livestock husbandry are connected to the group. It thereby remains unclear how the group gained possession of the livestock, if they could have been addressed as pastoralists, and how their local economies transformed due to the livestock. While economic orientation in Botswana focused on food production, northern and central parts of Namibia, in particular, remained dependent on livestock, complemented by hunting and gathering, which gained relevance in dry periods (Smith 2000).

In the 19th century, *Otjiberero* speaking people gained presence in Namibia. Hereros had migrated to the central part of the country and expanded their movements on southern pastures into the territory of the Nama and the Oorlam, two other groups. This led to conflict and forced the Hereros to move back to northern parts. Starting in 1820, their animals were plundered in high number by the Oorlam, who traded the cattle at markets at the Cape Colony. In 1870, missionaries and traders armed the Hereros who then were able to regain their presence. Hereros also started to extend raiding activities to the two groups from the south, which led to further conflict. During this period, a pastoralist society was formed among the Hereros in connection with missionaries and the Cape trade markets. Hereros began restocking their herds in high numbers, especially the Herero elite who owned up to 10'000 cattle (Bollig / Gewalt 2000: 17-18; Henrichsen 2000).

4.1.2 Under the German Rule: German South West Africa

German colonization started in 1883. Adolf E. Lüderitz made a land deal with a member of the Namas, which was the beginning of land tenure in the country. In the following years, German settlers continued the indirect colonization in the southern and central parts of the country by buying land from different indigenous groups. Using the conflict between Namas and Hereros, the German settlers forcefully expanded their territory (Zimmerer 2003). In 1880, when the Namas again started to gain control over water points and grazing areas, the Hereros' attempt to eliminate their leader ended in the loss of more and more ground. The Hereros' chief Maherero sought support from incoming German colonial forces. «What started as a small detachment of German colonial troops expanded and grew bit by bit, (...) until imperial Germany gained control over the territories of the Herero» (Bollig / Gewald 2000: 18). When Maherero died, German colonialists supported his son Samuel Maherero. Their sympathy ensured more land deals with the new chief and made it possible that by 1896, German forces were located all across the Hereros' area (Bollig / Gewald 2000: 18-19).

In 1896, the developments were cut by the rinderpest. The epidemic spread quickly across Africa. Reaching the Hereros' region, within a month the community lost two thirds of their cattle. The situation for the Hereros was further challenged by the German colonial administration that «enforced a selective culling and inoculation campaign, in which diseased cattle were killed for the production of vaccine» (Bollig / Gewald 2000: 19). As a consequence, the Hereros were forced to either lose their cattle or become indebted to vaccinate their herds, which was rarely successful. The rinderpest resulted in economic destruction and forced Herero chiefs, in the hope of maintaining their community and power, into selling more land to German colonialists (Bollig / Gewald 2000: 19).

In 1904 the Herero-German war (or German-Herero war) found its beginning. Samuel Maherero, the then current paramount chief of the Hereros raised forces against the German rulers to revolt against the progressive colonization of central Namibia. As colonization they understood developments such as violence, for example corporal punishment and violent attacks on Herero men and women, legal inequality between European settlers and the local communities, increasing indebtedness through dynamics of the colonial loan systems due to the rinderpest, competition for land which restricted migrations of cattle herds and the plans of a reserves system that wanted to restrict the people's mobility and access to land permanently (Krüger 1999; Kuss 2004). Within days, the Hereros attacked and killed more than hundred European farmers (Leutwein 1907: 466). From a legal view, what followed was one of the most difficult conflicts in colonial history. In August of 1904, the fight found its peak at the Waterberg with the «Kesselschlacht» (a fight in a valley of the Waterberg) where the German soldiers strongly dominated the battle. The Hereros, along with their livestock, escaped into the dry Kalahari Desert in Omaheke. The German soldiers, lead by the German corps commander Lothar von Trotha, cut their way back out of the desert, blocked all the water points and killed fleeing Hereros (Anlauf 2008: 150; Krüger 1999). In 1905, the surviving Hereros were forced to work in labor camps where many also died from hunger, thirst and exhaustion. It is estimated that between 35 and 80 percent of the 40'000 to 100'000 Hereros died as a consequence of the war, which is controversially discussed to have been genocide (Förster 2010; Zimmerer 2003; Kuss 2004).

The war had long lasting effects. In 1906, the German colonial administration issued the order that all groups involved in the war (also the Damara and Nama) would be expropriated. The Hereros land and livestock was shifted into German possession. The order deprived Hereros from their livelihood and forced them into wage labor, exploited by the German colonialists (Zimmerer 2001). With the «native law customs» coming into existence in 1907, Namibia's population was legally obligated to own a passport and thus, controlled the mobility of the residents. Through the control over the mobility, the German colonial administration established African wage labor, pushed ethnic segregation and a social order which privileged

the European settlers (Werner 1998). This provided a base for South Africa's reserve policy in Namibia (Förster 2010: 46, from Chatzoudis 2004; Werner 2004).

4.1.3 Under the South African Rule: South West Africa

Displacements and dispossession of indigenous Namibians in the South and the country's center increased the colonial accumulation of land by German settlers. German settlers established commercial farms on land parcels in fruitful areas of the country. For neutral indigenous groups, they planned small reserves (Förster 2010: 47, from Mendelsohn 2002: 135; Werner 2004: 294). During the First World War, South African and British troops invaded German South West Africa. The weakened Germany had to capitulate and in 1915, the country shifted under the South African rule, which took it under a military administration. The «native reserve» policy was pursued by South Africa (Förster 2010: 49). The «native reserves» aimed to produce a system that generated more labor for the colonial economy. The reserves were not meant to develop successful small scale farming, since this was seen as a threat to the labor market. Colonial administrators planned to have the women and children, the elderly and infirmed stay in the reserves while the men were engaged in the labor market (Werner 1993: 136).

In 1924, the Waterberg Reserve was established. The reserve for the Herero ethnicity lay partly within the area, where German colonialists planned a reserve in 1902. The reserve allowed the *Otjiberero*-speaking community who fled after the German Herero War to return to the region. They repaired former water points and moved to previous settlement sites in the East of Okakarara (Förster 2010: 50, from Köhler 1959: 35, 42). In 1964, within the Odendaal Commission, the South African apartheid policy also evolved in South West Africa and transferred the South African homeland system to the country. According to the Commission, the Waterberg Reserve was combined with three other reserves, the Otjiuuo Reserve, the Eastern Native Reserve and the Epukiro Reserve, and became the homeland Hereroland West (Förster 2010: 50). The homelands were intended to divide the country's land by skin colour. According to the Commission, the fusion of reserves combined with additional land would provide a livelihood for all its inhabitants. In reality, the homeland of the Hereros increased by unusable land due to the lack of water and the presence of a toxic plant. Like the other six ethnically divided enclaves, the Hereroland persisted in its form until the country's independence in 1990.

4.1.4 Namibia

When Namibia became independent in 1990, the homeland policy ended. Privately owned farmland became commercial land and stayed in the possession of the owners. Former reserve areas became the property of the government and were declared communal land, where local communities commonly use the land and resources (Mendelsohn et al. 2002). With multiple Land Reform Acts since 1990, the government pursues more equality in Namibia's land distribution (discussed in the next chapter). In the Okakarara area, the consequences of the Hereros' history are still apparent. Spatially, the frontier between the Hereros in the communal land and the former German settlers still persists even though today it marks different tenure systems rather than forming a socio-political divide. The majority of the land around the Waterberg is still in the hands of the commercial farmers and attempts of convergence rare and hesitant (Förster 2010).

In 2001, the German-Namibian history gained new attendance when representatives of the Hereros sued the Federal Republic of Germany and German commercial enterprises active in the former German South West Africa for several billions of USD as compensation payments for the genocide of thousands of Hereros. Two years later, they abandoned the lawsuit. In 2004, 100 years after the German-Herero war began, a representative of the German Development Ministry apologized to the Hereros for the German past in the region. Until today, among other things, due to the difficult body of evidence, Germany did not recognize the colonial war as genocide and did not meet any payments (Kämmerer / Föh 2004; Sarkin

the pressure on grazing land in the communal land» (ibid.: 7). The government decided to place their focus on the redistribution of freehold land. The land reform program started in 1990 with the Namibian Constitution and the goal that «all persons shall have the right in *any* part of Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of all forms of immovable and movable property individually or in association with others and to bequeath their property to their heirs or legatees» (Mendelsohn et al. 2012: 12, quoted after the Article 16, The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia). In 1991, Namibia held the first *National Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question* to discuss the redistribution of land. Shortly after, the first ideas like the «willing-seller, willing-buyer», the Affirmative Action Loan Scheme (AALS) and resettlement programs were implemented.

Land for redistribution is acquired through either the «willing-seller, willing-buyer» mode or expropriation. With the «willing-seller, willing-buyer» mode, the government buys land from willing sellers for commercial agriculture. «The state has the preferential right, meaning that any farm that is to be alienated in Namibia has to be offered to the state first before it can exchange hands on the open market» (Chigbu et al. 2017: 7). The government is dependant on offers from sellers to acquire land. However, it has been argued, that there is more land available to be bought than the government is claiming. The reason for the slow process of land distribution is considered to be the bureaucracy, not able to fulfill all the offers in a short amount of time (Odendaal 2005: 4). Expropriation is very rarely used for land acquisition. In these cases, the acquisition that takes place is compulsory, while the seller is compensated according to market prices. «This form of acquisition mostly targets underutilized, abandoned and excessive holding of land (Von Carlowitz / Mandimika 2015: 7). Between the independence in 1990 and 2015, about 1% of freehold agricultural land was redistributed to previously disadvantaged Namibians – approximately one fourth of the land held in freehold (Werner 2015: 5). Since 2004, the two land acquisition strategies are complemented by land taxes. The land taxes progressively rise with the amount of farms possessed by one farmer. In this way, the taxes pressures farmers to sell land and aim to produce more acquirable land for the state (Odendaal 2005: 5).

The Affirmative Action Loan Scheme provides farmers with a loan for a resettlement. It was implemented in 1992 to relieve pressure on the overgrazed and overcrowded communal areas by resettling farmers from communal to commercial farms. The «Agribank» provides loans for a 25 year period at interest rates which are subsidized by the government (Werner 2003: 12). Only a specific group of farmers are able to qualify for such a loan. The criteria they must fulfill are the following:

- » «The applicant must be identified as a farmer in the communal areas.
- » He/she must own a minimum of 150 large stocks or 800 small stocks or the equivalent thereof.
- » Proof must be rendered by the authority of the communal area of the numbers of the applicant's stock in the area.
- » The applicant must furnish proof that he/she has removed his/her total stock out of the communal area» (Werner 2003: 13, quoted from Werner and Vigne 2000: 50).

From 1992 to 2013, 649 farms and an area of 3'412'431 hectares of land have been established by the AALS (Werner 2015: 5).

The National Resettlement Programme (NRP) (later revised by the 2001 Resettlement Policy) puts focus on who do not qualify for the criteria of AALS. Beneficiaries thereby are divided in three groups: «Beneficiaries can be Namibians who have neither land, nor income, nor livestock; who have neither land, nor income but few livestock; and those who do not have land but income or livestock. Drawing on the AALS, only farmers with a maximum of 150 large stocks or 800 small stock can qualify for the program. People of the «San» community, ex-soldiers, displaced/destitute persons, persons with disabilities, and farmers who live in overcrowded communal areas» (Von Carlowitz / Mandimika 2015: 6) are thereby favored. The goal of the NRP is to allow farmers, groups or cooperatives to become self-supporting by

providing them with opportunities to grow their own food, generate an income and becoming part of the economy. Those farmers are often then resettled on a former commercial farm that is subdivided into smaller plots, receiving leasehold for 99 years. The leasehold further allows the farmers to receive a low-interest credit from the Agribank. This is an improvement from the communal land, where land can not serve as a collateral for credit (Von Carlowitz / Mandimika 2015: 5-7). From 1991 to 2014, 371 farms have been resettled by the NRP to 2'264'462 hectares of land (Werner 2015: 5). However, the NRP is still criticized because «post-settlement support, for example in providing water infrastructure, is insufficient and resettlement farmers lack the means and knowledge to make sustainable investments» (Von Carlowitz / Mandimika 2015: 7).

In 1995, the first Land Reform Act came into existence. The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act further stated that the state should purchase commercial land, based on compensations, establishing a Land Reform Advisory Commission, which planned how commercial land should be allocated and used, providing a scheme of small scale farming through subdivision of plots, prohibiting that foreigners buy land (Werner 2003: 7). The Act also gave a definition of Namibians, who should benefit from the land distribution as

«Namibian citizens who do not own or otherwise have the use of agricultural land or adequate agricultural land, and foremost to those Namibians who have been socially, economically or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory practices» (Werner 2003: 8, quoted from RoN 1995).

Therefore, income was not a criterion for benefiting. This was one of the reasons experts criticized that the definition's formulation is too imprecise and the selection procedures non-transparent. They argued that «the benefits of land distribution will be captured by elite groups who might have been previously disadvantaged but no longer fit the category» (ibd.: 7). The benefiting of a new elite such as ministers through such systems was also often critiqued the following years. A more precise definition by the White Paper on Resettlement in 1997 did not end this development either. The White Paper Resettlement mainly aimed to accompany the resettled target groups for five years towards self-sufficiency through a full income from farming and to bring them into the mainstream market of Namibia's economy. One way to do so was established by the National Land Policy in 1998 which proposed to subdivide larger commercial plots into smaller resettlement farms in order to adapt to the increasing pressure caused by population growth (ibd.: 8). Simultaneously, the Poverty Reduction Strategy for Namibia of 1998 as well as the National Poverty Reduction Action Programme 2001-2005 also placed focus on the redistribution of land as a strategy to reduce poverty in the long term. However, a World Bank study (1997) of poverty reduction concluded that farmland is limited and a shift towards a more urban lifestyle was recognizable.

4.2.2 Communal Land Reform

The Communal Land Reform Act 2002 (CLRA) intended to regulate land use on communal land and end illegal fencing by powerful and wealthy people. The Act therefore restricted the use and habitation of Communal land to Namibians of a traditional community. The purpose of traditional communities inhabiting those areas is to promote economic and social development of the people. It was designed so that people without access to land or without employment, in particular, would benefit. Traditional communities therefore have «claims to the use of land in their traditional area in terms of the customary law of their particular area». (Odendaal 2011: 15). This area includes «commonages»; parts within the communal land, which were traditionally used for grazing. Commercial farming thereby is prohibited within Communal areas, and suggested to be shifted to Commercial areas since large plots of land would have to be accumulated.

Before the country gained independence, the colonial legislation put traditional powers into place to allocate land. In 1928, traditional authorities (TA)⁷, chiefs (also called headmen) and paramount chiefs were appointed through the Native Administration Proclamation. A chief (headman) duties therefore were to be «responsible for the proper allotment to the extent of the authority allowed them by law of arable lands and residential sites in a just equitable manner without prejudice» (Odendaal 2011: 8). In a next step, magistrates were made overall controlling agencies. Their task was to make allotments of the land and since positioned higher than the chief, they could forbid him to make allotments. In 1954, the administration was moved to South Africa. As a consequence, traditional communities were forced into reserves on state land. Through the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa, the various communities were provided with self-governance. In 1980, the reserves were declared communal land of particular groups and the administration was moved back to the former «South West Africa» (today called Namibia) (ibid.: 8-9). «Notwithstanding colonial laws relating to the allocation of land, it appears, as indicated above, that communal land allocated effectively remained the responsibility of traditional authorities» (ibid.: 2011: 9).

After the independence, the government's involvement in communal lands focused mainly on developing unused parts for agricultural purposes. This strategy was developed at the National Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question in 1991 (Werner 2003: 12). Despite the fact that benefits were not believed to be distributed widely, the government decided to proceed with this strategy, since it was considered to be less cost intensive to «develop communal land for small scale commercial farming than to buy developed land on the open market» (ibid.: 12). Whereas this option provides access to land to many previously disadvantaged Namibians, Werner (ibid.: 12) critiques that this strategy does not increase equity since the land is not redistributed. Furthermore, the government pledged to compensate for the acquired land. However, this offer was only provided to commercial farmers, since the government argued to «own» the communal land already. This was critiqued, since it was considered as not treating all Namibians equally (ibid.: 12). It took the government of Namibia 12 years to develop a Communal Land Reform Act. In this time period «the absence of any constitutional recognition of customary land tenure rights in communal areas resulted in communal farmers and traditional authorities having no statutory law remedy to defend their right» (Odendaal 2011: 12). As a consequence, this situation was misused by powerful and wealthy groups or individuals to erect fences on communal ground. The problem of illegal fencing became more and more present in debates of the National Assembly and the issue of fencing and access to land by other farmers became more acknowledged by the government (ibid.: 13).

With the introduction of the Communal Land Reform Act in 2002, the government created a legal basis to control fencing on communal land. An important implementation of the Communal Land Reform Act was the establishment of Communal Land Boards⁸ to supervise and control «the whole, a part or a combination of various regions» (Odendaal 2011: 15) of communal lands. The Board carries out «control over the allocation of customary land rights by Chiefs or Traditional Authorities» (ibid.: 15), and governs those rights' granting, recording and cancelling to the applicants. Those customary land rights include rights to a farming unit, a residential unit and any form of customary tenure accepted by the responsible Minister from the Ministry of Land and Resettlement⁹. The size of the unit thereby is limited to a maximum of 20 hectares. Odendaal (2011: 15) states that the Communal Land Boards «in collaboration with Traditional Authorities, significant powers to manage land use and allocation in the communal areas».

⁷ «Traditional authority is the customary leadership of a traditional community» (Mendelsohn 2008: 5).

⁸ «Each region has a communal land board which, among other things, assesses and approves applications for communal land rights (...)» (Mendelsohn 2008: 5). Members thereby work voluntarily and from different sectors and work under the CLRA (Mendelsohn 2008: 5).

⁹ The Ministry of Lands & Resettlements is a government agency implementing the regulations of the CLRA 2002. «Regional staff of the MLR are required to serve as secretaries to the CLBs and to process all CLR applications and the issuing of CLR certificates» (Mendelsohn 2008: 5). The staff visits each property and maps the fences to register the unit (Mendelsohn et al. 2008).

Different Sections within the Communal Land Reform Act specifically refer to fencing and intend to prevent illegal fencing.

- » Unless authorized through CLRA, no more fences should be erected on communal land. Exceptions are fences surrounding houses, cattle pens, crop or water which are used to manage agricultural activities.
- » Grazing animals on Communal Land are only permitted to lawful residents. The right for grazing is dependable from certain conditions such as the decision of the Chief or TA where a certain number of stock is allowed to graze. Furthermore, the right is dependable on whether the Chief, TA or Land Board determine to use the land as a leasehold or other granted customary right.
- » Access to commonage furthermore is only granted if the residents are in possession of a written authorization from the Chief or TA and a confirmation from the competent Land Board. In any other case, on the commonage, no person is allowed to build or occupy any structure, cultivate land, inhabit the land or occupy it, to block the way to common water stations or prevent others from accessing them or do anything that prevents other residents from carrying out their rights of grazing.
- » If the fences have been erected before the CLRA became effective, the owner of the fence has to submit an application to maintain the fence. The allocation must be executed by documentary evidence, complemented by a letter granted by the concerning Chief or TA.
- » For the approval of the allocation, the Land Board must ensure that the fences were erected complying with the customary or statutory law, that the access and use of the land by other residents is not restricted or limited through the fences and there is enough reason within the circumstances of the case for the particular farmer to keep the fence or fences.
- » If the Land Board is not content with a farmer's claim to keep the fence, it could either reject it or pass on the matter to the responsible Chief or TA to decide (ibid.: 17-19).

Fences erected after the CLRA became effective are illegal and punishable. If the CLRA is ignored, a person can be liable and forced to be fined up to 4000 NAD, punished with a maximum of one year in prison or a combination of both. If a person refuses to remove a fence after conviction, this person gets sanctioned with 15 NAD per day as long as the offence exists. In the case of an offence, the Chief, the TA or the Land Board could also forcefully remove the fence and confiscate the materials whereby the owner of the fence must defray the costs for the removal (Odendaal 2011: 17-19; Malan 2003). However, fences owners rarely face these consequences, as interviews in the Okakarara area showed.

In 2005, a National Stakeholders Conference to propose amendments to the Communal Land Reform Act was held by the Municipality of Land resettlement. The conference intended to allow cluster villages (multiple households together) to be registered in the name of the village chief / headman. They wanted to exceed the parcels from 20 hectares to 50 hectares - approved by the Regional Governor permanent land tribunal - and for illegal fences removals to be regulated in a more transparent manner. However, all the renewals were rejected. In 2010, a new draft of a Land Bill of the Ministry of Land and Resettlement combined the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act of 1995 with the CLRA of 2002. This has been criticized for not including renewals and therefore the Ministry of Land Reform had to revise it (Thiem 2014). In 2016, first projects of the Flexible Land Tenure Act No. 4 2012 were started. The Flexible Land Tenure Act created new, more flexible forms of land tenure by preventing immovable plots to people, which they as a community can improve by buying for a Land Hold Title. This system mainly aims to benefit people in informal urban and rural land tenure settings (Matthaei / Mandimika 2015).

Today, Namibia is still searching for an answer to the land question. Land is still not evenly distributed and inequalities not overcome yet. The impatience of still disadvantaged Namibians is rising and as of January 2017, the Ministry of Land Reform has extended the time frame for the finalization of the Land Bill that should combine the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act of 1995 and the Communal Land Reform Act of 2002. Furthermore, after the first National Land Conference in 1991, a second one is currently planned (The Namibian 2017).




Figure 3: Timeline of Land Reforms in Namibia (source: modified from Falk et al. (2016))

5 The Farm: Making a Living from Sandy Soil

To make a living in one of the world's driest countries, one needs strategies in order to adapt to the rhythm of nature. In the area of Okakarara, people make their living as cattle farmers. They depend on fruitful rain seasons to provide enough food to endure the time period until the next rains. In summer, between November and April usually is the big rain season. During this time the frequent strong rains turn the dry and brown region into a fruitful, green landscape. From April to November – fall, summer and spring – the country does not receive any rainfall and the grass, bushes and trees quickly turn back to its brown color. Exceptions include a few weeks around September, where a short rain season provides the country with some showers. When I visited the communal land in the Okakarara region in October and November 2016, the area had not received proper rainfalls since the beginning of the year and the temperature regularly went up to 40 C°. People, animals and plants were longing for some drops of rain to bring back life and cool down the air. The farmers told me, that rainfall was also low the year before, which lead them to struggle even more to find enough food for their cattle.

The area of Okakarara is communal land. This means that the land is provided by the government for a group of people without access to land or land ownership. The government aims to prevent land to make a livelihood for people who do not possess the capital to invest in land themselves. From a legal perspective, the land therefore is still the property of the government but provided for the free, collective usage. The land should provide a living for the communities not for private usage such as in fenced properties only accessible by an individual or group and not for the commercial usage. The communal land in the area of Okakarara is inhabited by Hereros. The Hereros are one ethnic group in Namibia with recent origins in cattle husbandry. Hence, the land is mainly used for grazing.

The chapter prevents an insight into some actors' livelihoods, the chapter simultaneously illustrates the social and spatial organization of their farms and villages and the influence of fences on their everyday lives, especially under the climatic variability in the area. Furthermore, it gives an impression on how they mobilize which mechanisms of access and exclusion to make a living on the communal land. Therefore, the chapter introduces three Herero farmers of the area of Okakarara. They differ in their sources of incomes, their social relationships, their relation to the land and how they make use of it. This provides insights into their livelihoods and different practices used to organizing their lives in this climatic variable area. The first farmer mainly relies on income from livestock. The village he lives in is surrounded by a fence within which his cattle are grazing. For the valuable and weak cattle, he uses a smaller camp, which he inherited from his grandfather. During the dry season he has to buy extra fodder to sustain his cattle. The second farmer makes his living from his goats since he currently can not find a job in the town nearby. He had to bring his cattle to another farm, since the area he lives in is really dry and due to the intensive fencing of other farmers he can not find enough grazing space for them. Furthermore, he tries to build a camp himself, but can not afford the supplies. The third farmer is actually based in Windhoek and only visiting for the weekend. His family owns a rather large camp. In addition, with the area around the camp their cattle find enough food in the dry season. None of the family members make their living from the livestock but rely on wage labor in one of Namibia's cities.

5.1 Martin

Martin is a young Herero cattle farmer. He lives with his wife and his one-year-old daughter in an orange painted brick hut with a corrugated iron roof. Left of the hut stands a similar one covered in silver corrugated iron. The second hut is home to his uncle and his wife plus their blind grandmother. The family gains their income mainly from livestock production. For this, the family uses the grazing space of the village, which is fenced. A borehole nearby provides water for the whole village. When I arrived the family warmly welcomed me. They offered me the only chair not damaged in the shadow of a tree. My translator got offered the

second chair with a broken leg, while Martin took his place on the sandy ground. Martin was wearing a shirt and cap of a big gas company. His wife and daughter were standing close by also dressed in a shirt and pants. His grandmother who sat on the porch of the house was still wearing the traditional Herero dress combined with the traditional headpiece resembling the cattle's horns.

Martin told me, that he and his family own 47 cattle. Throughout the year the family can gain enough income from selling the calves to make a living. The distribution of work along the family members is clear: The men look after the cattle, the fences and houses, the women take care of the children, do the housework and milk the cows and goats. The milk provides valuable nutrition for the family, yet it is not guaranteed through the year. In the dry season, the cows are often not fed enough to produce enough milk for consumption. The small amount of milk remaining, the farmers usually leave to small calves. The longer the dry season lasts, the less grass is left in the area and the more fodder Martin has to buy to keep the cattle in a good condition.

The Ministry of Agriculture they told us what food to give to the cattle in what season. In wintertime we give winterlicks and dry concentrates. – Martin, 27 October 2016

Besides the Ministry's recommendations, Martin's family also buys grass during the dry season. This adds up over the months and becomes an intensive expense.

We need a lot of money. We also buy grass but we only use it for the bit weak cattle, not all of them. And calves. – Martin, 27 October 2016

Feeding only the weak cattle is their strategy to keep as much cattle as possible alive through the dry season. Despite the family's investments in their herd during the year of my fieldwork, five cattle had already died by October. When the condition of the cattle decreases it is also too late to sell them. «The cattle are not fed, nobody would buy them», Martin explained. In this way, not only do costs increase but also the possibilities of gaining an income are reduced. If the money runs out, relatives with jobs in towns across Namibia are helping out from time to time.

We have two relatives in Windhoek, one in Swakopmund and one in Okakarara. They work in a hospital or as builders. Sometimes they are sending money and one of them buys food and sends it to us. – Martin, 27 October 2016

The extra money from relatives helps the family to sustain themselves during the expensive months of the dry season.

We¹⁰ had sat down for the interview in which Martin gave us a lively account of his everyday life. After the interview, he took us to see his farm. We stepped through a gate to exit the family's living space and outdoor kitchen surrounded by a fence, keeping animals out. Then we walked to the back of the houses, where Martin had built two gardens. Fences also surrounded the fodder and vegetable gardens. In a dense interval of about 30 cm, wooden poles of ca. 1.20 meters' height had been put into the ground. About six cords of barbed wire were slung from pole to pole. The fence's purpose is to keep animals such as the cattle, small stock or wildlife out to prevent the plants inside from being eaten. In the bigger one – which is about 30x30 meter – Martin planted fodder for his animals.

¹⁰ Throughout my thesis I use the terms «we» and «us» to narrate of experiences during the fieldwork. I chose the plural to include the translator. Throughout the fieldwork he joined me and his translations and presence significantly influenced the outcomes.

We put a garden over here and chop the trees down so we can plant a lot of grass, which we cut and store for the dry season. In the dry season we give it to the cattle so they can sustain longer. – Martin, 27 October 2016

The hay they produce themselves helps them to have enough food for the cattle to overcome the dry season. Or at least it helped in the past, since the strategy is dependent on rainfall.

Before, when the rainfall was good, we used to even get through droughts with the grass collected. But nowadays we are not receiving proper rain. We are struggling to maintain and get through. – Martin, 27 October 2016

The smaller garden – about 10x5 meters – contains fruits and vegetable such as beans, pumpkin, watermelon and maize. The family plants those to provide some food for themselves. Like the fodder garden, this garden is mostly used during the rainy season, when the soil is fertile. In the dry season it stays empty. In other years they used the fruits and vegetable as a source of income.

We used to sell the vegetables from the garden in Okakarara and had some income. We used it to buy food for the home and diesel. With the help from the Ministry of Agriculture we could keep the garden through the year. But the borehole where we get the water from is a bit far. (...) We tried to pump water here with pipes, but we are struggling. Now we don't have anything in the garden. – Martin, 27 October 2016

Martin explained that a worker from the Ministry of Agriculture came to give advice on how and when to plant what vegetable to be more successful. He further described that the borehole is two kilometers away from his farm. To pump the water all the way from the borehole from the garden is difficult and would also be cost intensive. For these reasons the garden stays empty nowadays.

Next we walked to the front side of the house where Martin erected a small stock and a cattle *kraal*. He explained that a *kraal* is the fence where he keeps the animals for protection against thieves and as a safe place for the animals to rest. Martin's *kraals*, similar to the gardens are made from wooden poles in a close distance, slung with barbed wire. The smaller *kraal* is for the small stock. Martin owns 45 goats. He told me that during the day, the goats just roam around in the village to find food. In the evening, they come back to drink water and stay in the *kraal* overnight. The ground of the kraal was covered in dark goat dung, which makes the garden fertile in the rain season. The family holds the goats to drink their milk and meat, but they rarely sell them. The cattle are kept in the bigger *kraal*. Other than the goats they do not stay inside overnight. During the rainy season, the cattle mostly stay outside the *kraal* to graze. In the dry season, Martin lets them out at around four in the afternoon and they return in the next morning to drink water. The advantage of the animals returning back to the *kraal* once a day is the possibility to count if they are all back and check their health. Hence, the *kraals* also serve as a means for controlling the animals.

The next stop on our walk is the beginning of Martin's camp. By camp – or *Okamba*, how it is called in *Otjiberero* – Martin means a fenced area, which he uses for grazing cattle. The camp starts right behind the cattle *kraal*. The fence around the camp is more loosely staked than those of the *kraals* and gardens and has a size of 2x2 kilometers. Martin explained that he separates the cattle according to their health and value.

We only put the weak and sick cattle, calves and bulls in the camp. If we would put all of them inside they would overgraze it. – Martin, 27 October 2016

The weak and sick cattle stay inside the camp, so that they don't have to walk far distances to find food, so that they get stronger again, so that they can be under Martin's control and do not get stolen by thieves. As many farmers told us, depending on the village, they have high number of cattle loss to thieves. The calves

and bulls are the most expensive and the camp protects them. The rest of the cattle are grazing outside the camp.

From where we stood at one end of the camp, Martin pointed in the direction left of his house to show us where his cattle are grazing throughout the year.

The cattle only graze on this side. We put a fence around the whole village, with a length of 7x7 kilometers. Everyone' in the village is sharing that space. – Martin, 27 October 2016

The village fence belongs to all the village's citizens. What is special about the village where Martin lives, is that a road divides it into two parts. Both sides erected their own village fences, with a borehole in the middle. The fence runs along both sides of the road to prevent cattle from the danger of cars but simultaneously prevents cattle and humans from crossing. Martin estimated that on his side, about 15 to 17 households share the area inside the village fence.

There are 1150 cattle in the whole village, 550 on this side. The cattle from the other side can not come to this side. – Martin, 27 October 2016

He explained further their village had no regulation on who's cattle must go grazing in which specific area. The inhabitants all share the same grazing spots throughout the year. Furthermore, the village's residents do not use the «open space»¹¹ outside the village fence, since they fear that the cattle would wander off or get stolen by others.



Figure 4: Village with village camp in the Okakarara Area (not to scale)

5.2 Geoffrey

When we met for an interview, like Martin, Geoffrey offered the two chairs he owned to us while he himself sat on the step of the entry of his salmon-colored hut. One of Geoffrey's sons joined him when we started the interview. Geoffrey explained that he shares the house with his wife, three young children and an adolescent nephew who at the moment stays with him. They just moved to this village when he inherited

¹¹ During my fieldwork, the farmers I visited use the term «open space» to describe the area between villages. I decided to use «open space» with quotation marks because those areas are not open to everyone but often also have a group of people or individuals who claim access to the area. The «open space» thereby is mostly used as grazing space for cattle by farmers from villages without a village fence or by people or groups who have built their house in between villages.

the homestead from his uncle a few years ago. His wife currently works as a teacher in Okakarara and earns the income for the family. Geoffrey is without a permanent monetary income.

To earn money I sell my goats. But I am not sitting here, waiting to sell them. I go to town and see where I can work. When the job is finished I come back and sit a bit – just like that. – Geoffrey, 28 October 2016

During the times that he has a job, he stays in Okakarara like his wife and his other two children who are in school there. Instead of depending on a job in town, he would like to start his own business in the future.

I want to start a bricks business. All those people they are sleeping in those iron houses. We have to build brick houses. One of my friend's house even lost the corrugated iron roof because of the wind last night. – Geoffrey, 28 October 2016

The reason why he wants to build a business is because he does not think that farming has a future for him.

I don't like the business of farming and cattle... I want maybe five cattle or ten for milk and goats to eat, but I want to get money from other resources. I don't trust in farming, because farming depends on rain. And you don't know when the rain comes. And now we are facing global warming (...) and we have more and more droughts. – Geoffrey, 28 October 2016

Geoffrey owns about 8 cattle and 40 goats. Like described above, the family makes a living from the goats. For him, profiting from goats is more cost effective than from cattle.

I did not buy food for them, they just survive from stuff in the field. I am not saying that there is food, but they are still surviving, I don't know how they do it. I just try to give them vaccinations. As long as I do that they normally survive. – Geoffrey, 28 October 2016

Geoffrey explained that when he sells goats, during the year, he keeps their number around the same level.

From January till now I managed to sell maybe 25 small goats because of different needs like reparations of technical problems with the car and stuff for the house. So the goats just multiply and I sell them to survive. – Geoffrey, 28 October 2016

During the same time the number of his cattle stayed the same without having an income from them. Geoffrey only keeps them because of the milk. During the interviews in the field, it showed that the farmers in general can not generate enough income from a small amount of cattle. Especially farmers like Geoffrey who own less than ten cattle. They can not afford to sell them since their herd would decrease. The average families we visited owned about 17 cattle which was enough to sell a few calves every year but often also needed a family member with wage labor to sustain. Wealthy farmers on the other hand, own up to hundreds of cattle. This puts them in a position where they can sell a large amount of calves before the dry season and able to afford fodder or to rent other pastures for their cattle. This makes them more flexible to climatic variability.

Geoffrey who would not be in the position to rent land, could bring his cattle to his mother's village, which is a few kilometers away.

You see, last year was worse than this year. Two cattle died last year. I did not bring the cattle back because I thought this year will also be bad again. I decided to wait. (...) The rainfall differs a lot from place to place. Normally the site where my mother is staying gets better rains. – Geoffrey, 28 October 2016

Due to stronger rainfalls, his mother's farm has more grass available. In Namibia the rainfall is very locally limited. While some areas receive a rain shower regularly in some years, others a few kilometers apart get almost none. Therefore, the best places for rainfall can change every year. Geoffrey does not have to pay his mother for looking after his cattle. He only pays for water and diesel and his mother receives the cattle's milk in exchange for profits. At the other homestead we visited during our time in the field, the people also looking after cattle consumed the milk even though the cattle belonged to someone else.

When his uncle died in 2013, Geoffrey inherited the farm. He and his family are relatively new to the village. Other than Martin, Geoffrey and his family do not own any gardens or camps. They only built a kraal for the goats. Since many farmers around him had erected camps already, Geoffrey also started to build a fence, which at the time was only a few meters long and ran along one side of the house. At the time of the interview he couldn't afford to finish it.

My uncle bought the supplies for the fence. He was planning to make a fence, a camp. Unfortunately he died. Now the problem is the money. – Geoffrey, 28 October 2016

Geoffrey then told us that as a war veteran, his uncle received a monthly payment of 1000 NAD from the government. The money enabled him to invest in the supplies. With those payments gone, the family can not afford to invest in the fence he wants to use to build a okamba, a camp for his cattle.

The village Geoffrey lives in is not surrounded by a village fence. This produces a different structure of the homesteads and camps compared to a village with a fence, like Martin's. While in a fenced village people's camps often are rectangular and about two kilometers, in an unfenced village the fences are usually larger. There is no boundary that limits the village, and so it is at the borders of the farmers' grazing camps where the «open space» begins. Geoffrey's neighbor told me, for example, that they use all the «open space» up to the next village's fence for their cattle to graze. Only the fenced camps are unusable as grazing space for their animals. Satellite images show that the fences often start at a house and are then built in a trapezoid shape away from the house. This allows the owners to live close to the village but profit from more room to have their fenced grazing area. The shape often also marks the direction, in which one farmer's or one family's cattle are going to graze while the fences mark the boundary between the areas (Stahl 2000: 328).

As being a newcomer in the village, Geoffrey has difficulties to find enough grazing land between other people's fences. He just moved from his mother's village to this village after his uncle's death. Fencing processes have started years before Geoffrey inherited the farm.

All the people who came here first, they fenced the place already. They built their homes where they could make camps. For us who came new here, we realize how difficult it is. We are in the middle of the village, we don't know where our cattle should go graze. – Geoffrey, 28 October 2016

By building his own camp soon he wants to ensure access to grazing space so that he is not «in a circle» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016). With this expression, Geoffrey describes how all the houses around him build their camps so close to his house and to each other that he fears to become fully excluded from access to the road, the land around his house and places where his goats could find food.




Figure 5: Village without village camp in the Okakarara Area (not to scale)

5.3 Trevor

Trevor, an 18-year-old man was cooking on the fireplace in front of a white house made from corrugated iron with iron roofs in a varnished red color when we met him in one of Geoffrey's neighboring villages. Usually, he stays and works in Windhoek, but came to the village to visit his grandmother over the weekend. Next to his house were about nine more white houses built in a half circle, all surrounded by a big fence. Two old Herero women were sitting on the porch of their houses and a few kids ran around. Trevor explained that all the houses belong to family members of his.

It is like a family place. A lot of people live here, maybe around one hundred. But most of the people stay in Windhoek. Now only the grandma, workers and some uncles live permanently. Not more than 5 people. – Trevor, 28 October 2016

Trevor also has a job in a store in Windhoek. Only during holidays and sometimes on weekends he joins his grandmother in the village, where he grew up. Like many other young Hereros, he went to the city after school to have more job opportunities.

Two houses are smaller and stand a bit apart from the others. The houses are where the workers are staying. The workers are not members of the family and come from other places. Some of the workers of farmers we met during the time in the field were also Hereros as a lot of them came from Angola. While some of the workers stay at the farm for a few weeks, other work dozens of years at the same place. My translator once told me, that workers from Angola tend to leave faster since they do not have a connection to the region. He also explained that it is not easy to find reliable workers since some of them increase their income by selling some of the cattle when the owner is not around. While working on a farm, they usually look take care of the farm and the cattle and sometimes take care for the elders who permanently stay at the farms, like Trevor's grandmother.

In total, Trevor's whole family possesses about 50 cattle. The herd belongs to different members of the family who possess two or three cattle. Also Trevor's grandmother owns two. Doing different interviews in the area usually showed¹² that the cattle belong to the head of the homestead, who is usually a man and also responsible for looking after them. In situations when this person dies, the wife often inherits the cattle. On

¹² See also the interviews with farmer A, 15 October 2016, farmer P, 29 October 2016

this account I assume Trevor's grandmother also came into cattle possession in this way. The maximum of about two cattle do not generate a reliable income.

We don't have a lot, so we don't sell them. We actually want to increase the herd so we don't sell much. But it depends on the time of the year, if there is a difficulty somehow, somewhere you can sell one. For example if the kids are going back to school after the holidays. – Trevor, 28 October 2016

The grandmother makes her livelihood from the 1000 NAD she receives from the government as her pension supplemented by the money her children send her from Windhoek. Besides the cattle, the family cluster owns a few sheep and goats, chicken and a horse. The small stock and the chicken are providing food for the residents. The horse is used to ride and reach places much faster, especially places not reachable by car. Moreover, a carriage can be added for transportation.

Trevor, as well as other close family member do not make a living from livestock. Trevor, for example, does not even own one cattle. One reason may be his age. Hereros start a family and build a house when they become married. The other reason is that many Hereros migrate to urban areas first for school and later for or labor.

We get money from our jobs. We don't really make a living from the farm. We have our lives in Windhoek and don't survive from the cattle. – Trevor, 28 October 2016

Like in Trevor's situation, the relation to the village remains. The farm converts from a place providing income to a place where families reunite. In this way the farms strengthen the urban-rural relations and connects different generations.

The farm contains many houses, a camp and *kraals*. All the houses of family members form a half circle in the middle of which they had built four *kraals*; two for the cattle, one for the goats and one for the sheep. The *kraals* had a metallic gate, while the rest was made from wood and wire. All the *kraals* were built right next to each other, sharing the part of the fence parting them. Like at Martin's farm Trevor's family puts the animals in there to rest; the small stock during the night, the cattle during the day.

In the morning the cattle come and we put them in the kraal. They just came now. After five they go again and eat what they can find, come back to drink water and relax in here. – Trevor, 28 October 2016

In front of the kraals the family put a bathtub, which is constantly filled through a water pipe. The water is provided by NamWater, since the village where Trevor's family is located does not own a borehole.

Overnight, the cattle eat inside the family's grazing camp. Trevor estimated that it is about four or five times six to seven kilometers in size. This is one of the larger camp we came across during fieldwork. I learned, that family clusters often build a shared camp and hold all their cattle together. This is also acknowledged by other farmers and headmen (chiefs) in the villages. Like in Trevor's case, these family clusters are often located at the border of the villages. Trevor told us, that the family's cattle always went grazing in the same direction, away from the settlements. Since the village is not fenced, the family feared that the cattle would just wander off. About five years ago, they therefore decided to fence in the grazing area. Based on the location of the house, many families always bring their cattle to the same areas or finds agreements within the villages which residents are supposed to bring their cattle in which direction in order to manage the resource use and avoid conflict. Fencing in the direction the cattle always grazed is very common in the area, since the direction in a wider sense belonged to a certain homestead before. While the cattle not always stayed in this direction, fences strictly cut the crossing of cattle of different households between multiple directions.

During the dry season, when I visited the area, for me it was hard to believe how the cattle can survive from the few leaves and a bit of dry grass left on the bushes. Trevor told me that they have to get through to the next rainy season when the grass is growing again.

Maybe after December it will be fine, but for now they are just surviving. – Trevor, 28 October 2016

At the time I was there, they did not lose any cattle due to the dry season. Trevor explained that sometimes there is more grass left available outside their camp, so they send some of the cattle to graze there.

The one with the calves they go outside, because there is more food. But it is not safe, so the rest goes in the camp. We do it like this the whole year. I think less than 20 go out. – Trevor, 28 October 2016

The family does not consider the «open space» outside their camp as safe, since some cattle were stolen in the past, which they consider to be a problem in the area.

Some people are stealing, that is why our herd did not increase. (...) People that are staying somewhere else. It is a problem. (...) Sometimes they go to jail, but they always get away with it. – Trevor, 28 October 2016

The reason why they send the mother cows out is that it is their instinct to return to their calves. Because of this, they will not wander too far. The sheep and goats roam the open space to find food. They do not eat inside the camp. They leave in the morning and move freely. In the afternoon they come back and are sleeping here. Trevor explained that the goats and sheep mainly use the spaces left between the camps.




Figure 6: Houses of a family cluster in the Okakarara Area (not to scale)

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter gave insight into three different situations of livestock farmers in the Okakarara area. It gives a first look into the actors involved in fencing processes and practices and their use of resources such as land, grass, livestock and water. The farmer’s lives differ in the access to land, access to water, livelihood strategies and their strategy to cope with seasonality. While Martin’s family depends highly on livestock, Geoffrey only depends on small stock in times when he can not find a job in the city. Trevor’s life, on the other hand, is based in the city, his income independent from the communal pastures.

Furthermore, two different spatial patterns of villages have been evaluated, reliant on the village fence and the access to water. In Martin’s case, the first farmer that was described, a fence surrounds the village. Within

this fence Martin had a rectangle 2x2 kilometers camp for some of his cattle, while the rest of the herd was grazing within the village fence. In the second and third lives of farmers described, Geoffrey and Trevor, the village is not fenced. As a consequence, the cattle are usually grazing inside larger, trapezoid shaped camps. Only a few are let into the «open space» where the farmers risk that they will walk too far away or might be stolen. While Trevor's family owns one of those camps, Geoffrey does not own a fence at all. His animals only have access to the space between and behind other people's camps.

Table 1: Access, Seasonality and Livelihood of actor's in the Okakarara area

	Martin	Geoffrey	Trevor
Access to land	- land within village fence - camp for valuable and weak	- space between other farmers grazing camps - «open space»	- grazing camp - «open space»
Access to water	- borehole	- pipes from NamWater	- pipes from NamWater - water pans
Strategy to cope with seasonality	- grass production and storage - buying fodder	- relocating the livestock	- using the «open space» for the cows - rather large camp
Livelihood strategy	- selling livestock - support from relatives	- selling small stock - urban work income - support from relatives	- urban work income

6 Fence Making: Negotiating Neighbourhood

«Land alone does nothing for humans» (Netz 2004: 4). It has to be made usable. In the area of Okakarara, land is allocated by people and grazed by animals. In earlier times the Herero moved their cattle across the area and followed the local rainfalls to find the best grass. In more recent times, people's way of life changed from nomadic to settled and from herder to pastoralists. The Hereros started to build homesteads and were challenged to change their way of land usage. The most obvious changes were performed through erecting fences on the communal land. While different community members shared the grazing land and equal access to it, through fences, areas exclusively ensure access to land and grass for the owner's cattle and exclude others from benefiting. In this chapter I analyze the effect of the mobilization of certain mechanisms of access and exclusion on the renegotiation of property relations. Therefore, I illustrate why and how farmers who are capable to mobilize these mechanisms gain general and seasonal advantages in accessing resources in relation to other community members.

6.1 Fencing Camps

To understand the influence of the different camps in the Okakarara area on property relations, the seasonal usage of the land has to be outlined. On one hand, during the rainy season green fresh grass is growing all over the Okakarara area. The cattle usually graze close to the houses and do not have to wander far to eat. When the food near the houses is finished, the daily walking distances to grazing places increase. Since pans are filled with water, the cattle are able to roam far away to graze and drink in the field. In this situation it is not uncommon that the cattle do not return to the homestead for multiple days. In the dry season, on the other hand, cattle always have to return to the homestead in order to drink water. Unless the only grass left is in remote places, then the cattle stop returning to the homestead to drink on a daily basis and walk for two or three days to find food. In some years, when the grass is finished, the cattle have to survive on remaining leaves for weeks or even month.

The camps change this annual cycle of dry and rain season grazing. They enable herding and feeding strategies as well as accumulations of fodder by individuals. The different camps found in the area have different or similar functions. The most common type of camp is rather small and provides grass for only a specific group of cattle. It is called *okamba* in *Otjiberero*, the language spoken by the Hereros in the Okakarara area. These camps are often located close to the homesteads and are more or less in the official legal size regulated by the CLRA 2002 to a size of 20 hectares. Martin, the first farmer introduced in Chapter 5, is the owner of such a camp. He explained me, that he only puts «the weak and sick cattle, the calves and the bulls in the camp» (Martin, 27 October 2016). The camp itself would be too small to feed all the cattle. By separating the cattle in this way, the camp makes it easier for Martin to look after their health and strengthen them, as he told me during fieldwork in 2016.

This strategy is very commonly used by many farmers we visited in the Okakarara area. Other farmers also explained that they use the *okamba* for specific, vulnerable cattle such as «the bulls and pregnant cows» (Farmer K, 28 October 2016) or when «a cattle is sick or dying» (Farmer A, 15 October 2016). The camp has the advantages that the farmers can intensify the care for the weakened animals. They told us that they «can pump water in there» (Farmer A, 15 October 2016) so that «they do not have to walk long distances» (Farmer M, 29 October 2016). In this way, the farmers are able to control their health more regularly. Besides the weak cattle, the farmers let the calves and bulls stay inside the camp since they are the most valuable. It is too high of a risk to leave them outside. Calves can be sold on auctions and provide an income for the farmers' families, while the bulls are held for reproducing cattle. The fences assist the farmers to look after their most vulnerable cattle and to easily maintain control over them.

An other camp commonly found in the Okakarara area surrounds the whole grazing land. In *Ojjiherero*, those camps are called *okatemba*. Such camps are often rather large and either located within the villages or in the «open space». The family of Trevor, the young urban-based farmer introduced the last in Chapter 5, owns such a grazing fence within the village. We experienced it to be very common that big family clusters also share a larger grazing camp. Since sons often build a homestead in close distance to their parent's farm such large clusters come to being. The family shares one camp for all their cattle, which starts at their houses. According to the family's size, these fences have to be large to provide food for the whole herd. In Trevor's case, to reduce the labor of herding they fenced the area they used for grazing before.

The cattle were always going in this direction. We just decided to put a fence there, so we can just put them there. When it all was open, they were going all the way to other places and were not coming back. – Trevor, 28 October 2016

These camps have to surround a big area in order to provide enough food for all the cattle throughout the whole year, especially considering the long dry seasons. According to Werner (2015: 13), a parcel of 1000 hectares in this area could provide enough food for 69 livestock. One farmer we met told us, that he had owned 590 cattle before he decided to sell 200. In this case, his cattle would have needed a camp in the size of 8400 hectares, 84 square kilometers – a size unavailable to fence in within this densely inhabited area. Furthermore, almost every farmer I talked to told me about his plans to increase the amount of cattle. This is why despite of the size of the camp, it rarely provides enough grass since the number of cattle held is often at maximum capacity or above.

Village camps provide grazing space for all the cattle owned by one village. They are grazed in the rain and the dry seasons without rotating the cattle. Village fences serve as a special, shared type of an *okatemba*, a camp for grazing. Those fences also surround the whole grazing area but are shared and owned by all the village's residents. Martin's village is also surrounded by a fence. He estimated that the village contains between 15 and 17 homesteads. The village camp measures seven times seven kilometers has to provide fodder for all the village's cattle throughout the year. He explained that all the land inside the fence is accessible by all the resident's cattle. Village fences provide the farmers with the benefits of a fence that surrounds the whole grazing area but distributes the costs to all of them. Moreover, it is used to prevent cattle from being stolen by other people or other villages' cattle from grazing in the village's area.

Grazing camps can also be established in the remote «open space». These grazing camps are often much larger since there is more space available. Those fences are often referred to as «illegal» in the broader literature on fencing on communal land since they enclose a large area. During our time in the field, we were able to meet only one owner of a camp in the «open space». This farmer explained, that it is rare to meet grazing camp owners like him, since they most often live and work in the city while their workers take care of the farm. The farmer we met, a retired minister, told us that he just recently started the farm as a place to spend his years as a pensioner and because it is common to farm as a Herero, he told us, people are – even though he titled himself as «not being a cattle person» (Farmer H, 26 October 2016). Concerning remote grazing camps, according to Stahl (2000: 342), «legitimized by the traditional authorities and equipped with the necessary means, cattle owners take possession of a quantity of land, which then allows for a farm-like and commercialized management. At the same time, they take advantage of the surrounding commons». The sizes of remote grazing camps are often only limited by the owner's amount of capital and however much he is willing to invest in fences. This behavior excludes other local farmers who depend on the «open spaces» for grazing their animals.

Table 2: Characteristics of *Ozokamba* and *Outemba* (Stahl 2000)

	small scale fencing (<i>okamba</i>)	large scale fencing (<i>okatemba</i>)
fence	yes	yes
size	about 30-500 hectares	varies: 3'600 ha; 4'900 ha (Okamatapati)
location	central grazing areas	«remote areas»
allocation	no formal allocation, but based on rules and control of the community	by «traditional leaders», the government, or none
access	one or two households	one to five households (Okamatapati)
user	community members; average and wealthy farmers	often «outsiders»; typically wealthy farmers
period	primarily; permanently for specific parts of the herd, in part: seasonal as additional grazing	primarily; permanently, like a farm (often with seasonal movements to the commons); in part: seasonal, like ohambo

6.2 Process of Enclosing

The reasons for people to erect fences changed over time. During my interviews I found different temporal episodes when camps were built: Before Namibia's independence, right after the independence and more recently. In every period the building of different fences such as *kraals* and smaller and larger camps could be found. In general, the camps built before 1990 are smaller and the very recently built camps larger. Village fences generally were built after the Namibia's independence. *Kraals* throughout those stages existed in similar ways. The processes of fencing in those different temporal episodes are illustrated in the examples of farmers we met during our interviews.

The first period of the erecting of fences goes back to the time before Namibia gained independence. During the interviews older farmers narrated about erecting fences themselves when they were younger and the younger ones told us about their grandparents being the ones who built up the fences. One old farmer told us that he built a small camp in 1974. He chopped trees to bound land with branches. The area he fenced started right in front of the house, owned by his grandfather back then. It was often told, that these fences started right next to the house and the location of the house was chosen based on the quality of the surrounding grazing area. Martin is aware that he is not the legal owner of the area on the communal land but holds only the right to use the land, even though he inherited the place from his father and grandfather and identifies with it.

You don't pay for the land. It was given by the government; it is their property. (...) But we [other family members and me] grew up here, we like the place. We know this place is ours because we buried our fathers here and we are going to be buried close to them someday. We would not want to go away from here. Our fathers build the fences here; it was not us. – Martin, 27 October 2016

The decision to build the fence as well as its location was not made by Martin. Actually, many farmers I visited inherited their farms, including the fences around them. The establishment of the camps then usually goes back to the 1970s. Werner (2000: 265) suggests that they were told to do so by a traditional chief who recommended that every farmer should own a fenced off farm. With only 2x2 kilometers of land, Martin's camp is not large. I conclude that older fences like Martin's are often smaller, because they were a means to have control over a certain part of cattle, while the majority of the herd was grazing outside the camp.

Fencing the village is a newer enclosing structure in Martin's village. Martin told us that it was set up by himself and other farmers in the village. The village's camp was built as grazing land for the residents' cattle. It works as a barrier so «other people's cattle could not come graze over here» (Farmer I, 27 October 2016), as was explained to us. An other farmer also narrated, that it was him and his neighbors who erected their

village fence «We started 1991, right after independence» (Farmer C, 25 October 2016) he told us the camp was established in one or two month. Building the camp was based on negotiations with other villages. The farmer explained that they came to the agreement to «count the kilometers between the villages and cut it in the middle so that every village can get something to survive» (Farmer C, 25 October 2016). (see more on the understanding concerning agreements around fencing in the next chapter)

After Namibia became independent, in the early 90s, more and larger grazing camps were built. The farmers we met for an interview described the process of fencing as sudden and the accumulation of land as rather unorganized. In the first village we visited, we talked to a worker from a large farm with a big herd of cattle. He worked on this farm for the last 39 years. The worker remembered, when the fencing in the village started.

It is like, when we put the bread on the table and you came first, you fill your stomach. You eat almost the whole bread. And then someone comes a bit later. He has to eat the leftovers. That means only a bit. The people who came first they took a big area. The moment when the others woke up in the bed they realized: Oh, people built up camps surrounding us, let's cover our place so when other people come, they can not interfere. That is why some people have many hectares and some people have smaller camps. – Farmer C, 25 October 2016

Other people we met in the villages often agreed to this statement. One even told us that within his village, all the fences were erected within a one or two months. The fast pace of enclosures after the 1990s can be connected to the high hopes of a change in the legislation turning fenced land into private property, argued Fowler (1998).

Today, such fencing practices from the past still have consequences for those who could not mobilize mechanisms to maintain or gain access or mechanisms that prevented them from being excluded from the resources and land. Geoffrey, for example, is a rather new resident of the village he is staying in, since he inherited the farm from his uncle who passed away. For him it is difficult to erect fences because the land was portioned before he moved there. He told us that «other people's mothers and fathers came here first and built their homes. They built the homes where they could make camps» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016) for the new ones in the village the landmass already fenced provides a problem; «we are now in the middle, we don't know where to go with our animals» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016). Other people who move to the village further pressure the already limited space. Geoffrey criticized that those people «came without consulting anybody» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016). He said that they claim right by using former social relations by saying «our sister was living here earlier or whatever. She was here in the 1980s or 1970s so I build my farm here» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016).

Furthermore, farmer use previous enclosures to expand their property. Geoffrey told us, that in his village, other residents are enlarging the area they have fenced in the past. He criticized that those farmers react selfish since they «want to take the whole land for themselves» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016). Also other farmer from the Okakarara area confirmed these assumptions. One farmer we met, for example, from the village next to Geoffrey's, he told us that these farmers are mobilizing their capital to renew their camps. In this context, «every time they renew it, they are expanding their camps» (Farmer M, 29 October 2016). In this situation they can enlarge their camps without raising attention in the village community.

6.3 Functions of Fences

Camps in the Okakarara area are established to fulfill different purposes. I found six reasons for farmers to erect fences: progress in farming, protection, assuring benefits, pressure by others, investing in property, and prestige. These different reasons lead farmers to mobilize the mechanisms of access and exclusion. In the following, the reasons for fencing and their consequences are discussed. Fences became a part of farmers everyday live. Those who are able to mobilize the technology, markets, capital, and / or knowledge, can rely on social relations and a good relation to authority are the ones most capable to establish camps, which provide a system to profit the most from communal land under the climatic conditions of the area. On the other side stand farmers who are not able to mobilize these access mechanisms. Camps pressure the remaining pastures and enforce any kind of reaction from farmers without camps to be able to sustain.

Today, fences are part of the modern everyday lives on a Herero farm. When the Hereros stopped moving as herders with their cattle, their livelihoods also changed to settled farmers. As herders, the settlements of the Hereros were organized around the grazing places for the cattle. Today, daily lives are located at the Hereros' farms while the cattle are adjusting to the place of the owner. Establishing camps allows the farmers to control the mobility of their cattle without herding them. Trevor, for example, the young half-time Herero farmer introduced in the last chapter, described the process of fencing in his village as a part of modernization and changing livelihoods.

It was more like every house must build a camp for their cattle. It is like a process of farming. You build your houses like this way and then you just build a camp next to it, where you graze your cattle. – Trevor, 28 October 2016

As described, the camps became part of the farmers' everyday lives. Fencing is a process that is initiated through the change in the Herero's livelihoods and their demands on farming. Especially the youth pursues a more urban and modern lifestyle. They leave the villages to go to school and to work in town later. Through these developments, fences also replace herding. An other farmer also argued that today, fences are needed to replace a herder since «without a fence, you can not control the cattle's mobility (...) because you are not sleeping in the field, you are sleeping at home» (Farmer I, 27 October 2017). In this way, the fences also reduce labor. As all of the farmers explained us, especially in the rainy season, cattle tend to walk far to graze since they can drink in natural water pans on the pastures. Without having someone guarding them, they could wander away and become lost or stolen. All kinds of fences thereby reduce labor: *Kraals*, camps surrounding the whole grazing area, camps for a specific group of cattle and village camps.

Protection

Theft in general is a problem in the area. Talking to the farmers, one of the most mentioned reasons for fencing was safety. I thought this might be because the cattle have to be well protected from wild cats¹³ but cattle theft is a much higher risk. During my fieldwork, the mentioned amount of stolen cattle was up to three fourths of one farmers' herd. Another farmer metaphorically explained the need for protection by stressing the vulnerability of roaming cattle.

Yes, we need the fences (...), because how would you protect your animals? You have like sugar and water and there is no container for it, you understand? I compare it like that. – Farmer H, 26 October 2016

Marks attached to the ears of the cattle, indicating ear cuts or brands should further prevent thieves from selling other farmers' cattle in auctions. However, they do not seem to sufficiently serve as a means of protection, since theft is still a continuing topic. Like the majority of the farmers we visited,

¹³ One farmer told us that wild cats ate some chickens. Otherwise we never heard of any incidents with wild cats.

Stahl (2000: 332) stated that more losses in the area come from theft than diseases or droughts. Opportunities for farmers to react on theft are thereby limited. The government suppresses any kind of self-justice in order to protect its constitutional powers. In this way, the government indirectly encourages the populace to take individual action, such as fencing (ibid.: 333). Even though it would be possible to climb over the fences or tearing down the poles, they seem to help protect the cattle from getting stolen. This was especially surprising to me, since in many areas the fences are secluded and thieves would not draw attention by stealing animals. Never once during the interviews did I hear of a cattle loss from inside any fence, weather *kraals* nor larger camps.

Assure Benefits

Besides safety, through the establishment of large camps, the owners can assure more benefits from the available resources on the communal land. Fences guarantee a larger amount of resources to fence owners compared to others without fences. Especially during the dry season, fence owner profit from more fodder for their herds and can sustain them longer. During my fieldwork, the farmers often mentioned that the camps are too small to feed all the cattle. To overcome the shortage the farmers use the common space outside the camp for grazing also when they actually already «took a big area for themselves and the food for the animals» (Farmer E, 26 October 2017). He explained that those people's animals graze at the «open space» unless it is «the time of the drought, then they bring their animals back in their camps» (Farmer E, 26 October 2017). Inside the camps, the grass is stored until then and stays untouched until the communal pastures are fully grazed. Then the farmers can sustain their cattle from the enclosed grass.

To prevent the cattle from getting lost, the farmers use the intrinsic behavior of the cattle to their advantage. One farmer we met explained that the cattle adapted to the climatic conditions in the area. He explained that in his opinion the cattle are smart. In the dry season, they have to walk far distances to reach pastures with fodder. The farmer stated, that also during this time, the farmers are not herding their cattle, since they return by themselves. «They know where their home is», he explained (Farmer A, 15 October 2016). Furthermore, «even when they go far, they just eat there and come back home every day to drink water» (Farmer A, 15 October 2016). Even though the cattle could survive multiple days without water, if the cows have a calves, they are led by their motherly instincts and «always come back to their babies» (Farmer A, 15 October 2016). Like many other farmers, also Trevor's family uses this strategy. To provide enough milk for the calves, the cows «go outside the camp because there is more food. The rest stay inside in the camp» (28 October 2016). By «the rest», Trevor mainly means the calves and bulls, which are the most valuable to the family. The farmers in general can not risk to lose them.

The strategy of «in» and «out» allows camp owners to individually enclose grass for the end of the dry season, when the grass on the communal grazing areas gets rare. On the contrary, farmers without a camp are negatively affected by the enclosures. While camp owners' cattle can sustain on the stored grass, these farmers are excluded from those stocks. In addition, it is through enclosures that the shared spaces become smaller and the common resources are depleted faster. This affects farmers especially in the dry season, as for example Geoffrey told us, who currently can not afford to build his own camp.

Those fences, those are negative, especially now in the drought. That's how they do it nowadays. They put the cattle outside and when there is no more food they take it in. Or let me say like this when the rain comes, it means that the food is everywhere. So they take the animals out. They start graze in that open spaces. When the rain goes whatever and it gets dry like this they take the cattle to their camps. The grass is already gone by then. It's what they do. Us the poor, or how am I going to call myself, we people who don't have something or don't have a camp we have the disadvantage at the end of the day. It is a very, very, very big problem. – Geoffrey, 28 October 2016

Many farmers lacking capital to build a fence agreed with Geoffrey's opinion. They considered this strategy as unfair since they misuse the shared resources on the communal areas for their own profits.

Pressure by Others

In this way, while some farmers are able to fence in land and resources they also fence out other farmers and livestock. As a consequence, the fenced out farmers are forced to react to their exclusion from pastoral resources. Geoffrey, who was introduced in Chapter 5, critiqued that all his neighbors are erecting fences. These fences pressure him to build a camp himself, as he explained us.

You see nowadays it is a problem. Now, today when I am speaking, people are fencing like stupid. Normally, I used to take the goats in this direction. If you see there is a new fence, my neighbors built the fence. Since they built it, my goats can not go on to this direction anymore, because next to the new one is a new fence already. The fencing of this place is crazy. My animals lay down and they don't know where to go. – Geoffrey, 28 October 2016

Geoffrey's case provides an example of how farmers have to make an effort not to become excluded from grazing land. He explained that if he would not react with building a fence soon, he would «be in a circle» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016), a round piece of land around his house with no path in or out and with no land for his goats to graze. He further told us that currently his goats are walking between the fences in so-called corridors to find food. Because the other farmers of his village are fencing, he is pressured to react and also finds the solution in fencing. For him, erecting a fence is his only means to not become excluded from land and his livelihood. This contradicts with his general opinion on fences as them being «negative, especially in the drought» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016). Geoffrey considers the fences to be the reason why common grazing areas during the dry seasons become even scarcer. This example shows that fencing can also be a reaction to a process of enclosure by others. To maintain his access to land and to not become excluded from land, he feels pressured to also react by fencing land.

Investing in Property

Also for camp owners, property, such as land or cattle, need investments to generate high outcomes. The farmers we visited often considered those investments not to generate the effects they wished for. They explained that due to the communal land, the outcomes of their investments would be smaller than on a private owned farm because their neighbors would also profit from some of the positive outcomes. How fences influence the investment in property can best be seen in the example of grazing land and cattle. Investing in land means giving it time to recover. One farmer we visited had a rather large area fenced. Throughout the year he was able to keep all his animals inside his camp without experiencing fodder shortages. This was possible because he planned the grass consumption of the animals ahead of time.

My whole farm is divided, I think in six plots. In summer you use one side for six month and in winter you use the other side. That's what we do with the horse, the goats, the cattle and the small animals. So that the other side can grow. – Farmer A, 15 October 2016

Other farmers argued that rotating plots is only possible when land is owned privately. «Today you can put your cattle in one camp for a certain time and then you take it to another camp in an other month. It is a good thing» (Farmer B, 25 October 2016) they told us imagining having their own plots. Then they added that on the communal land, «we don't do that because it is open. We can not do this, the land is for everyone» (Farmer G, 26 October 2016). When I asked, why they could not adapt the rotation strategy in their village, the farmers usually answered that people have a «big heart». My translator explained that having a «big heart» means putting their own interests over the best interests of the village and over the interest of others. The farmers further responded that other village residents «would not keep to the conditions» (Farmer I, 27 October 2016) since «You know, here in the communal land it is a competition. (...) There is not enough land for all the cattle». (Farmer C, 25 October 2016). This quotes show how these farmers victimize

themselves as part of a tragedy of the common as described by Hardin (1968) and find the reasons and the justification for the fencing situation on communal land within this explanation.

Using the grazing space for the whole year on a high intensity is affecting the capacity for grass growth.

There are too many cattle in this village. We have more than 1000 cattle here, where should they eat? It is a big hell in the drought. (...) but also in the raining season. Because there are too many cattle they destroy the young plants. So even if we get enough rain, the plants can not grow back. – Farmer D, 25 October 2016

These examples demonstrate the effect of fences on the management of grass resources. The farmers we interviewed told us that they do not plan ahead as a community but just use the resources when they need them. In contrast, fenced areas allow their owners to schedule fodder in advance. Instead of exploiting all the grass and supplementary feed, they enlarge the capacity by calculating it throughout the year. However, when I visited Namibia in the end of the dry season, from September to December 2016, even commercial farmers with subdivided camps were fighting fodder shortages and lost livestock to the drought. For them, they failed calculating the fodder reserves for this long period and did not sell the necessary amount of cattle before the drought.

Shared profits of investments also prevent farmers from investing in livestock, especially cattle. Without a fence, the farmers we visited did not specialize in one breed. During the transect walk, the farmers explained the advantages of different breeds; some are able to walk further and find grazing in a broader variety of places while others are heavier and generate higher rewards in auctions. The farmers named two reasons for refusing to invest in cattle: First of all, without a fence, the benefits would be smaller, like this farmer explained:

The difference is that on private land you can produce your own... you can change your breeding by buying an expensive bull. You can say ah, I want to breed with Simbra or Brahmaan. You can control it. (...) If my neighbor had a bad bull, that I don't like, and it comes and climbs on my cow. I could not change the breeding. And you can do it on your own, without someone interfering. It is better to have a commercial farm than like here. – Farmer N, 28 October 2016

Secondly, the same farmer argued that excluding others from benefitting from his investments is as important as increasing his own benefits.

Here on the communal land, without a fence, you can not control your cattle. I can go buy an expensive bull and it costs me a lot of money but my neighbor here, he doesn't have a bull at all. Then my bull – because there is a cow looking for a bull – of course every time the cow goes in the field it comes across. Then my bull claims on that cow and my neighbor is going to get a quality calve but he did not even pay for it. (...) A bull costs you 35 – 40'000 NAD. I wanted to buy one but I came to realize, that this bull would not be mine, because I don't have a place to keep it. It would just go to other cows and to me would just be a loss. – Farmer H, 26 October 2016

Like this farmer, and many others we met, Geoffrey also told us that investing in a bull only makes sense in cases when a fence limits the access to it. For Geoffrey and his family, this generated too many circumstances. He told us that him and his family «don't even buy a quality bull so that we can have quality animals. Because if you have a quality bull, you always have to keep it in the fence so the bull is not going to other cows from other farmers». (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016).

Investing in property such as land and cattle generates costs for the property owner. Fences limit the access to the benefits from this property. Fencing ensures bigger profits and excludes others from benefitting because it is taken into account that it would decrease the benefits for the owner. Thereby, fences are only

one option to ensure full benefits. Agreements such as one breed per village / region or shared bulls would also provide a fruitful outcome. However, investments in fences as a property contradict the statement of individual benefits. In two villages we visited, farmers told us about shared fences. Especially in villages without a village fence, a grazing camp is a must for farmers. If they can not afford the material and / or do not have the strength to build it by themselves, it is not uncommon that fences are shared with one or two other homesteads. This is comparable to grazing camps established by large family clusters.

Prestige

During my time in the field, I observed that a farmer's camp often manifest his financial situation. The fences differ in their materiality, location and size. In this section I want to focus on the materiality and location. From the branches of thorn bushes to modern iron poles and mesh, different materials were used to fence. The different materials simultaneously illustrate a progress in farming and is therefore linked to the first section of this chapter. The most common fences were wooden poles and wire or barbed wire, which differ in the distance of the gaps between them. Fences made from branches or bushes usually were older and needed a lot of effort to erect and maintain them, like this old Herero told us.

The highest prestige in the Herero culture is possessing a large cattle herd. If the farmer owns a camp, its size indicates the size of his herd. Drawing on this, the length of the fence matters for prestige. The size and the location are often coupled since large, fenced areas are more only available outside of villages. As a consequence of the statement of capital made through the materiality and site of the fence, I deduce that fences also are a means of prestige, which visualizes a farmer's wealth to other farmers. One elderly farmer we met lived alone with his wife and grandchildren. He still remembered building the fence and how the materiality changed.

It was a long time ago, 1974. The fence made of wire is starting here and from over there it is only branches. (...) First, it was covered only with branches because I was strong enough to take the ax and chop the trees down to build a camp. Now I am old and weak, I can not do it anymore. –

Farmer M, 29 October 2016

This farmer's experience also illustrates the change in the materials over time. The newer part was built with poles and wire, while the older part was still made of branches. In addition to the temporal influence, there were also financial matters to consider. One farmer we met made his living from seven cattle and wage labor. He did not own any camp and was lacking capital for any fencing. He told us that he is «working as a security guard at the school» (Farmer F, 26 October 2016). Through the job he «can get a bit of money, but it is not enough» (Farmer F, 26 October 2016). He explained that he also has «to pay for the water for the cattle to drink (...) and a bit of food for my home. Then the money is finished» (Farmer F, 26 October 2016). To improve his livelihood he would need a new kraal, for instance, since his «is just made of branches, no fence» (Farmer F, 26 October 2016). In contrary, in the case of farmers with big herds and / or well paid jobs in the modern towns, iron fences were used to surround houses and build *kraals*. The different camps were still mostly built from fences by wire and wooden poles than iron grids.

From the location of a fence, one can also draw conclusions about an owner's financial situation. In particular, large fenced areas in the «open spaces» belong to rather wealthy farmers. This was also documented in the literature, where they found much larger herd sizes in «open spaces» than in more concentrated spaces like villages (Mendelsohn / Obeid 2002: 37). This is also coupled with access to one of Namibia's most valuable resources: water. Without water, land is not usable. One farmer we met told us about the situation in the «open space» behind the village he is living in.

There are a few people living there [in the open space]. They also have cattle. When they go there, they have money. They built their own borehole there. – Farmer D, 25 October 2016

Without a water station, the daily distance from the villages to graze at those places in the «open space» are often too far for the cattle to walk. Putting up fences away from villages requires enough capital to drill one's own borehole. Dependent on its depth, a borehole can cost around 200'000 NAD¹⁴ – a sum only payable for a fraction of Okakarara inhabitants. The highest prestige in the Herero culture is possessing a large cattle herd. If the farmer owns a fence, its size indicates the size of his herd. Drawing on this, the length of the fence matters for prestige. The size and the location are often coupled since large, fenced areas are more often found outside of villages. As a consequence of the statement of capital made through the materiality and site of the fence, I deduce that fences also are a means of prestige, which visualizes a farmer's wealth to other farmers.

¹⁴ This calculation is based on the information of a worker from a borehole company in Namibia.

7 Making Land: Between Agreements, Regulations and Law

The chapter focuses on the norms and laws regulating the distribution and usage of the resources, water and land. Both resources are necessary for the farmers' everyday lives. While water is scarce in Namibia, land is limited to farmers on the communal land. Following, it is therefore discussed how these local norms around water and land came to be and how they are perceived and executed by the farmers. In this way, the chapter analyses how property relations stabilize in territory and the influence of seasonality. To make the land usable, the government often equips villages with a borehole, which is then maintained by the residents. The government also provides the land which is used as communal pastures. While the land can be cultivated and inhabited by the communities, it remains the property of the government. The Communal Land Reform Act from 2002 - in collaboration with local authorities - thereby allows the farmers to fence a maximum of 20 hectares for their private usage. Many fences on communal pastures are larger than 20 hectares and put pressure on other farmers and decrease communal pastures. While the fences can be considered «illegal» on a national, legal level, on a local level they may have the approval of the village's headman. The final section then briefly discusses how the system for regulating access to water could be transmitted to land. Land and water from boreholes are both used as common properties, which makes them comparable. By discussing laws, regulations and access to resources, the chapter analyzes how property relations are negotiated and renegotiated through the mechanisms of access and exclusion and how they stabilize in territories.

7.1 Regulating Water Access

All the villages we visited in the Okakarara area were provided with water by either pans, NamWater or boreholes. The norms around the actors who access the water, the seasonal variability of water, and the agreement and laws of access to water differ along the three systems. Following the norms and usage of pans, NamWater and borehole are analyzed and discussed. The focus thereby is placed on the access to water from boreholes, since the making of norms and regulations for the distribution of this resource is most comparable to those for land due to their shared access and norms made in the villages.

During my fieldwork, the farmers explained that access to water from pans is coupled with seasonality and the access to land. Pans are natural troughs that store water from rainfalls. The hardened, loamy ground prevents the water from trickling away. During the rainy season around January and February, the pans are filled and store the water until it evaporates. The rest of the year, the pans stay dry. During the interview, Geoffrey told us that the water from the pans is the most preferable for the cattle since it «makes them very strong, so it can sustain very long» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016). All the cattle that can access the pan can consume the water. If one or multiple farmers hold the authority for the land around the pan and have fenced it off, their cattle profit. In cases where no fence was erected, all the cattle that are able to reach it can drink there. Furthermore, access can be gained over agreements with the access holders. During the rain season, when the pans are filled, the farmers' expenses for water decrease since «the cattle is drinking from the pans» (Farmer L, 28 October 2016).

NamWater¹⁵ is Namibia's water company, which by pipes provides households with water. Thereby, mainly the villages located close to Okakarara, where the water is pumped from, profit from this system, because the costs for longer pipes would be too high. This water comes from canals and groundwater. The ground water is coming from the Kunene river and from the Kavango river with canals. It enters here in Okakarara» (Farmer A, 15 October 2016). In Okakarara, it is stored in a basin and pumped into pipes. The farmers have to pay the company according to the amount of water they used. During the interviews, this payment system

¹⁵ NamWater¹⁵ is short for the Namibia Water Corporation Ltd. The company describes itself as a «commercial entity supplying water in bulk to industries, municipalities and the Directorate of Rural Water Supply in the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry. The latter supplies water to rural communities. The Namibian government is the sole shareholder (...)». (NamWater, no year, <https://www.namwater.com.na>, entered May 26, 2017).

was often talked about with discontent, like this farmer told us, who was struggling with the payments during the dry season.

We get water from NamWater. But it is too expensive to maintain – to pay for [the water for] the cattle and the garden. We would end up in jail, because we would come behind with the bill. – Farmer G, 26 October 2016

Like other farmers we talked to, the farmer preferred water access from a borehole over NamWater. However, another farmer argued, that it is the people's handling of the payments that is causing this discontent.

The water is not expensive. I think the problem with the water here is that we don't pay it each and every month. We just keep the money and the amount is getting bigger and bigger and in the end they say that the water is too expensive. You just pay 300 or 400 N\$ for the water per month. – Farmer L, 28 October 2016

As a consequence of late or failed payments, the water provision is cut, as told by one other farmer.¹⁶ This occurs especially during the dry season, when people and animals are only depending on NamWater for their water supply.

In the Okakarara area, it is mostly the government that drills the boreholes and installs the pumps to transport the water to the surface, since most of the villages can not afford to build them themselves. The borehole «remains the property of the government but fuel is done by the villagers» (Farmer R, 15 November 2016). The rules for the fueling and the consumption of water from the borehole, «are drafted by the elected committee members with the assistance of Ministry of Agriculture's extension workers» (Farmer R, 15 November 2016). Accordingly, the actors involved in making the rules are composed of village inhabitants and individuals connected to the government of Namibia. The village inhabitants were elected through the village's committee. In committees, people of a village who are affected or interested, meet to discuss urgent matters. Solutions are found based on the consensus of everyone attending, which can take up to several days. The committees thereby have a strict hierarchy, which one young, female farmer explained to us.

Elders are more respected, especially men. The opinions of men have more weight. Women tend to be more reserved. In most Herero cultures you are not considered to be a man unless you are married and have a child. – Farmer R, 15 November 2016

Furthermore, the opinion most valued is the one of the village's chief, often referred to as headman.

The villages we visited followed similar rules concerning the payment of the borehole. The rules can be understood best by illustrating them with the example of Martin's village. Martin himself is the headman. As a headman he is responsible for the allocation of the payment of the annual fee.

I keep all the numbers in a folder. People have to pay for the waterhole per cattle, so I know how many cattle are here. Per cattle it is 250 NAD per year for the borehole. – Martin, 27 October 2016

This method allows the distribution of the cost according to the intensity of its usage. In this way, big herd cattle farmers, who generally are wealthier, take on the majority of the costs. The system also makes exceptions. «People are understanding» the young, female farmer explained. She remembered that in her village «there used to be an old lady, who had only five cattle, she was not paying anything» (Farmer R, 15

¹⁶ Interview 14

November 2016) even though she argued that someone owning cattle can barely be considered as being poor. The money from this annual fee stays in the village's possession since they «use it for the maintenance of the borehole and for its fuel» (Farmer R, 15 November 2016). In other villages we visited, the farmers told us that the government also covered the maintenance of the borehole. Since «water runs the area» (Farmer D, 25 October 2016) a failure of the water pump must be fixed immediately. In this situation, the village informs the responsible Ministry of Agriculture, who send a worker to repair the defect. In the interviews, a time span between two or more months was brought up as the time needed for the reparations. Smaller reparations are always the village's responsibility. One farmer (Farmer D, 25 October 2016) mentioned that the expenses for the replacement of minor parts, for example, costs the village 500 - 1'000 NAD. In these cases, the annual collected fees from the collective are used.

Besides the annual payments, the farmers are paying for the daily usage. To use the water from the borehole, it has to be pumped to the surface by an engine. From there the water is often drained to the homesteads by pipes installed by the farmers, where it is used for the household or to fill drinking stations for the animals. To start the water pump of the borehole, people have to pour diesel in. The farmers told us, that with every usage two to five liters of diesel are needed, from which arise costs ranging from 20 to 60 dollars.¹⁷ The annual fees and the payments for the petrol are the only two expenses for water from the borehole.

This payment system has three advantages: small payments and a regulation of access. First, especially compared to water from NamWater, the payments are small since they have to be made each time the water is consumed. This provides the advantage that the water bills can not add up over multiple months and the amounts stay affordable. As a result, it does not need long to save the money for the payments. Additionally, since the diesel for the borehole has to be paid in advance, only the affordable amount of water is consumed. Exceptions for farmers lacking capital ease this system. Secondly, the annual fees calculated according to a farmer's size of cattle herd leads to a more selective process of who can access it. On one hand, the people considered residents of the certain village can use the borehole. This demands for a clear distinction of who belongs to the village and who does not. This is further stressed through fences. I detected that villages relying on water from boreholes are mostly surrounded by a village fence. One of the fence's purposes is this, to keep cattle belonging to external people from profiting from the village's water, since a drinking station next to the borehole is available in the middle of the village. On the other hand, its access is handled through money, which is calculated according to the usage. A third advantage is the local regulation, the farmers involvement in the making of the regulations through their attendance in committees and exceptions for certain farmers who can not afford the payments. This system was considered to be fair by the farmers we talked to.

7.2 Regulating Access to Land

Different agreements, norms and laws on different scales and their perception by the farmers regulate the access to land and the size of spaces that are allowed to be fenced. For example, the law of Namibia states that on the communal land, land is shared by its inhabitants and only kraals or small camps of 20 hectares are allowed by the CLRA. Locally, authorities such as headmen are deciding about the fences, as regulations are even less controllable in remote and areas. First of all, this leads to a plurality and uncertainty of rules and laws, which enable the uneven accumulation of land by fencing. Secondly, different understandings of how land should be farmed lead to conflict. Thereby, just the regulation of access and the usage of land is discussed. The farmers are aware that the land still is the property of the government and they «do not have any right to sell that out, because it also belongs to the government. The first person, who stayed there it

¹⁷ The price is calculated on basis of the current price of 0.81 USD (Dieselpreise, May 22, 2017, http://de.globalpetrolprices.com/Namibia/diesel_prices/, entered May 22, 2017) per liter, which can be converted into 10.43 NAD (May 22, 2017)

belongs to». (Farmer A, 15 October 2016). The reason someone «can not sell or buy it from someone, is because it is not their property» (Farmer A, 15 October 2016).

Since money does not control land ownership, control over landownership is exercised differently. In Martin's village, for example, the fencing is strictly regulated.

We don't have someone with a big fence [here], all of us only have the capacity of 2x2 kilometers of the camps. It is an agreement of the committee of the place. We are happy with this rule. – Martin, 27 October 2016

Besides the committee, also local authorities interfere in the rulemaking, like one other farmer we met stated:

We have not fought over the camps. The royal house allows us to have fences – not more than 4 kilometers. Actually, there is no problem with the fences. Everything is under control. – Farmer N, 29 October 2016

The different rules about the sizes (20 hectares, 2x2 kilometers, 4x4 kilometers) of the camps already show a plurality in the rules.

These camps thereby are too small to provide the whole herds with grass and are only used for certain cattle that need extra care¹⁸. The rest of the animals use the grazing space inside the village fence. Additionally, the village fence wasn't built until certain rules came to existence. Martin, who is the headman of the village, explained that the village camp embraces an area from 7x7 kilometers, which is owned by all the residents of the village, while «everyone in the village is using that space» (Martin, 27 October 2016). Martin's village is further divided by a road, which cuts the village, the village fence and the people and animal's mobility in half. Before establishing the camp, they had to negotiate over the land with neighbors. Since boreholes are often located in the center of the villages, they measured «from one water point to the next water point and cut it in half. We like cut it in the middle. One side belongs to one village and the other side to the next» (Farmer C, 25 October 2016). Furthermore, the rules concern the size of the fences locally since «the law of the village said, that the fence must be less than two kilometers in square» (Farmer K, 28 October 2016)

Despite Martin considering himself and the other residents of his village pleased with the rules, others are not. The land within the village is inhabited and camped densely, so strict limitations of the length of fences seem reasonable to most of the farmers. Yet, lack of capital and / or land generates inequality. A farmer from another fenced village, without owning a fence for himself, illustrates this.

If you are poor you can not fence. (...) [But even if I had money,] where should I go to fence, because the land is now finished! You know sometimes the cattle moves like this (makes movement), just squeezing themselves into camps. There is not enough space. – Farmer D, 25 October 2016

Furthermore, he critiqued that the land inside the village fence does not have the capacity for the amount of cattle it is used for. He argued that «there are too many cattle on the land, which leads to a degradation in grazing» (Farmer D, 25 October 2016). As a consequence, the village camp is useful for farmers with enough capital to enclose a small area inside the shared village zone to exclusively have access to grazing land.

Inequality can also be found in the locations of the distributed land. In another village we visited, the committee made up rules for the usage of land inside the village fence. Agreements with other farmers created exclusions from those regulations. Those agreements are necessary to cope with the climatic conditions. One farmer living in such a fenced village, explained the agreements in his village.

¹⁸ For example calves, pregnant, sick or weak cattle and bulls.

This is the part where we have the right to go (shows direction). It is a law from the village. The farms here must go in this direction and those over there go in this direction. But in this situation in the drought, when the cattle are dying, you can also go and ask other people, if you can bring your cattle to their side of the village. The other side is better, because they have more pans – small pans, which sometimes have water. On our side, we only have a few. – Farmer J, 27 October 2016

He told us, that the committee of the village came up with this rule about six to seven years ago. The division into directions for grazing on one hand allows a more even allocation of the cattle on the pastures. On the other hand, uneven natural conditions of the land can lead to discontent and anger, especially because this distribution is constant. The farmer accepted this since «it is a rule from the committee of the village, the agreed on it, so nowadays you can not change it» (Farmer J, 27 October 2016). It can be summarized that farmers in general described the village fences and the camps within as well managed. Conflict occurs when the area within the village fence is not evenly distributed. This conflict intensifies when resources such as land and grass get scarce, like in the dry season.

The rules are less narrow for camps in villages that are not fenced in, such as Geoffrey's and Trevor's. Before Trevor's family built the camp, they talked to the committee about their plans. The chances for approval of an acceptance of the fence were high since «they always agree on the camps because everyone has the same ones» (Trevor, 28 October 2016). The number of the animals influences the size of the camps. Trevor explained that on the other side of his village some residents «are building a camp now, for more than hundred cattle – on the other side of the village. (...) We do not have a problem with it» (Trevor, 28 October 2016). Trevor's neighbor explained that the village committee sometimes also allow large fences since «there are many people and every house in that family is having cattle» (Farmer K, 28 October 2016). As a consequence of the committee meeting «they agreed that their cattle mustn't go outside the camp, they must stay inside» (Farmer K, 28 October 2016). In this way, access to enough grazing land remains for other farmers of the village to sustain. Even in the rain season, because of their large grazing camp, they would not be allowed to use the communal pastures for grazing and rotating their herd. This local rule concurrence with the laws of the Communal Land Reform Act, explained one elderly farmer.

It would not be allowed. At the last meeting with the government – the guy from the Ministry of Agriculture – he said people are not allowed to have more than 2 kilometers [in square of fences]. But if the members of the village don't give a complaint about the fence, the government won't interfere. – Farmer K, 28 October 2016

Usually, the further outside of the villages, the bigger the camps get and the control over the area decreases (Stahl 2000). The owners of those camps are often also insufficiently connected to the villages and rarely attend committee meetings, since these half-time farmers are usually based in a town and the farms are left with workers. This is frustrating for farmers who are affected by the fences because «those are taking over the grazing land, it is a problem» (Farmer G, 26 October 2016). Often these farmers are also not attending committee meeting, which prevent fruitful discussion about fencing (Farmer G, 26 October 2016). On one hand, also people without fences find it hard to discuss the problems with fencing hard to discuss in village meetings since they do not «want to sit in those meetings with those people» (Farmer G, 26 October 2016). On the other hand, did one of these farmers propose to call the farmers with a career in a town or city to invite him to a committee meeting to discuss the issues.

According to one farmer we visited, in the «open spaces», capital is more important to fencing there than rules.

As you know, money can talk. If you have money, you can do anything you want. Those other people with a lot of money have big camps. For instance, in this drought, you see no one in the open space, there is no grass. They took their cattle in their camp. Since they have big fences, they can handle the drought. – Farmer M, 29 October 2016

The already capital rich farmers in this way accumulate grazing land, also from people without a camp. These process leads to a higher divide in profit from cattle. Other farmers agreed saying that «sometimes there were people with a lot of money and cattle, so they took advantage and took it» (Farmer L, 28 October 2016). An other farmer found similar arguments stating that «people with the big money just take the whole land» (Farmer H, October 2016). He considered this not to be fair and critiqued that «they must think about other people also. We also want to live, so they can not just enrich themselves and push the other people to the side» (Farmer H, October 2016). Moreover, he argued that «these people should not take law in their own hands, the government has laws» (Farmer H, 26 October 2016).

In general, land is fenced densely in and around villages without village fences. Village residents like Geoffrey, who do not own a fence, therefore level criticism against them. He argued that the rotation system of the camp owners pressures the shared pastures and «contribute to the place becoming more dry» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016). He explained that «the poor... or how you want to call us... us, people who do not own something or don't have camps – we have the disadvantage at the end of the day» (Geoffrey 28, October 2016). One other farmer who, like Geoffrey, does not own a camp criticized that «there is not enough space to put my own fence here, unless I put it behind someone's fence, who established a camp already» (Farmer F, 26 October 2016) but this would not be allowed and therefor is no option. The farmer wants «to come to the agreement, where we can decrease some fences» (Farmer F, 26 October 2016), which is rather difficult to achieve in the committee meetings. Residents without a fence often explained us that they envision a land use without fences.

When pressured and bothered by camps, farmers can either report it to the headman to discuss it in the committee or report it directly to the royal house in Okakarara. In committee meetings, people «come together and talk to each» (Farmer L, 28 October 2016) and decide as a group how to address a certain issue. Then again, when coming to fences, the committee meetings do not always proceed harmonically. The attendants are often split in two groups: farmers in favor and against fences. «It is like water and fire» (Farmer D, 25 October 2016) one farmer explained the situation in the meeting, stressing the lack of communication between the groups. In Geoffrey's village, the situation in meetings is this unconstructive that «one meeting collapsed» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016) so they could not find any solution. Also, not all involved parties are attending the committee meetings, especially large camp owners from remoter areas «they never come, even when they are around» (Farmer D, 25 October 2016). Because of their absence the problems occurring from the loss of the grazing land to other residents of the village remain unsolved.

As a further step after discussing fences in committee meetings, farmers can also report them directly to the royal house in Okakarara. In the farmer's descriptions, the royal house is a «traditional royal family, which had wealth and power in earlier days» (Farmer R, 15 November 2016). The family was called «royalty» «due to their political, social and economic influence» (Farmer R, 15 November 2016). Today, the farmers, for example, contact them «to approve the fence by the royal house» (Farmer P, 29 October 2016) which they use to apply for a license to gain the legal right to fence in land. Geoffrey furthermore explained that the royal house is solves conflicts occurring from fences. They then are supposed to address the issue and take a look at the camps themselves to find a solution.

Different hurdles keep farmers from reporting large fenced areas to the royal house. One example is the social solidarity and dependency within villages. During the transect walk, one farmer told me, that many residents of the village are related and he, for example, wouldn't report his own cousin.

I never reported it, (...) because others are also helping. And the other thing is that we are a group. If we would make a case, we would end up not talking to each other. It would be like we were not living in the same village. That wouldn't be good. – Farmer J, 27 October 2016

Maybe the most important aspect is that people – also based on previous experiences – mistrust in the royal house's interference to change the situation. When farmers report a camp, «they are turning a blind eye at the whole thing» (Farmer H, 26 October 2016). Some assumed that this is also due to the capital, connections and powers large fence owners hold. Therefore, «the politics is also playing a huge role in our set up here. It depends where you belong, what party you are supporting» (Farmer H, 26 October 2016). From this, conflicts arise because the royal house is accused to privilege some farmers over others.

Some of us with the small camps, we were reporting to the royal house that some of the farmers are having big fences and that this is a problem for us, since those people don't want to come to an agreement with the fences. But you know, some people have a lot of money and the royal house told them that they don't have to talk to us since the royal house will do that for them. (...) The royal house is not doing anything, because those people talked to them. – Farmer F, 26 October 2016

Other farmers, like Geoffrey, also decided not to report it, because they assume that they could not make an impact. Geoffrey used an illustration expression in *Ojibherero*, which translated said «one finger can not take a louse» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016). In his opinion «if you are alone, you won't get anywhere» (Geoffrey, 28 October 2016). Also another farmer considered himself as not able to make an impact. He found the reason in his financial situation since he considered himself a «poor man» (Farmer M, 29 October 2016). In contrast to Geoffrey, he knew «others in the village, who are in the same situation» (Farmer M, 29 October 2016), but also as a group, they did not make a move since they «are all poor, we can not do anything» (Farmer M, 29 October 2016). Those hurdles are a part of the reasons large fence owners very seldom face consequences or have to remove their fences. Traditional (like the royal house in Okakarara, which is considered to be a traditional authority by the farmers) and governmental authority mainly react to fencing when a problem occurs.

7.3 Conclusion & Discussion

In summary, the farmer's perceptions and descriptions of norms and laws regulating the distribution and usage of the resources water and land as well as their impact on them are diverse. Water from pans, NamWater and boreholes follow clear regulations. The common access to water from boreholes is organized by village committee members and supported by workers from the Ministry of Agriculture. The payments seem to be accepted by the farmers, the rules for usage are understood and respected and the water accessible to everyone in the village. On the opposing side, the norms and rules of land use are perceived as fuzzy, unclear, inconsistent and not respected by all inhabitants. This can be seen in the different answers of farmers on what types of fences are allowed, the different spatial structures of the fences, inequality within the residents of the communal land when acquiring access to land and how this inequality is addressed in the village committees.

I conclude that the reason for the different implementations and perceptions of rules and laws can first be found in the different attributes of the two resources and second, in the realization of the regulations. In the Okakarara area, at first sight, water seems very scarce and land endless. When a village has a borehole that is running, often the opposite comes closer to the truth. If someone accumulates land, others no longer can use it. Water, on the other hand, is just (almost always) running, despite how much others have already taken. Water therefore does not have to be accumulated to ensure one's share. Through the annual payment as well as the costs for diesel, the farmers are conscious of the water's value. Conversely, land is perceived as something that can be simply be allocated. This can clearly be seen in this statement of Trevor:

*It is just communal land. So you can take a piece, where you can put your fence and graze your cattle.
– Trevor, 28 October 2016*

Not only can land be «taken», it can be taken without making payments. The expenses are charged for the fence itself, but not for the land that is fenced in. The land is therefore accumulated «for free». While farmers pay annually for the water consumption, the used land only generates costs for the fence¹⁹ once and costs do not increase with the size of the land fenced in or for the amount of cattle they own. Enclosing a larger piece of land does not come with higher payments and therefore can be paid off quickly. Additionally, accumulating land brings benefits, since the cattle can sustain themselves longer than without the grass stored exclusively in the fenced areas. They profit due to the extra grass from which other farmers' cattle are excluded, whereas using more liters of water does not highly influence others.

Secondly, the rules and laws in villages are realized differently between water and land. Water is very well controlled. It is annually paid after the amount of cattle and their numbers are enlisted and updated. The diesel for the engine is the farmer's own responsibility. Without paying, profiting is not possible. The rules and laws of land are often not entirely clear to all the farmers, because they are also always formable in committee meetings and through agreements. Thereby these agreements, norms and rules made in committee meetings are legally subordinated by the rules of the local authorities and which again lie under the law of Namibia. These rules of different scales can stand in conflict with each other. For the farmers, the norms and agreements of their villages are valued the highest. This can be seen in the cases of large grazing camps, which are signed off by the committee members while exceeding the maximum of 20 hectares. This plurality of rules also makes the understanding and implementations more challenging.

Furthermore, the control over land is only partly covered. Especially in remote areas, population is sparse and control little. Large parts of land can often be enclosed without having to face consequences. Therefore, different farmers demanded that «The government should be stricter. Because nowadays those people

¹⁹ Here I do not mention the costs for maintaining the fences. Those costs are not occurring from the land itself, inconsistent and affordable. Sometimes, repairing a fence can also be done without extra costs.

shouldn't take law in their own hands, the government has rules» (Farmer H, 26 October 2016). Even when informed about misuses of land, institutions like the Ministry of Agriculture or the royal house are not reacting consequently. In this way, rules, norms or/and laws lose their impact. A further point of interest is the communication within the communities of the villages. Often larger camps are established apart from the villages' camps and their owners are working and living in towns. In such cases – also mentioned in this chapter – impacted farmers did not participate in committee meetings very frequently and were not available for communication.

The question arises, how understanding the regulations of the usage of boreholes can be used to overcome difficulties in regulating land use. What could be transferred is the protocolling of users and their herd size to generate an overview of the user situation in the area. Furthermore, the water system is effective because people have knowledge of the rules and respect them. This also would have to be generated with land. Two propositions to achieve this would be by better teaching farmers about their rights and rules and interfering more successfully in situations of conflict and strengthening the consciousness for the community in common projects. Furthermore, in a broader sense, the effort people have to make to mobilize mechanisms are more balanced and in relation to their effect on territory than in the regulations of land, where mechanisms have to be mobilized fast but only once and stay consistent for a longer time period.

8 Discussion

In this chapter, I analyze, compare and discuss the empirical findings within the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2. The first section therefore identifies different actors who claim rights to land and categorizes them. The second section draws on mechanisms used to claim access to land. Picking up on Ribot and Peluso's (2003) access mechanisms and the complement provided by Hall et al.'s powers (mechanisms) of exclusion, it discusses which mechanisms are used by whom and analyzes how these mechanisms gain the most effect on property relations. In the last section, I discuss how property relations are stabilized in territories (Delaney 2005) as well as the spatial consequences.

8.1 Actors who Claim Rights

Multiple actors claim a right to land on the communal pastures in the Okakarara area. Von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann (1999) introduce actors involved in claiming rights to property as social units. The researchers define social units as «individuals, groups, lineages, corporations, [or] states» (Benda-Beckman et al. 2006: 15) who may appear as a unit from the outside but may also obtain different attributes. During my fieldwork, I identified the actors claiming right to land and water primarily as individuals, groups and lineages. However, the actors were not limited to act within one of those social units but had different roles.

Analyzing various individuals who claim rights to resources and land, I identified three main characteristics amongst them: capital, source of income and place of living. The amount of capital individuals possess influenced the size of land they claimed access to. Individuals with large capital often owned more cattle, fenced larger grazing areas and invested more in the fencing materials. On the other hand, farmers who lacked capital were often not able to claim any rights to land since they could not invest in the fences and lacked manpower and influence. An individual's amount of capital often depended to the source of said capital: Income generally originated either from livestock or employment. Depending only on livestock includes the risk of diseases, climatic variability and irregular rewards. Employment, on the other hand, is more profitable in most cases. If farmers have a permanent wage labor, the farm becomes a back up strategy, an investment, a family tradition or a hobby, as discussed below. On most of the farms I visited, I found that different members of the household draw on a variety of sources for their income. Only very few farms relied solely on livestock. Any incomes from the government such as pensions, veteran payments or others frequently complemented other income sources. Moreover, the possibility of employment often decided about where people were based: Many, especially young farmers, moved to a town in order to find work and shifted their homestead from rural to urban areas. On the farms, family members or workers are in charge and the farm owners or members of the homestead become half-time farmers.

Furthermore, collectives claimed rights to land. Here, I distinguish between families, groups and villages. Big families of more than one hundred people often live together in groups of multiple houses. Together they share one or multiple camps of different sizes where they hold their cattle together in one or more herds. Since they claim their rights as a group, they also demand a larger size of land and have more resources for maintaining the land and the cattle as well as for putting up fences. Sharing the area around the houses with the other members of the family is more fruitful than building a fence on their own. The same applies for groups: In some cases, I found groups of two or more homesteads that claimed their right to land together. Fencing as a group was a strategy mostly used to overcome the lack of individual capital to invest in the necessary materials. These farmers often also lived in a densely cultivated area where land was scarce. Moreover, villages claimed rights to land. Similar to families or groups, they used their collective claim to regulate land use in and around the village where land was scarce and ensured that other farmers' animals could not enter. However, the villages differed from other collectives in the way decisions were made:

Villages have a designated chief, a headman, who decides about (collective) fences. In families, on the other hand, there can be multiple heads of the house while all farmers are equals within collectives.

I often found the three characteristics capital, source of income, and place of living in combination with each other and farmers acting in different roles, functions and collectives. This can best be illustrated with the farmers introduced in Chapter 5. Martin, the farmer described first, claims rights to land for his own camp, but also as part of a collective for the village fence. He is a full-time farmer based in a rural area and depends on livestock for his livelihood. Geoffrey is also a fulltime farmer based in a rural area but he lacks the necessary capital for fences; his land use is therefore limited to areas others did not fence in. His wife is employed in Okakarara and is the main breadwinner of the family. Unlike to other farmers lacking capital, however, Geoffrey is not involved in any collective claiming rights to land together. Trevor is based in an urban setting, where he makes his living. He only farms part time, while other family members and workers take care of the farm. The family claims right to land as a collective and fenced a relatively large area solely for their family's use. Yet, the amount of land claimed and used is relatively small in compared to the number of people in the family.

While part-time farming enables a livelihood for many people in Namibia, part-time farming at the same time is oftentimes not practiced for reasons of profit. Sherbourne (2006) argues that commercial farming is becoming a rich man's hobby. He bases this observation on the fact that the profits made from commercial livestock farming are low compared to the cost of commercial farming. He argues that – especially for new commercial farmers who did not inherit their farm – it is difficult to gain back the amount of money they have invested: «As a result, farming is rapidly becoming the preserve of the urban rich who farm as a lifestyle choice and prepared to subsidize their farms from their principal source of income» (Sherbourne 2006: 8). Sherbourne further explains that the farms are mainly used as a weekend and holiday residence, a place to enjoy the countryside away from their urban lives. During my fieldwork, I also met such individuals. This new elite uses their farms as a place of retreat and a means to maintain the tradition of farming in their culture, as an investment, a lifestyle choice or as a hobby. While these actors are mostly based in Windhoek and follow a well-paid career, the labour on the farm is mainly carried out by workers. Since these farmers have the necessary capital, they are able to fence of large areas of grazing land; especially, considering they seize the land for free and merely have to invest in the fences. As a consequence, this land is then inaccessible to other farmers who are entirely dependent on their farm's income. Meeting these elite farmers for interviews or having other farmers describe them illustrated that wealthy farmers further have the advantage of being more flexible. Especially during the dry season, when I visited the area, these capital rich actors were able to buy fodder, to move all or part of their cattle to another camp on the farm or to a camp rented in an other area. This way, they could benefit from an advantage compared to poor farmers who had to rely on the remaining pastures to maintain their cattle.

8.2 Claim Mechanisms

Actors control, maintain and gain access to resources and land through mechanisms, which are understood as processes, means and relations used to control, maintain and gain access to benefits. Actors mobilize such mechanisms to renegotiate property relations. Due to the seasonality of the resources, actors need to temporally adapt the mechanisms of access and exclusion. Ribot and Peluso (2003) distinguish right-based, legal mechanisms such as paying someone money and receiving a cattle in return and illicit access mechanisms, which are illegal, such as theft. They further subdivide structural and relational access mechanisms into «technology, capital, markets, knowledge, authority, social identities, and social relations» (Ribot / Peluso 2003: 165). These access mechanisms are complemented by mechanisms of exclusion such as regulation, force, markets and legitimation (Hall et al. 2011). On the communal pastures in the Okakarara area, I found actors controlling, gaining and maintaining access to land through most of these mechanisms. The following sections outline which mechanisms could be found during fieldwork by using examples from interviews I conducted with farmers. I further discuss how these mechanisms were mobilized and analyze the influence of seasonality.

Enclosing land requires mobilizing multiple access mechanisms. Considering that various actors are involved in multiple types of enclosures taking place in the Okakarara area, I will use the example of one farmer from my study who is building a grazing camp, to illustrate how the interplay of different social and structural mechanisms enables him to control, maintain or gain access to exclusive grazing land. By fencing in a camp in a certain area, the farmer is making use of his membership to a specific village (*social identity*). To build his camp, he has to gain the authorization of the committee and the headman. In our example, the farmer had a successful career in politics and is now a pensioner. Since he belongs to the elite of this area, he has a good relation to the royal house (*authority*), which is why the village's committee and the headman allowed him to fence in a certain part of land. To build the camp, he buys (*capital*) the fencing materials in a store (*market*) and transports them to his homestead by his car (*technology*). For the erection of the fence, the farmer asks his younger brother (*social relation*) to help him (*capital*) since he has been a farmer all his life and has more experience in building camps (*knowledge*). Furthermore, the farmer chooses the end of the rain season to build his fence: He does not have to invest in fodder and could previously sell some calves; he hence has the most capital available at this time. By erecting the fence, he gains exclusive access to land that was formerly also used by his neighbor's cattle. The fence thus also gives him the possibility to control the entry and usage of other individuals and their animals.

The following table presents a summary of some of the access mechanisms mobilized by farmers in the Okakarara area.

Table 3: Mechanisms of Access (based on Ribot / Peluso 2003)

mechanism	controls land claims	maintains land claims	gains land claims	mechanisms as presented in the study of the okarara area
technology	✓	✓	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » fences as physical and symbolical barriers to keep people away from land and resources. » water pumps to obtain water and cultivate land » cars to transport materials for farms and fences » roads to access homesteads or fences in remote areas
capital	✓	✓	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » capital as financial resources, equipment, workers » capital affects other categories for example social identity, knowledge, access to authority, access to markets, opportunities amongst others
markets	✓	✓	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » markets as the capability to exchange resources » value of resources (i.e. cattle) depends on access to exchange markets » no mentions of land trades on markets in interviews
knowledge	✓	×	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » educational and practical knowledge as the power to have a second income » knowledge on agriculture (i.e. fodder and gardening) to increase outputs from farming » knowledge on soil, cultivation, and fencing to control and gain access to land » knowledge as beliefs or ideological control, negotiation and discursive practices to position oneself » knowledge on how to shape discourses on fences at committee meetings and negotiate about them » knowledge on fencing rights and application systems used to maintain and gain access to land
authority	✓	✓	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » access to authorities (royal house and ministers with access to higher institutions) yields privileges in gaining access to land and maintaining access » authorities have overlapping jurisdiction; access to land approved through headmen, royal houses and the government can be rejected by other authorities
social identity	✓	✓	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » access to land passed on across generations or distributed among the members of a village or community; identity decides about gaining, maintaining and controlling access » right to live on communal land is attached to herero origins » interferes with the other mechanisms, (e.g. capital, authority, knowledge)
social relation	✓	✓	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> » influenced of the bonds of family, neighboring groups or village communities on access to land » social relations impact all mechanisms

Coming back to the example from before, the farmer's fence not only provided access for his cattle but also excluded his neighbor whose cattle also grazed on the land. If the farmer applies for and gets granted a license for his fence, his neighbor is legally obligated (*regulation*) to refrain from profiting from the land. These regulations are made by the headman and the village's committee and often overlap with the laws of the government but do not cover them completely. In the villages, the local regulations are often more important. Through his pension, the farmer has a regular income and is able to buy fodder throughout the dry season. This is important since farmers cannot rely on their cattle to sustain during the dry season.

Moreover, the prices lightweight cattle generate would be too low to sell them (*market 2*). The farmer further argued that he needed to build the fence because others are building one too (*legitimation*).

The following summary provides an overview over the mechanisms of exclusion found on communal pastures in Okakarara.

Table 4: Mechanisms of Exclusion (based on Hall et al. 2011)

mechanism	controls exclusion	maintains exclusion	gains exclusion	how the mechanism is used
regulation	✓	✓	✓	» influences access: i.e. regulates who is allowed in vs. who is excluded
force	×	×	×	» not present in the sample
market	✓	✓	✓	» price of the material for fences decides who can afford access » scarcity of land limits and controls access
legitimation	✓	✓	✓	» moral basis also influences all four mechanisms of exclusion

I developed four arguments on the mobilization of the mechanisms of access and exclusion. First, I argue that the more mechanisms a farmer can mobilize the more likely he is to control, maintain and gain access to resources and land. Mobilizing multiple mechanisms makes farmers more flexible and independent from climatic variability and other individuals. Second, not all mechanisms are of the same importance. Especially during the drought (when mobilizing mechanisms in general requires a higher effort), farmers who can mobilize capital and social relations are able to control, maintain and gain access to land and resources. This thesis has shown how farmers with large capitals are able to gain access to authority, knowledge, technology, markets, authorities and social identity more easily. On the other hand, capital is the mechanism the most vulnerable to seasonality, since multiple resources such as the pastures and cattle decrease in value. Here, farmers with another source of income or savings such as large cattle herds have an advantage. Social relations also affect access to land if other mechanisms can be mobilized: Social relations influence and allow access to authority, social identity, market, knowledge, markets, capital and technology. My study revealed that social relations between family members were the strongest since they are considered the most trustworthy. Moreover, social relations are insofar dependable on seasonality as the benefits gained from them decrease with the periodic offer of other resources during the rain period. Third, I argue that some mechanisms can compensate for a lack of an other mechanism, especially if they are mobilized vigorously. This can be illustrated on Geoffrey, the farmer who lacks access to land, capital, social identity authority and others. He relates on the social relation to his mother, since she allows him to use the pastures at her village. In this way he gains access to resources and land without the access of technology or capital.

8.3 Stabilizing Property Relations

After actors have tactically mobilized mechanisms of access and exclusion, property relations such as rights, duties, opportunities or privileges have to be renegotiated and stabilized in territories. Overlapping norms and regulations on different levels thereby complicate the process of stabilization. Seasonal changes in the resources further challenge the stabilization. Territories fill bounded spaces with meaning and create stability through communication, by forming classes of identity and creating an «inside» and «outside». The meaning of the space differs according to the intentions of the actors ascribing the meaning (Delaney 2005). The creation of territories has spatial consequences, which again demand for an adjustment in property relations.

In the Okakarara area such territories are best visible through fences. The research in the area has shown variations of spatial consequences resulting from stabilizing property relations. Besides garden fences and *kraals*, I found grazing camps for all or parts of the cattle as well as village fences. Picking up on the example of the last section, grazing camps were often used differently in the rain season than in the dry season. In

the rain season, many farmers mainly used the space outside their camps. In the dry season, when the pastures are fully grazed, they profited from the grass stored inside their camps. As a consequence, property relations with neighbors over communal pastures differ in the rain and the dry season. During the rain season, the farmer excludes others from profiting from the resources of his camp yet he also keeps his own cattle out. The farmers share the same communal pastures and the same privileges and rights of usage. On the other hand, when the pastures are empty and the farmer changes his cattle to the inside of the fence, the property relations to his neighbors also change. While they were competing over the same resources before, the owner with the grazing camp assumes a superior position where he decides about access and exclusion. The fence of his camp divides the «other» from «his» cattle and provides his own cattle with the grass and maybe water pans inside the fence. As a consequence, he excludes whatever remains outside from the benefits. The meaning of the camp changes from protecting grass from the cattle to favoring some cattle over others.

Moreover, village fences draw a line of belonging. Access to the inside of the fence is shared by multiple farmers but limited to residents of the village. My research has shown that these fences intend to stabilize the property relations between two different village communities: While individual fences exclude other members of the same community, all the residents of one village are included in a village fence. This could provide a sense of togetherness and more equality within the village. These camps simultaneously intend to keep other humans and cattle out the village area and try to prevent thieves from coming in. Furthermore, the village fence keeps out other village's cattle. Many fenced villages I visited also had a shared borehole. Through annual payments the residents assure the maintenance of the borehole. The fence therefore protects the people inside from increasing water costs, a loss of grazing area to other villages and possible cattle theft. On the other hand, the fence increases a sense of belonging within the village community. In such cases, the meaning of the camp is not changing throughout the year and the property relations do not have to be renegotiated.

In the Okakarara area, fences provide disadvantages for those who are fenced out. Building camps decreases the communal pastures upon which many farmers' livelihoods are depending. In such cases, these farmers have to mobilize mechanisms to maintain or gain access to resources, which others are claiming the right to in order to survive. For example, they can reach an agreement with family members or neighbors to use the grass inside their camps. Alternatively, they rely on money other family members are sending from time to time to buy fodder, try to enforce a change through communication in committee meetings or steal. In these situations, the newly stabilized property relations lead to conflict and asymmetrical relations of dependency (Delaney 2005). These dependencies can lead to a loss of livestock and poverty in cases where mechanisms cannot be mobilized sufficiently. These situations are especially common in the dry season, when the communal pastures are empty and other actors are lacking spare resources themselves. The farmers then have to find a way to become capable to mobilize access mechanisms to renegotiate property relation.

9 Conclusion

Since Namibia became independent in 1990, the high hopes for more equality among all residents have yet to come true: Unequal distribution of wealth and access to land resulting from the country's colonial past could not be balanced out by now. On one hand, these inequalities occur between commercial and communal farms. Commercial farms are held privately and are often a lot larger than farms on state held communal land, which is shared by multiple actors. On the other hand, inequalities in land use also persist on communal land itself. The government provides this land to specific communities in Namibia who were disadvantaged by colonial rulers and to this day struggle to gain access to land. However, different actors and collectives have started to fence in land in the 1970s. The thesis analyzed the influence of fencing on property relations in the climatic variable setting of the Okakarara area. The actors building these property relations are different framers who either own a homestead in the Okakarara area or are a member of one. Concerning enclosures, the greatest differences between these farmers are mainly their source of income, the capital they are willing to invest and their place of residence. Generally, income is either earned by selling livestock, cattle in particular, or by wage labor. Most of the homesteads rely on multiple sources of income by different family members to ensure their livelihood. Farmers working in wage labor are predominantly part-time farmers based in a town or city. Unless farmers owns a large herd of cattle, maintaining a job in the city throughout the year is frequently more profitable and provides them with more capital to invest in the farm. Farming on communal land is challenging because of the pressure the high number of people and cattle put on pastures as well as due to the long dry seasons which periodically decrease the available fodder for the animals. Enclosures further increase the pressure on the pastures, especially in the dry season. I have argued that farmers have to mobilize mechanisms of access and exclusion to control, maintain or gain access to resources and that these mechanisms have to be strategically adapted to seasonality. My findings show that actors had a higher effect on property relations if they were able to mobilize multiple mechanisms. Capital and social relations proved to be more important than other mechanisms since they facilitate the mobilization of other mechanisms such as markets or authority. However, the data also indicates that capital gained from natural resources is highly vulnerable to climatic variability and seasonally decreases actors' abilities to mobilize said mechanism. Moreover, actors were also able to compensate for a lack of one mechanism by mobilizing one or multiple others more intensively. I further argued that renegotiating and stabilizing property relations results in territories: The newly-formed property relations stabilize as agreements, norm and regulations. These agreements and local norms are frequently the result of debates in committee meetings, where residents of a village come together and discuss a problematic topic or as a result of discussions between different actors or groups. The territories that grow out of stabilized property relations become visible in their spatial consequences, such as fences. In and around the villages I visited during fieldwork, I found different types of fences: garden fences, cattle and small stock *kraals*, camps for certain cattle, grazing camps in the village area and in the "open space" as well as village camps. While they differ in size, each of them fulfills a specific function: Camps for certain cattle give the camp owner control over the cattle's mobility. The farmers use these camps to take care of vulnerable cattle. Grazing camps are used to assure access to resources such as water and grass. Moreover, they provide a rotation strategy; in the rain season the farmers' cattle graze on communal pastures and when those are fully grazed in the dry season farmers profit from the grass stored in their private camps. This especially puts pressure on farmers who are not able to erect a fence. I further found two patterns of fences in and around villages depending on whether the village itself was fenced in or not. In village camps, where the village is fenced in, farmers own camps for certain cattle and the camp sizes are strongly regulated. The village fence belongs to all the residents and provides grazing land to all cattle. Villages, which are not fenced in, are less regulated and while some farmers do not own a fence at all, others fence in a large area. Especially in remote areas, the size of such a private fence is often only limited by the owner's capital. The findings show that camps

influence farmers' everyday resource practices. The farmers consider them essential since they, for example, reduce labor by making a herder redundant and allow progress in farming.

This thesis contributes to existing research on enclosure practices and processes. It provides a conceptual framework, which allows an understanding of the different steps leading to enclosures. It shows how enclosure mechanisms force actors to mobilize mechanisms to renegotiate property relations, which is essential for maintaining access and preventing exclusion to land and resources. The thesis further finds that actors have to adapt the mechanisms they are mobilizing to seasonal variability. This provides information on why some actors are able to access resources while others are not. The results gained in this paper provide insight on where to invest to effectively strengthened actors' livelihoods on communal lands in Namibia, which is of high interest concerning the upcoming National Land Conference.

In the near future, neither completely removing existing fences, nor privatizing the land by dividing it into individual parcels seems to be a suitable strategy. Thus, I recommend to strengthen full-time farmers and local communities and to promote collective fences. Restricting wealthy part-time farmers who enclose large areas of communal land by increasing incentives for them to settle on commercial land would release the pressures places on other farmers. This would imply a redefinition of the criteria farmers need to fulfill to profit from communal land. Here, I recommend drawing on existing regulations about access to water: Granting the village headmen and village committees the power to distribute access to land would authorize them to demand a small yearly tax in proportion to the number of cattle owned by each household. This money could be invested in collective fences and infrastructure, fodder stocks for the animals and support farmers lacking capital. Such a tax would simultaneously discourage farmers from owning too much cattle and thereby decrease the pressure on pastures. The village committees can also decide a maximum number of animals in their village and fine cattle owners whose herds are too large to maintain pastures. While every farmer would possess an individual *kraal*, all the other camps would be paid for and maintained collectively. Neighboring villages would divide the distance between themselves and could fence in their whole territory (not necessarily excluding possible collaborations between neighboring villages to extend communal pastures). Within the village fence, the community decides about the subdivision of the area to allow rotation. Furthermore, I suggest to find a way to distribute Namibia's high incomes from tourism more equally among Namibians. It will therefore be very interesting to see whether the Second National Land Conference will bring about any change.

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Appendix I: List of Interviews

farmer	datum	gender	position on farm	camp	cattle	income	income 2	farming	water
A	15. Okt	m	owner	Okatemba	100-170	livestock, monetary	rural-urban	H	B
B	25. Okt	w	owner's (f) daughter	Okatemba, Village Fence	40 (had 50)	livestock	rural	F	B
C	25. Okt	m	worker	Okatemba, Village Fence	390 (had 590)	livestock, monetary	rural-urban	H	B
D	25. Okt	m	worker/ owner's (m) brother	Village Fence	over 80 (him 6)	livestock, veteran payments	rural-state	F	B
E	26. Okt	m	owner	Okamba, Village Fence	78	Livestock, veteran payment, family	rural-state-urban	F	B
F	26. Okt	m	owner	no	7	livestock, monetary	rural	F	NW
G	26. Okt	m	owner's (f) son in law	<i>unk</i>	80	livestock, monetary	rural	F	NW
H	26. Okt	m	owner	<i>unk</i>	19 (before the drought 40)	livestock, pension	rural-urban	H	NW
MARTIN	27. Okt	m	owner	Okamba, Village Fence	47 (lost 5)	livestock	rural	F	B
I	27. Okt	m	owner	Okamba, Village Fence	64 (before 76)	livestock	rural	F	B
J	27. Okt	m	owner	Okamba, Village Fence	26	livestock, family	rural-urban	H	B
GEOFFREY	28. Okt	m	owner	no	8	livestock, family	rural-urban	H	NW
K	28. Okt	m	partly owner	Okamba	120 (32 died, 15 calves sold)	livestock, monetary	rural-urban	F	NW
TREVOR	28. Okt	m	owner's (m) grandson	Okatemba	50	livestock, monetary	rural-urban	H	NW
L	28. Okt	m	owner	Okamba	35	livestock, state health payments, family	rural-urban-state	H	NW
M	29. Okt	m	owner	Okamba	18 (him 2)	livestock, pansion	rural-state	F	NW
N	29. Okt	m	owner's (m) son	Okamba (3x), large area fenced in through others	100+ (70 calves sold between July and October)	livestock	rural	F	NW
O	29. Okt	f	owner's (m) sister	Okamba	4 (earlier 200)	livestock, family	rural-urban	F	NW
P	29. Okt	f	owner	Okamba	18	livestock, family	rural-urban	F	NW
Q	31. Okt	m	owner	Okamba (2x), Village Fence	<i>unk</i>	livestock, pension	rural-state	F	NW
R	15. Nov	f	owner's (m) wife	<i>unk</i>	<i>unk</i>	monetary	urban	H	<i>unk</i>

general: unk unknown

farming: H half-time / *F* full-time

water: B borehole / *NW* NamWater

Appendix II: Fencing In Otjozondjupa and Omaheke

The approximate distribution and extent of fence lines in 2010

Compiled for the Ministry of Lands & Resettlement, by the KfW Accompanying Measure Project, implemented by GOPA and AMBERO


Notes:

The fence lines were traced off SPOT satellite images kindly made available by the Central Bureau of Statistics

The images were taken in 2010 and have resolution of 2.5 metres

Many other fences were not visible in the images and have not been mapped

Cartography: Raison, 2012



Appendix III: Personal declaration

I hereby declare that the submitted thesis is the result of my own, independent work. All external sources are explicitly acknowledged in the thesis.

Nadine Wolf, June 29 / 2017