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Good herder, bad herder – Understanding the construction of Fulani herders' identities by the local community in Agogo, Ghana

GEO 511 Master's Thesis

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Abstract

Conflicts between sedentary farmers and (nomadic) herders have been in the focus of academic research for many decades and different approaches have been taken to explain them. In West Africa, the Fulani ethnic group is often involved in such conflicts, because until today, many Fulani engage in pastoral activities. Existing work on their relationship with farmers is mostly concerned with exploring how conflicts between the two come about and how they can be resolved. The foci of such research lie on comprehending the underlying struggles about competition for limited resources, climatic changes, complex land tenure arrangements, questions of ethnicity and influence of external actors, such as cattle owners. In this case study on a farmer-herder conflict in Agogo in central Ghana, I will take a different approach to add to the understanding of such conflicts. Contemporary literature often treats pastoralists as one homogenous group of actors with similar socioeconomic interests. The reality, I argue, is much different. Local people (meaning farmers, traditional and government authorities, and local cattle owners) perceive Fulani herders around Agogo highly diversely. Based on three main characteristics of the pastoralists and their activities, they construct identities of 'the good' and 'the bad' herder. Firstly, they characterize herders based on their belonging, referring to their origin, specifics about their characters and their ethnicity. Secondly, local people make connotations of nomadic pastoralism with crime, based on notions of intangibility of the herders, their land use, their armament and the crimes they commit. Thirdly, the cattle shape the perception of Fulani herders by local people through their quantity, their owners and their type. Different sociopolitical groups of local people rely on these three aspects on a daily basis to decide whether a herder represents a threat to them or can be tolerated. Recent measures to deal with farmer-herder conflicts, such as the expulsion policy pursued by the Ghanaian government, are short-reaching in that they neglect these important perceptions and rather treat all herders alike. To pave the way for any lasting solution to the conflict in my case study, but also for many similar farmer-herder conflicts, it is indispensable to take into account how local people perceive (nomadic) pastoralists. Refining an understanding for these processes of identification advances the academic work on farmer-herder conflicts and, furthermore, is of use to policymakers.

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Abbreviations

AAND   Asante Akyem North District

ATC   Agogo Traditional Council

IPCC   Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

KAIPTC   Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

MP   Member of Parliament

1   Introduction

"So, yes, [the] government can impose whatever [it] wants to, whatever measure. But so long as there is disagreement, (...) on who the Fulanis are, what their statuses are, (...) how they presume themselves and how the farmers see themselves, or (...) how the experiences are. We cannot achieve any meaningful peace." (Interview with researcher on 12/06/2018 at the University of Ghana, Legon in Accra)

This quote by an expert of the University of Ghana in Accra refers to the situation in the recent conflict between sedentary farmers and migrant Fulani pastoralists in Ghana. Episodes of this conflict have occurred for many years in Ghana and even more so in other countries in West Africa (Hussein, Sumberg and Seddon, 1999). The case of Ghana is special in that the herders there are seldom indigenous, most of them originate from other countries in the Sahel region such as Niger, Mali or Nigeria (Agyemang, 2017). In search of nutritious grazing lands and sufficient water resources for their cattle, they migrate south towards the more humid savannah grasslands of central Ghana. Conflicts arise through disputes with indigenous farmers over land use, destruction of crops and property, and other controversies. As a result of the constant violent incidents between the two groups, the Ghanaian government has repeatedly tried to resolve the situation by expelling herders from the conflict area, which is one of the measures the expert in the quotation above refers to. However, the persistence of the problematic situation shows that this approach has not been successful and has rather led to further tensions between security personnel and armed herders. The aim of this thesis is to explore why the expulsion approach by the Ghanaian government has not worked and what is, according to the statement of the above-mentioned expert, missing to find a lasting solution for such farmer-herder conflicts.

Much has already been researched and written about farmer-herder conflicts in Africa. The majority of academic work deals with causes, typical progression, and conflict resolution approaches (Bassett, 1988; Tonah, 2002a; Turner, 2004; Moritz, 2010; Turner *et al.,* 2011). While different approaches are taken by scholars, many of them agree that the causes for farmer-herder conflicts lie in a complex setting of competition for limited resources, land tenure, different forms of marginalization, and ethnic issues (Benjaminsen and Ba, 2009; Turner *et al*., 2011; Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). Such work exists for incidents of farmer-herder conflicts in Ghana as well (Tonah, 2002a; Tonah, 2006; Agymemang, 2017), but is similarly concerned with driving forces of the conflict and its underlying socioeconomic context. To go beyond this exploration of causes and to understand what is missing to solve such conflicts, a case study at one of the hot spots of farmer-herder conflicts in Ghana appears useful.

The city of Agogo and its surrounding agricultural areas in the central Ashanti Region were repeatedly in the news for suffering from violent clashes both between farmers and herders and between security personnel and herders during expulsion attempts. In addition to the topicality of the events there, Agogo is a relevant example for a case study for two reasons. First, it is home to a rather homogenous community of mostly Akan speaking people and a number of migrants from Northern Ghana. The main economic activity in the district is small-scale farming (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). Most of those who engage in pastoral activities in the

Asante Akyem North District (AAND), the district of which Agogo is the capital, originate from outside the region, or even from outside the country. The case of Agogo therefore is highly representative for the setting of a 'typical' farmer-herder conflict: a rather homogenous indigenous community, whose members have similar economic interests, which is met by foreign pastoralists. Secondly, the AAND is generally perceived to be a very peaceful, well organized farming community (Agyemang, 2017). There are no reports of major conflicts or larger-scale violent incidents that are not related to farmer-herder conflicts. The latter conflicts in this area can therefore be observed as a unique feature that is not strongly influenced by, for example, existing religious tensions. These two reasons make the case of Agogo in the AAND a perfect setting for exploring the subtleties of the political economy of farmer herder conflicts with the potential of allowing conclusions that can also be applied to other cases in different geographical settings. In addition, the relatively stable security situation in Agogo facilitates access to the field.

The conflict in Agogo and especially its violent outbreaks can mostly be traced back to crop and waterbody destruction through uncontrolled cattle, but at the meta-level, many other factors emerge, for instance the herders' citizenship or land tenure regimes (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). The complexity of the case and poor or non-existent conflict management measures have until recently hindered any improvement of the situation. In 2015, the Ghanaian government increased its efforts in the form of creating the so-called 'Operation Cowleg'. Executing a court order from 2012, the operation intended to drive out all herders and cattle from the AAND through increased military and police presence. Its aim was to establish peace by ending all livestock rearing activities in the district (Gyesi, 2017). But the results of the Operation Cowleg were not as they had been intended. While initially many cattle and herders were effectively driven away, most of them returned quickly as the activities of the security personnel decreased. The occurrence of further violent clashes and destruction of crops in the following years demonstrated the failure of the operation (Gyesi, 2017). Its intrinsic problematic was that in dealing with every herder equally, it was too simplistic and did not account for the complexity of the situation (Olaniyan, Francis and Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). Kuusaana and Bukari (2015) start to uncover parts of this complexity by investigating the land tenure arrangements in the AAND. Already years before their work, Turner (2004: 885) established that farmer-herder conflicts were too often portrayed in a simplistic way, not regarding *"the moral claims and narratives that animate these conflicts"*. In addition, the situation in Agogo is further complicated through elite involvement: wealthy Ghanaians invest in cattle and give them to Fulani herders to take care of them. The owners of the cattle will then be the ones who have to take measures against their own employees' activities (Olaniyan, Francis and Okeke-Uzodike, 2015). I will investigate one aspect of this complex entanglement of the case that has not yet been researched. The herders in the district are perceived as being highly diverse by the local population based on different constructions of identities. While the Operation Cowleg treats them all the same, the locals actually disagree over what types of herders there are and what determines their identity.

This thesis will contribute to closing a gap in contemporary literature on farmer-herder conflicts. In the research on such conflicts, 'the herders' are often being generalized as some quasi-homogeneous group with a common identity. Maiangwa (2017: 283) is one of the few scholars who sheds light on this by emphasizing the importance of differentiating *"between Fulani herders and settled or urban Fulani"* in his case from Nigeria. Moritz (2006a) slightly touches on the issue as well when he refers to changing farmer-herder relations based on personal interest:

> *"In many cases, who is a 'herder' and who is a 'farmer' depends on with which party people ally themselves in a particular conflict and not on their economic interests or ethnic affiliation (...)."* (Moritz, 2006a: 23f.)

My research dismantles the group of Fulani herders and explores how their identities are rather diverse than common. This helps to understand the common contradiction, in which the local people tend to support the initiative to expel herders, and at the same time recognize that herders are a useful economic asset to which they can entrust their valuable cattle. My research further examines why some herders are considered as good or useful and others as bad or unwanted. This thesis refines an understanding of the conditions in which the relations between Fulani herders and local people are defined as either profitable or dangerous. The importance of this goal is described by Dr. Kwesi Aning, Director of the research section at the Ghanaian Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, who is quoted by Bukari and Schareika (2015: 7):

> *"What poses a threat to our collective security is the way that the so-called 'indigenous' Ghanaians perceive the Fulanis, most of whom are actually Ghanaian citizens."*

Making progress in understanding these processes of perception will lay the basis for successfully approaching the resolution of farmer-herder conflicts not only in Ghana, but also in a wider geographical area where the conclusions of my project should be applicable. It is the cornerstone for building lasting solutions that incorporate the interests of all stakeholders. In order to contribute to closing the research gap mentioned above, my project answers the following main research question and two sub-questions:

Main RQ: How does the political economy of farmer-herder conflicts help us to understand the different perceptions of Fulani pastoralists in Agogo?

1. Sub-question: How do different notions of the herders' belonging, connotations of nomadism with crime, and cattle (ownership) influence the perception of herders by local people in my case?

2. Sub-question: What are the differences in these perceptions among sociopolitical groups of actors in Agogo?

In answering these questions, my main argument will be that in the case of Agogo, local people actually differentiate between different kinds of herders, of which some are seen as 'good' and others as 'bad'. Different aspects of the political economy around farmer-herder conflicts and pastoralism in general are influencing these perceptions, I argue. Among these are modes of land use by herders, a notion of intangibility, strongly increased numbers of cattle in the area, and criminal activities by some pastoralists.

In order to deduce these arguments, I will first demonstrate how I conducted my research in Agogo, starting with some background on the research area and its specifications. Then I will go on to give an overview of the existing literature on farmer-herder conflicts with a focus on the West African Sahel region. This section will be followed by a framework of the main concept I will draw on, which is identity. In the next part, I will summarize my methodology and outline the methodological approach and my steps of sampling, data collection and data analysis. This chapter will also contain reflections on the challenges and limitations I encountered during my work. After this part, I will analyze my data, which I divided into three chapters. Each chapter will contribute to the understanding of local people's perception of pastoralists in the AAND but focusing on distinct aspects. The first chapter will be concerned with people's perception of the herders' nationality and ethnicity, the second will explore the understanding of nomadism and its connotation with crime in Agogo, and the third chapter will look into issues of cattle (ownership) and hired herders. The results presented in these sections will be discussed and summarized at the end of the third section. After setting them in the context of recent literature, I will answer my research questions in a final conclusion and give an outlook into further research on the topic.

2 Problem and research area

This chapter will give a broad overview of the research area and the characteristics that are important to understand the background of the farmer-herder conflict as well as my research focus. Due to the limited amount of literature and data on this particular area that is available, I will also rely on information from my interviews and my own observations. Unless otherwise stated, own observations will be the source of information.

2.1 The area – geographical and social context

In the introduction I have claimed that the city of Agogo is a significant case to research the perception of herders by local people in a setting of conflict between the two groups. I have based this claim, on the one hand, on the relative homogeneity of Agogo's society and, on the other hand, on the area's peaceful character. To justify this claim, I now want to give an overview over the main geographical and social features of the district, its system of land tenure and the recent history of relations between herders and farmers. Furthermore, this will serve the purpose of embedding my research project geographically and of giving a sense for the conditions under which my project was conducted.

Figure 1: Map of the study area, the AAND in the Ashanti Region in Ghana. Illustrated are the city of Agogo (red dot) and the five villages, where I conducted interviews (black triangles): Afrisere, Bebome, Hamidu, Kowireso and Seribourso. Sources: Map: openstreetmap.org, Inset map: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5a/Ghana-map-blank.png (Accessed 23/01/2019).

The AAND with its capital Agogo is located in the Ashanti Region in central Ghana (see Figure 1). It shares borders with other districts of the Ashanti Region (Sekyere Afram Plains, Sekyere East, Sekyere Kumawu, Asante Akyem Central, Asante Akyem South), as well as with the Kwahu East District of the Eastern Region. With an area of 1'160 km², it is an averagely sized district in the Ashanti Region (Ministry of Food & Agriculture, 2018). The region itself is often regarded as the core of food production of Ghana and is also the most populous of the ten national regions (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012; informal talk with research assistants on 18/06/2018 in Agogo). The AAND is no exception. In the 2010 national census, 72.7 % of all households in the district are reported to rely on crop farming as their main source of income (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). The district is ecologically well suited for such agricultural activities. The Ministry of Food & Agriculture of Ghana (2018) emphasizes the high fertility and nutrient content of the soil. Moreover, the area enjoys two annual rainy seasons with an average annual precipitation of roughly about 1300mm (Logah *et al.*, 2013). In general, the hilly area around the city of Agogo is used more intensively for agriculture, while the plains towards the Afram river in the north and the border with the Sekyere Afram Plains District are less densely populated and cultivated, mostly because of their distance to the city center. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate two exemplary landscapes of these different areas. For incoming pastoralists, the district's soil is said to be attractive too, due to its nutrient-rich and abundant grass, as well as due to the vast lands in the north of the district and the relative distance to larger settlements (interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem). Scattered around the urban center of Agogo there are multiple small- and medium-sized villages, of which most inhabitants are farmers or farm workers. The villages that I visited as part of my data collection are indicated on the map (see Figure 1).

Figure 2: Hilly area around the outskirts of Agogo. Cultivated areas in the foreground, the Afram Plains in the far background. Source: Own photo.

Figure 3: Flat landscape in the Afram Plains, Sekyere Afram Plains District. Lush vegetation, but sparsely populated and cultivated. Source: Own photo.

The 2010 national census, which is the most recent one available, accounted for 68,186 people living in the AAND, at a rate of 46.5:53.5 % urban to rural population (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). This rate is slightly in favor of rural population compared to national level, which in Ghana is almost 50:50 % urban to rural population. The many people who engage in farming activities in the district cultivate mainly maize, cocoa, plantain and cassava. Figure 4 shows an example of a typical plantain plantation in the Agogo area. Most of these crops are labor-intensive, which explains the high share of people being employed in agriculture (Ministry of Food & Agriculture, 2018).

While the farmers in the villages around Agogo have their farms close to their settlement, many people from the city of Agogo also engage in farming. It is common for farmers from the city to move to their farm in the morning and return to the city in the evening (interview with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo). As modes of transportation they either use motorbikes if they are able to afford one, but there are also several options of public transport, including shared taxis or smaller trucks that bring people to the countryside. According to one local activist, this practice is rather new and above all a reaction to the intensity of conflicts between farmers and herders in the recent years (interview with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo). Before conflicts reached their peak, many farmers used to live in the villages or stayed on their farms in small cottages for the busiest period of the farming season. But due to the threat by armed

Figure 4: Typical plantain plantation with some harvest close to one village, Bebome. Such plantations were mainly affected by crop destruction through invading cattle. Source: Own photo.

herders and other criminal activities, many decided to move to the city of Agogo for more security (interview with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo). For farmers who often have low incomes, this decision is tough to make, since transportation from the city to their farm costs them a large part of their income from selling their farm produce (interview with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo).

The majority of such farming activities are typically small-scale, subsistence farms. Due to limited access to financial capital from banks or other institutions, local people rely on their own capital to invest in farming. As a consequence, many people who do not have sufficient capital to buy their own farm work as farm workers on larger farms. Additionally, at the time of my research, two larger agricultural companies were active in the district: ScanFarm (Gh) Ltd., a commercial farming business, and Miro Forestry, a timber producer (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015; own observation). Both companies ran plantations for which they had leasing agreements for the land. As they were not mentioned in any of the interviews (with one exception), their activities will not be discussed in more detail here.

Regarding ethnicity, the population of the AAND is somewhat less homogeneous than economically. Although the dominant ethnic group in the AAND are the Akan speaking people, there are also many residents of other ethnicities, such as Busangas, Frafras, Nankanis, Kasems, Mamprusis, Dagaaba and Dagombas. Most of them are migrants from the northern part of Ghana (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). Religion-wise, most people identify as Protestant or Pentecostal Christians, but there are also significant shares of Catholics, Muslims and some other Christian denominations (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). Fulani pastoralists, who are partly not accounted for in these statistics because of their semi-nomadic lifestyle, are predominantly Muslims.

2.2   Land tenure

Land tenure was frequently mentioned in existing literature, but also in my interviews as one of the reasons for conflict in Agogo (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015; Agyemang, 2017; interviews with researcher and parliamentary on 12/06/2018 and 14/06/2018 in Accra). Because the aim of this thesis is not to understand how the conflict in the AAND came about, but to contribute to finding a solution to it by understanding how herders' identities are constructed among local people, the explanations on land tenure will be kept short. For a more detailed analysis, Kuusaana and Bukari (2015) offer further insight.

Land tenure in Ghana is 'de facto' in many parts of the country and in many societies still based on a traditional, communal system, while 'de jure' land tenure is organized by a more Western approach (Talbot, 2012). The AAND is a good example. There are private properties and also some state properties, but a large part of the area of the district is under the commission of the Agogo Traditional Council (ATC), led by the paramount chief or Omanhene (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). Most small-scale farming activities are conducted on privately owned land, which is generally the land in and around settlements. Land that is located farther away from villages and towns belongs mostly to the ATC. For such land, leasing agreements were arranged with the first Fulani herders in the end of the 1980s (see next chapter) (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). In order to get access to land, herders and other potential tenants often have to pay a

certain amount of money or a material gift to the traditional authorities (Agyemang, 2017). Fulani herders, often backed by wealthy cattle owners, are generally rather able to afford these gifts as compared to local farmers. For this reason, the traditional authorities were inclined in the past to lease their land to herders rather than to farmers (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). However, with the arrival of more and more external herders in the area, the leasing agreements became less important. At the time of data collection, it seemed that the majority of herders did not have any leasing agreements for the land they used. Those who did were the local, small-scale cattle owners from Agogo. Land conflicts were therefore not too much about formal access to land, but rather about a general grievance by local people towards herders for not respecting local property.

2.3   Fulani herders in Agogo: History of the conflict and the Operation Cowleg

Before the immigration of Fulani herders with their cattle, the local people reported only very few pastoral activities, mostly in the form of people having a small number of cattle, goats or sheep on their residential property or around the towns (interviews with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem, former city assembly member on 28/06/2018 in Agogo and local cattle owner on 05/07/2018 in Agogo,). After frequently migrating to other parts of Ghana already since the end of the 20th century, Fulani herders first entered the AAND reportedly in 1997 (Tonah, 2005; Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). At that time, they were reported to be just a few herders with small numbers of cattle (interview with former city assembly member on 28/06/2018 in Agogo). Reports by Kuusaana and Bukari (2015) about the herders signing lease agreements for community land with the traditional authorities of Agogo at that point are concordant with information from my interviews (with a veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem and former city assembly member on 28/06/2018 in Agogo). The herders who followed in the consecutive years were reported to be mostly nomadic herders who only immigrated or passed through in the months of the dry season (especially between November and March). During this time, the Harmattan, a hot, dry wind from the Sahara Desert, blows southwards and complicates ways of finding pasture and water resources for large numbers of cattle in the Sahel (interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem). This was the main reason for Fulani herders to move south from their (alleged) origins in Niger or Mali. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, the grass in the AAND is repeatedly reported to be very nutritious and the conditions, thus, favorable for cattle rearing (interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem). This caused many herders to stay longer than just for the dry season and they became a constant pressure on local resources. The decision to stay in the area around Agogo in spite of frequent conflict with local farmers was, according to the veterinary officer of the AAND, also related to deteriorating environmental conditions in their place of origin, that made it more profitable for the herders to lose a few cattle to violent clashes in Ghana instead of a larger number to drought in their homeland:

> *"And so, if anybody has 100 animals, and (…) the soldiers in Ghana (…) will go and kill 50 of them, he still owns another 50. It is better than moving them into his home country, where they will all die."* (interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem)

Thus, many foreign herders remained permanently in the AAND or in other regions of Ghana. These herders were also reported to be the ones who most actively engaged in cattle rearing services for local Ghanaian cattle owners (interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem). The relations between such hired herders, cattle owners and local people will be discussed in the chapters 6, 7 and 8 in more detail. The practice, however, quickly became common among local businessmen and wealthy people from other parts of Ghana: people bought cattle as a kind of financial investment and then gave them to Fulani herders to take care of them, due to their expertise in cattle rearing (interviews with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem). These changes to the pastoral economy in Ghana also influenced the nature of 'herders', who could no longer be regarded as a homogeneous group with similar interest.

First violent clashes between local people and Fulani herders were reported to have occurred in 1999 by Tonah (2002b). While the number of immigrating herders constantly increased in the following years, the majority of them seemed not to have any land tenure arrangements (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). As a result of tensions around land tenure induced by an increasing number of herders and cattle, more and more violent conflicts between herders and smallholder farmers started to occur. The first climax of these conflicts was reported between 2009 and 2012, from which Kuusaana and Bukari (2015) report of at least 50 violent incidents. As a consequence of these incidents and increasing pressure from local residents, the issue was taken to the High Court in Kumasi in 2012 (interview with local activist on 12/07/2018 in Mallam, Accra). The court ruled in favor of the local residents and ordered the expulsion of all herders and their cattle from the AAND (Agyemang, 2017). This expulsion exercise, known as 'Operation Cowleg', was the third of its kind in Ghanaian history. Tonah (2005) reports of the two preceding events in the history of Ghana where the expulsion of migrant Fulani herders had been used as a tool to deal with conflicts between farmers and herders: the first took place nationwide in 1988 and 1989, the second in 1999 and 2000, this time being coordinated on regional and district level (Tonah, 2005). As the legal basis for such exercises, the Ghanaian state has relied on the Aliens Compliance Order of 1969, which stated that all foreign nationals living in Ghana without permission must leave the country within 14 days (Tonah, 2005; Agyemang, 2017).

In the years following the court's sentence, and especially during the regional dry season, when conflicts between herders and farmers were most intense, several operations were conducted by police and military personnel in and around Agogo to expel herders and cattle. However, such actions were generally unsuccessful since, on the one hand, not all herders and cattle could be removed from the district and, on the other hand, many pastoralists quickly returned to the area after security personnel had left (Agyemang, 2017). According to a newspaper report, which is the most recent source of information about the actions, the winter 2017/2018 marked a turning point (Gyesi, 2017). As in previous years, actions were taken to drive out herders and cattle in January 2018. During these operations, three military and one police officer were shot and wounded by an unknown assailant. As a result, the national government sent more than 200 military and police personnel into the area to expel herders and cattle from the region and to kill cattle that remained in the region after a few days (Gyesi, 2017). In the short term, these measures appeared to be effective, as the presence of Fulani herders and cattle was very limited in the following months. During the data collection period

in the district in June and July 2018, it was clear that the majority of cattle and herders had left the area, only a few were remaining on the fringes of the district. However, from very recent reports by my research assistants from Agogo, some herders have meanwhile (December 2018 and January 2019) returned and incidents of crop destruction have begun again. The overall assessment of the Operation Cowleg as a measure to prevent conflicts between farmers and migrant herders in the AAND has therefore to be negative. Neither did it prevent the murder of more than 60 people (interviews with two local activists on 27/06/2018 in Agogo and 12/07/2018 in Mallam, Accra, and with former city assembly member on 28/06/2018 in Agogo[1]), nor did it sustainably keep out pastoralists from the area. As a measure dealing with all herders and cattle owners alike, it is clearly too generalizing to be effective. This is the reason why, in this thesis, I am taking the position of calling for a more diverse understanding of herders' identities, especially from the perspective of local people. They are the ones who are directly in contact with the pastoralists and it is therefore important to understand how they perceive them.

To get a sense for the scale of pastoral activities in the AAND, some figures are already mentioned as a starting point, but in general, the size of herds and their influence on the perception of herders will be discussed in chapter 8. Local people reported of quite differently sized herds of cattle in the district at the time of research. While many local, small-scale cattle owners were not owning more than 50 to 60 cows (interviews with two local cattle owners on 28/06/2018 in Agogo, resp. on 05/07/2018 in Agogo, and with veterinary on 28/06/2018 in Fwidiem), there were also reports of large-scale pastoralists being present with herds ranging from 2'000 up to 12'000 cattle (interview with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo[2]). Such larger herds were, in general, associated with the semi-nomadic Fulani herders. Before I will discuss more issues about cattle in the AAND, I want to review the existing literature on farmer-herder conflicts in the next chapter.

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[1] This information was also confirmed in a number of informal talks with the research assistants and other people from Agogo.

[2] A number of other interviewees gave indications about the number of cattle being in this range too. This included one local activist (interview on 27/06/2018 in Agogo), one local cattle owner (interview on 28/06/2018 in Agogo), two farmers (interviews on 25/06/2018 in Bebome and on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso), a veterinary (interview on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem), one subchief of the ATC (interview on 22/06/2018 in Agogo) and two members of traditional authorities from different villages (interviews on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere and on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso).

3 Literature review

This chapter will give an overview of various aspects discussed in the academic literature relating to farmer-herder conflicts in (West) Africa. The review will start with a geographically wider focus and will first discuss impacts of competition for resources, climate change and land tenure on such conflicts. Concentrating more on the region of interest, the AAND, and on Ghana in general, it will then consider the importance of issues about ethnicity or marginalization and that of external actors. From this will then emerge the research gap and the research questions.

3.1 First approaches – competition for resources and political ecology

While conflicts between farmers and herders have been a subject of research for a long time, the context in which they are viewed, and the explanations used to describe them have changed substantially. Bassett (1988) reports that most 20ᵗʰ century literature identifies declining availability of resources, most notably, (grazing) land, as the central cause for violent clashes between farmers and herders. The link between environmental or resource scarcity and violent conflict served as a plausible explanation, culminating in Robert Kaplan's contested essay *'The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet'* (1994). However, this discourse was largely contested towards the turn of the millennium. Peluso and Watts (2001) rejected Kaplan's (and other scholars') point of view as too simplistic, arguing that violence was rather

> *"...rooted in local histories and social relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformation and power relations."* (Peluso and Watts, 2001: 5).

On this basis, following the political ecology school of thought, many researchers called for a more holistic and differentiated observation of farmer-herder conflicts, instead of presenting them as 'just' resource conflicts (Turner, 2004; Moritz, 2006a; Benjaminsen, Maganga, and Abdallah, 2009). In contrast to earlier studies, in which competition for scarce land or water was projected as the main driver of violent conflict, the political ecology approach challenged this 'hegemony' and took into account various political, ecological and social framing conditions that could facilitate conflict (Bassett, 1988; Turner, 2004). Nonetheless, especially the availability of suitable land remains crucial for both pastoral activities and crop farming. The resulting contestations over land in a farmer-herder symbiosis can arise from different aspects.

Firstly, the population in West Africa is steadily growing and land is limited. In Ghana, the population growth rate between 2010 and 2015 was 2.36 per cent (United Nations, 2017). As more people engage in agricultural activities for making a living, more land is required to sustain these people. Benjaminsen *et al.* (2012) refer to this process as 'agricultural encroachment' that can be a driver of conflict between farmers and herders. A similar tendency can be induced by a growing number of herders and cattle (intensified through the trend to financially invest in cattle), who then will need larger pastures (Breusers, Nederlof, and van Rheenen, 1998). Secondly, through unsustainable practices and a general overuse, many regions in West Africa face a degradation of agricultural lands. Degraded land produces less output, thus more land is needed to attain the same harvest or sustain the same amount of cattle

(Tonah, 2000; Agyemang, 2017). Equally important, but covered in chapter 3.3, are contestations over land that arise from the political dimension, namely from land tenure regulations.

Mostly overshadowed by the discussion about competition for land is the competition for other resources, especially water. Turner *et al.* (2011) highlight the importance of rainfall for any agricultural activity in the Sahelian region of West Africa, where rainfall is seasonal and erratic. Indeed, precipitation in Ghana is generally more abundant than in the Sahel, especially in the AAND. So, the lack of drinking water in the Sahel might force pastoralists to relocate their water-intensive business further to the south. The increasing use of water resources in Ghana leads to competition as well (Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015). As the next chapter will show, this competition could be intensified by the consequences of climate change for West Africa.

3.2   Climate change and migration

Besides the natural limitations of land resources, the sum of effects that climate change has already, or will have, on the Sahel region is identified as another trigger for conflict between farmers and herders in recent literature. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (Niang *et al.*, 2014: 1209), mean annual temperatures in West Africa are projected to rise between 3 to 6 degrees Celsius compared to 20th century mean towards the end of the 21st century. Precipitation is much more uncertain to predict, but there is low to medium confidence that heavy rainfall events will change: increased incidence for the period from May to July is suggested (Niang *et al.*, 2014: 1211). Nonetheless, the report (with high confidence) assesses that climate change, in interaction with non-climate factors, will increase stress on water availability and on vulnerability of agricultural systems (Niang *et al.*, 2014: 1202). These changes present new and increased challenges for both pastoralists and farmers in the region, in different forms.

The predictions made by the IPCC are in accordance with the results from recent research on migration and conflict in West Africa. Cabot (2017) emphasizes the effect of climate change on food security and availability of water, especially for pastoral livelihoods. She agrees with the conclusions of Reuveny (2007) when claiming that such shortages will induce environmental migration throughout the region. Reuveny (2007) pursues this storyline in his review on cases of communal conflict in the past. He draws the conclusion that environmental migration can (but not necessarily will) lead to communal conflict, a category into which farmer-herder conflicts fall as well. Cabot (2017) identifies pastoral nomads as one of the groups most affected by environmental stress and deduces a higher tendency to migrate. My results will confirm this later, as there is already a tendency for Fulani herders to stay permanently in the region they used to prefer only for the dry season (interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem). The potential for subnational, communal conflict is also linked to climate change by Raleigh (2010). However, he sees this in relative terms to a certain degree, by stating that communal conflict might also be a strategy to negotiate access to resources between livelihood groups such as farmers and herders. Arguing in a similar sense, Benjaminsen *et al.* (2012) find in their case study in the Inland Niger Delta in Mali that more

erratic rainfall does not necessarily increase the probability of violent conflict between farmers and herders. Instead, they find that 'agricultural encroachment' on previously pastoral land is a key driver for conflict, a phenomenon that is also mentioned by other authors (Hussein, Sumberg and Seddon, 1999; Tonah, 2002).

In conclusion, it appears that climate change factors, similar to competition for land, can be one, but often not the only driver for conflict between farmers and herders. A variety of other factors, many of which are related to the political economy around the conflict setting, play a role in causing such conflicts. This fact was already observed by Dunn (2001) in his work on conflict in Central Africa, where he claims that

> *"approaches that ignore the importance of identity and space provide overly simplistic understandings of the situation. For that reason, the 'politics of greed' explanations of the conflict in Central Africa are somewhat lacking. By interweaving a 'political economy of conflict' perspective with discursive analyses of identity and space, one can get a deeper understanding of the processes at work in the conflict."* (Dunn, 2001: 73f.).

The following three sections of the literature review will therefore present how existing scientific work discusses such political economy factors in relation to farmer-herder conflicts in West Africa.

3.3 Land tenure and land acquisition

For both farming and pastoralism, suitable land is the crucial resource. Kuusaana and Bukari (2015) have contributed largely to the understanding of the importance of land tenure arrangements for the farmer-herder conflict in the Agogo Traditional Area. Their findings reveal the importance of access to land and the complex baseline that characterizes the situation in the AAND: three parties (smallholder farmers, Fulani pastoralists, and a foreign, agricultural company) are in competition for limited, but fertile land. The Fulani, as outsiders, often fail to achieve formal land use rights and therefore remain insecure. Kuusaana and Bukari (2015: 61) identify this as the main reason for conflict, which they say is often presented to be rather about *"resource scarcity, crop destruction and intrusion"*.

This being said, it is interesting to understand how this marginalization of Fulani herders, regarding issues of land tenure, plays out in other cases in Ghana. On the one hand, Yembilah and Grant (2014) state that most Fulani herders in Ghana have no formal access to land and their statuses as outsiders or foreigners prevent them from achieving that. Nevertheless, they have adapted to this fact and through their actions (nomadic grazing, occupying space, herding services, networking) started to explore informal notions of land ownership. On the other hand, there are indeed formal procedures through which (foreign) Fulani herders can obtain land for pastoral activities. Tonah (2002a) explains these procedures, which are carried out in Ghana by traditional authorities who have the say on land issues: herders are required to pay a fee for the land and in some cases also a (yearly) 'rent'. In return, they get access to a piece of land that theoretically is not being used at the time. The traditional chiefs prefer this sort of land allocation to the allocation to farmers, because the payment they receive from pastoralists is

usually higher than what they receive from the local tenants (Tonah, 2002a). In this case, according to Tonah (2002a), conflict mostly arises when cattle leave the land that is allocated for grazing and instead roam through farms and crops, destroying them. Tonah (2002a) also highlights the role of cattle owners in this scenario: they force herders to keep the cattle close to villages in order to keep control of their movements and bring them closer to agricultural lands.

Similar to what Yembilah and Grant (2014) describe in their work, Gonin and Gautier (2016) identify the appropriation of grazing land by pastoralists through their actions. This informal access to grazing land, for example by leading cattle onto the respective area or by cutting branches from trees or plants for the cattle to eat, can easily lead to confrontation with farmers who see their farm property in danger (Gonin and Gautier, 2016). These forms of confrontation also arise in Brottem's (2014) case study from Mali, where the creation of livestock corridors and the appropriation of land for cattle grazing challenges existing power structures on the ground. Such processes of boundary formation, according to Brottem (2014), change the position of power for those who promote them and those who try to reject them.

Overall, issues of land tenure and land acquisition can therefore be regarded as a central aspect for understanding the origin and nature of farmer-herder conflicts. Existing literature, however, leaves undiscussed how access to land and processes of land acquisition shape the perception of herders and the relation between herders and indigenous people. Moreover, while land tenure seems to be important for this understanding, it is only one among a number of political economy factors that should be accounted for. Benjaminsen and Ba (2009: 71) emphasize this in their work on another case from Mali, where they state that the farmer-herder conflict is indeed about land use but facilitated only through *"national policies and laws giving priority to agricultural development at the expense of pastoralism."*. The next section will therefore discuss such issues of political marginalization and also relate them to ethnicity.

3.4 Ethnicity, marginalization and stereotyping

Besides competition, climate and land tenure, some researchers also identify issues of ethnicity and marginalization as crucial for understanding farmer-herder conflicts. Moritz (2006a) explores how ethnicity is often used to situate farmer-herder tensions in a larger political economy, for instance by politicians who make use of such conflicts using xenophobia. This is especially the case in situations where one of the two groups is regarded as autochthonous and the other as migrants. He also adds that farmer-herder conflicts can be portrayed as being related to larger ethnic or religious conflicts, since farmers and pastoralists are often separated along ethnic, religious or cultural lines (Moritz, 2006a). A good example for this situation would be the current farmer-herder conflict in Nigeria, which is generally between Muslim Hausa or Fulani herders and Christian farmers (Mikailu, 2016). Maiangwa (2017) uses this case from Nigeria to emphasize the importance of such divisive lines for communal conflict. He notes that in the respective farmer-herder conflict, tensions arise based on an indigenous-settler confrontation, in which both groups make claims about limited land (Maiangwa, 2017). In this sense, conflict is less about ethnicity than about a different fragmentation of society based on origin and socioeconomic characteristics.

Such fragmentation processes can also be triggered in different settings by marginalization of certain groups. Both Raleigh (2010) and Benjaminsen and Ba (2009) agree that political marginalization (e.g. through land use politics preferring farming to pastoral activities) can be a main driver of conflict in farmer-herder relations. Their studies show that political marginalization creates an imbalance of power between groups that have conflicting interests. I have already mentioned how this marginalization plays out in the case of Fulani herders in Ghana: their formal access to land is limited through their external status (Yembilah and Grant, 2014). Political or economic marginalization is therefore directly connected to tensions between farmers and herders (Benjaminsen and Ba, 2009; Yembilah and Grant, 2014). This goes hand in hand with the above-mentioned political ecology approach, which focuses intensively on how such processes increase the prevalence of conflict.

In addition to political or economic marginalization, the Fulani herders in Ghana are often confronted with social marginalization, or segregation. Bukari and Schareika (2015) report that Fulani people are repeatedly accused of (violent) crimes they have not committed because of their non-citizen and non-indigenous status. They become victims of stereotyping and prejudices based on their ethnicity and occupation (Bukari and Schareika, 2015). Naturally, such social fragmentation serves as a catalyst for conflict and consolidates existing fragmentations along ethnic or socioeconomic lines. Not much is written about the social relations between herders and locals, although it seems to play a crucial role in understanding how Fulani herders are perceived by local people in Ghana. This does not apply for economic relations between the two, however, for which the following sections summarizes the existing literature.

3.5 External actors, cattle ownership and research questions

Since pastoralism is a productive and a financially interesting business, herders seem to have intensive economic relations with indigenous people. These relations can take various forms, of which some can be exploitive and a cause for conflict. As an example, Benjaminsen *et al.* (2012) identify external actors in the form of corrupt or rent-seeking government officials as one driver for conflict in their case from Mali. They state that herders are required to pay 'fees' (actually bribes) for a number of circumstances, such as the opening of a new livestock corridor or cattle entering the region. Their marginalized status forces them to do so, if they want to obtain access to any resources or services. Tonah (2002a) detects similar mechanisms in relations between herders and local institutions in Ghana: the above-mentioned system that a herder must pay a fee to traditional authorities in order to obtain land is equally based on the marginalized status of herders, since they are perceived as outsiders. For local people, access to land is much easier and often cheaper.

Another important issue is that of external cattle ownership, which is only covered in parts by recent literature. Olaniyan, Francis and Okeke-Uzodike (2015) point out that most Fulani herders in the AAND do not own the majority of the cattle they take care of. Instead, they are the property of so-called 'big men', members of the upper class of the Ghanaian society who invest in cattle and employ herders as caretakers. Bassett (1994) researched this mode of employment already, although in a different locality (Northern Côte d'Ivoire). His findings

suggest that, similar to their role in the community to which they migrate, the herders are underprivileged in the relationship with the cattle owners. Thus, they feel a strong pressure to take good care of the cattle in order to receive a regular salary (Bassett, 1994). Moreover, in the case of Agogo, some of the cattle owners seem to be either politically or economically influential people, e.g. traditional leaders or those making decisions about expulsions of pastoralists. Their involvement makes the situation even more complex and complicates power relations between the various groups of actors (Olaniyan, Francis and Okeke-Uzodike, 2015).

In another article, Tonah (2002a) focuses on a different group of external actors that are essential for some farmer-herder conflicts: small-scale cattle owners and livestock traders. In his case from northern Ghana, they appear to have close relations with Fulani herders and are profiting from their services and the herders' presence in general. Their interest, thus, would rather be to avoid conflict and maintain symbiotic relations among each other (Tonah, 2002a). Other external actors might include exploitative institutions, such as local authorities, which aim to sustain conflict between Tupuri farmers and Fulani herders in the case study by Moritz (2006b), who highly profit from rents paid by the pastoralists. This relates back to the work of Benjaminsen *et al.* (2012), who blame a 'political vacuum' and a failure of certain institutions (or people in these institutions) for catalyzing farmer-herder conflicts in their case.

The literature summarized in these five sections contributes considerably to the understanding of farmer-herder conflicts and to the refinement of the understanding of how these two groups come about. That competition for resources in combination with the effects of climate change create a scenario where difficult regimes of land tenure, marginalization of actors and the intervention of external players lead to conflict appears plausible. What is lacking for a lasting solution to such conflicts is a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between farmers and herders in this political economy environment. The gap in the existing literature on farmer-herder conflicts is that it fails to acknowledge that 'the herders' are not just one uniform group of actors but based on how they are perceived by indigenous people around them, they attain a diverse, multifaceted identity, the understanding of which is essential for thoroughly grasping relations on the ground. I would like to close this gap by answering the following research questions.

Main RQ: How does the political economy of farmer-herder conflicts help us to understand different perceptions of Fulani pastoralists in Agogo?

1. Sub-question: How do different notions of the herders' belonging, connotations of nomadism with crime, and cattle (ownership) make 'good and bad herders' from the perspective of local people in my case?

2. Sub-question: What are the differences in these perceptions among sociopolitical groups of actors in Agogo?

To lay the basis for my intensive engagement with herders' identities, I justify my use of the concept and create a framework for how I understand the term in the next chapter.

4 Theoretical framework

4.1 Making use of 'herder identities'

My focus on issues of identity, perceptions and categorization requires a clear definition of my understanding of the concept of identity and its meanings. The second part of this chapter will serve the purpose of explaining this understanding, but the first will justify why I see the concept of identity as a useful tool for researching on my case.

One report on why identity is important when observing conflicts between sedentary farmers and Fulani pastoralists is given by Maiangwa (2017: 283):

> *"As a group, Fulani herders in West Africa have been associated with varying forms of aggressive and violent behaviors, including crimes such as kidnapping, arson, and brutal murder of their victims. Fulani herders are also regarded as 'settlers' or 'aliens' in relation to 'autochthonous' or 'indigenous' communities in several parts of West Africa, including the Sahel belt. It is worth mentioning that there is a distinction between Fulani herders and settled or urban Fulani, even though the identity of both groups is often conflated in the discourse of farmer–herder conflicts."*

It is precisely this conflation of identities, I argue, that is part of the reason why the conflict in Agogo has assumed such regional, violent proportions. Both the analysis of the causes of the conflict and the measures taken to resolve it have been extremely short-reaching and simplistic (see chapter 2.3). The lack of focus on distinct herder identities and how these should be incorporated into measures taken to deal with the herders fueled the escalation of violent conflict. This is congruent with the conclusion drawn by Turner *et al.* (2011: 185) from their analyses of a farmer-herder conflict in Niger:

> *"Instead of here-and-now struggles over a dwindling stock of resources, most 'conflicts over resources' are shaped by social identities, political interests, historical precedent, and the defense of broader principles."*

In Agogo, even when moving away from the 'competition over scarce resources'-narrative, approaches to explain the conflict still lack an adequate recognition of identity and identification of actors, especially of herders. Kuusaana and Bukari (2015) contribute much to the understanding of how complex traditional land tenure arrangements prevent herders from access to this resource, but they also fall short of exploring different types of herders. As my results will show later, some herders do not care for land tenure arrangements at all, whereas others have had leasing agreements for many years.

Looking at what identities exist and understanding how they are constructed (and by whom) will help to establish the basis for any long-term solution to such a conflict. Or, as Dunn (2001: 73) puts it in relation to his research on conflict in Central Africa: *"Approaches that ignore the importance of identity and space provide overly simplistic understandings of the situation."*. Understanding processes of herder identification is therefore an important contribution to any work on farmer-herder conflicts and to a better comprehension of some aspects of pastoralism in general. Having justified why it is a useful concept to engage for my research project, I now want to frame the term and arrive at a working definition of it for my thesis.

4.2   Herder identities – A framing approach

The demarcating of a clear understanding of identity is becoming increasingly difficult given its multifaceted use in the existing literature. As Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue:

> *"'Identity' (…) tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense),*
> *too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its*
> *sheer ambiguity)."* (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 1)

To understand the methodology and the results of this work it is therefore crucial to know what definition of identity underlies my assumptions. As a general 'baseline' understanding of identity, I tend to rely much on Dunn's work on "Identity, space and the political economy of conflict in Central Africa" (Dunn, 2001). Even though his work stems from a different geographical setting, his understanding of identity is extremely useful for my project too:

> *"(…) identities can be understood as the product of multiple and competing*
> *discourses, which construct unstable, multiple, fluctuating and fragmented*
> *senses of the self and other. Identities are socially constructed, conditional*
> *and lodged in contingencies that are historically specific, intersubjective and*
> *discursively produced."* (Dunn, 2001: 56)

The quote consists of five essential parts on the basis of which I would like to frame my understanding of identity in the following five sections. First, the notion of identities as *"the product of multiple and competing discourses"* (Dunn, 2001: 56) will be relevant to understand the variety of attributes that play a role in constructing Fulani herders' identities in the case of Agogo. Margaret Somers' (1994) work on 'the narrative constitution of identity' contributes to this argument and adds up to my methodology, which I will present in the next chapter. Her focus on how people's social identities are constituted through one or more narrations serves as a basis for analyzing how Fulani herders' identities are constructed by local people in Agogo. Furthermore, the understanding of identities as a *"product of (…) discourses"* (Dunn, 2001: 56) leads to an important point that is made by Brubaker and Cooper (2000): they highlight that in many of its uses, 'identity' should rather be replaced by 'identification'. Using 'identification' instead of 'identity' facilitates the researcher to focus more on the agents that are involved in the process of identifying and it prevents him or her from assuming that the result of the process of identification must be an *"internal sameness, [a] distinctiveness, [a] bounded groupness"* that is often implied by 'identity' (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 14). They also emphasize that

"identification – of oneself and of others – is intrinsic to social life; 'identity' in the strong sense is not." (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 14). This makes their argument very useful for researching on farmer-herder relations in Agogo, since it shifts the focus on the *process* of constructing identities, away from a too perfectionistic expectation of researching the *result* of the above-named process, a distinct, homogeneous identity.

Secondly, understanding identities as *"multiple, fluctuating and fragmented"* (Dunn, 2001: 56) will help me to better comprehend how they are being created as a result of actions and beliefs. In this context, it is worth taking a look at Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov's (2004) work on 'ethnicity as cognition'. Although they refer to other categories than identity, such as ethnicity, race, or nationality, their proposition of using a cognitive approach to understand identification processes is useful in that it connects these processes to several social experiences (Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov, 2004). They also emphasize that categorization takes place regularly in everyday life, because the creation of categories helps us to make sense of what is happening around us; categories *"structure and order the world for us."* (Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov, 2004: 38). This is important in trying to understand how local people in Agogo create categories of herders through their narratives. Another report on how identities can be *"multiple, fluctuating and fragmented"* (Dunn, 2001: 56) is given by Turner (2004), who also works on farmer-herder conflicts. From his work in the Sahel he draws evidence that contradicts the common representation of clear, distinct identities of 'the herder' and 'the farmer'. Instead, he explains their differences in terms of caste or ethnicity on the one hand but highlights their regular social and political relations and economic interdependence on the other hand (Turner, 2004). These make their identities much more fluctuating and sometimes fragmented as they are often represented.

Thirdly, within the framework of categorization of Fulani herders in Agogo, it is useful to not only look at either construction of identities by oneself or by others, but to include both (*"senses of the self and other",* Dunn, 2001: 56). This is again addressed by Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov (2004), whose argument for categorization as an everyday-practice refers not only to the categorization of others, but also to that of oneself. As to this they refer to Henri Tajfel's 'social identity theory'. Relying on group experiments, Tajfel (1974) argued for the importance of social categories in inter-group relations in societies. He documented a strong 'in-group bias' for individuals who were members of artificial groups, meaning that they would prefer members of their own group to those of another (Tajfel, 1974; Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov, 2004). The identification here refers both to the individual itself and to 'the others'. The individual (partly) defines itself as a member of its group, even though it does not know common values or characteristics. Moreover, it defines individuals who do not belong to its group as 'others', equally unaware of their values or characteristics besides group membership. At this point, the comparison with Benedict Anderson's (2006: 6) nation as an *"imagined political community"* comes to mind. In his opinion, nations are imagined communities because, similar to group membership in Tajfel's experiment, nationality is something that is conceptually shared by its members, yet not clearly known to one of them. They identify themselves on the basis of nationality and equally identify others who have a different nationality (Anderson, 2006). This bifocal perspective on identification processes justifies why in my case it is important to conduct interviews with local people *and* herders. Not only is it

important to understand how people identify herders, but it is also crucial to comprehend how herders identify themselves.

Fourth, Dunn (2001: 56) states that *"identities are socially constructed (...)"*. This is probably the least contested part of his definition of identities, since most scholars working on issues of identity would agree that they are in fact socially constructed. It is, however, also the most important part of the definition, since it lays the basis for all other parts. The fact that identities are constructed allows them to be *"fluctuating and fragmented"*, *"conditional"* or *"the product of multiple and competing discourses"* (Dunn, 2001: 56). That identities are socially constructed is therefore at the core of my understanding of the concept 'identity'. In order to better understand how they are constructed, it makes sense to take another look at Somers' 'narrative constitution of identity' (1994). She sees narratives as the central *"ontological condition of social life"* (Somers, 1994: 614) through which individuals construct identities. This happens through their social actions and social experiences, which are then made sense of through narratives. Thus, identities are a product of social life and relations, for which narrativity can be a tool of analysis. This view on identity is useful because, in Somers' words "*the narrative identity approach embeds the actor within relationships and stories that shift over time and space.*" (Somers, 1994: 621). These could be neglected by different concepts of identity. The narrative construction of identities also bears parallels to Anderson's 'imagined communities' (2006). Similar to those communities that are created in imagination, identities, especially as they are defined by Somers, are created through narrations, which can be equally abstract and unreal as Anderson's imaginations. They both may connect to past events, common features or observations, but their subjective creation makes them abstract.

Finally, Dunn (2001: 56) defines identities as *"conditional and lodged in contingencies that are historically specific, intersubjective and discursively produced.".* This is a feature that I would like to connect back to two characteristics of identity that I have already discussed. First, that they are conditional is concordant with them being fluctuating. As discussed above, Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov (2004) relate the fluctuating character of identities to them being connected to multiple social experiences. This connection is also of use to explain the conditionality of identities, in that it explains how multiple, subjectively experienced events in social life can form diverse identities. Since such events are often conditional on a certain place or time, so are the resulting identities. This is also where I want to connect the second feature that Dunn (2001: 56) brings up, that identities are *"lodged in contingencies",* to a part I already discussed: Somers' narrative constitution of identity. It is these contingencies that Somers (2004) refers to as well, which are specific in space and time, that are then made sense of through narratives and therefore contribute to constructing narrative identities.

Building on Dunn's definition of identity and the additional literature I have dealt with, a definition of my understanding of identity could therefore be summarized as follows. Identities can be seen as a product of social action or social experiences that are processed through narratives, which makes identities conditional and dynamic, sometimes fragmented and/or contested. Originating from everyday social life, they are constructed not only for oneself, but also for others. The process through which identities are constructed is called identification and has to be differentiated from the term 'identity'. Having defined how I understand identity, I

now want to present in the next chapter, what methodological tools I used to explore herder identities in my case.

5 Methodology

5.1 Methodological approach

My interest in the construction of herders' identities in the case of Agogo is well suited for an empirical research project. Very early in my preparations for the project I decided to use a qualitative research approach. Telling from the final essence of my work and my research question that is very much concerned with social actions and experiences, this may not come as a surprise. But even at the stage where the focus of my work had not yet been clarified, using qualitative methods to satisfy my interest in the specifics of the farmer-herder conflict in Agogo seemed most appropriate. I want to justify taking this approach after a short definition of what a qualitative approach actually is.

Draper (2004: 643) describes a qualitative research approach and its aim as follows:

> *"(...) human action is seen as infused with meaning in terms of intentions, motives, beliefs, social rules and values, and (...) these factors must be taken into account in both understanding and explaining it. These meanings are seen as socially constructed rather than universal 'givens' and thus contingent on social context. Qualitative research thus aims to describe and explain social phenomena as they occur in their natural settings."*

In her description of the purpose of a qualitative research approach there also lies the justification for my choice of such an approach. According to her, the essence of qualitative research is that it is concerned with exploring notions of the 'why' and 'how' of social actions or social experiences. To answer such questions, social context and background are crucial, which is why qualitative research often is interested in *"phenomena as they occur in their natural settings"* (Draper, 2004: 643). The aim of my research is exactly that, understanding social actions and the social process of constructing identities in their natural setting.

As a more specific approach to conducting qualitative research, I employ the methodology described by Glaser and Strauss (2008) in order to generate Grounded Theory. According to them, generating theory from data should be an essential aim of qualitative research, which had often been neglected at the time of their writing. Through comparative analysis, researchers should create new concepts and hypotheses instead of verifying existing ones (Glaser and Strauss, 2008). Charmaz and Mitchell (2001) describe the five crucial strategies of grounded theory application:

> *"(1) simultaneous data collection and analysis; (2) pursuit of emergent themes through early data analysis; (3) discovery of basic social processes within the data; (4) inductive construction of abstract categories that explain and synthesize these processes; (5) integration of categories into a theoretical framework that specifies causes, conditions and consequences of the process(es)."* (Charmaz and Mitchell, 2001: 160).

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In relation to these characteristics, the decision of applying Grounded Theory methodology in my project was based on the following factors. First, my knowledge about the field and the society in Agogo was limited, because I only had some information available before I went to the field. A handful of studies had been conducted in the region (Baidoo, 2014; Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015; Agyemang, 2017), but otherwise, only fragmentary news reports were available. Therefore, an iterative approach to sampling, data collection and data analysis appeared to be the most useful (see also chapter 5.3). Second, my aim of understanding how pastoral identities are perceived by the local population can be understood as a kind of generating new theory, as there is no literature on this aspect of farmer-herder conflicts. Hence, I was not aiming at verifying existing theory, but rather at trying to create new concepts and hypotheses that can be applied to my case, but also in a broader environment. Third, parallel to what Charmaz and Mitchell (2001: 160) mention in their writing, my aim was to understand *"basic social processes within the data"* by analyzing on the basis of which attributes pastoral identities are constructed. Grounded Theory methodology, thus, seemed to be a useful tool to carry out this research, because of the usefulness of an iterative sampling process, my aim of generating new theory, and my focus on intrinsic social processes in the field.

5.2   Access to the field and positionality

5.2.1   Access

As already mentioned in the introduction, the case of Agogo was selected partly due to the existing access points to the field. Access, as characterized by Burgess (2003), means not only getting to the research site and establishing oneself there, but also to get access to important documents and relevant individuals. To achieve this, I had two main points of access: first, through my head supervisor, Dr. Muriel Côte, who has connections to Ghanaian researchers through previous academic work in the region. With her support and that of my co-supervisor, Frank Agyei, initial access to my secondary research site Accra was greatly facilitated. The second point of access, which related to my primary research site Agogo proved to be more challenging, since no a priori connections existed. First attempts to gain this access through local journalists who had worked in Agogo failed quickly, mostly because people seemed reluctant to assist me. More successful was the approach through a junior researcher who had earlier conducted a research project at the same site (Agyemang, 2017). Through him, I made contact with one of my research assistants, who was from the beginning willing to assist me both in getting access to the site and to people, as well as in conducting my research. The local journalists and my research assistant are to be seen as gatekeepers, as Burgess (2003) refers to them. While one was facilitating my access through his position in the community (the research assistant was an influential member of the catholic church community in Agogo), the other one(s) restricted my access by being reluctant to assist me (Burgess, 2003). Furthermore, after securing access to the field, my research assistant was a gatekeeper in that he worked with me for the majority of my sampling and data collection process. During this time, he influenced these processes through his connections in the field and therefore enabled me to get access to some people, but not to others. How this had an influence on the outcomes of my project will be discussed in more detail in the following two sections, which refer to my own and the research assistants' positionality.

5.2.2   Researcher's positionality

Flick (2016) emphasizes that a researcher doing qualitative research will always assume a certain role as soon as s*he enters the field. This role might, for instance, be as a participator or as an observer. What role s*he takes determines to a certain degree to what information s*he will get access. I would not define my own role in the field as a clear example of a participating researcher, but since I was present in the field and interacted with the 'subjects' of my research, I cannot classify myself as a typical observer either (Flick, 2016). My role is somewhere in between, but in general I have tried to have as little influence as possible on the research subjects or actions in the field.

As an external I certainly had a different understanding of 'the field' than the people in it. For example, while the vast majority of people from Agogo were strictly against Fulani herders in their district and saw the expulsion of all as the only solution, my approach was somewhat different. Much of the scientific literature on this conflict that I had read in advance used a more holistic approach to the issue and mentioned wrongdoings of the local people against the herders as well (which did seldom come up in the locals' narratives). My approach towards a possible resolution of the conflict was therefore more focused on mutual tolerance. This did most probably not go unnoticed by some of the respondents in my interviews, which might have led to them focusing more on 'convincing' me of their point of view. In other ways, my positionality will also have influenced the type of data collection I have used. I composed my interview guides to the best of my knowledge and according to my personal research focus prior to fieldwork. By asking only these questions, I may have missed valuable information that I could have gained by asking others.

My positionality and experiences from the field also played a role in the data analysis. In a broader sense, the researcher always has an influence on how the data is analyzed. This starts when making decisions about how to transcribe and what parts to leave out as not relevant for the research topic (Hammersley, 2010). It continues with decisions being made during the different steps of coding, e.g. which code to use for a quote or how to create categories (Mey and Mruck, 2011). Even in terms of summarizing the results from the data analysis to find concluding hypotheses, the personal experiences of the researcher have an influence. In a narrower sense my experiences in the field might have affected my mode of data analysis too. For example, the memory of a certain interview might have influenced the way I analyzed that interview. If I had remembered the interview as successful or the person as very cooperative, I might have tried to interpret more into the interview than it actually contained. That being said, I did my best to remain neutral and objective in both my data collection and analysis.

5.2.3   Positionality of research assistants

Both research assistants came from the city of Agogo and were, thus, more or less directly affected by the conflict. On the one hand, this had the positive implication that they knew many people to talk to. On the other hand, it might have affected their decision-making and their way of helping me. Although I personally decided who to interview, their presentation of some people and their priorities might have influenced these decisions. On other instances they did not hesitate to openly state their opinion regarding groups of people, causes or factors of the conflict. However, while translating interviews or introducing me to people, they usually maintained a neutral position as far as I could judge.

One of the research assistants had been directly affected by the conflict. Being a farmer himself, he suffered from the crop destruction by cattle and was not successful in getting any form of compensation through legal action. Nevertheless, his strongest emotion regarding the conflict was the urge to find a lasting solution, not a general rejection or anger against herders or cattle, as far as I could tell. Besides that, both research assistants might have had their own, personal reasons to help me, of which I did not know. But from my point of view they have taken a neutral and professional position in most situations and have not extensively influenced my results.

5.3   Sampling

The Grounded Theory methodology, as described by Glaser and Strauss (2008), is based on theoretical sampling. In contrast to statistical sampling, where the population is well-known at the beginning of the data collection process, Grounded Theory assumes that most characteristics and the size of the population are unknown at this time (Mey and Mruck, 2009). It is therefore impossible to draw a representative sample and work with this sample for the duration of the data collection. Instead, the sampling suggested by Glaser and Strauss (2008) differs on two features. First, theoretical sampling means to select cases based on the relevance they ought to have for the research interest. This is done by the researcher, who relies on his or her knowledge about the thematic. Every selected case should contribute to the collection of relevant information. The cases might be attributable to different categories, but these are not necessarily socio-demographic categories (e.g. gender, age, ethnicity) as in a typical quota sampling. It is up to the researcher to determine which categories are relevant for his or her research and which cases s*he wants to select from these. Secondly, theoretical sampling is defined as an iterative process. Since it is assumed that the researcher cannot know enough about the population in advance of his or her study, s*he has to return to the stage of sampling after a first phase of data collection and analysis. With the knowledge s*he gained from this first step, s*he can then select further relevant cases that complement the information. Figure 5 on the next page shows these phases of sampling and data collection/analysis for my project. This process is repeated until the addition of further cases would not result in a gain of relevant information. At this point, 'theoretical saturation' is reached (Mey and Mruck, 2011). Mey and Mruck (2011) see this saturation both theoretically and pragmatically. Theoretically, because only new, relevant cases should be considered in the sampling process, and pragmatically, because financial and temporal resources are considered.

Figure 5: Iterative sampling steps and following phases of data collection/analysis. Source: Own model.

These guidelines generally applied well to my procedures. In total, my sample consisted of **36 respondents.** A complete list of the interviews I conducted can be found in the appendix. Prior to entering the field, only four of the **six expert interviews** were fixed and groups of possible respondents were loosely framed. These categories were: farmers, herders, cattle owners, authorities (and experts). During my time in the field, which, in total, consisted of five weeks in Agogo and Accra, it turned out that these categories fitted quite well to the situation on the ground. Farmers and herders were rather easily distinguishable. When me or my research assistant asked them about their economic activities, they either related to one or the other group. Few of them seemed to engage both in cattle rearing and in farming. Cattle owners, too, identified as such during the interviews and that was concordant with the information my research assistant provided me about them. As to authorities, I later distinguished between official and traditional authorities. As official authorities counted those working for governmental institutions, as traditional authorities those who had some position as traditional leaders of the community (e.g. chiefs or committee members of traditional institutions). The four experts selected in the first stage of sampling were chosen based on their credibility and occupation with the topic of farmer-herder conflict in Agogo. In a second stage of sampling, after entering the field in Agogo (and after having conducted the first four expert interviews), possible respondents were discussed with my research assistants and a vague research plan for the first two weeks was drawn up (see figure 5). The plan included a first sample in the city of Agogo (especially official and traditional authorities) at the beginning and later visits to four villages around Agogo: Kowireso, Bebome, Afrisere and Seribourso (indicated on the map, figure 1). In these villages, conflict between farmers and herders had frequently occurred in the past. There, the intention was to sample mainly farmers and herders, but also traditional authorities. This stage of sampling was still mostly based on my knowledge obtained from the literature review and the news analysis, but also influenced by information from the initial expert interviews and by suggestions of the research assistants. Both research assistants lived in the city of Agogo and were therefore familiar with the conflict and the various actors. In chapter 5.2.3, I have already discussed how their influence on my sampling might limit the applicability of my results.

Adhering to the guidelines of Glaser and Strauss' (2008) on iterative sampling/data collection, this second stage of sampling was followed by data collection, i.e. the conduct of interviews. A third stage of sampling followed after about two weeks in the field. By combining first bits of analysis from notes during the interviews, informal talks with both research assistants and an exchange with my supervisors, my definitive research focus was more specifically determined and further respondents were selected. This sampling phase mainly took place in the city of Agogo, but also included another visit to a fifth rural village, Hamidu (see figure 1). After this third stage of sampling and collecting data, theoretical saturation after Glaser and Strauss (2008) was more or less reached, as far as this was possible in the context of a Master thesis. The pragmatic understanding of this saturation by Mey and Mruck (2011) helps in this sense, because my stay in the field was limited in time and money. Further sampling and data collection may have resulted in some additional relevant information. However, given the scale of my project, extending the field stay was not possible. In general, my sampling can be regarded as being iterative, since I conducted three 'phases' of sampling and data collection. The guidelines of Grounded Theory methodology were, however, not too closely fulfilled when it came to including data analysis in the iterative process. Due to my limited time in the field, I could not conduct a detailed, formal analysis of my data during this phase. I therefore had to rely on a broad, tentative assessment of my data for further steps of sampling and data collection.

The selection of individual persons for my interviews was mostly done in cooperation with my research assistants. This was rather straightforward with the official authorities, as they usually referred me to the person in charge. For traditional authorities and cattle owners from Agogo, I relied on existing contacts of my research assistants and their further connections. The neighboring villages presented themselves similar to the scene indicated in figure 6. The selection of respondents there (mostly

Figure 6: Village scene in Kowireso, AAND. The majority of farmers and herders interviewed were sampled in villages like this. Source: Own photo.

farmers and herders) worked slightly different. Since this part of the field was generally unknown to me and my research assistants, theoretical sampling in the strict sense proved to be more or less impossible. Instead, we applied snowball sampling (Patton, 1990). Patton (1990) describes snowball sampling as a method to reach most relevant informants through a few but valuable key informants. In my case, we relied on representative members of the villages' societies as key informants. These were in most cases traditional leaders, who Agyemang (2017) reports to be important figures in societies based on Asante traditions, the dominant ethnic group in the research area. Because of their importance, they were both useful informants to talk to, but also supportive in selecting farmers and herders from the locality that had been affected by tensions between the two groups. Since my time in the villages was limited (as was

my overall time in the field), most informants mentioned by the key informant(s) were approached, if physically available. Almost all informants that were approached agreed to conduct an interview. In the few cases where they declined, the main reason seemed to be that they were migrants and did neither speak English nor Twi, the local language my research assistants spoke. Overall, my approach of using theoretical sampling on a broader scale and snowball sampling on a narrower scale in the villages proved to be successful to provide me with a sufficient number of informative respondents for my study.

5.4   Data collection

I conducted two types of interviews to collect the majority of my data: problem-centered interviews as described by Witzel (2000) and expert interviews as, among many others, described by Meuser and Nagel (2002). In addition, I have relied on my own observations during my time in the field, on informal conversations and on some documents and notes. The information I gained from these additional forms of data collection helped me to understand key processes and issues that came up in the interviews. They also influenced my interviews, because I could focus on specific events or conditions I had previously noticed or use them as an example to illustrate my questions. In the following two sections, the two types of interviews will be discussed, starting with the problem-centered interview. A systematic overview of all data that I collected is given in the appendix.

5.4.1   Problem-centered interviews

Problem-centered interviews were first proposed in psychological research by Witzel (1985). He characterized this type of interviewing through a specific focus on a socially relevant problem, a focus on a specific subject of research, and a focus on a specific process in the research (Flick, 2016). With its comparably long duration and its omnipresence in everyday life in Agogo, the current farmer-herder conflict can certainly be seen as a socially relevant problem to focus on. The essence of the problem-centered interview is furthermore that it uses both specific questions and narration stimuli, but still focuses on a single, relevant part of the respondent's social life (Flick, 2016). As such, I identified the problem-centered interview as a highly appropriate tool for researching on issues of identity construction in Agogo.

Flick (2016) also embeds the problem-centered interview into the methodology of Grounded Theory, which fits well with my research project. He emphasizes the importance of subjective perspectives and the understanding of social processes and highlights that questions from the interview guide of a problem-centered interview should be focused on comprehending *"processes of socialization"* (Flick, 2016: 213, own translation). Moreover, just as proposed by the guidelines of Grounded Theory methodology, selection of respondents for problem-centered interviews should happen iteratively (Glaser and Strauss, 2008).

Similar to the semi-structured interview (Helfferich, 2009), I conducted my problem-centered interviews using an interview guide, which is also suggested by Witzel (2000). This guide was prepared before entering the field, but then subsequently adapted during the course of data collection. I used three different guides for the various groups of respondents I intended to interview at the beginning: farmers, herders and authorities. Since not every respondent just fitted perfectly into these categories, I slightly adapted the guides for each interview, e.g. by adding or skipping questions depending on their relevance. Witzel (2000) suggests using a short questionnaire before the main part of the interview to collect personal data of the respondent. I considered this too but dropped the idea later. The reason was that the additional value of such data for my research interest was neglectable, since I am mainly interested in understanding how local people construct pastoral identities, not how their age, gender, or ethnicity influence this process.

In this manner, I conducted **30 problem-centered interviews**. Building on the categories that I justified before, they can broadly be summarized as follows.

- Six interviews with official authorities (a local Member of Parliament (MP), district assembly representatives, a district police representative, a veterinary)

- Seven interviews with traditional authorities (chiefs from the villages or Agogo)

- Ten interviews with farmers or locals affected by violence stemming from farmer-herder conflict

- Five interviews with herders or Fulani people from Agogo

- Two interviews with local cattle owners

The majority of these interviews were conducted in Twi, for which I used the interpreting services of one of my research assistants, who translated into English. Exceptions were the interviews with official authorities, of which only one was conducted in Twi and the rest in English. If possible, the interviews were conducted in a secluded, quiet place. However, in many cases this was not possible. Therefore, many interviews were conducted in public spaces. The disadvantages were that sometimes it was loud and noisy, which reduced the quality of the audio recording I used. Also, in a few cases, random people tried to join in the discussion. My research assistant and I politely denied them to do so, for research purposes. The advantage of conducting interviews in public spaces was that many respondents who might have rejected the enquiry for an interview if it was connected with spending more time for finding an adequate place, were still willing to participate. All problem-centered interviews, except one, were recorded with the consent of the respondent using an audio recording device or my smartphone. After a short introduction by my research assistant and by myself, the interview was started. I did not compensate respondents for participation in my interviews. The decision not to do so was based on two incentives. On the one hand, respondents were willing to participate even if they knew that there was no compensation, because they were eager to share their thoughts on this highly relevant topic. On the other hand, I did not want to make a possible compensation an incentive for participating in my interviews.

The outcome of conducting the problem-centered interviews can generally be regarded as successful. Problems that occurred will be discussed in chapter 5.6. As the problem-centered interviews were my main tool for data collection, the data obtained from them was the central element for my analysis.

5.4.2 Expert interviews

Meuser and Nagel (2002) differentiate between two types of expert interviews: those in which the information shared by the expert is of central interest to the study and those in which expert knowledge plays a complementary role in the study. My research project in Agogo makes use of expert knowledge as in the second type, as complementary knowledge. Therefore, the purpose of conducting expert interviews can be defined as understanding context conditions for my area of interest, which is the farmer-herder conflict in Agogo (Meuser and Nagel, 2002). In this sense, the majority of my expert interviews can be understood as *"exploratory expert interviews"* (Bogner and Menz, 2009: 46). The context conditions included information about the history of the conflict, but also about actors involved and measures taken, such as the Operation Cowleg. Additionally, I intended to use the first expert interviews to get a better understanding of my research field and the population. The rationale of this was to be able to improve my theoretical sampling, which, as discussed in chapter 5.3, relies on the researcher's familiarity with the research field.

I conducted **six expert interviews**, four of which were held before entering the main research field (Agogo). The term 'expert' was in this context assigned on the basis of the person's knowledge of the topic of interest. Meuser and Nagel (2009: 470, own translation) state that someone is an expert, if s*he *"has privileged access to information about groups of individuals, social states, decision processes, political fields, etc."*. It is, following their argumentation, not necessary for someone to be widely acknowledged as an expert to be considered for an expert interview. Sufficient is his or her extensive knowledge on the researcher's area of interest (Meuser and Nagel, 2002). Relating this to my study, I considered people as experts, if they had either worked scientifically on the issue of farmer-herder conflicts in Ghana or had intensively politically or socially engaged with the topic. Hence, I conducted expert interviews with the following experts.

- One researcher at the University of Ghana, Legon of the Centre for Migration Studies

- Two researchers at the KAIPTC

- One MP of the Parliament of Ghana and environmental scientist

- Two local activists

The expert interviews were conducted independently in English, since all experts were fluent in English and no introduction was needed by my research assistants (except for one of the local activists). Interview place and time were mostly set by the expert, the majority of the expert interviews were conducted in the expert's office or home. Following Meuser and Nagel's (2002) suggestions for the procedures of an expert interview, I used an interview guide during the interviews. Due to their familiarity with and vast knowledge about the topic, some open stimulating questions sufficed to steer the interview. In some of the expert interviews, the respondent wandered from the subject, a common problem in expert interviews (Meuser and Nagel, 2002). In these cases, more follow-up questions were necessary to acquire the desired information. All expert interviews were recorded with the consent of the expert using an audio recording device or my smartphone.

In general, my expert interviews proved to be successful and useful. The exploratory interviews deepened my understanding of the field and enabled me to better conduct the theoretical sampling. They also added important context information to my existing data.

5.5   Data analysis

5.5.1   Documentation: Transcription

As described in chapter 5.4, I recorded almost all of my interviews using an audio recording device. These recordings were stored under pseudonym names. A key file to connect pseudonyms with real names (where possible) was stored password-protected and shared only with the supervisors. According to my own observations on site and information from research assistants and other contacts, these measures were sufficient to guarantee the security of the participants in relation to my study. Since the topic was openly discussed and dealt with and there seemed to be no obligations with my work from official side, no further measures were taken. No attempts of seizing my data or metadata were noticed.

Hammersley (2010) reports that transcriptions of audio recordings are the standard in today's qualitative research and that since they have replaced field notes, the latter have even become a secondary source of data. Indeed, from the beginning of my project, I intended to record and then transcribe my interviews, instead of just taking notes. Hammersley (2010) further reports that important decisions are already made during transcribing that influence the analysis of the data. Such decisions include, for example, how to transcribe the interviews (rather interpretatively or strictly), whether one includes non-word elements, or whether one 'transcribes' gestures. He also emphasizes that transcribing means not only 'writing down', but also 'describing' (e.g. when describing hand gestures) (Hammersley, 2010).

In my transcripts, I generally tried to transcribe rather strictly. However, certain exceptions were made. First, I decided not to transcribe non-word elements that I did not regard as absolutely crucial for the meaning of what was said (e.g. "…ehm…"). Secondly, I included notes on important non-verbal reactions by the respondent, such as laughter. And, third, I broadly corrected grammar where it was necessary to clarify the meaning of what was recorded. Using the application Transcribe+ for iPad and Microsoft Word, as well as the software Express Scribe for some interviews, I transcribed my interviews for further analysis, which was the coding described in the following chapter.

5.5.2 Open, selective and theoretical coding

The main step in analyzing qualitative data by using Grounded Theory methodology is coding. The aim of coding the empirical material, usually in the form of transcripts, is to summarize the theoretical content of the existing data (Mey and Mruck, 2009). The coding is done by deconstructing the data into logical units and later systematically reconnecting and categorizing these. Different approaches to coding qualitative data have been developed in relation to Grounded Theory. When analyzing the data from my project, I relied on the coding approach suggested by Glaser as described by Mey and Mruck (2011).

As a first step (and similar to most other coding approaches), Glaser proposes 'open coding' of the data in text form (Mey and Mruck, 2011). Open coding assigns codes or meanings to small sections of the empirical data in order to make sense of what is being said (ibid.). These codes can either be in-vivo (word-by-word taken from the transcript) or constructed (ibid.). It is essential for this step that everything that is relevant for the research interest is given a code (ibid.). Glaser also emphasizes that during open coding, the analyst should begin to create few, meaningful categories from the large number of conceptual codes (ibid.). Such categories are the first step to make sense of what is often chaotically mentioned in the interview (ibid.). Open coding is the step were Mey and Mruck (2011) detect a strong subjective influence by the researcher who is conducting the analysis on the process, based on his or her decisions which code to assign to what text section.

The next step following Glaser's approach to data analysis is selective coding (ibid.). Selective coding begins when the first 'core categories' can be identified from the categories created during open coding (ibid.). Around these, the remaining categories are organized and connected (ibid.). The core categories should also influence the sampling, which, in an iterative research approach, is still continuing (ibid.). Selective coding is followed by theoretical coding, the aim of which is to *"[integrate] the core category and the other, related categories into a theoretical model, which explains the problems of action and the related actions in the field best"* (Mey and Mruck, 2011: 36, own translation). Since the aim of using Grounded Theory methodology should be, as the name states, to generate theory, this can be identified as the main step of data analysis (Mey and Mruck, 2009). Throughout the steps of coding, the creation of memos (notes by the researcher about crucial insights attached to certain sections of the transcripts) is used to better understand connections and correlations in the data (Mey and Mruck, 2011).

Figure 7: Example of open coding using MAXQDA 12. Source: MAXQDA 12.

When analyzing my transcribed interviews, I more or less followed the guidelines explained above using the software MAXQDA 12. Figure 7 shows an example of how I assigned open codes with both in-vivo and constructed codes. In a next step, I identified the core categories for my analysis. I also used memos to note down important findings in specific interviews. However, I did not strictly follow the iterative procedure that is an important part of Grounded Theory methodology. Most interviews were coded after I returned from the field and only a quick

informal analysis was conducted while I was still taking samples. The main reason for this was my limited time in the research field, which I preferred to use for a more extensive data collection.

Another shortcoming concerning the data analysis is that with the limited amount of data that the short time available for the Master thesis allows to collect, it is not possible to 'generate theory' in the strict sense, as intended by Glaser and Strauss (2008). Instead of generating theory, the thesis will therefore aim to deduce a few concise hypotheses on the research problem. In the next chapter I will discuss other challenges that occurred during my research and how they limited my outcomes.

5.6   Challenges and limitations

5.6.1   Time of research and topicality

In view of the fact that conflicts between farmers and herders are a constant topic in the research field and usually emerge and dissolve on a very short-term time scale, it proved difficult to assess the situation there prior to fieldwork. Upcoming trends and actions influenced my decisions about the scope of the research project and the timing of the fieldwork. This was intensified through the fact that the start of my project (winter 2017/2018) coincided with the most intense phase of conflict during the dry season (November to March).

Conducting fieldwork in the months of June and July proved to have both positive and negative effects on the outcome of the research. On the one hand, the situation was calmer during this period compared to the dry season, when most conflicts occur. Moreover, people seemed to have gained some 'emotional distance' to the issue and the violent events, so that they were able to talk a little bit more objectively about the topic. Still, most respondents turned out to be rather emotional about relations to herders. On the other hand, access to many interviewees proved to be more difficult during that time. Nomadic herders had been pushed into the bush at the fringes of the district, most of them even out of the district. For the farmers, the rainy season is the main sowing season, meaning that their workload was high during that time. Furthermore, the low prevalence of conflicts during my time in the field apparently led some respondents (e.g. authorities, politicians) to represent the problem as being more or less solved, even though history had proven that conflicts would almost certainly resume in the dry season. Other challenges that arose in the interviews are discussed in the following section.

5.6.2   Interviewing

During the interviews, it quickly became obvious that people did not use a clearly defined terminology when talking about pastoralists. Especially the farmers often did not distinguish between 'Fulani', 'herder', 'herdsman' and 'cattle owner'. This led to confusion on my part in interpreting the answers that people had given me, and confusion on their part in trying to understand my questions. For instance, they seemed to be confused when I asked the same questions but referring to cattle owners on the one hand and herders on the other hand. Even people making a difference between the two terms (e.g. those from government institutions) sometimes used one of the terms as an overall term relating to all people involved in the cattle rearing business.

In general, language-related issues proved to be one of the main limiting factors in my field work. Even though I spoke the official language of Ghana (English) and my research assistants spoke the most common and, in this area, native language (Twi), we encountered different types of obstacles. Some of the herders who had migrated to the AAND did neither speak Twi nor English, as many of them came from outside of Ghana. This obstacle might have been overcome by finding a translator who spoke the Fulani's language and English, or at least Twi. However, this proved to be difficult. In the field, my time was too limited to allow for such explorations. Also, most Fulani in Agogo lived rather segregated from the majority of the community, within Muslim communities, the Zongos. Therefore, I was not able to contact a possible translator through my assistants within that short time. Other people from Agogo generally did not speak the Fulani's language. Another language-related difficulty arose in interviews with farmers or traditional authorities in the villages. Although, to the best of my knowledge, Twi was generally spoken by every person native to the district, in a few cases the respondents seemed to have difficulties understanding certain questions. Mostly these issues could be resolved by my research assistant, who successfully paraphrased complicated phrases or expressions.

In the next three sections, I will present the results I obtained from my fieldwork after overcoming the above-mentioned challenges. The three sections come from the three aspects I have identified earlier that play into local people's perception of Fulani pastoralists. Figure 8 at the beginning of the next chapter will present an overview of how these aspects are further divided.

6   Herder's belonging

Looking back at my literature review (chapter 3) and the claims that I have made until so far, there is a need to explore how the perceptions of the Fulani herders in and around Agogo by local citizens create not one homogenous, but many different types of herders. While some respondents tended to use the same narrative for all herders alike, it quickly became clear from the claims and arguments they were making that they actually saw different 'types' of herders. However, respondents had distinct perceptions of what constitutes these differences and to what aspect of herding activities they are attributable. From an overall analysis of the data I collected, it emerged that there are roughly three ways for people to identify differences among pastoralists. In the following three chapters, I will analyze on which three aspects this identification process is based. Firstly, I want to understand how characteristics of the belonging of the herder play out in this process (this chapter). The focus, here, is on issues of origin, allegedly 'bad' character and ethnicity. Secondly, I want to find out how connotations of nomadism and crime have an influence on this process (chapter 7). I am interested in uncovering how intangibility, land use by herders, ownership of weapons and crimes are shaping the perception of herders. Thirdly, my interest is in clarifying how cattle, cattle ownership, employment status of herders and different types of cattle are shaping the herders' perception by local people (chapter 8). Accordingly, the results section will consist of three main parts that will be sub-divided further. Figure 8 indicates these three sections and also the following sub-sections. The structure of the data analysis will follow the structure in the figure.

Figure 8: Overview of the three aspects that shape local people's perception of Fulani herders: herder's belonging, connotations of nomadism and crime, cattle (ownership). Below are the respective sub-sections that will be analyzed in this and the following two chapters. Source: Own model.

The herders' belonging (whether as perceived by themselves or by local people) played an important role in how their identities were constructed. 'Belonging', in this context, is based much on Carola Lentz' (2013) work on belonging of (migrant) people in West Africa. She assesses that for a person to be fully legitimate in a local community from a political perspective, the person has to be regarded as the son or daughter of another local person. This, she argues, goes for many societies in West Africa, and for Ghana too (Lentz, 2013). Building on this understanding, the Fulani herders' belonging is an interesting aspect, since most of them are not indigenous to the Ashanti Region of Ghana, as the chapter will show. Bukari and Kuusaana (2018) agree with this importance in their research on how Fulani herders' access to land in the Agogo Traditional Area is shaped by dimensions of belonging and citizenship. Coming from this background, this chapter will explore different aspects that local people identified about the belonging of Fulani herders.

Information about how local people perceived herders on the basis of their belonging were often hidden in their description of the different types of herders that they observed. Most respondents answered extensively on questions aimed at characterizing the Fulani herders, resulting in a large variety of codes on different notions of what distinguishes between different herders. Those were broadly attributable to three aspects of the herder's belonging that seemed to be important in how they were perceived: citizenship and origin, (bad) character and ethnicity. The figure 8 above shows these sub-sections listed under 'herders' belonging'.

6.1   Origin and citizenship

The origin of herders was brought up by many respondents as a criterion for their characterization (167 codings). This happened in most instances only after explicitly questioning the respondents about the issue, but in some cases, it seemed to be so important that they brought it up themselves. When it came to the origin of Fulani herders, most respondents were very unambiguous, as this statement by a person of the traditional authority from the village Afrisere illustrates:

> *"They are not Ghanaians, (...) almost all of them are Fulanis. (...) Some of them from Nigeria, Niger."* (interview with local village chief on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere)

For most local people, it was important to emphasize that the herders they were referring to were not Ghanaians (interviews with one district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo, one subchief of the ATC on 22/06/2018 in Agogo, one farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, among others[3]). Rather, they located their origins in Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso or Benin, some of them also in Togo, Chad, Senegal or Côte d'Ivoire. Their perception as outsiders and foreigners seemed to be one of the most important characteristics for local people.

On the other hand, a number of interviewees acknowledged that there are also herders that count as Ghanaian[4]. Their description of Ghanaian herders varied strongly, indicating that they might not have had the same understanding of this term. While some were referring to *"the indigenous that were rearing animal (...) from Agogo"* (interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Bebome) and who were owning a few cattle prior to the most severe phase of the conflict, others were rather talking about *"those that have moved from the above-mentioned countries to settle in Ghana"* (email-questionnaire with regional representative of Fulani herders on 02/10/2018). The origin, thus, seemed to be also connected to how long ago the respective pastoralist had migrated to Ghana. Apparently, such herders that were originally from outside of Ghana, but had lived in the community for a long time, were perceived as a different 'type' than those who had just come recently. This fact does also show that origin was only used to a certain extent to categorize herders and that other attributes were of equal importance.

It has to be said that many of the respondents seemed to be not too sure about the origin of the herders. While some were very clear with their answer to questions about origin, others first hesitated to answer and then presented rather their assumptions than clear information. It also occurred that a person mentioned a handful of countries of origin, indicating that they might not have attained this information first-hand, but were repeating information from other sources.

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[3] This was stated by the majority of respondents, in total by seven farmers, four representatives of official authorities (two from the district assembly, one head of district police, one veterinary), one local cattle owner and six representatives of traditional authorities (two representatives of the ATC, three representatives of traditional institutions from different villages, one representative of the Agogo Muslim community, the Zongo).

[4] Interviews with one local cattle owner on 05/07/2018 in Agogo, with head of district police on 21/06/2018 in Agogo, with one farmer on 25/06/2018 in Bebome, with one researcher from KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie, with one local activist on 27/06/2018 in Agogo. Email questionnaire with regional representative of Fulani herders on 02/10/2018.

In general, though, the origin of herders seemed to be an important aspect for local people. Not only that the issue came up in almost all of the interviews, but also was it mostly one of the topics where respondents were rather emotional. There were two kinds of responses to questions about the origin of herders. Either the interviewee reported all herders to be outsiders and did not differentiate between different places of origin. Or the interviewee emphasized that some of the pastoralists are from Ghana, but many of them also from outside of Ghana. When it came to evaluating the herders, the narrative was very clear: being a herder from outside was never a good thing. Instead, herders that were regarded as non-Ghanaians were mostly mentioned in relation to the 'bad herder' narrative. On the other hand, the herders who were perceived to be from Ghana were more often projected to be 'good herders', but not always so. Less important was, against my expectations, the notion of citizenship. Only a few respondents brought up the term when talking about pastoralists. The reason for that might have been that for local people, citizenship was very much connected to origin. They seemed to have a practical understanding of who is a Ghanaian citizen and who not, based on how long they have been in the country. Others also connected citizenship to ethnicity, stating that the Fulani, as an ethnic group, are by definition not Ghanaian and will therefore always be non-citizens[5]. Thus, the origin of herders played a meaningful role in constructing herders' identities, as did the character of a specific herder, to which the next chapter will refer.

6.2   (Bad) character and identity

> *"And so, yes, we will look at climate change, we will look at land ownership, we will look at access to all these things. But one thing is about how the people... the Fulani themselves, see themselves. If they see themselves as Ghanaians, then they see themselves irrespective of what the legal framework is saying. They have (...) defined their sense of belonging, which is to Ghana."* (interview with researcher from the University of Ghana on 12/06/2018 in Accra)

As one expert described, the self-constructed identity and the sense of belonging of herders is one of the most important factors when looking at the farmer-herder conflict in Agogo, and it is even more so when investigating the perceptions of Fulani herders in this area. In this section, I will discuss how local people created categories of good and bad pastoralists in their area, solely based on how their behavior or actions made them so. I will also look into how the self-constructed identity that is mentioned in the quote above influences this process.

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[5] Interviews with one researcher from the University of Ghana on 12/06/2018 in Accra, with one researcher from KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie, with two farmers on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, resp. on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso.

The 'bad herder narrative' was one of the most frequently occurring codes throughout the data. People were complaining about what the herders had done or how they behaved, on some occasions also connecting this to the underlying cultural differences and their typical lifestyle, which they said to be much different from the local one. The code relating to a general resentment against the herders based on their character occurred in all of the farmer-interviews and the majority of the interviews with traditional authorities[6] and official authorities[7]. One farmer summarized on what this aversion against herders was based:

> *"For them, they don't have any demarcations. Whenever we have demarcated the land for him [the herder], he won't abide it. He will cross it. You see, (...) for instance, the farm here. You will see that the animals come. You will call the Fulani and tell him that he should send the animals away. He will tell you no, no... the animals need more food than you, the human. (...) So, you should leave [the farm] for the animals to feed. And let me add one thing. Most of the farmers of this community buy wire and fence their farm. (...) These Fulani people will come in the night, use the cutlass and cut it and the animals will enter and destroy the farm."* (Interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso)

The farmers' main issue was with the 'malicious' character that some herders apparently had. They traced this character to the, from their point of view, intentional destruction of crops and the non-adherence to any regulations or limitations (see also chapters 7.3 and 7.4). From their perspective, herders either purposefully directed their cattle onto the local people's farms to feed, or they did not prevent it and rather put up with the consequences, knowing that their actions were wrong. This can also be seen in the accusation of herders intentionally cutting fences and wires to enable their cattle to access private farms, as in the quotation above. The narrative of herders being malicious was certainly intensified through the long history of the conflict. For the farmers, the destruction of crops and property had been a recurring issue for many years and they were fed up with these nuisances. It represented enormous economic challenges for them to recover from such incidents, since the vast majority of farms were operated on a small-scale, family level. Furthermore, they almost never had access to credits or loans from any of the local banks, how I learned from informal talks with my research assistants. The tendency to categorize herders which had caused any kind of problem or disturbance to their businesses as bad herders was therefore high. As this quote by a farmer shows, this tendency had also changed over time since the first herders had arrived in the area:

> *"They weren't like that the first time they came here, they didn't have that character. (...) Initially, it wasn't like that. (...) Yeah, later they came to have a different mentality and different ideas. (...) The moment you say anything, they shoot you."* (Interview with farmer on 27/06/2018 in Agogo)

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[6] Interviews with two representatives of the ATC on 22/06/2018, resp. on 27/06/2018 in Agogo, and with two representatives of traditional institutions from villages on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, resp. on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso.

[7] Interviews with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo, with head of the district police on 21/06/2018 in Agogo, with the MP for the AAND on 24/06/2018 in Juansa, with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem. Email questionnaire with regional representative of Fulani herders on 02/10/2018.

Apart from the destruction of their own property or produce, some of the local people also identified this violent or destructive character among herders towards each other. One representative of the local district administration as well as one local activist reported on typical competition fights among Fulani herders (interviews with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo and with local activist on 27/06/2018 in Agogo). The significance of the cattle was so high for the Fulani, they stated, that they would engage in cattle rustling against other Fulani herders to enlarge their own herd. While this report was not confirmed in my interviews with herders, even the fact that this narrative exists among local people is enough to strengthen their construction of 'the bad herder' category. What added to this was that if a herder got killed in such a fight, the local people accused the Fulani of then blaming locals for the killing instead of admitting that it had been done by one of the herders (interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem). They were able to do so, because most of such incidents happened in the bush reportedly (see chapter 7.1).

Another aspect of classifying herders was based on how well they were integrated in the local communities. Concerning belonging or character of the herders, this was the only feature where local people were able to identify good herders, namely the ones that were well integrated and had been living in the communities for some time already. Quite a few respondents acknowledged that this group of herders did not pose any problem to them personally or to the community[8]. Especially the two small-scale cattle owners from Agogo and a former herder and long-time resident were very clear that this group of well-integrated Fulani (herders) existed in the district (interviews with two local cattle owners on 28/06/2018 in Agogo and resp. on 05/07/2018 in Agogo, and with one local Fulani resident on 22/06/2018 in Agogo), since they probably counted themselves as closely affiliated to this 'group'. They were also the ones who complained the most about the measures of the Operation Cowleg, because the operation did not differentiate between different kinds of herders. As a consequence, also the local small-scale cattle owners suffered from the expulsions even though they had not been involved in any farmer-herder incidents (interviews with two local cattle owners on 28/06/2018 in Agogo and resp. on 05/07/2018 in Agogo). Another group that was referred to as well-integrated by local people were Fulani people who had been in Ghana for a long time but did not anymore engage in pastoral activities. Since the terms 'Fulani' and 'herder' were often used synonymously by respondents, they probably saw these Fulani people as part of the conflict too (see chapter 5.6.2). They also might have established this link through their ethnicity (see chapter 6.3).

What also played a role when identifying well-integrated herders was their degree of 'formal' integration, meaning, for example, if they were paying taxes or did get a Ghanaian education. Such formal measures for making a good or a bad herder were acknowledged rather by people from Agogo (compared to farmers from the villages) and by experts (interviews with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem, and with researchers from the University of Ghana on 12/06/2018 in Accra and from KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie). For respondents from the rural areas, it mattered more where the herders/Fulani lived and how they were interacting with

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[8] This was stated by four farmers, three representatives of official authorities (one district assembly official, one head of the district police, one veterinary), two local cattle owners and three representatives of traditional authorities (two local chiefs from different villages, one subchief of the ATC).

them. Naturally, some herders were also categorized as the opposite, as living segregated from the communities or as social outsiders:

> *"True, when you go to most of the communities, those people are isolated, the herdsmen. They are isolated, they are not part of community things. Because they see them as foreigners."* (Interview with researcher at KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie)

This segregation was on the one hand related to a physical distance from the communities. Herders were often living outside the villages, but still close to them. Both farmers and herders reported this condition and it was also confirmed through my own observations. Pastoralists had their own settlements a few hundred meters to several kilometers outside of the regular settlement. They were reported to only come to the villages in the evenings or at night for a few errands and then leave back to their home (Interviews with farmers on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, and on 25/06/2018 in Bebome). This physical distance made a good integration much harder. Correspondingly, the herders who classified as well-integrated were rather the ones who had been living within the communities, or at least at the edges of such. A Fulani man living in Agogo was also very clear about how the place of residence affected how a herder was perceived: he clearly differentiated between those living in the city and those living *"in the bush"* (interview with local Fulani resident on 22/06/2018 in Agogo) (see also chapter 7.1).

On the other hand, the segregation was related to a social distance, meaning that the herders often stayed among themselves and were not part of social life in the communities. Similar to the physical distance, this came up both in interviews with local people and with herders. Local people, but also experts, emphasized that many of the herders did not send their children to the community schools and in general avoided extensive contact with the local community (interviews with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo, with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Bebome, and with researchers from KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie). I was able to confirm this situation in one case, where an American woman living in Ghana was regularly visiting a Fulani family to educate their children, because they otherwise might not have received any education at all since they were not attending the local school. In interviews with Fulani herders, they confirmed that although some of them had been in the area for quite some time, they rather stayed among other Fulani people and their next neighbors (interviews with Fulani herder on 03/07/2018 in Hamidu and with local Fulani resident on 22/06/2018 in Agogo). In one of the expert interviews, this practice of avoiding contact with local people came up as a reason why the conflict in Agogo was so difficult to resolve. The expert, a MP in Accra, stated that in general, conflicts were harder to resolve, if one of the actors involved was using avoidance as a strategy, as in the case of Agogo (interview with parliamentary on 14/06/2018 in Accra).

Generally, the integration and overall character of herders were frequently used by local people as thresholds on which they would distinguish between good and bad herders. Good physical and social integration were naturally seen as preferable, whereas 'bad character' and segregation from the communities clearly resulted in making an unfavorable herder. What stood out is the fact that the majority of codings in this context attached to 'what makes a bad herder' (110 codings), compared to the smaller number of codings that attached to 'what makes a good herder' (39 codings). This result can be interpreted by taking into account that the topic was

highly emotional among local people, especially among farmers and people from the villages, who had been directly affected by violence. They therefore might have highlighted the bad characteristics of herders instead of the good ones. The respondents' statements were more mixed when it came to questions about ethnicity, as the next chapter will show.

6.3   Ethnicity and stereotyping

Reactions and answers to questions about the ethnicity of herders were much more inconsistent than those concerned with identity or behavior. What was interesting to notice was that almost all local respondents (both from Agogo and from the villages) used the terms 'Fulani', 'herder' and 'herdsman' as synonyms. Thus, Fulani ethnicity seemed to be a homogeneous characteristic that was shared by all herders. When it came to 'Ghanaian herders', however, this seemed to get a more complicated issue. Some respondents referred to them as Fulani herders, who had lived in the community for a long time and had therefore obtained some kind of 'local identity', others were apparently rather referring to native, small-scale cattle owners. Consequently, it proved difficult to clarify the role that ethnicity played in the perception of pastoralists.

Still, in a number of interviews it appeared that people either had an ethnic resentment against the Fulani in general or did explicitly not. Regarding the codings in my data analysis, the two positions seemed to be quite balanced with only slightly more codings for people having ethnic resentments than people not having them. Among the farmers, four respondents[9] explicitly stated that they did not like the Fulani as an ethnic group, regardless of their occupation, in a similar way to the farmer from Kowireso quoted below.

> *Interviewer: "So do you feel negatively towards Fulani in general? Or just..."*
> *(...) Farmer: "Yes. (...) In general, mhh. (...) Fulani is Fulani. (...) A*
> *scorpion is scorpion."* (Interview on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso)

Their resentment, clearly also based on emotional reasons, seemed to be strong. In how far this ethnic aversion had changed over the last years due to the consequences of farmer-herder clashes was difficult to assess but could be another interesting process to look at. Certainly, the destruction of food crops and the constant threat of criminal activities by some herders led to a generally negative perception of Fulani herders from the farmers' part. Their statements have to be seen relatively to a certain extent, however, because I cannot be completely sure that they meant the Fulani people when they said they did not like the 'Fulani', but possibly just meant all herders.

As mentioned in chapter 5.6.2, the use of terminology was an issue in some interviews. Still, the resentment was also strongly influenced by stereotyping, prejudices and exclusion of ethnic Fulani in relation to farmer-herder conflicts. Bukari and Schareika (2015) elaborate more on this issue, but also in my interviews with experts the topic frequently came up. The Ghanaian media were strongly taking sides in their reporting about any clashes between local people and Fulani. On the one hand, they were reporting preferably on such crimes, where the local person

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[9] Interviews with farmers on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, on 25/06/2018 in Bebome, on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere, and on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso.

was the victim and the Fulani the culprit (interview with researcher at KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie). On the other hand, they were said to be accusing Fulani (herders) of crimes where the culprit could not be identified without doubt (interview with another researcher at KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie).

> *"(…) And the media plays a role too. Like, how they report issues. I mean, if a Ghanaian farmer kills a Fulani, you hardly see [it] in the papers. And even if you see it, it doesn't make noise. But then if a Fulani shoots a farmer, that is trouble."* (Interview with researcher at KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie)

Their reporting in combination with frequent violent incidents strongly influenced the national and local discourses about Fulani, as Bukari and Schareika (2015) report. One expert even reported of an incident where people intentionally tried to redirect the blame for their own criminal activities onto the Fulani:

> *"In Maamekrobo [farming community in the Afram plains] two policemen were arrested for armed robbery. They dressed like Fulani people and attacked a (…) van that was sending money to the Commercial Bank in one of the towns. (…) The way they were dressed, and they could speak the Hausa language. So, they thought they were Fulani people. They got there, arrested the men, saw that they were rather policemen who had disguised themselves. (…) So, you see, it creates a perception that these people are bad (…)."*
> (Interview with researcher at KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie).

Such incidents of defamation obviously strengthened the narrative of Fulani people being criminal. Having said that, other respondents were equally clear in stating that the problem is not ethnic and that they did not have resentments against all ethnic Fulani. While the ethnic resentment was to be found more among farmers, the opposite position seemed to be popular especially among traditional authorities[10]. They stated that problems in the district did not occur with all Fulani, but rather with a few. Which ones were problematic and which not depended, according to them, on other features, such as their cattle or the non-adherence to regulations and limitations (see chapters 7.3 and 8.1). While their more tolerant position might be seen as constructive for finding a solution to the conflict, it has to be said that the traditional authorities often profited from the herders' presence. Since they are the institution who is in charge of land allocation in the AAND, they had often received payments from herders for land which they were using to graze their cattle in the past. This might explain their favorable attitude towards Fulani in general to a certain extent.

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[10] Interviews with two representatives of the ATC on 22/06/2018 in Agogo and on 27/06/2018 in Agogo, with two local chiefs from different villages on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso and on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso, and with representative of Muslim community 'Zongo' on 28/06/2018 in Agogo.

There was a tendency that respondents from the city of Agogo did rather have no ethnic resentment, whereas those from rural areas did. Although this effect was not perfectly consistent, it might have been caused through the experience that the respective respondents had made with Fulani people. In the villages and on the farms, the only Fulani were those in the bush who were seen as responsible for crop destructions and other crimes. In the city of Agogo, many Fulani lived a 'regular' live and did not engage in cattle rearing. This might hint at another actor being responsible for the resentment against Fulani pastoralists: their cattle (see chapter 8).

One last issue that can be related to ethnicity was brought up by one of the experts:

> *"(...) So, let's say for instance, you are Ghanaian, I am Ghanaian, you are a herder, I am a farmer. You destroy my [farm], I will come to you, and you pay. I mean, it's easier to reach an agreement with (...) a fellow Ghanaian. But if it's a Fulani, it becomes an issue."* (Interview with researcher from KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie)

This kind of inter-ethnic or inter-cultural difficulty was not mentioned precisely by many other respondents but related to similar statements by small-scale cattle owners from Agogo (interviews with two local cattle owners on 28/06/2018 in Agogo and resp. on 05/07/2018 in Agogo). Similar to the expert quoted above, they described communication and conflict resolution between them and local farmers as conducive and non-problematic. It was common for them to compensate farmers for crops which their cattle had destroyed. On the other hand, they also reported that this was much more difficult between Fulani herders from outside of the community and the local farmers. Naturally, those herders who compensated farmers for their loss were perceived as less problematic than those who did not. However, this issue was obviously not only related to ethnicity, but also to origin and other factors. In summary, the tendency to connect Fulani ethnicity to 'bad' herders was strong among farmers, but less among other respondents. The next section will analyze the influence of attributes of herders' belonging on perception of herders in more detail.

6.4 Importance of the herders' belonging

Summarizing and interpreting my findings from the three sections above, origin and identity of herders tend to be decisive, while ethnicity plays only a minor role for locals when constructing herder identities. This minor role, I argue, comes to light in the disagreement among respondents over whether their conflict is with the Fulani people in general, or just with Fulani herders. In the cases where ethnicity appeared to be an attribute on the basis of which local people categorized herders into good or bad, it seemed to be strongly influenced by the stereotyping of Fulani people as criminals, which I have discussed in chapter 6.3. The lesser importance of ethnicity might also be traced back to the specifics of my case: as I reported in chapter 2, Agogo has no history of intense ethnic conflicts. Instead, nationality seems to be an attribute dominating over ethnicity.

Nationality, in other words, if a herder counted as a Ghanaian or not, appeared to be synonymous with origin in most of the interviews. This attribute was frequently used by respondents to create categories of the good and the bad herders, especially by farmers. It clearly emerged from the analysis of my results that herders who were seen as outsiders (meaning in most cases that they originated from outside Ghana, not just outside the Agogo area) quickly classified as bad herders. On the other hand, those pastoralists who were identified by local people as Ghanaians or, even better, as local people from Agogo (but probably with a migration background) were more likely to be categorized as good herders. Relating these findings back to my theoretical framework around identity, it is less surprising that outsiders are categorized as bad herders than it is how Ghanaian herders are perceived. The fear of the unknown or the alien fits nicely into the argumentation of Anderson's nations as *imagined communities* and Tajfel's social group identity: among a group that identifies as such on the basis of the common idea of, for example, a nation, members will always favor those inside their group over those outside of it (Tajfel, 1974; Anderson, 2006). It was more of a surprise that not all Ghanaian herders were identified as good herders. In my view, since they fulfilled the primary 'prerequisite' for a good herder (not being an outsider), they were then categorized by the means of other attributes, which I will discuss in the following sections.

An attribute equally important as the origin of the pastoralists was related to accusations based on their character or identity. Local people, but most importantly farmers identified bad herders based on their bad actions or bad intentions. Naturally, this attribute also relates to other analytical categories, such as crimes committed by the herders or their land use. But besides that, accusations that herders had a bad character or were inherently violent occurred repeatedly. One example for this was the claim made by one local activist that it was a typical practice among Fulani herders to raid other Fulani, steal their cattle and kill the herders (interview on 27/06/2018 in Agogo). It could not be verified if such practices occurred or not, but the story did certainly add to the 'bad intentions'-narrative around Fulani herders. Another threshold for categorizing the pastoralists in relation to their character was their degree of integration. Those herders who moved closer to the city or the villages or at least engaged in regular social interaction with indigenous people were perceived more tolerable than those who stayed 'in the bush'. This degree of integration, which relates also to the herders' intangibility that I will discuss in the next section, was mostly recognized by respondents from the city of Agogo and by traditional authorities, rather than by farmers. The latter relied more on notions of nationality and the origin of herders when constructing herders' identities.

7 Nomadic pastoralism and crime

Adding to the influence that the herders' belonging had on the construction of their identities by local people, the latter also appeared to make connotations between nomadic pastoralism and crime. These occurred on the basis of four different attributes, for which I will present my findings in this chapter. According to what I presented in figure 8, these four attributes are: intangibility, armed herders, land use and criminal activities.

7.1 Intangibility

As a farming locality on the scale of a smaller city, the community of Agogo is characterized by close social relations among its citizens and constant interaction. Even with the surrounding villages, people are frequently in contact for mainly economic interests, such as farmers bringing their produce to the market in Agogo twice a week. In contrast to this, the relations to the Fulani herders who migrated to the area just recently are quite different. Herders are reported to stay among themselves in the bush or in small settlements outside of the bigger cities or villages, as reported in chapter 6.2. Due to this self-imposed distance of the herders, there was a sense of them being physically intangible for the local people. Respondents in the villages reported that they would rarely see a Fulani herder in town and if so, only during dusk or nighttime (interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso). Instead, they would stay in sparsely populated areas with their cattle that were difficult to access for people (as well as for the security personnel when it came to expelling them) (interview with local activist on 27/06/2018 in Agogo). In itself, this behavior did not pose much of a problem for local people, since they were not too eager about contact to the Fulani anyway. It did, however, result in complications when it came to the destruction of farms and crops. Many of the farmers and also other respondents reported of the same issue: returning to their farm in the morning and finding it destroyed by cattle[11].

> *"So (…) you will (…) leave home to the farm, then the farm has been destroyed. So, you can't witness, or can't know that... this man or this man has done it. This is our problem."* (Interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso)

At this point, it is useful to look back at the way farming is practiced in the AAND. As discussed in chapter 2.1, it is a common practice for many farmers to live in the city of Agogo and move to their farms in the morning, then return in the evening. This practice increases physical intangibility of the herders and makes it difficult for farmers to claim compensation for such incidents. In the interviews with the farmers, it was one of the main things they complained about. Furthermore, the physical intangibility of the herders was also mentioned in relation to stereotyping and discrimination of the Fulani (see also chapter 6.3). As an example, the veterinary officer of the AAND described the following situation:

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[11] Besides the farmer quoted above, this included two farmers interviewed on 25/06/2018 in Bebome, one farmer interviewed on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso and one representative of Agogo's Muslim community, the Zongo, interviewed on 28/06/2018.

"Because as soon as you go and see a black man dead, 'ohhh, a Fulani man has killed [him]'. Because you have no prove. It could be that your own Ghanaian has killed you, but you put the blame to the Fulani man." (Interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem)

Since there was no way, neither for police nor for other people, to reconstruct incidents that happened in the bush, it was easy for someone to blame a minority, in this case the Fulani. Similar to such accusations, there was also a general tendency to ascribe particular features to pastoralists that seemed to be either exaggerated or just invented but could not be verified due to their intangibility. One such feature was the claim that herders could move extremely large distances in one night and therefore could be held responsible for crop destructions in different places. A local activist claimed that herders could move their herds about 100 miles within a single night (interview with local activist on 27/06/2018 in Agogo). Another claim was that the nutritious grass in the AAND enabled the cows of the Fulani to give birth twice a year, instead of only once a year when grazing somewhere else (interview with local village chief on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere).

A second issue about intangibility of herders was related to the legal prosecution of crimes they had committed. First, as reported above, it was almost impossible for prosecutors to identify and seize the person who was responsible for crop or waterbody destructions, rape incidents or murder due to their physical intangibility. Additionally, in the rare case that a herder had been seized by the police for committing a crime, his or her prosecution was occasionally impeded by powerful people behind them. This process was described by one of the experts as the cattle owners, who were employing the herders, using their political or legal influence to prevent any measures be taken against their employees (see also chapter 8.2):

"These [herders] commit... they destroy people's farms, they destroy waterbodies, [and] when you send them to the police, the police do not deal with them in most cases, (...) because the owners are able to influence the process (...)." (Interview with researcher at KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie)

Naturally, for the local people this form of legal impunity of the herders did result in strong grievances, especially because, on the other hand, the few farmers who had been seized for retaliating crimes were quickly punished. However, from the perspective of farmers and other locals, the police and district administration were the ones to blame for this grievance. They did not link it to cattle owners (interviews with one farmer on 25/06/2018 in Bebome and one representative of the ATC on 27/06/2018 in Agogo). A representative of the district administration of the AAND acknowledged this problem by relating it back to the intangibility of herders: whereas local people were easily accessible, those farmers who were staying in the bush had no address (interview with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo). This effect was increased not only through physical intangibility, but also through some sort of 'social intangibility'. As already discussed in chapter 6.2, especially the nomadic herders stayed among themselves and avoided contact to the local communities. Even some of the herders who were not from Agogo but had been in the area for some time and were also Fulani, claimed that they did not know the nomadic, large-scale herders (interview with Fulani herder on 03/07/2018

in Hamidu). It was this separation that made this particular group of herders to be perceived as *"strangers"* (interview with head of district police on 21/06/2018 in Agogo) by many of the local people.

Finally, the perception of herders acting with legal impunity was also related to issues of immigration by some respondents. Two representatives of the traditional authorities as well as one local activist blamed porous borders and lax immigration procedures for the high influx of herders and cattle into the area and, thus, also for the conflict (interviews with representatives of ATC on 22/06/2018 and 27/06/2018 in Agogo, interview with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo). In their view, herders could just cross the state borders into Ghana without providing any form of identification or formalities for their cattle, whereas every regular citizen usually had to do so when crossing a border. Whether these claims of lax immigration controls were true or not could not be verified, but the presence of a large number of herders with immense amounts of cattle in the past might suggest that the claims were not far from the truth.

To summarize, intangibility proved to be one of the strongest attributes for local people to categorize herders. Although it was not mentioned in relation to them, the better integrated, 'local' herders were clearly seen as favorable over those who were either staying outside of the settlements or even as nomads in the bush. In combination with the crimes committed by some pastoralists (see chapter 7.4), intangibility proved to induce strong emotions among the people affected by the conflict, because they, obviously, felt deprived of equality before the law. The issue can also be regarded as an important one when it comes to resolving the continuous conflict in the area around Agogo, since it was a main complaint among the farmers that were interviewed. But it might also prove as an issue that will be difficult to deal with, because making nomadic herders tangible seems to be a complicated task.

7.2 Armed herders

A number of reports as well as a few studies have identified a growing proliferation of firearms among nomadic herders in different pastoralist areas of West, Central, or East Africa (Mkutu, 2006; Greiner, 2013; Mikailu, 2016; The economist, 2017). Nomadic herders around Agogo are not an exception in this regard (Agyemang, 2017). The majority of the respondents answered positively when asked, whether the nomadic herders were armed or not. When talking about arms, most of them were referring to firearms and guns (20 codings) rather than to machetes or knives (4 codings). Many emphasized that the herders were often armed with *"sophisticated guns"* (interview with local village chief on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso)[12], such as AK47s or G3s. It was not possible for me to verify these allegations directly. The few herders I was able to interview did not carry weapons with them, but also were not part of the 'category' of herders who were alleged to have them: the nomadic, intangible herders. Still, the recurring mentioning in interviews with local people and policymakers, as well as the striking fact that in

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[12] Other respondents made similar claims: two officials of the district assembly interviewed on 20/06/2018 in Agogo, the head of district police interviewed on 21/06/2018 in Agogo, the MP for the AAND interviewed on 24/06/2018 in Juansa, one subchief of the ATC interviewed on 22/06/2018 in Agogo, one local cattle owner interviewed on 28/06/2018 in Agogo, two farmers interviewed on 25/06/2018 in Bebome, one farmer interviewed on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere, one local activist interviewed on 27/06/2018 in Agogo.

the past years a large number of local people suffered gunshot wounds make it highly probable that the allegations are true and some of the herders are armed with such weapons and use them.

The fact that the herders were in possession of such sophisticated guns led to much confusion and anger among the local people. As one of the farmers illustrated, they did not see the need for pastoralists to carry such guns.

> *"The reason is that, at first, (...) when some people are rearing cattle, they [were] attacked by (...) big animals. So, that is why some nomads [used] guns. But here, we don't have tigers, we don't have any wild animals in our forests. So, why do they have to use guns?"* (Interview with farmer on 27/06/2018 in Agogo)

He tried to make sense of their armament, but generally, the weapons were seen as completely disproportionate and a threat to local people. This disproportionality was increased through the fact that the only 'weapon' the local farmers were using was a machete, which they mainly used for their farming activities. None of them was armed with a gun. Hence, in situations where it came to a confrontation between farmers and armed herders, e.g. a dispute about crop destruction or farm invasion, the herders were allegedly using their guns as a threat to drive away the farmer.

> *"I'm a farmer, when I'm going to farm, I can't take a weapon. I'm used to my cutlass (...). But he is coming (...) with a weapon. And then he tells you that you should leave the farm. So that the animals will graze on it. Then you leave."* (Interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso[13])

Naturally, incidents as the one described above by a farmer did result in strong grievances by the farmers. According to them, even during the activities of the Operation Cowleg, the security personnel was not able to completely prevent such events, let alone during the times where no security personnel was present. As a consequence, herders who were bearing arms, but also other ones who just suffered from generalization in this case, were perceived very negatively by local people. Many respondents connected the possession of firearms to bad intentions, since they did not see a legitimate reason for a herder to carry a gun other than to threaten or kill farmers protecting their land[14]. Interestingly, the opinion that the armament of some herders was disproportionate was also shared by one pastoralist (interview on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso). This finding relates back to the intangibility of especially the nomadic herders, who are also the ones who are said to be armed. Even to other Fulani herders, in this case a hired herder living in one of the villages around Agogo, those nomadic herders seemed to be strangers.

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[13] This was confirmed by another farmer, interviewed on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso.

[14] Interviews with one farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, with one farmer on 25/06/2018 in Bebome, with one farmer on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere, with one farmer on 27/06/2018 in Agogo, and with one subchief of the ATC on 22/06/2018 in Agogo.

When enquiring about the background of these weapons, answers remained blurry and uncertain. The interviewees generally could not tell where the pastoralists got these weapons from. To some extent, this was to be expected, due to the limited contact between local people and armed herders. However, it may also be a hint that the procurement of weapons happens in unofficial, or at least informal ways. A few people suggested various potential providers for these weapons. These included one ominous supplier from Northern Ghana (interview with researcher at KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie), the cattle owners (interview with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo), or even the herders buying weapons from soldiers and the police (interview with local village chief on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso). The issue of procurement was also brought up in relation to their financial means, indicating that the herders should not be able to afford such weapons (interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso). Of the three assumptions above, probably the cattle owners are the most realistic source of such weapons. How they supported herders they had employed will be discussed in chapter 8.2.

In contrast to owners supplying there hired herders with weapons, one local, small-scale cattle owner suggested that firearms used by the nomadic herders originate from countries such as Liberia, which have a history of armed internal conflict. Through family relations, he proposed, herders would be able to obtain the arms.

> *"They bring some from Liberia. (…) Because some of their family members are in Liberia and some of them are businessmen, so they acquire it through legal means for them."* (Interview with local cattle owner on 28/06/2018 in Agogo)

He did, however, not specify the ways in which the weapons ended up in the hands of regular herders. Similar to other respondents, he did not have first-hand information about the issue and was rather sharing his assumptions. Still, the trading of weapons across borders in West Africa, whether legal or illegal, is a topic that requires much further research to understand the implications such weapons can have at their destination. Nevertheless, for the perception of Fulani herders by local citizens of the AAND, whether the herder was carrying a gun or not played an important role.

7.3 Land use and herding activities

An interesting aspect that does not appear in the literature about farmer-herder conflict came up during interviews with farmers. Their attitude towards pastoralists was influenced by the way the herders were grazing the cattle. There were three aspects of the grazing where farmers saw differences between multiple types of herders, as well some other issues about the herder's land use, which will be discussed at the end of this section. The figure 9 shows the main subcategories of data analysis, which also relate to the above-mentioned three aspects: control over the cattle, temporal pattern of grazing and whether herders had agreements for land or not.

Figure 9: Categories from data analysis for the attribute "Way of herding/land use". From top to bottom, two subcategories respectively refer to control over the cattle by herder, temporal pattern of grazing and whether they had agreements for land. Source: MAXQDA 12.

Firstly, and barely surprisingly, farmers and other locals commented on the degree of control that the herders had over their cattle. A large number of respondents stated that the nomadic Fulani herders (the 'bad' herders) were lacking control over their herds[15]. The reasons that the farmers identified for this were either the large numbers of cattle in a single herd or that there were not enough herders relative to the number of cattle. In fact, since some herds of the nomadic pastoralists were reported to number several thousand cattle, the ability to control these numbers might be questioned altogether (interview with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo)[16]. Many farmers did also relate the lack of control back to the herders' *"bad intentions"* (interview with farmer on 27/06/2018 in Agogo)[17] and traced back the failings of the herders to control their cattle to their lack of effort to do so. There were accusations that Fulani herders had intentionally driven their cattle onto farms, as already discussed in chapter 6.2. Overall, there seemed to be a disagreement among the respondents about whether the lack of control over cattle was induced by the herders' inability or their bad intentions.

In contrast to the uncontrolled cattle of the nomadic herders, fewer respondents also referred to herders who had their cattle at least partly confined, meaning that the cows would stay in a confinement, a 'kraal', during the night and then leave the kraal for grazing during the day. This was the method used by the two local small-scale cattle owners which I interviewed and it was also applied by some other Fulani herders (interviews with two local cattle owners on 28/06/2018 and 05/07/2018 in Agogo, interview with Fulani herder on 26/06/2018 in Ananekrom). Reactions by the local people to this kind of cattle rearing were mixed. While one farmer presented this as the method that had been used in the past by local cattle owners with which there had never been conflict, a representative of the district administration assessed this

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[15] Among these were five farmers, two local cattle owners, a district assembly official, a veterinary, two traditional chiefs from different villages, one subchief of the ATC, and a representative of the traditional authorities of the Muslim community of Agogo.

[16] Other respondents confirmed this statement: interview with local activist on 27/06/2018 in Agogo, with local cattle owner on 28/06/2018 in Agogo, with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Bebome, with farmer on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso, with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem, with subchief of the ATC on 22/06/2018 in Agogo, with two village chiefs on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere and in Seribourso.

[17] Three other farmers confirmed this: interview with one farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso and with two farmers on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso.

method as almost equally destructive as uncontrolled, free-range grazing (interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, interview with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo). Generally, though, local people favored herders who at least temporarily confined their cattle over those who did not at all.

Secondly, local people identified different temporary patterns of grazing by the herders. On the one hand, they stated that most local, small-scale herders were grazing their cattle during daytime only (interview with local cattle owner on 28/06/2018 in Agogo, interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso). These were reportedly the ones who also used kraals as a confinement for their cattle during the night. On the other hand, they identified a particular 'type' of pastoralists who grazed their cattle during the night, which was also confirmed by experts[18]. This type of grazing was seen as much more problematic by local people:

> *"We have natives, who have some of the cattle. But those natives, they don't destroy. They don't use their animals in the night. In the daytime, when the animals are (…) in fact, they will put them in a garage. But those from Niger, Nigeria... they use the animals in the night."* (Interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso)

The grazing of cattle during the night relates back to the sense of intangibility that the farmers were especially feeling towards the nomadic herders (see chapter 7.1). It also underlines the way in which crop destruction happened mostly: during the night and impossible for the farmer to observe or prevent. Again, there was disagreement over the reason for the crop destruction during the night. While farmers blamed the pastoralists to graze their cattle intentionally during the night to enter their farms and let the cows feed on food crops, one expert related the crop destruction during nighttime rather to the herders' regular movement as nomads, of which the destruction of farms was an undesirable consequence (interviews with two farmers on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, interview with one researcher on 13/06/2018 in Teshie). As a consequence of the intangibility towards herders grazing during the night, but also of the fact that most incidents of crop destruction had happened in the night, local people perceived herders that conducted this type of grazing very negatively. Pastoralists who confined their cattle in kraals from dusk to dawn were perceived better but were still not desirable for many.

A third aspect about herding activities was related to the herders' land use: local people often were aware of the type of land tenure the herders were practicing. All herders and local cattle owners I interviewed, except for one, stated that they paid for land which they were using for their cattle (interviews with two local cattle owners on 28/06/2018 and 05/07/2018 in Agogo, interviews with three herders on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, on 26/06/2018 in Ananekrom, on 03/07/2018 in Hamidu). There were different types of agreements, however, and some herders were also reserved about the type of agreement they were having. Local cattle owners used to acquire a piece of land through the traditional authorities. They emphasized that

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[18] This was noted by one local cattle owner (interview on 28/06/2018 in Agogo), by four farmers (two interviews on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, one interview on 25/06/2018 in Bebome, one interview on 27/06/2018 in Agogo), by two local village chiefs (interviews on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso and on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere), by one researcher (interview on 13/06/2018 in Teshie) and by one local activist (interview on 27/06/2018 in Agogo).

the land was given to them, because they had been members of the community for a long time (interviews with two local cattle owners on 28/06/2018 and 05/07/2018 in Agogo). In spite of that, one local cattle owner admitted that the land he acquired was only used for the kraal, but he did not pay for the land where his cattle was grazing during the day (interview with local cattle owner on 28/06/2018 in Agogo). The herders, on the other hand, were more diffuse about their arrangements, probably also because they sometimes were not the ones who made these arrangements, but their employers. One herder stated he would pay to a local chief (interview with Fulani herder on 26/06/2018 in Ananekrom), one that he would pay to a police commander (interview with Fulani herder on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso) and one that the owner of the cattle he was herding paid for it (interview with Fulani herder on 03/07/2018 in Hamidu). Having an agreement for grazing land seemed to be a positive feature for a herder or a cattle owner, because none of the respondents of these groups reported of having conflict or tensions with local farmers.

In contrast to them, the interviews with farmers showed that other herders did not have agreements for grazing land and rather used the land 'for free':

> *"Who do they pay to? They don't pay to anybody. (...) All what we see is, they are just here. You never see them paying anything to anybody."* (Interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Bebome)

This perspective was supported by the majority of local respondents[19]. When asked about what type of herder this was who did not pay for land, most interviewees referred to the nomadic type. Comparing the local people's statements with those of herders and cattle owners, it seems that there is some accordance, but the issue is still diffuse. Local cattle owners, in most cases, have agreements for land with the traditional authorities. Other herders, such as the ones I interviewed, might have some agreements, but probably not all of them or not covering enough land to contain their cattle. And nomadic herders most likely do not have any land tenure arrangements at all, telling from the statements by traditional authorities, who should be in charge of creating such agreements. There is still the need to look further into this issue, although the work of Kuusaana and Bukari (2015) is already contributing much.

When it came to constructing identities of different types of herders in the district, it seemed that the lack of control of the cattle and the grazing during the night strongly induced a negative image of pastoralists. Whether they had land agreements or not appeared to be less of an issue, probably because local people had the opinion that the herders would not adhere to such agreements anyway (interviews with farmers on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere, and on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso). This non-adherence to limitations or demarcations was mentioned as another issue about the pastoralists by many local people. An overall mistrust towards their respecting of local laws and customs appeared to be common[20]. One reason for

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[19] This included five farmers, three district assembly officials, the head of the AAND district police, three village chiefs from different villages and one representative of the ATC.

[20] Such mistrust was expressed by five farmers (two interviews on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, one on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere, one on 26/062018 in Seribourso, one on 27/06/2018 in Agogo), by one district assembly official (interview on 20/06/2018 in Agogo), by the head of district police (interview on 21/06/2018 in Agogo), by the veterinary (interview on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem), by one subchief of the ATC (interview on 22/06/2018 in

this mistrust might have been the frequent occurrence of violent crimes in the past, of which the herders were accused. The next chapter will therefore discuss the impact of such crimes on perceptions by local people.

7.4 Crimes

Concerning the case of Agogo, the issue of crop destructions and crimes committed by Fulani herders is probably the one that has been written about most extensively. Multiple research papers and two Master theses focus to some extent on how pastoral activities are having an impact on local farming communities, whether in the form of unintended crop destruction by cattle passing through farms or in the form of deliberate criminal acts such as rape or murder (Baidoo, 2014; Bukari and Schareika, 2015; Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015; Olaniyan, Francis and Okeke-Uzodike, 2015; Agyemang, 2017). Furthermore, when it comes to herders destroying personal property and threatening the security of local people, it is clear that the effect of such acts on how herders are perceived is strongly negative. Hence, I will not discuss the issue of crimes and destructions extensively in this thesis but will quickly summarize my main findings on this topic.

Crimes that were allegedly committed by the pastoralists included mainly the destruction of crops and waterbodies[21] but in some cases also incidents of rape and murder[22]. Naturally, the issue was highly contested among respondents and different people made different claims about how many and by whom the crimes were committed. Due to my limited time in the field and to the focus on other issues about the conflict, these claims could not be verified. More claims were made about further criminal activities, such as the involvement of politicians in sponsoring armed herders[23] (see chapter 8.2) or the involvement of traditional authorities in covertly allocating land to nomadic herders in exchange for money[24] (see Kuusaana and Bukari, 2015 for a more extensive investigation). While the two latter grievances fell back on the perception of politicians and traditional authorities by local people, the crimes and destructions caused by herders had a strongly negative influence on how the identities of herders were constructed. They were used by a number of respondents to create categories of which herders were problematic and which not, for instance by this subchief in Agogo:

Agogo), by one village chief (interview on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso) and by a representative of the Agogo Muslim community (interview on 28/06/2018 in Agogo).

[21] Such crimes were reported by almost all respondents: ten of ten farmers, seven of seven representatives of different traditional authorities, six of seven representatives of different official authorities, one of two local cattle owners and five of six experts.

[22] The latter crimes were reported to have occurred by five farmers, one district assembly official, the veterinary, two representatives of the ATC and one local village chief.

[23] Reported by one researcher of the University of Ghana (interview on 12/06/2018 in Accra), one researcher at KAIPTC (interview on 13/06/2018 in Teshie), one local activist (interview on 04/07/2018 in Agogo), the head of AAND district police (interview on 21/06/2018 in Agogo), the veterinary (interview on 28/06/2018 in Fwidiem), one local cattle owner (interview on 05/07/2018 in Agogo) and one local Fulani resident (interview on 22/06/2018 in Agogo).

[24] Reported by one researcher of the University of Ghana (interview on 12/06/2018 in Accra), one researcher at KAIPTC (interview on 13/06/2018 in Teshie), one local activist (interview on 04/07/2018 in Agogo), the head of AAND district police (interview on 21/06/2018 in Agogo), the veterinary (interview on 28/06/2018 in Fwidiem), two local cattle owners (interviews on 28/06/2018 and 05/07/2018 in Agogo), one local village chief (interview on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso) and one local Fulani resident (interview on 22/06/2018 in Agogo).

*"You are the [herder] who is taking care of the cattle and I have seen you
shooting my brother, I have seen you raping my wife, so I don't have to put
blame on anybody, it's you that I should blame. (...) If he [the cattle owner]
bought the cattle for you to come and use them for here, he didn't ask you to
go and kill somebody. He didn't ask you to go and rob somebody at (...)
gunpoint, he didn't ask you to go and rape anybody's wife. So, our blame is
clearly on the Fulani, not on those supposed to be owners of the cattle.*
(Interview with subchief of the ATC on 22/06/2018 in Agogo)

Those herders who committed crimes were clearly the ones least tolerable for local people.
An interesting addition to the effect of crimes on the perception of herders by locals was the
way one of the pastoralists I interviewed responded to a question about the nomadic, intangible
herders:

*[I don't like them.] Cause when they come, they cause a lot of problems. You
know, and then it is, you know, it is stress for [me], [I] will also be affected.*
(Interview with Fulani herder on 03/07/2018 in Hamidu)

Similar to farmers, the herder identified other, unwanted herders on the basis of their
criminal activities. Crimes were therefore a very clear threshold throughout all groups of
respondents, based on which 'good' and 'bad' herders were separated.

7.5 Importance of connotations of nomadic pastoralism with crime

As I have shown in the four previous sections, connotations of nomadic pastoralism with
crime emerged from a large number of interviews, but in different forms. Of the four attributes
I defined in this chapter, the armament of the herders and the committing of crimes had a strong,
but rather straightforward influence on how perception of herders changed for locals. Naturally,
crimes committed by Fulani herders were directly connected to the 'bad herder'-narrative and
many accounts of different such incidents came up during the interviews. However, the
stereotyping that happened through the media and throughout society played an important role
in how crimes changed the perception of pastoralists (Bukari and Schareika, 2015). While a
few respondents made it clear that for them only criminal herder were bad herders, in the
majority of interviews it appeared that through stereotyping, all herders became criminal and,
thus, bad and unwanted. A similar impact could be detected on the influence that the carrying
of firearms had on the herders' perception. Many respondents were quick to accuse all herders
of being armed, but statements were not as consistent as with crimes. This included mainly
farmers and people living in rural areas, for whom crimes and the possession of guns were
central attributes when it came to identifying 'good' and 'bad' herders. Generally, not much
seemed to be known about the armament of herders (see chapter 7.2) and the few herders I
interviewed denied carrying any weapons. The topic remains secretive, despite a few recent
publications on cases from East Africa (Mkutu, 2006; Greiner, 2013). With a growing
proliferation of arms among herders, similar to the trends that can be observed in Central Africa,
armed pastoralists will represent a challenge for different aspects of development and security
in the future (The economist, 2017).

More surprising were the impacts of the attributes intangibility and land use concerning pastoralists in the AAND. Intangibility seemed to strongly influence the perception of herders by the local people in the two ways I referred to in chapter 7.1. Their physical and social intangibility established a sort of social distance between them and the indigenous people. It also induced grievances due to the herders not being brought to justice, simply because police could not catch them in the bush. Such grievances were expressed by many respondents, but mostly by farmers and traditional authorities. Similar to how local people felt towards foreign herders, the rejection of intangible herders might relate to a fear of unknown risks. With herders who were more easily accessible, local people supposedly saw more potential for a successful conflict management and the prevention of further clashes. Adding to the physical and social intangibility of herders was their 'legal' intangibility, meaning their impunity from the law through legal support by powerful cattle owners. Hostilities towards herders often seemed to arise from this feeling of disparity when it came to legal prosecution. This feeling of legal disparity might have resulted in the local people supposing they were treated unfairly and deprived of legal equality. Consequently, it negatively influenced their perception of such herders. In contrast to the physical and social intangibility, legal impunity of herders raised more objections among the respondents from Agogo (e.g. traditional and government authorities) than from the farmers in the villages. The reason for this tendency might be that in the city of Agogo, news about a criminal herder going unpunished would spread quicker than in the countryside, so people were more aware of the situation.

Finally, as a fourth attribute on the basis of which the local people from the AAND connotated nomadic pastoralism with crime I looked into the land use by herders. This attribute was strongly brought forth by farmers and by government authorities. Two interesting thresholds appeared to be used by them to categorize herders into good or bad ones. The first was related to their temporal land use: as I discussed in chapter 7.3, pastoralists were either said to graze during the night or during the day. Almost all respondents connected grazing during nighttime with a negative image of the herder, instead of grazing during the day being normal and good. Clearly, this was partly caused by the fact that farmers were unable to prevent destructions of their property when those happened during the night, while they at least felt like they could do so during the day. Furthermore, the rejection of nocturnal grazing might also hint at a connotation of such nocturnal activities with criminal intentions (i.e. the herder does not want to be seen breaking regulations, so he grazes his cattle at night). However, from the few interviews with herders in the area, it emerged that grazing activities might not be so easily separated into nighttime and daytime. None of the herders reported of grazing their cattle during the night, instead they stated to graze them in the early morning and late evening. More research is necessary to come to a comprehensive conclusion here. A second threshold that appeared in connection with land use was the distinction between cattle being partly confined (e.g. during the night in a kraal) and cattle roaming around freely. For local people the unconfined herds clearly seemed to be more problematic, thus negatively influencing the construction of the herders' identities. While this, at first, seems evident due to the higher risk of crop destruction through unconfined cattle, the correlation is not so easy after all. Reports by the two local cattle owners on pastoral activities before the times of high influx of Fulani herders show that cattle in and around Agogo used to roam freely in 'the early days' (interviews with two local cattle owners on 28/06/2018 and 05/07/2018 resp. in Agogo). The rejection of free-roaming cattle,

which I found in my data, therefore either stems from bad experiences with such cattle or from the large numbers that in recent years came to the district. Hence, how the quantity of cattle had an influence on the perception of Fulani herders will be discussed in the next chapter.

8 Cattle (ownership)

Besides issues concerning the belonging of herders and a general connotation of nomadism and crime, a third topic that seemed to be central for locals to identify different types of herders was related to their cattle and the underlying ownership relations. Because the cows were, de facto, responsible for the main complaint the farmers had against herders, the crop destructions, their presence was frequently criticized. But not only the large number of cattle represented a grievance for local people, also its owners, who were mostly living outside of the AAND, and their employment of Fulani herders posed a challenge. Lastly, some complaints also related to the type of cattle that was brought in by Fulani pastoralists. The following four sections will look into these issues in more detail, and a fifth closing section will assess their influence on perception of herders.

8.1 Quantity of cattle

> *"Some of them are having as many as 10'000, just one herdsman, 10'000. With 10'000, you cannot control them. How can you confine 10'000, just for one herd?"* (Interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Bebome)

The majority of respondents from the city of Agogo and the surroundings noticed how large the number of cattle had become that was being reared by the herders in recent years[25]. In many interviews, this fact was noted as a main reason for conflict. Different people assumed different reasons for why the number of cattle had increased so tremendously. Some claimed that the nutritious conditions of the vegetation around Agogo favored the reproduction of the cows, resulting in them *"multiplying every year"* (interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem, interview with one local village chief on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere). Others identified the increasing influx of new herders and new cattle into the district as the main reason for the abundance of cattle (interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, interview with the MP for the AAND on 24/06/2018 in Juansa). Having said that, there was a general agreement among respondents that the numbers at the time of my research were much higher than about 20 years ago. When trying to quantify the size of such large herds, people appeared to be discordant: some mentioned herds with 1'000 (interview with local cattle owner on 28/06/2018 in Agogo), 2'000 (interviews with one subchief of the ATC on 22/06/2018 in Agogo and with one local village chief on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere) or 3'000 cattle (interview with farmer on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso), others such with about 5'000 cattle (interview with member of village traditional council on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso) and some even stated that there were herds of 10'000 (interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Bebome) up to 12'000 cattle

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[25] This was noted in five interviews with farmers, three interviews with village chiefs from different villages, three district assembly officials, the head of AAND district police, the veterinary, the regional chief of Fulani in Ashanti Region, one subchief of the ATC and one representative of the Muslim community of Agogo.

(interview with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo) in the area during dry season. Although many respondents did not articulate it clearly, it was obvious from the context of the responses that the local people attributed such big herds to the intangible, nomadic herders only. Since those were the ones not well known by locals, the numbers they stated might be not exactly true (see chapter 7.1). However, they still give an indication of the scale that cattle rearing has assumed in the AAND.

The main problem local people identified about the large numbers was that herders were, in their eyes, not able to control the herds. Instead, they were perceived to let the cattle roam rather freely and did, thus, not contribute to preventing crop destructions.

> *"(…) they are many, they are too much for them. They cannot control the cattle."* (Interview with representative of Muslim community of Agogo on 28/06/2018 in Agogo)

Consequently, the issue about large numbers of cattle in the area relates back to the way of herding (see chapter 7.3). Pastoralists who attended large herds (i.e. those with above 1'000 cattle) were perceived negatively due to their alleged lack of control of the cattle. The problem with big herds was also confirmed by one herder, who stated that the land could not contain the big numbers that had been brought in by nomadic herders (interview with Fulani herder on 03/07/2018 in Hamidu).

In contrast to the nomadic herders with herds of thousands of cattle, the local, small-scale cattle owners and herders were perceived quite differently. Their herds numbered around 50 (interview with one local cattle owner on 28/06/2018 in Agogo, interview with Fulani herder on 26/06/2018 in Ananekrom), 60 (interview with local cattle owner on 05/07/2018 in Agogo) or 70 cows (interview with Fulani herder on 03/07/2018 in Hamidu) each. However, the two local cattle owners reported that before the activities of the Operation Cowleg, their herds contained about 300 (interview on 28/06/2018 in Agogo) or 200 cows (interview on 05/07/2018 in Agogo) respectively.

> *Interviewer: "You own some cattle yourself, I heard?" Cattle owner: "Yes."
> Interviewer: "Yeah, how many?" Cattle owner: "Formerly I was having about 200 cattle. (…) And due to what has happened, the number has reduced. I'm having about 60 cattle now."* (Interview with local cattle owner on 05/07/2018 in Agogo)

A large share had, thus, either been killed or expelled by the security personnel. Still, their herds were much smaller than those of the nomadic herders and they also emphasized that their cattle were well controllable (due to these small numbers) (interview with one local cattle owner on 05/07/2018 in Agogo and with a Fulani herder on 03/07/2018 in Hamidu). This view was generally shared by respondents of the farmer and traditional authorities groups, who reported of the situation about 20 years ago, before external Fulani herders had entered the district:

> *"(…) at first, when we were growing up, there were a lot of people in Agogo that were rearing cattle. And they were about 15, this man has 20, this man has twelve, and this man… They weren't threatening."* (Interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso)

Before conflicts between farmers and herders got intense, many such cattle owners kept their livestock on their own residential property in Agogo (if the numbers were small), or at least close to the town in the outskirts (if the numbers were larger) (interviews with two local cattle owners on 28/06/2018 and on 05/07/2018 in Agogo). This practice changed with the occurrence of more frequent and more violent conflict, and even more so with the beginning of the Operation Cowleg. One local cattle owner explained that he had to secure a plot of land in the countryside and move the cattle there (interview on 05/07/2018 in Agogo). Still, in combination with their more formalized way of herding and a better communication with farmers, the small herds of these people did, in general, not represent a threat to farmers[26].

However, a few respondents, mostly those among traditional authorities, had a very strict perspective towards cattle in the district. Their opinion was that any cattle represented a threat to them, regardless of how many they were. They emphasized that the main cause of the conflict was the presence of cattle in the district[27]. In some way, this opinion might have been strengthened by the activities of the Operation Cowleg, which did not differentiate between any kind of cattle or herder but did just aim to expel all of them. A similar directive was brought forth by the official authorities, whose personnel maintained that it was important to expel all herders and all cattle from the area in order to establish peace and order (interview with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo, with head of district police on 21/06/2018 in Agogo and with the MP for the AAND on 24/06/2018 in Juansa). This view of the whole problematic was noticed by a local cattle owner in an interesting way:

> *"No matter what you want to do. All what the people of Agogo want to hear, is, they will sleep one night, wake up, and see, there is not a single [cow] in Agogo stool land."* (Interview with local cattle owner on 05/07/2018 in Agogo)

To summarize the perception of herders based on the size of their herds, large numbers of cattle were unanimously regarded as a problem and a threat to the security. Opinions on smaller herds of cattle were more diffuse, but the majority of respondents did not attach a strong negative image to herders taking care of only a few cows. Thus, herder identity depended to some extent on the size of the pastoralist's herd.

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[26] This view was expressed by two farmers (interviews on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso and on 27/06/2018 in Agogo), by the veterinary (interview on 28/06/2018 in Fwidiem), by one subchief of the ATC (interview on 22/06/2018 in Agogo) and by village chiefs from two villages (interviews on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso and on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere).

[27] Expressed by two representatives of the ATC (interviews on 22/06/2018 and 27/06/2018 in Agogo), by two village chiefs from different villages (interviews on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso and on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso) and by one farmer (interview on 22/06/2018 in Agogo).

8.2 Cattle owners

As demonstrated in chapter 2.3, pastoral activities in the AAND are characterized by diverse ownership arrangements. While some herders were reportedly just taking care of their own cattle, others were rather employees of cattle owners who had given them some cows to rear.

> *"Those people, those herdsmen, a lot of them are caretakers for other people's cattle. It's only few situations where you find that the whole cattle belong to one herdsman. So, in terms of ownership, the traditional rulers, the political class, and the elite in society, a lot of them have their cattle being catered for by herdsmen."* (Interview with researcher at KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie)

Estimations about how many of the Fulani herders in the AAND were hired herders ranged between 70 % and 90 % (interview with one researcher on 13/06/2018 in Teshie, interview with head of district police on 21/06/2018 in Agogo). There were also hybrid forms of herding, where one part of the herd belonged to the herder and another part belonged to one or more cattle owners. Depending on these ownership arrangements, local people talked differently about the herders. Three issues about cattle ownership seemed to stand out regarding the perception of herders: the scale of cattle ownership, whether the owner was Ghanaian or foreign, and whether ownership was open or secretive. The subcategories shown in figure 10 relate to these three issues and also mention the support of cattle owners for herders, which will be discussed at the end of this chapter.


Figure 10: Categories from data analysis for the attribute "Cattle owners". From top to bottom, two subcategories respectively refer to scale of cattle ownership, origin of the owner and whether ownership was disclosed or not. The bottom two categories refer to owner's support for their herders. Source: MAXQDA 12.

Respondents differentiated between small-scale and large-scale ownership of cattle. According to answers from the herders that I interviewed, small-scale owners were mostly local people, sometimes further away in urban centers such as Accra, Kumasi or Nkawkaw, who had bought a few cows as a sort of financial investment and given these to Fulani herders to take care of them (interviews with Fulani herders on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso and on 03/07/2018 in Hamidu). The two cattle owners from Agogo that were part of my research also fitted into this scheme. With formerly 200 and 300 cows in their herds, they can be seen as bigger players in the small-scale sector (interviews with two local cattle owners on 28/06/2018 and on 05/07/2018 in Agogo). Their perception by the local people proved to be similar to those herders who were herding small numbers of cattle (see chapter 8.1). Since they owned only a few cattle, farmers and other locals did seldom see a conflict of interest with them (interview farmer on 25/06/2018 in Bebome, interview with subchief of ATC on 22/06/2018 in Agogo). Large-scale owners, however, were perceived differently. On the one hand, many respondents from the villages, who were actually affected by tensions with herders and cattle, were unaware about the details of ownership arrangements and therefore did not relate their grievances back to the owners. On the other hand, the issue repeatedly came up in expert interviews and in interviews with officials from the district. They were aware that large-scale ownership changed the political economy of the conflict on the ground quite a bit. One issue of large-scale owners having their cattle in the area was that the owners did not take responsibility for any incidents involving their cattle, but instead let the herders on the ground deal with the consequences[28]. This, obviously, increased tensions between local people and herders, because the actors being responsible for the presence of the cattle in the first place did not take any action. Another issue was that of a conflict of interest for the owners: some cattle owners were said to be influential people in Ghana (e.g. politicians) who were at the same time profiting from having their cattle in the areas around Agogo and meanwhile pushing forward measures to drive herders and cattle out, such as the Operation Cowleg (interview with veterinary on 28/06/2018 in Fwidiem and with researcher on 12/06/2018 in Accra). This controversy could not be completely clarified, but suggestions indicated that this scenario was rare (interview with researcher on 13/06/2018 in Teshie). Generally, the effect of small-scale vs large-scale ownership on the perception of the hired herders by local people was similar to the effects induced by small versus large numbers of cattle. People on the ground blamed herders directly, not the owners behind them, and therefore were more concerned about the extent of the threat than who was behind it.

Most responses concerning cattle owners indicated that the majority of them were Ghanaians. Of the two different types indicated above, the small-scale owners were perceived to always be from Ghana[29]. Only of the large-scale owners, some were said to be foreigners (interview with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo, interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem). Here, the veterinary officer indicated an interesting, but probably rare scenario of cattle ownership: wealthy cattle owners from neighboring countries such as Mali,

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[28] Reported by one researcher at the University of Ghana (interview on 12/06/2018), one researcher at KAIPTC (interview on 13/06/2018 in Teshie) and the head of AAND district police (interview on 21/06/2018 in Agogo).

[29] Stated in interviews with veterinary (on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem), with researcher at KAIPTC (on 13/06/2018 in Teshie) and with local cattle owner (on 05/07/2018 in Agogo) Also in email questionnaire with regional chief of Fulani in Ashanti Region (on 02/10/2018).

Burkina Faso or Niger would move into Ghana with their herds. Since the owners would be older men, they would bring along *"errand boys"* (interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem) to take care of the cattle. He was, however, the only respondent who referred to this type of ownership in detail. The vast majority of cows being reared by Fulani herders seemed to belong to Ghanaian nationals. In a couple of interviews, they were referred to as 'big men' or 'important businessmen'[30]. This was also the only type of owners that was reported to be noticed by people on the ground, in the following way:

> *"And the women say that, once in a while, this is a typical rural area with hardly any cement buildings. But you see [a] very beautiful car driving to the bush. Of course. It should tell you that it's a big person going to visit his or her property [the cattle]."* (Interview with researcher on 12/06/2018 in Accra)

Incidents as this one might have slightly changed perceptions of herders by the local people but were probably not occurring too often and did not generally result in a more positive or negative image of herders. Thus, origin or nationality of the cattle owners did only marginally influence how pastoralists were perceived on the ground.

A third issue about ownership occurred around whether the ownership arrangements were open or secretive. As discussed before, most people did either not know such arrangements in detail or did not care about them much. If ownership was publicly known, it was rather mentioned by experts or by the herders themselves[31]. Such examples of disclosed ownership were then related to small-scale, local cattle owners instead of large-scale owners[32]. More respondents maintained that ownership arrangements were undisclosed[33]. In these cases, it remained unclear whether the people did not know, because of a lack of information (or even, interest), or if cattle owners intentionally tried to stay anonymous. Since I was not able to interview such large-scale cattle owners, this remains an interesting point for further research. However, one expert extensively talked about an indirect way of cattle ownership:

> *"The bulk of them belong to businessmen, who are not… have given them to caretakers, and the caretakers have employed attendants. That is the chain, how it works. The typical Fulani owns very few of them. And he earns his wages by taking care of the (...) cattle."* (Interview with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo)

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[30] Interview with researcher at the University of Ghana on 12/06/2018 in Accra, with researcher at KAIPTC on 13/06/2018 in Teshie, with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo and with head of AAND district police on 21/06/2018 in Agogo).

[31] E.g. in interview with researcher at the University of Ghana (on 12/06/2018 in Accra), with researcher at KAIPTC (on 13/06/2018 in Teshie), with two Fulani herders (25/06/2018 in Kowireso) and with one Fulani herder (on 03/07/2018 in Hamidu).

[32] Mostly by Fulani herders (interviews on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso and on 03/07/2018 in Hamidu) and by local cattle owners (interviews on 28/06/2018 and 05/07/2018 in Agogo).

[33] Three farmers (interviews on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso and on 27/06/2018 in Agogo), one district assembly official (interview on 20/06/2018 in Agogo), one village chief (interview oon 26/06/2018 in Afrisere), one representative of the ATC (interview on 27/06/2018 in Agogo) and one representative of the Muslim community of Agogo (interview on 28/06/2018 in Agogo).

This indirect ownership through an additional agent redirecting the cattle to the caretaker on the ground did certainly result in more confusion about ownership arrangements and might have been a way for owners to better hide their involvement in the cattle industry. Unfortunately, this assumption could not be finally verified by the expert, but he also did not reject it (interview with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo).

Compared to the scale of ownership and the origin of the owners, the openness of ownership arrangements did probably have the largest influence on the perception of herders. If the local people knew the person, it meant that they had someone to refer to about issues of crop destruction. Even more so, because the owners that were open about their cattle were also the ones living in proximity to their cattle. If people did not know who owned the cows which destroyed their farms, they might have felt that they were being victimized by a bigger, intangible power.

While the local people did not value cattle ownership as very important for the conflict, it gained much more attention by experts:

> *"(…) what makes one [herder] dangerous and the other not is those who are backing them. Those who have employed them. That's what makes the difference."* (Interview with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo)

The reason for that was that experts had a broader understanding of how cattle owners supported their hired herders. From my data, two forms of support emerged. Financial support was granted to them, not only in monetary form, but also in the form of weapons and ammunition, allegedly (interview with researcher on 13/06/2018 in Teshie, interview with the MP for the AAND on 24/06/2018 in Juansa).

> *"All of a sudden, they started wielding sophisticated arms. AK47s, machine guns, and so on. (…) it was quite serious. It was someone who was financing them."* (Interview with local activist on 27/06/2018 in Agogo)

This form of support was even supposed by some farmers when being questioned about the origin of the herders' weapons (interviews with farmers on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso and in Bebome). Besides the supply of weapons, some owners were also accused of granting their herders legal support. In one way, this legal support could mean that they used their political power to prevent legal actions on the district level against herders and the cattle (interview with researcher on 13/06/2018 in Teshie, interview with veterinary on 28/06/2018 in Fwidiem). This sort of support was discussed in chapter 7.1 already. In another way, legal support could also mean to shield herders from the consequences of expulsion exercises such as the Operation Cowleg (interview with farmer on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso, interview with veterinary on 28/06/2018 in Fwidiem, interview with Fulani herder on 03/07/2018 in Hamidu). For the development of the conflict, these measures of support are of high importance, because they distort power relations on the ground and keep the tensions high. For the understanding of how the herders' identities are seen by locals, however, they are marginal, because these processes are mostly unknown by people in the villages.

8.3   Hired herders

Despite the intangibility of some nomadic herders, quite a few of the respondents seemed to have at least a broad idea about their ownership arrangements. This was less the case with farmers in the villages, who, as discussed in the previous section, had only heard rumors and just in a few cases seen a wealthy cattle owner visit their property in the bush. It was more common for authorities in Agogo, for experts and, obviously, for local cattle owners. Because the estimations about what share of the cattle in Agogo was actually owned not by the herders but by cattle owners were so high (70 % to 90 %), the majority of herders in the district can be regarded as hired herders (interview with one researcher on 13/06/2018 in Teshie, interview with head of district police on 21/06/2018 in Agogo). Direct reports of herders who took care of only their own cattle were few, only one of the herders interviewed maintained that his cattle belonged to his family, another one stated that he had previously owned some himself but had lost them and was now working as a caretaker for a bigger cattle owner (interviews with Fulani herders on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso and on 26/06/2018 in Ananekrom). Other local people estimated the share of self-owned cattle a little bit higher, but still remaining unclear about precise numbers (interviews with local village chiefs on 25/06/2018 in Kowireso and on 26/06/2018 in Afrisere). Few respondents put herders having their own cattle in the same category as large-scale owners (interview with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo, interview with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo). The larger herds in the AAND therefore seemed to be rather reared by hired herders.

Similar to cattle owners, the hired herders tended to be distinguished by the local people on the basis of how many cattle they were herding. This is not surprising, since contact and communication between farmers and herders was very limited and the size of the herd was often the most outstanding characteristic that locals could identify about the herders (interview with farmer on 26/06/2018 in Seribourso, interview with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo). Consequently, if local people differentiated between different types of hired herders, it was between small-scale and large-scale herders. In general, though, whether a herder was hired or not and whether s*he practiced small- or large-scale cattle rearing did not essentially influence how s*he was perceived. As discussed in the previous section, local people tended to relate their complaints directly to the herders, instead of concerning themselves with cattle owners or modes of employment of the herders.

For some local people, however, hired herders presented a business opportunity they could profit from, in form of buying cattle and employing a Fulani to care for it (interview with local activist on 04/07/2018 in Agogo).

> *"So, the indigenous Ghanaians also own cattle. And what did they do? They (…) don't know how to graze cattle, they don't know how to treat, it is the Fulani (…) herdsmen, their specialty is to graze cattle, to rear cattle, to take care of them. And so, the Ghanaians who bought cattle, are now cattle owners, employ the Fulani herdsmen, some of them, to take care of their cattle."* (Interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem)

In such situations, a hired herder might be perceived differently than a 'regular' herder, but mainly due to the economic benefit that s*he represents. Besides that, being employed by a wealthy cattle owner did not strongly influence the perception of a herder by locals.

8.4   Type of cattle

There was one last attribute based on which some local people differentiated between 'good' and 'bad' herders. Rarely mentioned in the existing literature about the case, the nomadic herders coming in from other countries were reported to bring other types of cattle than the common local ones[34]. According to the local veterinary officer, local pastoralists were used to the Endema, a type of West African short-horn cattle. The nomadic herders, instead, brought in other breeds such as the Zebu from Mali and Burkina Faso, or the Sokoto Gudali from Nigeria (interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem). The use of different breeds than the local one had two consequences. Firstly, the cattle brought in by foreign herders was reported to be almost impossible to confine (interview with veterinary on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem). Naturally, this increased grievances for farmers related to crop destruction and other problems with free-ranging cattle. It also impeded attempts to create cattle ranches as a measure to prevent conflict in the future. Secondly, since they were used to the nomadic lifestyles of their herders, the incoming cattle were reported to be able to cover much bigger distances than the cattle to which locals were used to (interview with local activist on 27/06/2018 in Agogo). A consequence might have been increased trouble for farmers due to the higher mobility of this type of cattle, causing more crop destructions. The different types of cattle themselves might not have directly influenced the local people's perception of herders. However, through the characteristics of these breeds, consequences might have appeared that made some herders become 'good' and others 'bad'.

8.5   Importance of the cattle (ownership)

In four sections, I have discussed the different attributes related to cattle that shape the construction of pastoral identities by people from Agogo (see figure 8). The importance of these attributes stood out most prominently when talking to the actors who had directly been affected by the presence of cattle and its implications: farmers losing crops and property. While respondents from official authorities and many experts focused more on the secretive ownership arrangements and the investors who were involved, local people on the ground were primarily concerned with the large amount of cattle in the area. The influence that the type of cattle which a herder was guarding had on how they were perceived by locals was only minimal.

The quantity of cattle was explicitly brought up in interviews with farmers when it came to telling which herders were the 'good' and the 'bad' (see chapter 8.1). For the farmers, large numbers of cattle meant an increased risk of crop destruction. In combination with the lack of control over the cattle of which herders were often accused, such large herds threatened the livelihood of small-scale farmers, of which only few have any measures to improve resilience.

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[34] By one local cattle owner (interview on 28/06/2018 in Agogo), one local activist (interview on 27/06/2018 in Agogo) and the veterinary (interview on 27/06/2018 in Fwidiem).

The increase in the number of cattle was also reported to be one of the main changes in pastoral activities over the last years and, thus, appeared to local people as a main driver for conflict in their area. Therefore, farmers tended to make strong claims about the identity of herders based on the size of their herds and used this attribute as a main tool to construct herders' identities. Their complaints were supported by other groups of local people, such as most representatives of the traditional authorities and many representatives of government authorities.

The farmers' view on ownership arrangements and wealthy cattle owners was, surprisingly, much less emotional. Besides the already mentioned objections based on legal impunity of herders that was traced back to cattle owners, farmers and other respondents in the villages seemed to either not know about who owned the cattle, or they did not care. Who was a good and who a bad herder was for them not influenced by who owned the cattle. Neither did it matter for the perception of herders by people in the villages if they were self-employed or only caretakers (see chapter 8.3). In contrast, experts and representatives of official authorities, as well as some of the traditional authorities, did in fact take into account such ownership arrangements. With their broader perspective on the whole situation, they were more able to see how specific violent clashes could be traced back to the influence of cattle owners (e.g. when a cattle owner forced his or her caretakers to keep the herd close to a settlement for easier accessibility but increasing the risk of crop destruction). Consequently, the influence that cattle ownership and the fact that a herder was 'only' an employee had on the herders' perception among local people was rather small. Only through indirect influence of the owners, for instance by financing herders or supplying them with arms, did ownership play a role in the construction of identities by locals.

8.6   Synthesis

Until now, I have looked at the three aspects that influence how herders are perceived by the local people in Agogo separately. In this section, I want to bring my main statements together and identify primary and secondary attributes that shape pastoral identities. I also want to demonstrate in a more comprehensive manner, how these attributes are evaluated differently by the different sociopolitical groups in Agogo (e.g. farmers, traditional or government authorities, and rural or urban populations). The figure 11 on the next page gives an overview of the primary and secondary attributes and how the above-mentioned groups employed each attribute.

Figure 11: Model visualizing which actors made use of which primary and secondary attributes when constructing Fulani herders' identities. The groups of actors are: farmers, the rural population, traditional authorities, the urban population (of Agogo) and official authorities. Primary attributes are: quantity of cattle, intangibility, land use and crimes. Secondary attributes are: origin, arms, bad character and cattle owners. Dark colored lines indicate high importance of the respective attribute, light colored lines indicate lower importance of the respective attribute. Source: Own model.

Overall, there appear to be four attributes that have a primary importance for constructing the identities of Fulani pastoralists by the local people: quantity of cattle, intangibility and land use of herders, and crimes committed by herders. The origin of the herders, as well as issues about ownership or hired herders, and claims about their violent character in combination with the possession of guns can be seen as attributes of secondary importance in this process. Of the attributes that I observed in my interviews, only ethnicity and specifics about the type of cattle have minor importance for the process of identity construction. The most important of the three aspects I discussed in this thesis that shape the Fulani herders' identities in Agogo (herders' belonging, connotations of nomadism with crime, cattle (ownership)) is therefore the connotation of nomadic pastoralism with crime, combined with the large amount of cattle in the district.

Looking at how different groups employ the above-mentioned attributes when constructing the identities of Fulani herders, the following conclusions can be drawn (see Figure 11). The farmers and the rural population rely strongly on connotations of nomadism with crime (e.g. the attributes crimes, land use, arms), but also complain about the influx of large herds and about certain aspects of the herders' belonging (origin and (bad) character). The urban population of Agogo, mostly in accordance with the government authorities, evaluate connotations of nomadism with crime highly as well (e.g. intangibility and crimes), but also have a broader perspective that takes into account the influence of cattle owners and the quantity of the cattle. Claims by the traditional authorities, coming both from the villages and from Agogo, are clearer confined and relate strongly to the attributes intangibility, origin of the herders and quantity of the cattle. In the next chapter, I will set these findings in the context of recent academic literature and, subsequently, use them to answer my research questions.

9 Conclusion

9.1 The larger picture – scientific context

Before I summarize my main findings and close up with a few concluding remarks, I want to compare my results with recent publications on farmer-herder conflicts and on pastoral identities. In my introduction and the review of the literature I have argued that scholars writing about farmer-herder conflicts treat all herders alike, instead of distinguishing between different types of pastoralists. With my project, I wanted to contribute to closing this gap. Very recent research by Bukari, Sow and Scheffran (2018) makes advances in a similar direction. Relying on fieldwork in two communities in Ghana, of which one was also part of my sampling (the village of Kowireso), they look closer into how farmer-Fulani relations are not only characterized by conflict, but also by peaceful cooperation and co-existence. Their argument is that, while conflict relations tend to be overreported, 'normal' beneficial relations between the two groups are rather overlooked (Bukari, Sow and Scheffran, 2018). Their account of herders having consistently good relations to local farmers contributes to seeing herders in a conflict setting as a diverse group of many actors with different socioeconomic interests and characteristics, similar to what I aim at with my research. Brottem (2016), on the other hand, focuses more on how recurring situations of conflict between farmers and herders can deteriorate relations in the long-term. His findings agree with mine on how bad experiences can influence future perceptions of herders by farmers, and how stereotyping is intensifying this process (see chapter 6.2).

From a different perspective, but also focusing on the West African subregion, Houessou *et al.* (2019) extensively add to the understanding of different types of pastoralists. In their work on herders in Benin, they rely on a number of attributes, of which some are similar to the ones I used in my analysis, to create categories of different kinds of pastoralists (Houessou *et al.*, 2019). From the perspective of the herders, they create categories by making use of attributes like quantity of cattle or land use style (Houessou *et al.*, 2019). Although not originating from a conflict setting, their results agree with mine to a large extent, but have a stronger focus on biological and ecological specifics.

Talking about increasing numbers of cattle infiltrating into rural communities in Ghana as well, Soeters, Weesie and Zoomers (2017) identify this as a main driver for tensions on communal level. Their argument, however, that private sector investment in agriculture brings capital and, through that, more cattle to rural communities, does not look further into how such economic changes influence the perception of Fulani herders. Parallels to the case of Agogo can be identified nonetheless, for example that Agogo profited from private sector investment in agriculture too: two private companies were active in the area at the time of research (see chapter 2.1). How this investment influenced the influx of cattle has to be interrogated separately, though.

My findings on connotations of nomadism with crime in the case of Agogo relate to the work by Olaniyan and Yahaya (2016) in Northern Nigeria. They find that, while cattle rustling among pastoralists and by externals has existed for many years, it has become much more extensive and violent in the 1990s (Olaniyan and Yahaya, 2016). Similar to what my analysis shows, herders are increasingly heavily armed (see chapter 7.2). The frequent occurrence of crimes, including homicide, that I have reported for the case of Agogo sadly fits in this framework (see chapter 7.4). Their work does, however, not explore how increasing violence and armament shape the herders' identities.

Due to the constant changes and challenges to nomadic pastoralists' lifestyles that are reported across the globe, state institutions are increasingly making efforts to regulate and confine such pastoral activities (Ojima and Chuluun, 2008; Robinson, Jamsranjav and Gillin, 2017). In this aspect, my results on how official authorities constructed herders' identities based on the formality of their land use and the scale of their intangibility agree to a certain extent with what Prout Quicke and Green (2018) report from their research in Australia on different mobile cultures and their transformations. The confining measures by the Australian authorities they detect in relation to indigenous hunter-gatherers can be seen as another example of how state authorities attempt to cope with issues of informality and intangibility. Similar tendencies can be identified in the case of Agogo: respondents of official authorities followed up their complaints about informality and intangibility of herders with a claim for more formal ways of organizing pastoral activities, such as confining cattle and herders to ranches (interview with district assembly official on 20/06/2018 in Agogo).

In general, literature on the construction of herders' identities in farmer-herder conflict settings is still scarce. Recent work does, however, advance the topic and my main findings fit nicely into such work on identity and identification of herders.

9.2   Concluding remarks

In this thesis, I have aimed to explore how the political economy of farmer-herder conflicts helps to understand different perceptions of Fulani herders in such settings. I have done so by researching on the case of Agogo, a farming community in the Ashanti Region of Ghana that has experienced ongoing conflicts between sedentary farmers and (nomadic) Fulani herders for over a decade. Building on a dynamic, narrative conception of identity, I have argued that, in contrast to existing literature, the herders in farmer-herder conflicts are not a homogenous group but are instead very diverse and have different characteristics and socioeconomic interests. In this concluding section, I want to put together my main findings and explain, how they contribute to advancing the contemporary research on farmer-herder conflicts. By doing so, I will answer my set of research questions, which I posed in my introduction and literature review. After that, I will outline the potential for further research that I detected during my project, before I wrap up my thesis by presenting why it was successful in achieving its aims.

I have supported my argument that Fulani herders are being perceived diversely by presenting evidence for different attributes based on which local people from Agogo and the neighboring villages construct their identities. The attributes of paramount importance for understanding perceptions of Fulani herders by locals are the quantity of cattle under the herders' control, their intangibility, their modes of land use, and the crimes they committed. Building on this evidence, one of my main outcomes is the realization that connotations of nomadic pastoralism with criminal intentions shape the perception of Fulani herders, not only by local people, but also by experts and policymakers. Such connotations often result in stereotyping and overly simplistic solutions to this complex conflict. The answer to the first of my two subordinate research questions is therefore that local people in Agogo decide whether a herder is 'good' or 'bad' based on different connotations of nomadic pastoralism with crime and the size of their herds.

A second important outcome of my work is that my results show that the perceptions of Fulani herders differ among certain socioeconomic groups. Farmers and, in general, people from the rural areas of the AAND based their perception of herders mainly on the latter's criminal character (crimes and possession of guns) and on the large numbers of cattle. Additionally, I observed that notions of 'othering' played a role too in their perceptions of pastoralists: origin of herders and complaints about bad behavior of 'the outsiders' were brought forth frequently to assess Fulani herders. In the city of Agogo and among traditional and official authorities, the construction of the herders' identities was rather based on their intangibility and modes of land use, indicating that a lack of integration of the (nomadic) pastoralists into the local legal and social framework shaped their identities. This also answers the second subordinate research question, which is concerned with exactly these different perceptions. Overall, the political economy of farmer-herder conflicts helps us to understand the conflict in Agogo, but also many other similar conflicts, in that it opens up the perspective to a better understanding of how relations between herders and local people are shaped by a variety of factors. It consequently enables us to better adapt conflict resolution policies to these subtleties.

My findings contribute to very recent literature on farmer-herder conflicts in West Africa that takes a more holistic perspective when looking at 'the herders' in such settings. Similar to the comprehensive identification of different types of Fulani herders by Houessou *et al.* (2019) in Benin and to the assessment of positive, productive relations between Fulani herders and local farmers by Bukari, Sow and Scheffran (2018) in Ghana, my work advances the current state of the art when it comes to understanding the embeddedness of pastoral groups in the Sahel. Nevertheless, further research is needed to optimize policy approaches such as the Operation Cowleg in Ghana. Criminal aspects of nomadic pastoralism need to be better understood, for example the proliferation of firearms among herders or the intrinsic intangibility that often characterizes nomadic groups. In a changing world, such research will help to embed nomadic pastoral people into the dynamic fabric of social and political communities.

To sum it up, this thesis successfully explored the process of identification of Fulani herders by local people in the case of Agogo, Ghana. It detected important attributes based on which the political economy of a farmer-herder conflict shapes the construction of identities and, therefore, the conflict itself.

10 Bibliography

10.1 Literature

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10.2 Figures

Figure 1, map data: OpenStreetMap (2019), [online]. Available at: www.openstreetmap.org (Accessed 23/01/19)

Figure 1, inset map: Wikimedia (2019) [online]. Available at: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5a/Ghana-map-blank.png (Accessed 23/01/2019).

Figure 7: MAXQDA 12. (2015). Berlin: VERBI GmbH. Own data.

Figure 9: MAXQDA 12. (2015). Berlin: VERBI GmbH. Own data.

Figure 10: MAXQDA 12. (2015). Berlin: VERBI GmbH. Own data.

All photographs were taken by the author.

All models were created by the author with own data.

Appendix

Data overview – Problem-centered interviews

#	Interviewee pseudonym	Personal information	Date	Place
1	Official 1	Official at the Agogo District Assembly	20.06.2018	District Assembly, Agogo, AAND
2	Official 2 and 3	Two officials at the Agogo District Assembly	20.06.2018	District Assembly, Agogo, AAND
3	Police	Head Police Commander of Agogo District Police	21.06.2018	District Police Headquarters, Agogo, AAND
4	Subchief 1	Subchief of the Agogo Traditional Area, Werempem Hene	22.06.2018	Backyard of his house, Agogo, AAND
5	Affected 1	Woman who lost her husband due to alleged shooting by Fulani herders	22.06.2018	Roadside, Agogo, AAND
6	Farmer 1	Farming woman who had lost crops due to cattle invasion	22.06.2018	Roadside, Agogo, AAND
7	Fulani 1	Former public relations officer of Fulani community in Agogo	22.06.2018	Backyard of his house, Agogo, AAND
8	Hon. Andy Appiah Kubi	Current MP for AAND and lawyer	24.06.2018	His house, Juansa, AAND
9	Herder 1	Hired herdsman on the way to his cattle	25.06.2018	Kowireso, AAND, Ashanti Region
10	Village chief 1	Local chief of Kowireso village	25.06.2018	Kowireso, AAND, Ashanti Region
11	Farmer 2	Two farmers from Kowireso, both affected by crop destruction	25.06.2018	Kowireso, AAND, Ashanti Region
12	Farmer 3	Farmer from Kowireso, affected by crop destruction	25.06.2018	Kowireso, AAND, Ashanti Region
13	Herder 2	Hired herdsman in Kowireso, from Benin	25.06.2018	Kowireso, AAND, Ashanti Region
14	Farmer 4	Young farmer from Bebome, affected by crop destruction	25.06.2018	Bebome, AAND, Ashanti Region
15	Farmer 5	Farmer from Bebome, affected by crop destruction	25.06.2018	Bebome, AAND, Ashanti Region
16	Farmer 6	Farm worker, affected by crop destruction	26.06.2018	Afrisere, AAND, Ashanti Region

17	Village chief 2	Local chief of Afrisere village	26.06.2018	Afrisere, AAND, Ashanti Region
18	Farmer 7	Three young farmers/farm workers from Seribourso	26.06.2018	Seribourso, AAND, Ashanti Region
19	Farmer 8	Old farmer from Seribourso	26.06.2018	Seribourso, AAND, Ashanti Region
20	Village committee member	Seribourso village committee member	26.06.2018	Seribourso, AAND, Ashanti Region
21	Herder 3	Young herdsman at Ananekrom market	26.06.2018	Ananekrom, AAND, Ashanti Region
22	Chief farmer	Chief farmer of the district (meaning best annual output in last year)	27.06.2018	Agogo Presbytarian Hospital, AAND
23	Chief 1	Co-chief of Agogo Traditional Area, Krontihene	27.06.2018	Agogo, AAND, Ashanti Region
24	Vet	Veterinary for AAND/Agogo Traditional Area	27.06.2018	Fwidiem, AAND, Ashanti Region
25	Zongohene	Zongohene, chief of the Zongo area in Agogo	28.06.2018	Zongo, Agogo, AAND
26	Cattle owner 1	Cattle owner from Agogo	28.06.2018	Zongo, Agogo, AAND
27	Assemblyman	Former assemblyman of Agogo Traditional Area, met first Fulani herders in 1997	28.06.2018	Agogo, AAND, Ashanti Region
28	Vet	Veterinary for AAND/Agogo Traditional Area	28.06.2018	Fwidiem, AAND, Ashanti Region
29	Herder 4	Herdsman employed by the vet to care for his cattle	03.07.2018	Hamidu, Sekyere Afram Plains District
30	Cattle owner 2	Cattle owner and local politician from Agogo	05.07.2018	Zongo, Agogo, AAND

Data overview – Expert interviews

#	Name	Pseudonym	Position	Date	Place
1	Dr. Mary Setrana	Expert1	Researcher at Uni Ghana (UG)	12.06.2018	UG, Legon, Accra
2	Margaret Adomako	Expert2	Researcher at KAIPTC (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre)	13.06.2018	KAIPTC, Teshie
3	Dr. Festus Aubyn	Expert3	Researcher at KAIPTC (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre)	13.06.2018	KAIPTC, Teshie
4	Hon. Dr. Emmanuel Marfo	Expert4	MP at the national parliament and environmental scientist	14.06.2018	Parliament of Ghana, Accra
5	Kwaku Jo Nti	Expert5	Local activist and farmer from Agogo	27.06.2018	Agogo, AAND
6	Kwaku Jo Nti	Expert5		04.07.2018	Agogo, AAND
7	Samuel Kusi	Expert6	Local activist and member of the Agogo Citizens Overseas Association	12.07.2018	His house, Mallam, Accra

Data overview – Additional data

#	Category	Name (of author)	Personal information or information about content of data	Date	Place
1	Informal talk	Nana Ameyaw Boadi	my host in Accra (Tema), from Ashanti Region	11.06.2018	Tema, Greater Accra Region
2	Informal talk	Evans Antwi & Peter Amoako	informal talk with interpreters before start of fieldwork in Agogo	18.06.2018	Agogo, Ashanti Region
3	Informal talk	Elodie (?)	French woman living in West Africa and Ghana for many years, experience with Fulani	29.06.2018	Lake Bosomtwe, Ashanti Region
4	Informal talk	Roland Attenang, 2 national service assistants to the veterinary officer	informal talk after visit to a Fulani family and their cattle herd	03.07.2018	Agogo, Ashanti Region
5	Informal talk	Christine and Kirk (?)	American couple living in Ghana for 14 years, working with Fulani families	19.07.2018	Damongo, Northern Region
6	Report	Ghana National Association of Cattle Farmers (GNACAF)	Report "A draft proposal for everlasting peaceful co-existence between the herdsmen and the crop farmers in the country"	-	-
7	Blogpost	Dr. Mary Setrana	Interview "Life as an APN Alumnus: An Interview with Dr. Mary Boatemaa Setrana"	-	-
8	Blogpost	Dr. Mary Setrana	Policy forum entry "'No Cattle Would Be Left Out': Farmer-Herder Conflict and the Challenge of Peacebuilding from Below in Ghana"	-	-
9	Email questionnaire	Osman bin Ahmad	Email questionnaire with regional chief of Fulani in Ashanti region, vice president of Fulani community in Ghana	02.10.2018	-

Personal declaration

I hereby declare that the submitted thesis is the result of my own, independent work. All external sources are explicitly acknowledged in the thesis.

Julian Kaiser

Zürich, 30 January 2019