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"Taking place?" Formalization through Community-based Resource Management and Shea Nut Certification in Ghana

GEO 620 Master's Thesis

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Abstract

Natural resource management is in different parts of Ghana not considered as sustainable. The pluralistic setting of resource access and property regimes in Ghana are seen as problematic. Community-based resource management areas (CREMAs) were introduced in Ghana, to remedy this unsatisfactory situation. CREMAs are presented as an integral tool, which fosters nature conservation and economic development. The approach shall empower local people to formally manage their natural resources. CREMAs can thus be seen as a formalization attempt of the state. The presented case study is about Murugu and Kaden, two communities bordering the Mole National Park. Murugu and Kaden feel as "victims" of conservation, because they lost access to land and hunting grounds. Both communities were motivated by the state, the Park and an NGO, to develop a CREMA. The CREMA should bring benefits through sustainable resource management. Murugu was convinced and accepted the CREMA, Kaden remained skeptical and rejected it. Formalization manifests itself in two ways in the study area. Firstly, the CREMA formalizes resource access by legalizing traditional resource regulations. Secondly, shea nut certification formalizes trade of shea nuts in CREMA communities. In the presented case, resource access formalization is a condition for resource trade formalization. Shea certification is used to motivate communities to join the CREMA. Hence, women in Murugu profited, while women from Kaden were excluded from higher benefits. Analyzing narratives of legitimacy and empowerment, helped to understand the conditions, under which formalization "is taking place" or not. It is argued that formalization dynamics are shaped by histories of relations between communities (their traditional authorities) and the state. It is demonstrated that participating or not participating in the CREMA is a trade-off between hopes for development and fear from conservation. The presented case is interesting, as it shows that formalization can be resisted by communities. And that, resisted formalization does not automatically lead to empowerment. People in Kaden were rather left with the feeling of exclusion, from development.

Acknowledgment

Content

1 Introduction

"Natural resources governance and management is formally done by government agencies for and on behalf of the people of Ghana. Governance and management are done through national laws and regulations. Therefore, the local people, who live with or next to the resources, are not directly engaged. Hence, they feel alienated. Consequently, the cooperation by the local people and civil society that is critical to sustainable management of natural resources, is not obtained. This situation, among other factors, has occasioned decline in biodiversity and natural resources in general." (Officer Forestry Commission of Ghana- Wildlife Division, email questionnaire on 12.12.2017)

Local people, that live closest to and from natural resources, have been marginalized in resource management in Ghana (Asare et al. 2013). Through the creation of National Parks, some communities lost access to land and hunting grounds, while others have been evicted. The powerlessness towards state institutions in resource management, left people in the fringing communities in anger and sorrow (Mason & Danso 1995). It is argued that, this non-involvement of local communities in resource management, led to an unsustainable use of resources (see statement above, Blomley 2016: 7). In 1994, the Wildlife Division of Ghana developed community resource management areas (CREMAs) to counteract this unsatisfying situation (Asare et al. 2013: 2). CREMAs are meant to foster rural development and nature conservation (IUCN: 2005 in Acquah et al. 2016: 2), by building on a participatory, decentralized approach (Baruah 2015: 1). But, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is often criticized for fostering existing and new inequalities, instead of empowering people in communities equally (Kellert et al. 2000, Baruah 2015, 2017).

Integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), like the CREMA, have to offer something for everyone (government, communities, park management, NGOs), but risk to be overambitious (Wells et al. 2004). ICDPs are in fact trade-offs between conservation and development, Wells et al. (2004) argue. The conservation aspect of the CREMAs contains the legalization of resource access regulations. It is a common strategy, to fulfill decentralization and sustainable promises of the CREMA (Asare et al. 2013, Blomley 2016). Nevertheless, the inscription of local rules, can also be seen as a formalization attempt of the state, legitimated by presenting current resource management institutions as "weak" and unsustainable (Turner 1999). The development aspect of the CREMA, is aimed to be achieved by increased benefits from natural resources for local people (Blomley 2016). One strategy is to attract tourists; another is to increase profits from the trade with natural resources. The certification of shea nuts is one example, of generating higher benefits from natural resources in CREMAs (Kamstra 2014).

This master's thesis tells the story of Kaden and Murugu, two communities bordering the Mole National Park in Northern Ghana. Kaden, rejected the CREMA concept, while the neighboring community Murugu, accepted it. With support of an NGO, the CREMA concept was introduced and sought to be implemented by both communities. It is not by chance that the communities next to the park were chosen for the CREMAs. As an officer of the Forestry Commission explained that communities next to protected areas often suffer from wildlife

conflicts, which increase tensions between communities and the Park (email questionnaire on 12.12.2017). The aimed, improved relationship between the Park and communities (Agyare et al. 2015) shall also help to prevent illegal exploitation in the conservation areas (cf. Wells et al. 2004). Following Sikor & Lund (2009), it can be argued that, illegal activities in the Park area (like poaching) contest state authority. The state therefore tries to regain power in these peripheral areas through the CREMAs, which can be framed as a frontier of resource formalization (see Peluso & Lund 2011, Rasmussen & Lund 2018). Kaden's case is interesting, as it resisted the formalization attempt of the state. The flipside of the coin is; Kaden was consequently excluded from development projects of the CREMA.

In Murugu and Kaden, like elsewhere in western Africa, women traditionally collect shea nuts, process them into butter and soap, and/or sell them as raw nuts (see Chalfin 2004). The shea trees grow wild and the nuts are an important non-timber forest product (NTFP) for many women and their families (Neumann & Hirsch, 2000; Pouliot, 2012 in Rousseau 2016: 97). The global shea value chain is segmented in two markets: 90 % of the shea export is used as an industrial fat, mainly as cacao butter equivalent, and the other 10% is used as a luxury product in cosmetics (Yinug & Fetzer 2008 in Rousseau 2016: 97, Lovett 2004). The certified market for cosmetics, is a lucrative niche market (Rousseau 2016: 95). Women in Murugu can sell their nuts on this well-paid, organic, niche market, while women from Kaden cannot. The NGO refused to link Kaden with the company that sells organic nuts. In 2017, women in Murugu get 60 % more money for their shea nuts than women in Kaden (data fieldwork 2017). To understand why women in Kaden lose out, it is insightful to look at legitimation struggles between different authorities dealing with natural resource management.

The state and the traditional authorities are different institutions that regulate natural resource management in Northern Ghana. While the central state is responsible for resource management (Adjei et al. 2017: 312), traditional authorities hold the land in trust for the people (Asare et al. 2013, Lund 2006b). Looking at access and property regulations of shea trees, the central state owns the trees, while traditional authorities regulate access to trees. The traditional authorities and the state comprise of different institutions. Different institutions' claims can overlap, regarding natural resource management. The CREMA, as an additional institution dealing with natural resource management, reconfigures these recent regimes of access and property in some ways. It can be argued that the state gains control over the resource management in CREMA-communities, through the formalization of resource access (see Turner 1999). This thesis seeks to understand, why such formalization attempts are welcomed by some communities and refused by others. The main research question, which guides through the thesis is:

Under what conditions does the formalization of access to and trade in natural resources "take place" in communities surrounding the Mole National Park in Ghana?

This thesis uses the conceptual lens of legitimacy and empowerment narratives, to gain insights about formalization dynamics (see Figure 1). It argues that formalization dynamics are shaped by certain histories of relations between communities and government. Figure 1

illustrates how different narratives (of legitimation and empowerment) affect these histories and influence formalization dynamics. Narratives of empowerment suggest that power transfers to the local level, do not necessarily empower the whole community. Other actors, like NGOs can benefit from power transfers too. This thesis contributes to the debate around formalization and resource frontiers. It contrasts scholars, who portray local people rather as victims of formalization (Kelly & Peluso 2015, Putzel et al. 2015); and shows a case of community resistance against formalization moves of the state.

By looking at the shea certification project, this study contributes also to debates about global value chains. The shea value chain, especially the alternative strand of it, ends often on European cosmetic markets. It is important to understand what difference the product choice in Europe (e.g. certified vs. noncertified shea) makes for producers in Ghana. The study does not seek to give general recommendations, on whether certified or non-certified nuts are "better". It rather demonstrates, how certification projects can be politicized instruments of land control.

Figure 1: Thesis content and chapter overview

Figure 1 gives an overview of the structure and the arguments of this thesis. The left side present the communities (with traditional authorities) and right side the state (with NGO, National Park and Company). The circle in the middle reflect the histories of relations between these actors, in which formalization is embedded in. The top and the bottom

rectangle symbolize the narratives of legitimation and empowerment, which are mobilized by different actors to legitimize or delegitimize the formalization.

The thesis is structured in several chapters, as illustrated in Figure 1. After this introduction, Chapter 2 presents the case study area. It gives important background information about the studied communities and the different conservation approaches, which emerged in the area (The National Park and the CREMA with its shea certification project). Chapter 3 explores promises and critiques of certification and CBNRM. It shows that CBNRM can be seen as formalization attempts at the frontier of land control. After the research focus is presented in the end of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 describes the methodical approach, which was applied to answer the research questions. During two months of fieldwork in Ghana, data was gathered mostly through semi-structured interviews. These were conducted with local shea nut collectors, traditional authorities, NGOs, governmental, National Park and certification company representatives.

Chapter 5 looks into access and property relations and how they are shaped by different institutions. That institutional background is crucial to understand the conditions, under which formalization occurs. Chapter 6 discusses different narratives, which are mobilized by different institutions to legitimize or delegitimize the acceptance or rejection of the CREMA. Chapter 7 looks more closely at the strategies used to legitimize or delegitimize the resource and trade formalization (through the CREMA and the shea certification). Chapter 7 ends with a discussion on whether the CREMA is a needed or an abundant institution. In Chapter 8, the question of empowerment through the CREMA, as well as the certification, is revisited. Different narratives and interpretations of empowerment are presented to show the shifting power dynamics in place.

2 The Case– Conservation's Arrival, Revival and Rejection

Fieldwork was conducted in Murugu and Kaden, two communities in the Northern Region of Ghana (Figure 2). The communities are bordering the Mole National Park. The Park and its surroundings represent the largest biologically diverse savannah ecosystem in Ghana (A Rocha Ghana 2007: 8, Robinson & Sasu 2013: 9). Murugu and Kaden are approximately 12 kilometers apart. Murugu is part of the Murugu- Mognori CREMA, which is 237 km² in size, whereas Kaden is not part of the planned Yazori-Kaden CREMA (Asare et al. 2013: 5). Shea nuts are an important livelihood strategy of the women in both Murugu and Kaden. Through one CREMA project, shea was certified in Murugu, but not in Kaden.

Figure 2: Map of Ghana with Mole National Park and Communities. (Source: www.ghanaweb.com, modified by the author)

The Mole area comprises mainly Gonja and Hanga people with some Fulani herders. Gonja people are the dominant ethnical group in the wider area and the land is under Gonja sovereignty (Forestry Commission, 2011). In Murugu and Kaden, however, the majority are Hanga, some are Gonja and there is a small number of Fulani herdsmen (A Rocha Ghana 2007: 8). In Northern Ghana, social organization is mainly, but not only, based on patrilineal relations (Awedoba 2006). The majority of people in Ghana are religious, which is manifested in everyday worship practices. In Murugu and Kaden, the majority are Muslim, some Christian and some Traditionalists. During fieldwork villagers explained that traditional beliefs are often merged with Christian or Muslim believes. Communities in the region of

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Murugu and Kaden, are among the poorest in Ghana (A Rocha Ghana 2007: 12, Shepherd 2016: 26). Due to the hard living conditions, the Northern Region has a low population density (31 people/km^2), compared to the rest of the country (103 people/km^2). Nevertheless, the population density doubled from 17 people/km^2 in 1984 to 35 people/km^2 in 2010 (Ghana Statistical Service 2012: 2).

The landscape has a parkland characteristic, farms scattered with trees and uncultivated common land, the so-called bush. Shifting cultivation[1] is a common land use system in Northern Ghana. This means, the land is mainly divided into three tenure types: bush (or common land), fallow land and farm land. Each of these land types have different access regulations. Compared to other areas in Ghana (and West Africa), land is abundant in the case study area and labor is the restricting factor for intensifying land cultivation (Shepherd 2016: 4). The trend of land scarcity and threatened shifting cultivation (especially through shortened fallow times) (see Poudyal 2009, Rousseau et al. 2016: 9), has not become problematic in the Mole area, according to an NGO officer (skype interview on 03.03.17). Nevertheless, several informants said that the landscape is changing, especially due to intensified logging and charcoal burning in the last years.

The households rely on subsistence agriculture (Shepherd 2016). Furthermore, gathering of shea nuts are important for domestic use of shea butter and soap, as well as for cash income (Shepherd 2016, Poudyal 2009: 2). Women are responsible for the shea collection. Women collect shea nuts from the bush and the farms, bring the nuts back to the compound house, where they dry and parboil them. The raw nuts are either sold or further processed to shea butter and soap, the latter usually for subsistence (A Rocha Ghana 2007: 13). Shea trees typically fruit after 15-20 years, on an annual basis (Lovett & Haq 2000: 274). The yields vary spatially and by year. In Murugu, for example, women were able to collect on average four bags[2] of shea nuts in 2017, whereas the yields in Kaden were very low and the women could, on average, not even fill one bag of shea nuts (Own data, shea sales 2017 Murugu & Kaden). The high variability of shea yields make women vulnerable, because they depend on shea as a livelihood strategy.

In the next section, the history of the Mole National Park and the CREMA are described, which will be important to understand the context of this case study.

2.1   The Mole National Park

The area of the current Mole National Park went through various classifications, from an agricultural area through a Game Clearance Area to a National Park. The British Colonial

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[1] It is defined as "agricultural system in which the fields are cleared (usually by fire) and cultivated for shorter periods than they are fallowed" (Conklin 1957 in Warner 1991: 9).

[2] One bag is approx. 10 kilos, depending on the bag size.

Administration saw the potential of the fertile land in the Mole area and wanted to develop an agricultural area from it. The situation for an agricultural area was not ideal, because of the Tsetse flies. Instead of agricultural, the British then changed the land to a Game Clearance Area in the 1930s. Two strategies to control the Tsetse flies were pursued: eliminating the big game like elephant and buffalo, as well as clearing river forests. Forests were seen as the Tsetse fly's main habitat. The first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, reclassified the Game Clearance Area as a National Park after the independence in 1958. The shift towards nature conservation of the Mole area, stopped the clearing of river forests and the killing of animals. It was 1971, when the park was fully established. Between 1979 and 1985 the park suffered under Ghana's economic decline. Its infrastructure was in a bad condition and poachers were uncontrolled. In the 1990s, Mole National Park was supported by international organizations. Management plans were formulated and the infrastructure improved over the years. (Forestry Commission, 2011, IUCN (n.d.)).

The eviction of communities within the area of the Mole National Park caused mistrust and resentment against governmental institutions until today (Mason & Danso 1995: 1). Evictions can be seen as an instrument of land control, utilized by institutions to control space (Grandia, 2012; Thompson, 1963 in Rasmussen & Lund 2018: 394). Five hundred people from five communities in the southern part of the park were resettled in 1964 (Forestry Commission 2011: 19). When the park was enlarged to 4,663 km^2 1992, the last community of Gbantala was evicted (Forestry Commission 2011: 19). Today 33 communities are fringing the National Park (Forestry Commission 2011, IUCN (n.d.)). The evacuated people lost their power, when they were settled in new communities. The remaining communities, lost farming land and hunting ground, which made them feel restricted in their livelihood activities (Mason & Danso 1995). Participation of the local communities, in the park development, was not common at the time of its establishment. Traditional chiefs were involved to some extent, but the concept of "a park", was easily misunderstood, as an NGO field officer argued:

> *"That were the dark days in the country, nobody actually saw the need to involve communities. Once master says, it is final. So they only talked to a few chiefs and at that time, what was the level of understanding of chiefs?"* (Ex-NGO field officer, Damongo, interview on 18.10.2017).

The time was characterized by a top-down governance approach. People within the communities, did not have much to say. The experience of the Mole National Park, made the relationship between communities and park (and state) tense.

The next section explains, how the CREMA has tried to improve relationships between communities and the park.

2.2   CREMAs at the Fringe of the Mole National Park

As time passed by, integrated conservation and development programs (ICDPs) became popular nature conservation approaches (Acquah et al. 2016: 7, see also 3.1). The Ghanaian Wildlife Division realized that exclusive conservation was not fruitful for their relationship with the communities nor for reaching conservation goals:

> "the 'fences and fines' model of conservation was not only poisoning relations with communities on the fringe of PAs [Protection areas] such as Mole National Park, it was also only partly successful in achieving conservation goals" (Robinson & Sasu 2013: 7).

In 1994, a new Forest and Wildlife Policy was established. This was followed with a new policy on Community and Collaborative Wildlife Management, which contained the CREMA framework in 2000 (ibid.). The Wildlife Division sought to improve the tense relationship between the Mole National Park and the fringing communities with the CREMA approach. The CREMA approach is based on the assumption that "when governments provide the right conditions and incentives, people will manage their resources sustainably" (Collaborative Resource Management Unit 2004: 3 in Robinson & Sasu 2013: 7). CREMAs, as a participative approach, should therefore help to improve the relationship with the park, as well as improve sustainable resource use. CREMAs are often situated at the fringe of protection areas (IUCN (n.d.)), to keep the landscape around and in the park intact.

A CREMA's establishment, is often led by an NGO or the Forestry Commission (FC) of the Wildlife Division. They make the first assessment of an area according to criteria such as land tenure, land use and resources used by the community. Traditional authorities are also integrated in this process. They must agree on their engagement with the CREMA in order for its development to continue. If in agreement, a village meeting is called and the community is informed about the CREMA. An Executive Committee (CEC) is then elected for the entire CREMA area. As well as a Community Resource Management Committee (CRMC) for each village within the CREMA. These committees shall represent different groups within communities (a quota for women is for example defined). Often under the supervision of an NGO, the committee works out the CREMA's strategies and defines the core area. Regulations, so called by-laws, are developed for the CREMA. Some by-laws are valid for the whole community area, while others are only effective for the CREMA core area. The strategy and its by-laws, must be accepted by the state and the traditional authorities. It cannot stand in conflict with any other laws or regulations (Murphree 2000: 25). After the governmental approval, the CREMA is legally in power to manage the natural resources of the community (Asare et al. 2013).

Figure 3: Map of the study area (map provided by A Rocha Ghana)

Both, the Wildlife Division and a local NGO, supported the idea of establishing CREMAs at the fringe of the Mole National Park (Ex-NGO field officer, Damongo, interview on 18.10.2017). The NGO supported and guided its establishment through capacity building and the improvement of livelihood activities. They introduced methods of bee keeping, animal husbandry and marketing of shea nuts. Secondly, the NGO established a local committee, composed of different important stakeholders such as chiefs, elders, responsible women etc. This committee demarcated a core area, under supervision of the NGO (see Figure 3) and developed by-laws for the CREMA. The core area of the Murugu- Mognori CREMA is geographically attached to the Mole National Park. Their aim is to draw animals from the reserve, to the CREMA in the hopes of attracting tourists (Robinson & Sasu 2013: 8). The Murugu- Mognori CREMA's goal is to generate benefits from these tourists (Robinson & Sasu 2013: 8) and to support other livelihood activities such as bee-keeping and shea certification. Traditional authorities are represented, but not part of the CREMA committees. Nevertheless, the CREMA Committee stated, every decision regarding the CREMA, is made in consultation with the traditional authorities (Murugu, interview on 14.09.17).

Conservation is still the underlying approach of the CREMA (like it was for the Mole National Park). Different is that the CREMA communities define resource regulations themselves. This means regulations are not forced by the state. Furthermore, the CREMA has a new focus, to support income generation activities in the CREMA communities. The shea certification project is such an initiative and will be introduced in the next section.

2.3 Certification of Shea Nuts– A CREMA Project

The shea market is structured through three channels in the Mole area: the middlemen, the women traders and the companies (Introduction Trip, communities, field diary, 08.09.2017, (Magazia, Murugu, interview on 13.09.17). The middlemen are usually from larger, nearby towns and regularly come to the communities to buy full bags of raw shea nuts from the women (Scholz 2009). The women traders, are from the communities and buy only small amounts from other women in the community that are in need of money. The women traders accumulate these nuts and sell them to the middlemen or to a company. There are several companies active in the Mole area, some of which focus on organic shea nuts. In the Murugu-Mognori CREMA, the NGO introduced Company 1 to the collector-women. Company 1 bought certified shea nuts from these women and took them to Tamale, where women groups processed the nuts into butter. From Tamale, the shea butter was directly exported to Europe, where it was either, sold raw or refined for use by cosmetic companies (Company 1, Operations manager, Tamale, interview on 24.10.2017). Company 2 is also active in Murugu. This company buys mainly conventional shea nuts; only recently they started to engage in the organic shea business, but not in Murugu or Kaden (Company 2, Field officer, Damongo, interview on 21.10.2017).

A company that buys organic shea nuts, must be certified by an organization, in this case Ecocert (www.ecocert.com). Companies can apply to be certified by Ecocert. Once certified, Ecocert sets the standards for the label and monitors whether the standards are met. The companies then choose the communities or women's groups to work with. The companies are also responsible to inform the women about the standards and to build up a system in which contamination is reduced to a minimum and where single producers can be traceable. One step of the certification project, is the education of the women on the organic standards. This education entails information on the collection areas as well as the processing and storage of the nuts (CREMA Committee, Murugu, interview on 14.09.17, Company 1 2014). The organic collection areas in Murugu are basically the same like for conventional nuts. Exceptions are unhygienic conditions in the settlement area, and nuts from farms treated with chemicals (Company 1 n.d.).

The payment system differs between companies and middlemen. For example, middlemen simply pay the price they negotiate with the women (on the day of the trade). A company will make three different payments for the shea nuts. In the first payment, the company gives the local market price for shea nuts directly to the women on the day of trade. For the Mole area, Company 1 examines the current price paid for shea nuts in the district town (Damongo) (Company 1, Operations manager, Tamale, interview on 24.10.2017). This makes their price, in the remoter village of Murugu, already higher (80-90 GHS (14-16 Euros) per bag in 2017) than the one of the middlemen (50-60 GHS (9-11 Euros) per bag in 2017) (Own data, shea sales 2017 Murugu & Kaden). In the second payment, the company gives a bonus of 20 GHS (3.5 Euros) per bag to the women a few months later. A Company officer stated that this bonus is payed to compensate for their extra effort to produce organic nuts (e.g. for collection in remoter areas) (Company 1, Operations manager, Tamale, interview on 24.10.2017).

Furthermore, organic nuts are better payed on the world market and he sees it as fair to share this profit with the producers (ibid.). With the third payment, the company gives a conservation premium of 5% (ca. 5 GHS (1 Euro) per bag), which is intended to support the partner organization, in this case the CREMA (Company 1, Operations manager, Tamale, interview on 24.10.2017).

Company 2 has a similar pricing system: To determine the price, they examine what the other companies pay then make their price competitive. Company 2 guarantees to give the highest price. Additionally, they give a bonus for conventional and organic nuts, as well as a conservation bonus for being organic. The second conservation bonus is given directly to the women. Company 2 does not work together with CREMAs or NGOs (Company 2, Field officer, Damongo, interview on 21.10.2017). At the time of fieldwork, it was more profitable for women to sell their shea nuts to a company, instead of middlemen (Own data, shea sales 2017 Murugu & Kaden).

After presenting the study area, its people and landscape, different conservation approaches that emerged in the Mole area, were presented. It was discussed, how the Park shaped relations between the state and the communities. And, how the CREMA, tries to "repair" the tense relationship. Lastly, the shea certification as an income generating CREMA-project, was discussed. It was shown that people benefit more from the shea nuts, through that project. Which can be interpreted as an incentive to join the CREMA (see also section 7.1). The next chapter will embed certification and community-based conservation in a broader context. Firstly, current debates in literature about the two approaches will be presented. Secondly, the theoretical lens applied in this thesis is introduced, which will lead to the research questions of this thesis.

3 Certification, Communities and Formalization

3.1 Certification

Certification comes about in various forms. Forest certification, with focus on timber is one of it. It was introduced in the 1990s as a market-based development[3] tool to support sustainable forest management (Meidinger et al., 2003; Rametsteiner and Simula, 2003 in Quaedvlieg et al. 2014: 41, Pokorny 2008: 91). Organic and fair-trade certification are the two main certification schemes. Both challenge the conventional way of production and consumption and try to offer an alternative market idea by working "'in and against the market'" (Raynolds 2000: 297ff). The goal is to provide an alternative to the inequalities caused by globalized production and trade systems, especially for regions in the poorer South (ibid. 298). Organic certification focuses on "re-embedding crop and livestock production in 'natural processes'" (ibid.). While fair trade certification emphasizes on international commodity production and distribution in "equitable social relations" (ibid.). In short, organic certification focuses on environmental issues and fair trade rather on social sustainability.

The certification of Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) was introduced shortly after the forest certification. NTFPs include for example nuts, bark and medicinal herbs (Stanley et al. 2008). The certification of NTFPs promised to bring sustainable development, which led various NGOs and governmental organizations to support this market-based development strategy (Shanley 2008: xxi). Certification can strengthen community forest management and the recognition of small producers (Stanley et al. 2008, Vallejo 2002: 133ff). Compared to timber, NTFPs have high potential, due to the new emerging niche markets (Stanley et al. 2008: 94). The constraints are that NTFPs have altering yields. Also the market's boom and bust characteristics make the demand unpredictable (ibid.).

Certification schemes are based on standards for production, labels for recognition and verification to ensure the standards are maintained. (Klooster 2006: 252, Elgert 2012: 295, Stanley et al. 2008: 7). Standards define what is "ecologically sound, economically feasible and/ or socially just" (Meidinger et al. 2003, Auld et al. 2008 in Quaedvlieg et al. 2014: 44). Labels provide information about the environmental and social conditions, in which the goods were produced and/or traded (Raynolds 2000: 298). As for NTFPs, voluntary, social and environmental standards are most common for certification. In some schemes, costs of the certification are compensated by better market access and/or by a premium. The premium is paid by the company to the producers (Elgert 2012: 295). In some instances, a higher price can be paid to the producers, because the value chain is shortened when middlemen are cut out of it (Amaral and Neto 2005 in Pokorny et al. 2012: 389).

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[3] In market-based development, development is understood as both, improving social/ environmental conditions and expanding the market (Bebbington 2003, 299 in Klooster 2006: 561).

Certification attempts to "kill many birds with one stone". Firstly, forest certification should help the environment: certain standards shall ensure that both cultivation and extraction are sustainable. Secondly, certification tries to internalize environmental costs, meaning that environmental degradations shall be compensated by higher prices (Markopoulus 2002: 105ff). Thirdly, forest certification should help people that are living in and from the forest; making certification a poverty alleviation strategy (Vallejo 2002: 133ff). Fourthly, certification shall support ethical consumption. Either by shortening the value chain or through labeling the products; following the motto to "bring consumers and producers together" (Fridell 2007: 5). For these reasons, certification is highly promoted by many. Nevertheless, there are also critiques and constrains to the framework, which will be discussed in the following section.

3.1.1 Certification's Effects on Power Relations

On a local scale, certification reproduces existing power relations (see Elgert 2012, Pokorny et al. 2012). Pokorny et al. (2012: 398) argues that market-based approaches in the Amazon "(…) tend to create new relations of dependency. Thus reinforcing the traditionally existing, paternalistic structure" (ibid.). Patriarchy often "refers to a system of social relations in which there is gender inequality" (Nash 2009: 102). In this understanding, patriarchy means the subordination of women and the dominance of men[4] (Gregory et al. 2011: 522). Pokorny et al. (2012) use paternalism in a broader way. They refer to certain elites as paternalistic actors. They see such paternalistic power structures as "highly unfair" (Pokorny et al. 2012: 397) and criticize them, for being a threat for the integration of smallholders in the market. They argue that paternalistic structures are reinforced by certification (ibid.).

Connecting international markets and local producers, can result in the (re-) production of dependencies between North/South and also between NGOs and communities. On the one hand, there is a risk that certification is "re-enforcing the traditional subordination of Southern producers to the dictates of Northern consumers" (Cenival, 1998 in Raynolds 2000: 299). These disparities between "poor Southern producers" and "wealthy Northern consumers" are hard to overcome through a "top-down/Northern-driven" approach (Shreck 2002: 21). Klooster (2006: 543) point out that certification initiatives are rather shaped by global elites, than by local small holders. Because local producers find it difficult to access the international markets, NGOs often play a crucial role in the establishment and maintenance the market access (Klooster 2006: 252). Initiatives, with NGOs involved, are often more successful (Pokorny 2008: 93). Since an NGOs influence in certification initiatives is high, it leads to a dependent relationship with communities:

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[4] Paternal patriarch stands for a household structure with the father as a dominant head of the family. Whereas women and other members of the household (e.g. young men) are subordinate (Nash 2009: 102, Gregory et al. 2011: 522).

> "There are some critical studies (…) which document a paternalistic relationship between supporting NGOs and conservation agencies and local communities." (Molnar 2003: 178).

Certification is hence making local communities dependent on the international markets and on NGOs, as gate keepers to it.

The initial objective, to fight inequalities caused by markets, are twisted. Certification can be framed as a non-state, market-based, environmental governance (Cashore et al., 2006; Cashore, 2002; Klooster, 2006; Nepstad et al., 2006a in Elgert 2012: 295). Some question, how alternative the alternative food networks really are (Whatmore et al. 2003) or if they just "legitimate current patterns of consumption" (Klooster 2006: 543). Raynolds (2000) argues that organic production does not challenge the solely price-driven market logic. He further criticizes the omission of social aspects in organic certification (ibid.). Others point out that certification loses its original intention, because big companies come in and "take the niche away from the small farm sector it was thought to protect" (Guthman 1998; D. Goodman 2000, Renard 1999, 2005 in Klooster 2006). This brings up the discussion, of how to upscale certification without marginalizing small producers (see Renard 2005). Some companies also use certification as an image-polisher (Bonanno and Constance 1996, 1996; Lawrence et al., 1998; Murray and Raynolds, 2000 in Klooster 2006). This is critical, because the profits of certification tend to end up in the pockets of cooperation's and not those of the producer's (Buck et al. 1997 in Klooster 2006). Certification is an approach that tried to work "'in and against the market'" (Raynolds 2000: 297), but different dynamics show that this is a difficult aim to meet. The approaches are thus criticized to just "work in the market" without challenging the current market logic.

Coming back to the certification of NTFPs. Unclear access to, and property of, land and NTFPs can lead to unequal empowerment. NTFPs are often collected by people who do not own the land which the resources are grown on (Stanley et al. 2008). Commodifying and certifying NTFPs, can help elites and exclude those, who have weak claims to access land or resources (ibid.). This means empowerment happens only partially trough the certification of NTFPs. One approach to clarify access and property relations, is Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). The emergence of CBNRM and the critiques are discussed in the next chapter.

3.2 Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM)

Since the 1980s, many participatory resource management initiatives have been introduced in different places all over Africa (Nelson 2010, Fabricius et al. 2004). CBNRM is based on the idea that local people best know, how to use local resources sustainably. The approach often seeks to achieve this, by formalizing the local regulations of resource access (Turner 1999). CBNRM is also a response to critics on the exclusionary character of conventional national parks. Conventional parks were following the discourse that nature has to be protected, by separating it from humans. While CBNRM tries to reintegrate humans in nature, still with the goal to foster nature's conservation (Hall et al. 2011). The CBNRM, like other integrated

conservation and development projects (ICDPs), further aims to prevent illegal activities such as poaching and logging within in National Parks (Wells et al. 2004). In addition to the conservational aspect, CBNRM is also presented as tool for local livelihood improvement (see Asare et al 2013). The developmental aspect of CREMAs is often connected with economic development. One strategy is to formalize the trade of natural resources, for example through certification. While CBNRM try to merge development and conservation, the approach has been criticized. It is questioned, in practice, if empowerment and sustainable development can be achieved in the expected ways (e.g. Turner 1999, Ribot et al. 2010, Murphree 2009, Sullivan 2006: 106).

CBNRM are an attempt to decentralize natural resource management (Baruah 2015). Decentralization[5] aims to empower local people. Nevertheless, some argue that CBNRM is a conservation approach of the "neoliberal era" (Sullivan 2006: 106). It is argued that decentralization "is often misleadingly understood and executed as the privatisation and marketisation of government functions" (Bennett 1994; Litvack et al.1998 in Baruah 2017: 371). Firstly, CBNRM fits to the neoliberal "roll-back" of the state (Deininger and Biswanger 1999 in Amanor 2008: 10, Hall et al. 2011: 72). With "roll-back", it is meant, the destruction of institutional forms and regulations (Peck et al. 2009). In this vacuum, private actors, like NGOs come in and take over state responsibilities (Baruah 2017). In such privatization of state responsibilities, NGOs can gain power (Baruah 2017).

Secondly, CBNRM also fits to the "roll-out" strategy of the state; the creation of new modes of institutional regulations (Peck et al. 2009). CBNRM legitimizes the state to influence local resource management and to exclude some people from their desired resource use (Pimbert & Pretty 1995; Brockington 2002; Li 2002; Wilshusen et al. 2003 in Vihemäki 2009: 37). CBNRM is thus still dominated by the "setting aside of land for the purposes of biodiversity conservation" (Sullivan 2006: 106). It is not done by excluding people totally from any land use, but by making regulations that restrict resource use (Hall et al. 2011: 71ff). Ironically, local people themselves are invited to create restrictions, which sometimes excludes themselves from resource use (Hall et al. 2017: 71ff).

Formalized property regulations not necessarily mean improved access to benefit from resources. CBNRM's formalization of traditional rules, shape reconfigured access and exclusion dynamics (Turner 1999). Unclear tenure is seen as an institutional failure of the natural resource management (Ostrom 1990; Simpson and Sullivan 1984; Sinclair and Frywell 1985 in Turner 1999: 643). Formalized tenure is promoted by CBNRM (Murphree 1993 in Thompson & Homewood 2002: 110), as it is based on the notion that clear it results

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[5] "Understanding decentralization as the processes of transferring powers and resources to local authorities representative of and accountable to, and administrators responsive to, their constituents" (Agarwal & Ribot 2000 in deGrassi 2003: 1)

in more sustainable land use[6]. This legalization and institutionalization of customary laws, is criticized for being a mechanism of land control (Peluso & Lund 2011). Although, some community-based projects could help marginalized groups to gain better access to resources (Kellert et al. 2000: 709), other examples show that "overlapping jurisdictions and mandates" (Heinen and Mehta 1999 in Kellert et al. 2000: 710) result in conflicts between different institutions and unequal power distribution. A potential "parallel structure" (Blomley 2016: 16) can emerge through the implementation of a CBNRM, which can lead to competing institutions (Sullivan 2006: 106). To prevent a parallel structure, local authorities are included in CBNRM (Blomley 2016: 15f). The challenge is thus, to include the elite without marginalizing other groups (Kellert et al. 2000: 709, Nelson 2010: 195, Awudi & Davies 2001b in deGrassi 2003: 21, Blomley 2016: 16, Sullivan 2006: 106). Under such diverse institutional arrangements, formalization brings forth winners and losers (cf. Kelly& Peluso 2015), instead of providing local people equal opportunities, to benefit from resources (cf. Turner 1999).

This section showed that the power transfer through CBNRM does not automatically empower communities (equally), but that also other actors, such as NGOs profit from power transfers. Secondly, it was discussed that the formalization of resource access does not automatically lead to fairer resource access. The next section discusses how formalization is closely related to struggles over authority, which in turn is manifested in access and property relations.

3.3 Formalization and Struggles over Legitimacy at Resource Frontiers

Access and property relations are entangled in struggles over authority (Sikor & Lund 2009). Access is defined as, "the ability to derive benefits from things". The concept of access focusses on the "bundle of powers" and less on "bundle of rights", which was often the focus in work on property (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 153f). Hall et al. (2011) criticize the access theory and stress the importance to look at exclusion, as an inevitable part of access (Hall et al. 2011: 4). Hall et al. (2011) conceptualize different powers of exclusion: regulation, force, the market and legitimation (ibid. 4, 15). Legitimation, as the forth power of exclusion, provides the justification for exclusive claims and defines whether, exclusion is seen as acceptable or not (Hall et al. 4f). Property is a legalized form of access and "is only property if socially legitimate institutions sanction it" (Lund, 2002 in Sikor & Lund 2009: 1). Looking at legitimization strategies helps to understand the links between access, property and authority (Sikor & Lund 2009). Legitimation is not only one-dimensional, therefore "it is not useful to see legitimacy as a fixed absolute quality" (Moore 1988 and Lentz 1998 in Lund 2006a: 693). Legitimacy changes in time and place, as it bases on social norms (Lund 2002 in Sikor &

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[6] "Theoretical analyses suggest the conditions necessary for conservation rest on clear ownership, the ability to exclude outsiders and to enforce that exclusion." (Thompson & Homewood 2002: 110)

Lund 2009: 1). Legitimization struggles are shaped by different actors' and institutions' claims over authority and property of resources (Sikor & Lund 2009: 6f). In my thesis, legitimation, is used as a lens, to analyze formalization of resource access and trade.

Formalization serves the state to control resource access and property relations. This indirectly creates conditions for resource commodification (Kelly & Peluso 2015). The formalization of access (and exclusion) to land is "actively created, through struggles involving varied actors, contexts, and dynamics" Peluso & Lund (2011: 668) argue. To reconfigure land control (through formalization) legitimation struggles are inevitable (Lund& Rasmussen 2018). Problems with formalization are encountered, if "multiple systems of ownership of and access to land and resources" exist (Putzel et al. 2015: 465). Peluso & Lund (2011) claim that formalization takes place at frontiers of land control. Frontiers of land control are "sites where authorities, sovereignties, and hegemonies of the recent past have been or are currently being challenged by new enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes" (Peluso & Lund, 2011: 668). This means, diverse actors and dynamics contest current authorities and reconfigure the institutional structure and the ways in which land is accessed and possessed. "A frontier is not a space itself. It is something that happens *in* and *to* space. Frontiers *take* place." (Lund & Rasmussen 2018: 388). The "taking place" (or "not taking place") of the frontier qualifies formalization attempts. Meaning, "taking place" is a crucial element, to understand successes and failures of formalization. It provides insights on the conditions, under which expansion and "push-backs" of frontiers of land control happen.

3.4   Research Focus and Questions

By analyzing formalization of access to and trade in natural resources (Putzel et al. 2015: 475), CBNRM and certification schemes can be both interpreted as formalization attempts (see Turner 1999, Wynberg et al. 2015) in a frontier of resource control. Certification formalizes trade of natural resources, for which clear land and resource tenure is crucial. And CBNRM is an approach, which fosters clear resource tenure, through formalization of access regulations. The question is, under what circumstances formalization "takes place" and to what extend empowerment (through CBNRM and certification) happens. This thesis aims to provide some answers to these questions, by analyzing CBNRM acceptance and rejection with the analytical lens of legitimation- and empowerment- narratives. The case study is interesting, as it analyses two communities in a very similar context, one in which formalization "takes place" and the other in which it does not. The study gives insights in the links between CBNRM and certification and relations between communities and the state.

The following research questions, guide through this thesis:

Under what conditions does the formalization of access to and trade in natural resources "take place" in communities surrounding the Mole National Park in Ghana?

- How do different institutions and organizations manage access to land and trees in the Mole area?

- What narratives are mobilized to legitimize the formalization of access to and trade in natural resources through the CREMA?

- In which ways do strategies and narratives of legitimation affect the formalization of access to and trade in natural resources?

This chapter discussed the debates around certification and CBNRM. Certification is a form of trade formalization. CBNRM is a tool to formalize land and resource access, which is crucial for certification to be effective. It was shown, that theoretical debates on access, exclusion, authority and formalization are closely related to certification and CBNRM, which led to the research focus and questions. In the following chapter, the methodological approaches used, to answer the research questions, are explained.

4 Methodology

4.1 Access to the Field

Before fieldwork, a local NGO gave me precious information about the area and shared insider documents about the CREMAs and the Mole National Park. The NGO was a gate keeper to the communities and organized host families in Damongo and Murugu, where I could stay during my field research. During the two months of fieldwork, I usually went a few days to the communities (Murugu and Kaden) and the rest of the week I spent in Damongo, transcribing interviews and reviewing interview guidelines. I could also take part in some NGO activities, like a capacity building workshop. I was offered to join information tours through the communities about the shea tree nursery and the conservation trust fund. These opportunities helped me gather extra information and make contacts with different stakeholders. Apart from the practical support, the NGO let me "do my own thing". It was on me to decide, when, how often and how long to go to the communities as well as what kind of interviews to do and with whom. In the communities, my main translator, as well as my host father, assisted me in organizing the interviews.

4.1.1 Choice of Communities

This case study is about one community (Murugu) that accepted the CREMA and where women could sell certified shea nuts. It also includes a neighboring community (Kaden) that rejected the CREMA and where women could not sell certified shea nuts. The two communities were interesting to study, as in one, formalization took place and in the other, it did not. The exemplary CREMA and a successful certification project, made Murugu an interesting starting point. It helped me understand how formalization at the example of the CREMA and the certification work together. During the first days in the field, an NGO officer informed me about Kaden's case of the CREMA rejection and consequential exclusion from the certification and other projects (Introduction Trip, communities, field diary, 08.09.2017). This inspired me to include Kaden in my case study. It seemed like a very interesting opportunity to contrast the situation in Murugu.

4.2 Data Collection

This thesis bases on a case study[7]. For the data collection, I chose a qualitative approach, which is understood as a circular process (Flick 2007: 128). The case study sought to understand formalization, by looking at legitimation and empowerment narratives. The

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[7] "Case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods. The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame- an object- within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates" (Thomas 2011: 513)

qualitative approach enabled me to collect different narratives and argumentations of various actors involved.

4.2.1 Semi-structured Individual and Group Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were used as the core data collection method. Chambers writes, semi-structured interviews "can entail having a mental or written checklist, but being open-ended and following up on the unexpected" (1995: 12). I was following this idea of "flexible" interview guides. During the field work, I adapted the guides, added some and erased other questions. I first used a printed version and then worked more and more with hand-written question guides. The guidelines helped me to steer the interview, but also left openness that the interviewees could bring in new aspects and topics (see Flick 2000).

Additionally, I conducted focus group interviews (Flick 1998: 114-126). Focus group interviews are defined as: "A group of people brought together to participate in a group interview concerning an area of interest" (Boddy 2005: 251). Two focus group interviews were held with the women's group from Murugu that sell shea nuts to Company 1. This women's group was formed in conjunction with the certification project. It had already been in existence for a few years, by the time of my field work. In Kaden, I also conducted a group discussion with female shea collectors. I was aware of the risk that group procedures may be dominated by a few, while others are silenced. The attentive observation during the group interview, helped me, to identify such relations. The group interviews also helped me gain access to other women, I did not know before.

4.2.2 Participatory Methods

PLA methods, were also used during fieldwork. I tried to understand the structure and influence of different institutions concerning access to shea trees with the method of Venn Diagrams. The participants of the women's group were asked to draw circles of the different institutions (CREMA, NGO, local authority etc.) and relate these to themselves. The bigger the circle, the more influential the institution was in regards to shea management. The closer the circles were to that of the women's group circle, the easier the institution was for them to access (Chambers 1994: 960, Abedi & Khodamoradi 2011: 153, Thomson & Freudenberger 1997).

The Venn Diagrams did not turn out to be a very useful method. I tested it in the focus group interview in Murugu and Kaden. In Murugu, one women after the other started to draw circles, without discussing and agreeing on one distance and size. I interfered and they started discussing a bit more. Nevertheless, I was able to gather some information on narratives about different institutions. In Kaden, I realized after a while that they were rather mapping the houses of different people (Tindaana, chief, Magazia). It was also different, as there were not as many institutions as in Murugu (no CREMA, no NGO, no company). The language barrier also made it more difficult to moderate this participatory method.

Secondly, I did some participatory mapping exercises during the group interviews. Before my own fieldwork began in Murugu, several participatory mapping exercises had already been

done, by different organization (Man, Murugu, interview on 21.09.2017). Based on a sketched map that presented the organic collection areas, I drew the community boundary, the main road and the location of the meeting on the ground. I then asked the women to draw their fields and to put rocks, to show the amount of shea nuts that they collected (one rock for one bag). Initially, I planned that they put the rocks where they collected the nuts, but that was too complicated. The women put the amount of collected shea bags (in form of rocks) on their farms (on the illustrated in the map). Then, I made three fields, one to represent middlemen, one Company 1 and one domestic use. The women were asked to distribute the rocks (representing shea bags) between these three fields. It was a very interesting exercise and worked (with adapting some steps) quite well.

A transect walk was conducted with my translator and a female shea collector. "Transects are systematic walks taken with farmers or key informants through an area" (Kirsopp-Reed 1994: 9). I asked the woman to show me the collection areas for shea nuts, especially the organic ones. She and the translator could tell me about the practices and struggles they were facing. It was a wise choice to make the transect walk in the beginning of my field work. I got familiar with the area, which helped me for the further field work.

4.2.3 Observations

Observations and experiences were noted in a field diary. These observations were unsystematic and they took place in a natural setting (Flick 2009). This data helped to complement the information I collected through the interviews and participatory methods. Additionally, I made participant observations during meetings, information meetings and workshops. I had the chance to take part in two community information trips. One was about the CREMA trust fund, the other about shea tree nursery/planting. Another event that I participated in was a capacity building workshop from PAMAU[8]. I also took part in a meeting between Company 1 and the women in Murugu. These situations and other informal communications, were helpful embed the insights from my interviews in a broader context. They also helped me develop the interview guides. Furthermore, I participated a meeting of the District Assembly, where they accepted the CREMA by-laws. This meant, I could be part of the formalization process of the Murugu- Mognori CREMA. Engaging with various actors during my field stay informally, helped me to understand different narratives of legitimacy and attitudes towards formalization of resource access and formalization of resource trade.

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[8] The PAMAU (Protected Area Management Advisory Unit) is an additional participatory institution, which is sought to advice the CREMA and mediate potential conflicts within the CREMA but also between communities and the park. Fringing communities, chiefs, the Mole National Park as well as governmental officials are represented in the PAMAU. (PAMAU conflict workshop, Damongo, participant observation, 25.10.2017, Blomley 2016: 12).

4.2.4 Sampling

The first question to look at, when analyzing certification initiatives is, "how they might affect the lives of the world's most marginalized citizens?", argues Evans (2000: 231). In line with that, my research focused on the implementation of certification at the level of production. Focusing on this level of analysis, did not intend to capture the complete story of the value chain. However, to understand the potentials of the organic movements, it seemed to be the most insightful level for analysis (see Shreck 2002: 13).

The sampling strategy is based on Bolwig's et al. (2010) framework for horizontal value chain analysis. Bolwig et al. (2010), suggests an integrated framework, which includes vertical and horizontal elements in the value chain analysis (see also Arora-Jonsson & Elias 2016). The combination of horizontal and vertical elements, enables the researcher to include gender issues that arise through changes in the value chain. I It also gives a better understanding concerning the inclusion and exclusion of people in the value chain (Bolwig et al. 2010: 5). I interviewed chain actors (participating women), external actors (NGO staff, certification companies, National Park executive, researchers), excluded actors (women, who did not want or were not able to participate) and non-participants (husbands of participants). The participants of the certification were my starting point to conduct interviews. The number of participants and non-participants of the certification program were balanced. This sampling strategy worked well in Murugu. In Kaden, I tried to mirror the data. But as Kaden was not part of the CREMA nor of the certification project, I could not follow Bolwig's et al. (2010) framework as I did Murugu. Therefore, I interviewed women (who collected shea nuts) traditional authorities (chief, Tindaana, elder), as well as a few men from the community.

Additional interviews were conducted with shea experts, companies and representatives from park and government. Some expert and key-informant interviews were conducted prior to the field work. I also had email contact with different experts, NGO workers and the certification company. These contacts helped me gain some basic knowledge about shea, the area and the certification project in Ghana. I also interviewed the Field Officers from Company 1 and 2, as well as the Operations Manager from Company 1. Additionally, I also had the opportunity to visit Company 1's production site, in Tamale, where the shea nuts are produced into shea butter. After the field work period and after having some distance from the material, I selected a few people in Ghana (NGO staff, governmental and National Park officials) and asked them to comment on a list of questions via email. For the questions I asked them, I already had first propositions in mind. This helped me to start thinking about my data (what data was I able to collect?) and where I wanted to put my focus (what is most interesting?). It also helped me to triangulate the previously collected data and enabled me to reflect my propositions.

The interactions with NGOs, government and park, gave me valuable insight to complement the data gathered "on the ground" within the communities. I could use these insights to triangulate data and formulate specific questions on certain issues to ask the women in the communities. The interviews further helped me embed the knowledge, which the shea

collectors shared with me, with information about the next step of the value chain. Most of all, during the analysis, I laid the focus on different narratives, for which these interviews were essential. Through them, I came to understand, how the two formalization attempts (CREMA and shea certification) work and what narratives are used to legitimize or delegitimize these.

4.3 Data Processing

4.3.1 Translation and Data Documentation

As most people in the communities only spoke mainly Hanga and only a few words English, I was dependent on translators. The translation was already a first interpretation of the data, as Nchanji & Bellwood-Howard write: "translations and transcriptions inevitably [add] (…) several layers of interpretation to the data, an unavoidable drawback of ethnographic fieldwork" (2016: 45). I had several translators, which made the experience challenging. The first and main translator sometimes added explanations to the answers of the interviewed person. We discussed this issue and I asked him to only translate what was being said. Conducting an interview with him personally, proved helpful. It gave him the opportunity to explain his take on the situation. After some time in the field, I also understood things better and could estimate what the interviewed person said and what he added. On the flip side, interviewees sometimes spoke metaphorically, making a literal translation difficult to understand. In this situation, the first translator was very helpful, as he gave the extra information needed. These were not the only obstacles. Linguistics were sometimes a challenge with other translators.

Each interview was recorded and later transcribed. Most of the transcription was done word by word, though, at times it was smoothed and small adjustments were made for better readability. Nevertheless, it was ensured that no information was lost and the content of the interviews was represented in the transcripts.

4.3.2 Data Analysis

Playing with the data is a good start for the data analysis (Miles & Huberman 1994 in Yin 2003: 111). This step helps, if an analytic strategy is absent or still vague (ibid. 138). Data can be arranged in different ways, to help achieve an overview and better idea of what might be most interesting to focus on. First, I summarized all gathered interviews in an table, to get an overview over the data (see Appendix). Secondly, I tried to break down the case, by making up small parables (see Chapter 6 and 0). By portraying different actors, insights about representations of different actors, as well as paradox in the cases, could be identified in a playful way. Developing this little story during data analysis, helped me to understand the effects of resource access and trade formalization that were either "taking place" or "not taking place".

Using Propositions as Analysis Strategy

An analytical strategy is important for data analysis (Yin 2003). The strategy I applied in this thesis is based on theoretical propositions (ibid.). Yin (ibid.) argues that these propositions

are the reason for what was studied. They shape the research design, questions and the review of literature. They can also be helpful to analyze the data. By starting the data analysis, propositions can be a guidance to focus on some data, while ignoring others. From initial propositions, new and more grounded propositions can be developed (ibid.). For analyzing the data, I chose a mixed approach. First of all, explanation building (ibid. 120ff) seemed a convincing method for my case study, as it is an iterative process. The initial propositions are revised many times. The explanation building method, does not take propositions as given but reflects them repeatedly. The explanation building step by step:

- "Making an initial 'theoretical statement or an initial proposition about policy or social behavior

- Comparing the findings of an initial case against such a statement or proposition

- Revising the statement or proposition

- Comparing other details of the case against the revision

- Comparing the revision to the facts of a second, third, or more cases

- Repeating this process as many times as is needed"

(Yin 2003: 121f)

The approach by Yin (2003) was suitable for my case. I was deeply engaged with literature and unpublished documents, concerning the CREMA and shea certification, before the fieldwork began. Some propositions were developed before my trip to Ghana. Making these propositions explicit, helped me to frame the research. During and after the field work, I revised and extended these propositions. I began to formulate more developed arguments. These were again inspired by new literature or by my own first "intuitive" interpretation. Yin's approach helped me reflect over and over on the ideas I had. It helped me not to stick to first assumptions, but to be open for new ideas and interpretations. This open approach enabled me to adjust the focus of analysis.

Coding

For the coding, I chose a combination from deductive and inductive codes. In the first step, I focused on the descriptive level and tried to find out "what is my case?" (see Lund 2014). From these initial thoughts, I decided to make four main categories: 1) CREMA, 2) Certification, 3) Institutions/Organization and 4) Shea Market and Management. Some of the codes (that branch off the categories) were defined before, many also during, the coding procedure. For the coding, the software MAXQDA was used. This software helped me achieve an overview of all of the material. Through coding the interviews and documents, I was efficient in finding interview passages, from diverse interviews, on different topics. Using this software, an overview of all codes was established (see Figure 4). I added conceptual terms to this code-map, like market, regulation and legitimation (Hall et al. 2011) as well as institutionalization/legalization and territorialization (Peluso & Lund 2011). The coding helped me to develop my analytical frame, by connecting to the gathered data. It was through the coding that legitimacy, which helped me to see formalization dynamics.

Figure 4: Coding Map

Data Analysis and Interpretation–Doing Discourse Analysis

Lund (2014) provides in his article "Of what is this a case?" a tool on how to analyze data. Starting with the obvious observations (specific, concrete) (see Table 1), Lund suggests to look for resonance, not only from similar, but also from different cases, from which some elements might echo with own data. In a second step, the observations are empirically generalized. Triangulation helps to find patterns (concrete, general) and gain a feeling of what is typical and what is rare. As a basis for the triangulation, other cases help to see what can be expected. Abstraction is the third step, Lund (ibid.) describes. For the abstraction, concepts are used to "'see something as something else'" (Danermark et al. 2002: 93 in Lund 2014: 228). The "something" refers to the obvious case, the "something else" to the conceptualization of the material. As concepts are often too complex to directly bridge with the empirical data, Lund (ibid.) suggests to break the concepts down (e.g. the concept of property appears in land sales, taxation etc.). The fourth "analytical movement" entails theorizing. This step brings abstraction and generalization together to embed the case in (or generate theory of) the case. In other words: What does the case tell us outside of its context.

	Concrete (real, in-context)	Abstract (ideal, conceptual, theoretical)
Specific (special, unique,	Observations	Concepts

25

	Concrete (real, in-context)	Abstract (ideal, conceptual, theoretical)
limited, particular)		
General (universal, common, widespread)	Patterns	Theories

Table 1: "Of what is this a case?", adapted from Lund (2014)

	Concrete (real, in-context)	Abstract (ideal, conceptual, theoretical)
Specific (special, unique, limited, particular)	Shea nut certification Community-based resource management Conservation Logging Poaching	Access theory (Ribot & Peluso 2003) Powers of exclusion (Hall et al. 2011) New frontier of land control (Peluso & Lund 2011) Frontiers of commodification: State lands and their formalization (Kelly & Peluso 2015) Reconfiguring Frontier Spaces (Rasmussen & Lund 2018)
General (universal, common, widespread)	Narratives of legitimacy Legitimation strategies Narratives of empowerment	Formalization of access to and trade in resources

Table 2: Case study master's thesis, adapted from Lund (2014)

For analysis, conceptual frameworks served as guidelines (see Table 2). The concepts helped me to think about the lines along which access and exclusion can be characterized. Through combining these concepts with the initial codes and categories, as well as with the propositions, I was able to identify patterns (see Table 2). This procedure helped me to see, what makes the case special and what the case can contribute in a broader sense.

During the data analysis, it became clear that many processes are explained differently by different actors. It was exemplary for the notion that there is not only one "true" story, but several narratives are used to explain the same event (see Berg 2000). These narratives are not universally "true", but make sense from the narrator's viewpoint. The "real" extend of empowerment and legitimation, for example, is difficult to measure in interviews. As interviews are just an interpretation of the "reality". Like Berg (2000: 216) explains: "language does not mirror some preexisting reality, but instead language constitutes the conditions under which we 'know' reality". Discourses can affect, how the phenomena are interpreted. Such discourses and narrations are powerful and can, from a Foucauldian

perspective be seen as "a set of unspoken rules which govern, control, and produce knowledge in a culture." (Berg 2009: 216). Discourses become productive on their own (ibid.). For example, the underlying conservation/development discourse creates believes that the CREMA is urgently needed to manage resources "sustainably". Based on which the CREMA is being established. The collected data of this thesis, contained different narratives, which made the method of discourse analysis very useful. During the analysis, I looked for "patterns of truth" (Berg 2009: 219) in the data, to find common and distinct discourses about certain topics (for example for explanations for CREMA's rejection in Kaden). Analyzing different narratives, gave me a more holistic understanding, of the reasons behind certain decisions.

4.4 Reflections

4.4.1 Positionality

Before the fieldwork, I expected the entrance to the communities, through the NGO, to be a challenge for my positionality. During the field work, I did not perceive it as a problem, but rather as an advantage. In Murugu, the NGO had a good reputation. Thanks to my connection with the NGO, I had the feeling that people were open and trusted me. Nevertheless, the interviewed were critical and stated their opinion.

My positionality was additionally shaped by the translator in the field. The first translator in Murugu was native and a CREMA committee member. He had a great knowledge about the community, its practices and knew the people personally. He was helpful and I gained a lot of information through him, in the beginning. I remained vigilant, as he also had a normative viewpoint concerning the CREMA and the certification project. During and after interviews, as well as during transcription and analyzing, I kept my ears open for possible additional comments from his side. My strategies to remedy this problem were: First, to clearly communicate my expectations to him. Secondly, to give him a voice by conducting an interview with him. Afterwards, the quality of the translation improved. Additionally, I worked with two young translators, who assisted me in Kaden and in Murugu. They did not know much about the CREMA nor the certification project, which helped to keep the translation more neutral. It was interesting to see the different personalities of the translators. I felt that some women were more open to speak in front of young men, than in front of the older, male translator. Unfortunately, there was no woman who was available for translation to Hanga. I believe that women would have been even more open towards another woman. Nevertheless, to interview traditional authorities, it seemed more accurate to be assisted by a man.

4.4.2 Limitations

Focusing merely on women in the sampling, left out some groups of people. Retrospectively, it would have been interesting to include the youth and teenagers in the sampling. This would have enabled me to investigate more in the generational aspect of different narratives about CREMA's legitimacy. I conducted some interviews with younger men and women. These turned out to be especially interesting when talking about the changing roles of the chiefs and

the power structures within the communities, also when discussing the expectations and reservations about the CREMA.

The translation is to be mentioned once more: Not understanding the local language made me dependent on the translation. As stated above, a translator comes with his/her own positionality, which shapes, what people say and what they might not say. Sometimes I did not know what the interviewee said and what the translator added, which made me insecure. Nevertheless, the interviewees were generally very open and I felt they trusted me. There were just some encounters in Kaden, where I met skeptical people. Some were not open to speak about the CREMA and pretended to know nothing about it. This reaction was interesting, as it showed their opposition against the CREMA.

5 Access to Land and Trees –the State, Chiefs and Men

Diverse institutions are in place to manage natural resources in Northern Ghana. As Lund (2006a: 686) state: "In Africa there is no shortage of institutions.". Multifaceted regulations on access to land and trees, as well as the overlapping roles of institutions are explored in this chapters. When looking at formalization, it is important to take current and recent systems of access regulations into account: "Formalization of land and natural resources ownership, access and trade is influenced by national histories of use, title, and control." (Putzel et al. 2015: 458). The chapter firstly explains ways in which traditional and governmental authorities shape and compete over access to land and trees. And shows secondly, how gender roles and regulations are entangled in resource use and further diversify resource access.

5.1 The State and Natural Resource Management

Historically, the governmental structure in Ghana went through three stages: Before colonial era (A in Figure 5), the chiefs (in their hierarchical order) held the power. During the colonial era (B in Figure 5) the British colonial governance system built on the traditional system. Though, only chiefs obedient to British rulers were let in power, whereas disobedient chiefs were disempowered. After independence (C in Figure 5), the Ghanaian governance structure was built up, based on a Western model. In 1992, the Ghanaian Constitution included the strategy to empower the local governments (deGrassi 2003: 1). Regional Coordinate Councils and District Assemblies were established (see C in Figure 5). With this, Ghana followed the general decentralization trend in Africa (Fabricius et al. 2004: 10).


Figure 5: "Changing trend of representation of traditional authorities (Chiefs) in Ghana's local government structure." (Adjei et al. 2017: 307)

Chieftaincies are recognized in the Ghanaian constitution[9], but Adjei et al. (2017) argue that the chiefs can only marginally influence the state. The Ghanaian state owns all trees and other natural resource, which restricts CREMA's power in resource management. Since the colonial era, the central state has been responsible for the natural resource management (Adjei et al. 2017: 312). The centralization of the resource management, disempowered the traditional authorities so that they "only enjoyed statutory recognition as ceremonial authorities (…) and became purely symbolic", Adjei et al. (2017: 313) argue. Natural resources, such as timber, are under public property, owned by the state:

> "The Concessions Act, (Act 124, 1962) vests timber resources and naturally occurring timber trees in the President of the Republic of Ghana on behalf of the People of Ghana" (Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, 2016: 30).

This means, the power of the CREMA is restricted. The state could still give logging permits for the CREMAs, even though the CREMA would not allow logging. The weak legal backing, is criticized in reports and news-articles (Ghana REDD+ Strategy 2016: 58, Hinneh 2017: 7). Looking at the actual access to tree resources, the state plays a minor role:

> "Ownership rights to naturally occurring economic timber trees in off-reserve forests rests with the government, but access to other forest and tree resources depends on the prevailing landownership and inheritance system.". Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (2016: 37)

Although trees belong to the state, access to tree resources like shea nuts, is not regulated by the state. Such traditional systems of land and tree access, the reports refer to, are discussed in the following.

5.2 Traditional Authorities and Natural Resource Management

Chieftaincy is a key institution regarding natural resources management in Ghana. 80% of the land is owned by customary authorities (Ministry of Justice, 2000; cited in Adiaba, 2006 in Kuusaana et al. 2013: 64). The chief system is hierarchical and reaches from king to paramount chief, over different levels to the village chiefs and his elders (or sub-chiefs) (Poudyal 2009: 45, see Figure 6). Chiefs are responsible for settling all kinds of disputes in the communities, including conflicts regarding natural resources (Leach et al. 1999: 273, Murphree 2000: 26). Conflicts, which cannot be solved on community level, are brought further up to the next chief level. The traditional, mediating way of conflict resolution, is important until today (Kasangbata 2006 in Adjei et al. 2017: 314). The traditional governance system is seen as "easily accessible, cheap, fast and understandable to many local people" (Sharma 2006; Booth and Cammack 2013 in Adjei et al. 2017: 314). Furthermore, it is considered as a sustainable way of resource management, not least because of its integration

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[9] "Article 270 (1) of the constitution of Ghana, indicates that, 'the institution of chieftaincy, together with its traditional councils as established by customary law and usage, is hereby guaranteed." (Adjei et al. 2017)

in the everyday and the cultural norms and traditions that back up the system (Alhassan 2006 in Adjei et al. 2017: 314).


Figure 6: Governmental and Traditional Institutional Structure Murugu (blue triangle) and Kaden (grey triangle)

Murugu and Kaden belong to different governmental and traditional territories (see Figure 6). Administratively, Murugu belongs to West Gonja, while Kaden is part of North Gonja. Traditionally, Murugu and Kaden are both under the Gonja King (Yagbon-wura), but under two different divisional chiefs. Kaden is under the Wasipe-wura and Murugu under the Busunura (A Rocha Ghana 2007: 8). The sub-chiefs are situated in the communities, the paramount chiefs in Damongo, respectivly in Daboya, where the District Assemblies are located (see Figure 6). Many chiefs are under one paramount chief; the Wasipe-wura for example rules over 80 chiefs (North Gonja District Assembly, Medium Term Development Plan 2014-2017). How these overlapping traditional and governmental institutions manage natural resources, are discussed in this chapter.

5.2.1 Struggles Over Land: Different Traditional Authorities

Traditional authorities in Ghana are not a single, homogenous institution. They consist of different authorities, such as the Tindaana (the earth priest), the chief and the Magazia (the women leader). The Magazia is the female leader in the community (Apunsigah 2008: 54, Husseini et al. 2016: 251 f). Her role is to inform women, conduct women's meetings and participate in political decision making (Rosset 2009: 24). She does not control any rights over land or other resources (Apusigah 2008: 54). The roles of the Tindaana are to distribute land, mediate land disputes, sacrifice land and other resources (Ministry of Lands & Natural Resources 2016: 101, Awedoba 2006, Amanor 2008). The chiefs are the head of the community and hold the land in trust of the people (A Rocha Ghana 2007, Poudyal 2011: 1068). Customary regulations as well as the duties of the Tindaana and the chief, vary across

scales, from kingdoms to community level (Knox 1998: 69; Kasanga 2002: 26 in Rosset 2009: 40).

The Tindaana is from the lineage of the first settler of the community (Kuba and Lentz 2006 in Côte 2015: 19, Amanor & Ubink 2008:22) and the chiefs are often from the families that colonized the community (Kuba and Lentz 2006 in Côte 2015: 19). The Magazia is not from a specific linage (Awedoba 2006: 2). Chiefs are sometimes seen by some community members as recent and not as real, traditional power (Bamler 2015: 175, Awedoba 2006: 2). In many instances, the Tindaanas and the chiefs work together (Awedoba 2006: 2). Nevertheless, overlapping duties can also cause conflicts (Lund 2006b, Awedoba 2010: 267).

Questions about authority over land caused struggles between different traditional authorities in some areas of Northern Ghana (Lund 2014). In the Northern part of the country Chiefs historically played a minor role, compared to the Tindaanas (Lund 2014: 225). Before the colonial era, traditional authorities held the authority over land (Berry 2009: 30). Between 1927 and 1979, land was mostly under private ownership based on the "Land and Native Rights Ordinance" from 1927 (Lund 2009: 127). Since the new Constitution in 1979, the land has been given back to traditional authorities, which triggered struggles over land authority (Lund 2006b). Conflicts came up, as not only chiefs but also Tindaanas claimed to be traditional owners of the land (Lund 2006b). The Tindaanas, who felt left out during colonial period (Amanor & Ubink 2008: 22), took the opportunity to reclaim their authority over land (Lund 2006b). This shows that although, land property relations are considered as clear and not overlapping in Ghana (Tomomatsu 2014: 158), disputes over land happen, due to overlapping traditional institutions (Lund 2006b, Amanor 2008: 56).

During field work, a conflict about land authority of the CREMA core area occurred in Murugu. The chief and the Tindaana from Murugu, as well as the Busunura chief (see Figure 6), agreed to the CREMA and granted land to CREMA for the core area. In 2017, another clan claimed authority over that land, as the CREMA chairman from Murugu explained (informal conversation on 27.10.2017). During an NGO workshop, a youth leader from Murugu and an officer of the Mole National Park confirmed the tense situation (PAMAU conflict workshop, Damongo, participant observation, 25.10.2017). As the conflict came up at the end of the fieldwork, it could not be investigated. Thus, the fact that there was a conflict shows that disputes over land are likely to happen due to unclear authority over the land. The next section links access to land with access to trees, and explores how access diverges along different lines.

5.2.2 Access to Trees

The owner of the trees may differ from the owner of the land on which the trees grow (Berry 1988: 3). This means, access and property of land and trees in the same area can be granted to different people or institutions (Fortmann 1985, Boffa 1999 in Poudyal 2011: 1064). Rousseau et al. (2016: 125) listed the three main characteristics of tree tenure: "(i) tree tenures are distinct but entangled; (ii) rights to trees are multiple and overlapping; (iii) tree tenure is flexible and dynamic" (Berry, Fortmann and Rocheleau in Rousseau et al. 2016:

125). Looking at the example of Northern Ghana, the trees are officially owned by the central state. One exception concerns planted trees. Planted trees must be registered with the state to become privately owned. In practice, the registration is often lacking (see Nyame et al. 2012, Baruah et al. 2016: 39). Even if the registration is missing, land "owners" access shea trees on their land exclusively (NGO officer, skype interview on 03.03.17). However, a land borrower and/or tenants often have exclusive access to tree resources. For example, they may only be allowed to collect nuts for domestic use, but not for commercial use (Fortmann 1985 in Poudyal 2009: 26).

Regulations to tree access vary between tree species, space and different groups of people. The tree tenure can be differentiated in: "(i) the right to own or inherit; (ii) the right to plant; (iii) the right to use; and (iv) the right of disposal" (Fortmann 1985 in Poudyal 2009: 25). Looking at the right to use or to access trees, the regulations are diverse. Planted trees are usually seen as the property of the planter, because they have commercial value, while wild trees (such as shea trees) are considered as common property (ibid.). Wild trees also have facetted access regulations: while shea trees on private land are fully accessible by land owners, *Parkia clappertoniana* (Dawadawa)[10] trees belong to the (tree-) chief and cannot be accessed by land owners (Poudyal 2011, Tomomatsu 2014: 162). Spatial diversification of access regulations even account for the same tree species (Elias & Carney 2007). Late-comers have generally weaker claims and restricted access to shea trees compared to autochthonous people (Rousseau et al. 2016, Poudyal 2009). There are also time variations within the day; lineage women might collect earlier, while other women are only allowed to collect the "leftovers" later in the day (Tomomatsu, pers. Comm. Poudyal 2001 in Boffa 2015: 16). Tree tenure is manifold and traditional regulations play an important role in legitimizing, who actually benefits from the tree resources.

In Murugu and Kaden, village women have different access to shea trees then the Fulani[11] women. For village women, nuts in the bush were fully accessible, nuts from the farm and fallow land were exclusively accessible for the farmer's family (unless the plot had been fallow for a long time). Fulani herders, who settled at the fringe of the communities, could not collect shea nuts in the bush. Fulani women could access shea nuts on their farm land, but not exclusively. On Fulani's farm land, village woman and children collected nuts too. The Fulani were not happy about these regulations, but did not have the power to contest them: "*Because we are strangers, when the people from the community come in and do the picking, we have no say and we allow them to do the picking."* (Fulani 1, Murugu, interview on 22.09.2017). In Murugu and Kaden, access to shea trees varies for different ethnical groups.

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[10] Dawadawa is a NTFP, which is used as a condiment in many Ghanaian households (Poudyal 2009: 76).

[11] Fulani are cattle herders, who are traditionally nomadic. Some Fulani families settle near communities and take care of the cattle that are owned by people in the community.

Different studies found similar, ethically differentiated access regulations, in Burkina Faso (Rousseau 2016) and other places in Ghana (Poudyal 2009).

In Murugu and Kaden, the Tindaanas were responsible for conducting rituals related to shea production and gathering. A woman from Kaden described the process: each year before the shea collection, the Magazia collects some nuts and produces shea butter from it. The Tindaana uses the shea butter for his sacrifices to officially open the collection time (Murugu, interview on 12. 09. 17). No one is allowed to pick shea nuts before this ritual is carried out. The ritual regulates the harvest and shall protect women from risks during shea collection, (like scorpion or snake bites). It is believed that if women pick before the official collection time, they are not protected, as this statement shows: *"if that sacrifice is not done, before they go in to pick, they get snake bites."* (Tindaana, Murugu, interview on 14.09.17). In Kaden, women give the Tindaana and the chief some shea nuts after the shea season has ended. In Murugu, this is no longer a common practice (Organic shea collector 4, female, Murugu, interview on 21.09.2017).

This section showed, how facetted the access to trees is. The next section will focus on gender as another dimension that shapes access to land and trees.

5.2.3 Gendered Access to Land, Trees and Nuts

Gender relations are seen as a key factor, shaping unequal resource access (Tomomatsu 2014, Elias & Carney 2007, Apusigah 2008, Nchanji & Bellwood-Howard 2016, Rousseau 2016). Women do not have the same rights to own land as men (Kuusaana et al. 2013). A practice deriving from the patriarch tradition in Ghana, according to which women are seen as men's property and can therefore not own resources themselves (Kuusaana et al. 2013). If women do not respect their gender roles, they might be regarded as "witches", which can be punished through social isolation (Nchanji & Bellwood-Howard 2016: 49). But as women are responsible for shea and other NTFPs (e.g. Dawadawa), they strongly rely on access to trees.

Women have different strategies to negotiate access to land and trees. These strategies are often based on good relationships with men (see also Poudyal 2009: 26, Nchanji & Bellwood-Howard 2016: 42). Gausset et al. (2005) mentions other strategies such as creating women groups or planting trees and claiming ownership over them. Especially in the time of "mainstreaming gender" and "women empowerment" in development (see Cornwall & Whitehead 2007), men profit from women groups, as they attract NGOs and development projects (Gausset et al. 2005). Men sometimes make use of less intense conflicts, concerning access to shea trees, as a strategy to claim access to land (Rousseau et al. 2016: 17). Conflicts between women and men can arise, because they sometimes have a different understanding of tenure: Gausset et al. (2005) documented in their case that women see trees in the fallow as wild (meaning everyone can pick the nuts), while men complain that women steal nuts from "their" trees. In practice, some women also hold land, especially if widowed, divorced or unmarried (Becher 1996 in Amanor 2008: 117). Women are not treated equally regarding access to land and trees, but they have certain strategies to overcome the unequal property

regulations. The next section discusses how the access to land and trees is affected by the commodification of land, shea trees and nuts.

Gender Roles and the Commodification of Land, Trees and Nuts

Problems with unclear tenure especially occur, if the demand on land or natural resources increases and the resources on it gain value or get scarce (see Rousseau 2016, Hall et al. 2011). Common land, which is open to everyone for shea collection, is shrinking through the formalization of land (and trees) in neighboring Burkina Faso (Rousseau 2016: 134f). The enclosure of such common land, is often a result of land scarcity (ibid.). There, privatization of shea trees is seen as a problem, because some women lose access to trees (ibid. 125 ff.). Migrants and new- comers have weaker claims and are disadvantaged in accessing shea trees, when land or trees are commodified (ibid., Arora-Jonsson & Elias 2016: 9).

With the spreading shea commodification, the shea-profit capture of men is an emerging issue. Elias & Carney (2007) compare the shea case to the palm oil case in Nigeria, where women had been making and used palm oil for centuries. When palm oil commodification began, men became interested in palm oil. While women having the knowhow, worked on the palm oil plantations, it was the men that captured the profit (Martin 1984 in Elias & Carney 2007: 53). Elias & Carney (2007: 53) conclude with the question: "Will shea replicate the history of palm oil (…)?". Different cases show that men are increasingly getting involved in the traditionally women-based shea collection and trade (Rousseau 2016, Chalfin 2004, Arora-Jonsson & Elias 2016: 10). Women can only reach trees within walking distance, while some men are able to collect shea further away from the villages, if they use bicycles and motorbikes (Arora-Jonsson & Elias 2016: 10).

In Murugu and Kaden, shea collection is generally regarded as women's business. Nevertheless, in Murugu some men started to get active in shea collection too. In Kaden, none of the interviewees said that men are engaged in shea collection. The Magazia for example expressed: *"shea is about women's matter"* (Magazia, Kaden, interview on 05.10.2017). But in Murugu, there could be noted a tendency on men's involvement in shea collection. One interviewee stressed that men got involved recently in shea collection, he also confirmed that men could reach areas further away:

> *"Four years ago, the shea trees bore more nuts. Those [men] who had motorbikes or bicycles had the chance of even going further to the bush (...) the shea nuts are added to what the women pick, because everything contributes to the support of the house."* (Man, Murugu, interview on 21.09.2017).

One man, who is active in shea picking, explained that he did not usually pick nuts with his wife. He explained that she picked with a women's group and he rather went further in the bush with motorbike (Occasional shea collector, male, Murugu, interview on 21.09.2017). This shows that the involvement of men in shea collection, influence spatial collection pattern in the communities.

The profit capture of men did not come forth clearly in Murugu (see statement above) or Kaden. In the literature, it is mentioned that men lack the knowhow of processing shea into

butter. Therefore, they either sell raw nuts to buyers (Gausset et al. 2005: 71) or they let women process the shea nuts and sell the butter later on the market. Sometimes, men give something to the processor, but mostly they keep the major part of the profit, Elias & Arora-Jonsson (2016: 10) found. Other examples show that men do not get involved directly in the shea collection, but rather seek rents from the women's shea income (Researcher, skype interview on 08.03.17). In Murugu and Kaden, women spend the income from shea nuts on basic goods such as cooking ingredients, education of children and health insurance, as came out from diverse interviews. Although, some men get involved in shea collection in Murugu, the profit capture of men was not encountered.

To understand formalization attempts from the state, the prevailing access and property system must be taken into account (Putzel et al. 2015: 458). Discussing the different institutions (state, traditional authorities, men) that shape access to land and trees, demonstrated the complexity of access and property relations. The various institutions can clash, when it comes to competing interests and claims over access to land and trees. How different overlapping institutions justify the acceptance or the rejection of resource access formalization through the CREMA, is discussed in the next chapter. This also lays the ground, for the formalization in shea trade to either take or not take place.

6 CREMA's Acceptance and Rejection

Once upon a time, there were two goats. People called them the stubborn and the model student. The model student, as the name says, always behaved well. It never entered the prohibited compound, even if the door was wide open. It listened to the wise eagle, who said: "You goats, leave the drying beans better for the people. If the people have enough food, you live longer." The stubborn on contrary, did not trust people. It saw with its own eyes, how his loved and well behaving mother was slaughtered. It used every opportunity to enter the compound to steal delicious nuts.

One day, the stubborn met the hungry model student. The days got hotter and the model student did not have enough to eat. The stubborn was well-fed and bleated: "How delicious these beans are. I don't even have to walk far for it". The model student struggled. In the morning it saw the fresh beans in the compound waiting to get dry: "If I try just one, they won't notice!". The model student sneaked quietly in the compound. It was overwhelmed and ate the whole harvest of the week. Shocked by his crime, it left the compound as quickly as possible. The woman came home from the farm and cried: "What have you done, stubborn?!"

The story of the two goats came up during analyzing the gathered data from the field. The parable refers to two narratives that are in place explaining the decision to accept, respectively to reject the CREMA: Kaden is portrayed as the "stubborn student", because it does not listen to the advice of the "wise eagle" (which refers to the NGO and Mole National Park) and acts against the rules. Murugu represents the "model student" and makes a good example of the CREMA approach.

This chapter discusses narratives, which are mobilized to legitimize formalization through the CREMA. It is shown that in Kaden two different narratives are mobilized to explain CREMA's rejection/acceptance, whereas in Murugu there is mainly one narrative. These narratives influence, whether formalization of resource access and trade is justified or not. The second part of the chapter shows that these narratives are facetted and that not everyone in the communities agree upon the predominant one. It is shown that formalization in Murugu and the resisted formalization in Kaden, are also contested within the communities.

6.1 The "Stubborn Student" Narrative

Local people had been hunters for many generations, when the government of Ghana made this activity illegal within the boundaries of the Mole National Park; hunters then became poachers. Poaching and logging were identified as problems in a report from the NGO, already in 2007 (A Rocha Ghana 2007). During fieldwork, the NGO, the Mole National Park and a governmental official argued that Kaden's interest in illegal activities, like poaching, led to the rejection of the CREMA. An NGO officer for example argued:

> *"This decision [to reject the CREMA] was mainly due to the fact that they felt they would be restricted not to do a lot of the illegal activities they are used to. Let's also remember that Kaden is a community with lots of Hunters (they virtually hunt everything). The illegal logging also started in Kaden. They wholly welcome these illegal activities. Therefore, they're decision wasn't surprising at all."* (email questionnaire on 12.12.2017).

This statement of the NGO officer underlines the narrative of the "stubborn" Kaden. It implies that Kaden likes to go against the rules and does not want the CREMA, because it is not interested in more regulations on resource use. The officer referred not only to poaching, but also to logging, as an activity that is considered as unsustainable. The statement of a Mole National Park officer recapitulated this narrative by saying:

> *"Kaden is a difficult community that is reluctant in embracing the collaborative approach to resource sustainability. It is a community of notorious poachers"* (email questionnaire, on 06.11.2017).

The park officer also referred to the unsustainable resource use of Kaden and concluded that Kaden is not interested in engaging in conservation. The first narrative concluded that poaching and other illegal activities in Kaden prove its people are not interested in sustainable resource use. This is one narrative, explaining CREMA's rejection in Kaden, a second one is illustrated in the following.

6.2 The "Wolf in Sheep's Clothing" Narrative

Through the establishment of the Mole National Park, people in Kaden lost authority over "their" land, hunting grounds and sacred places (Mason & Danson 1995). The second narrative is closely related to the history of the Mole National Park, it assumes: People in Kaden are afraid that the CREMA replicates the story of the Park and are therefore not willing to accept the CREMA. The memories of the Mole National Park are young and the trust in governmental institutions is low. An ex-NGO field officer stated: *"they [Kaden] don't trust the government"* (Damongo, interview on 18.10.2017). People in Kaden see the CREMA as a "wolf in sheep's clothing", or a "Park in a new wording", and are afraid of losing authority over more land, through it. A quote of Kaden's Tindaana reflects the perception that the CREMA takes away land:

> *"When the CREMA people came, they said we should cut a place for them and we asked them, if we give them the place, can the women go there to pick the shea nuts? They said: No. Can the men go to farm? They said: No. We said: If it is like that, we don't accept."*
> (Tindaana, Kaden, interview on 13.10.2017).

This second narrative about the CREMA rejection, can be connected to the argument of Hall et al. (2011). They argue that CBNRM is "self-exclusion" by communities (ibid. 71ff), under the motto: "engage people in excluding themselves from resource access" (ibid.). The fear of losing autonomy and giving away more land, is reflected in another quote: *"when we give the land to them, there will not be sufficient food for us"* (men, Kaden, interview on 05.10.2017). All these restrictions seemed, to people in Kaden, very similar to the ways the Mole National Park was established. The chief in Kaden stressed that he did not want to be the one who gives away land again (Chief, Kaden, interview on 06.10.2017). It was shown that this second narrative follows the logic that Kaden does not want the government/NGO to interfere in their resource regulations. They already lost land once, they did not want to make the "same mistake" a second time.

6.3 The "Model Student" Narrative

Murugu was in the same position as Kaden, they lost land, hunting- and sacred grounds, because of the Park (Mason & Danso 1995), but Murugu accepted the CREMA. The narrative about Murugu is that Murugu's resentment from the past could be transformed. The community understood the advantages of the CREMA and accepted it. In 1995, a participatory study was conducted in fringing communities of the Mole National Park (Mason & Danso 1995). Murugu was highlighted during this study, as it transformed from a skeptical community to an open community (ibid.). The two authors first encountered suspicion and mistrust from the people in Murugu. Especially as one of the authors was also a governmental official from the Game and Wildlife Department. After the authors took time, listened to the narration from people in Murugu concerning the exclusion from resources in the Mole National Park, Murugu became "the most open and trusting of the park villages" (Manson & Dason 1995: 2). During the fieldwork for this thesis, some interviewees from Murugu stated that they were skeptical about the CREMA in the beginning, deriving from past experiences with the Mole National Park. One man argued that back then, the traditional

authorities also agreed to give land to the Mole National Park, which made people in Murugu afraid of the CREMA (Murugu, interview on 21.09.2017). The NGO, the National Park and the Wildlife Department informed people in Murugu about the CREMA and its advantages. This finally led people in Murugu accept it. One man in Murugu explained:

> *"They were fully engaged, continuously, they came in to tell us about the concept of the CREMA, and we got to understand the whole thing"* (Man, Murugu, interview on 21.09.2017).

After its acceptance, the CREMA was implemented in Murugu. The Murugu- Mognori CREMA was regarded as an exemplary CREMA, as this statement of a park official shows: *"Generally, [Murugu- Mognori], is a model of the CREMA approach"* (email questionnaire on 06.11.2017). The narrative about Murugu's acceptance is that Murugu has transformed the wounds from the Mole National Park and understood the advances from the CREMA.

The following sections discuss how these different narratives are contested within communities.

6.4   Facetted Narratives about CREMA's (De-)Legitimation

The two narratives about Kaden's rejection of the CREMA are discrepant. Interviewed community members argue land would be "taken" for the CREMA, which led them to reject the CREMA. Interviewed NGO-, Park- and governmental-officials explained CREMA's rejection through illegal activities, like poaching in Kaden. The second narrative, which was based on mistrust towards the CREMA (that the CREMA might just be another park, a wolf in sheep's cloth), was also present, first in Murugu. But in Murugu, this skepticism was transformed and Murugu agreed to the CREMA, so the narrative from National Park, NGO, governmental officials, but also from some people in Murugu.

The narratives are assumptions at the community level. If looking at the individual level, different actors are using different narratives to legitimize the CREMA decision in Murugu and Kaden. Some people, questioned the poaching narrative in Kaden. The chief and other men claimed that men in Kaden are not hunting anymore, though they admitted that they were once hunters (Men, Kaden, interview on 27.10.2017, Chief, Kaden, interview on 06.10.2017). During a discussion with men in Kaden, they said hunting was not an option anymore, as hunters are chased away from the Park. When asked if hunters were ever killed in the Park, the men started counting names (Men, Kaden, interview on 27.10.2017). This shows that there were actually people hunting/poaching in the Park. In Murugu, the translator, as well as the CREMA chairman contested the explanation of Kaden's men. It was said that men in Kaden still poached and are therefore afraid of more regulations through the CREMA (informal discussion, Murugu on 27.10.2017). These findings are corresponding with those from a socio-economic report of Kaden and Yazori (before Kaden rejected the CREMA) (A Rocha Ghana 2007). It is written that in Kaden no one admitted to practice hunting, although the Park Management registered arrests from Kaden (ibid. 13). It remains uncertain, whether hunting was only popular in the past in Kaden, like the chief and the Tindaana argued. Or whether there are still many hunters, as NGO workers, park officers and

people from Murugu declared. The narrative that Kaden's men are poaching and hence rejected the CREMA, is nevertheless omnipresent in explaining Kaden's CREMA refusal.

The second narrative (the CREMA is just another conservation approach that excludes local people from resources) is also contrasted by some people in Kaden. One man from the community claimed that the traditional authorities in Kaden did not understand the CREMA concept, compared to other communities like Murugu (Kaden, interview on 05.10.2017). The NGO officer also questioned whether Kaden understood the concept (Introduction Trip, communities, field diary, 08.09.2017). He argued that there was no valid reason for the people of Kaden to be afraid of regulations, because Kaden would make the regulations themselves (ibid.). The quote of the Tindaana (in section 6.2) contrasted this. He claimed that the traditional authorities identified the CREMA as a "wolf in sheep's clothing". This would mean that the CREMA is another instrument, to take away land from the community.

Narratives, which justify CREMA's acceptance/rejection are facetted. Firstly, there are discrepancies between narratives of different actors. Secondly, the common narratives are aggregated on the community level, but different people within communities have different opinions and contest dominant narratives. This finding links up to Blom et al. (2010), who argue that communities are not homogenous, which is often ignored by ICDPs (see also Wells et al. 2004: 405). These different narratives that legitimize CREMA's acceptance or rejection, influence, whether the frontier of land control will take place or not. How the narratives actually effect formalization of access to and trade in natural resources, will be explored in the next chapter with examples from Murugu and Kaden.

7 Formalization of Resource Access and Trade

It was a day like any other, small goats and slim dogs roamed around a handful of mud huts. Children swung sharp cutlasses artistically in their tiny hands, as they cleaned up Murugu's school yard. Minira carried an enormous basin on her head, it was filled with water from the nearest river. Walking far with a heavy load on the head, reminded her of the shea season. This year it was bad, she could only collect one bag of nuts. She dried the nuts in the sun and shelled them. In other years, she was able to collect more than five. Back then, she took one bag aside and produced shea butter and soap from it. Then sold the remaining bags to the middlemen. This year, there were no nuts left for her. She sold the one bag to a middleman. Minira was worried, the 60 GHS from the bag were not enough to pay children's health insurance and school fees.

Back in the house, her sister Deborah awaited her. She visited from Kaden, a nearby village. Deborah was happy: "I got my bonus today!" In Deborah's village there were plenty of shea nuts this year. For the past few years, she sold the nuts to a company that paid 80 GHS right away and 20 GHS as a bonus later on. Minira did not understand, why this company had not come to her village too.

Strategies and narratives used to legitimize or delegitimize formalization, influence relations between communities and the state. Murphree (2009: 2553) argues that community-based resource management "is, like other aspects of governance, a general condition and not a technique, always relative in regard to its efficacy and legitimacy". This chapter discusses, in which ways strategies and narratives of legitimation affect the formalization of access to and trade in natural resources in Murugu and Kaden.


Figure 7: Green rectangle: Resource access formalization, based on a political empowerment narrative (green rectangle). Blue rectangle: trade formalization, based on an economic empowerment narrative. Arrows: legitimation relations of different institutions

Resource access formalization, which will be discussed in the first part of the chapter, is embedded in governmental and traditional institutions (see green rectangle in Figure 7). To make the CREMA effective, these institutions need to legitimize it (see arrows in Figure 7). The cases of Murugu and Kaden show that CREMAs sink or swim with traditional authorities' refusal or approval. Adjei et al. (2017: 308) argue: "political structures that lack a foundation in these traditional values will lack legitimacy" (Adjei et al. 2017: 308). In addition to that, CREMA's efficacy (cf. Murphree 2009: 2553) depends on the state: The central state, legalized the CREMA by establishing the concept, and the local state, by accepting CREMA's regulations.

The trade formalization, discussed in the second part of this chapter, is embedded in private institutions (see blue rectangle in Figure 7). The NGO and the Company chose communities, which are (according to them) legitimized to benefit from the certification. As they chose CREMA communities, women in Kaden miss out, like demonstrated in the above parable. It

portrays women in Murugu (alias Deborah) and women in Kaden (alias Minira). The resource access formalization is in that case a condition for the resource trade formalization. The third part of this chapter, discusses narratives that justify the CREMA (see blue and green rectangle in Figure 7). It is discussed how empowerment narratives are used to justify formalization and conservation interventions.

7.1   Enclosure through Shea Trade Formalization

The shea certification project can be seen as a formalization attempt that leads to an enclosure of the organic market. The strategies that are used to (de-)legitimize the CREMA, influence benefit distribution from certified shea nuts. In Murugu, women profit from higher benefits from Company 1. Whereas in Kaden, the access to this certified market was refused, because Kaden rejected the CREMA.

7.1.1 Formalization of the Organic Shea Trade in Murugu

In Murugu, the organic shea trade has been formalized through the certification project. "Certification systems cannot properly function without a relatively high degree of formalization and control.", Meidinger et al. (2003: 340) argue. The certified trade in Murugu also includes formal contracts between the Company 1 and the producers, quality standards, predefined price per quantity (nuts are weighted before selling) (Company 1 Contract with women). Middlemen or women traders do not have a formal trade relationship with the shea collectors. Producers and traders are not bound to one specific buyer and the price is negotiated between middlemen and producers without weighting the nuts. Compared to the trade with middlemen or women traders (see section 2.3), the formalization level is higher in the trade between Company 1 and the women.

Different motivations can underlie trade formalization. Wynberg et al. (2015: 564) identified two motivations: firstly, increased revenue generation and secondly, improved ecological standards. Tor the NGOs the aims of the shea certification project, are in line with that. They state that improved environmental and economic benefits should be reached through the project (email questionnaire on 12.12.2017). Putzel et al. (2015: 461) argue that formalization attempts of states are closely connected to international actors: "Formalization is undertaken by states in the name of improving governance and producing some environmental or social benefit, and often in the name of global institutions and regimes.". In Murugu's case, the state is not involved in the trade formalization[12]. It is private actors (such as NGOs and certification companies), who drive the initiative.

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[12] But the state is involved in the resource formalization (see 7.2), which is a condition for the trade formalization.

7.1.2 Exclusion from Organic Shea Trade in Kaden

The spatial boundedness of the shea certification project to the CREMA, creates enclaves of the certified shea market. In Kaden, people were not interested in the CREMA (resource formalization). This led to an exclusion from the shea certification project (trade formalization). As Company 1 is only active in CREMA communities, "on request of" the NGO, Kaden is not part of the trade area. This exclusion is intended to motivate Kaden to join the CREMA in the future, an officer stated:

> *"So let's see how we can encourage them [Kaden] to sign on to the conservation program before we allow them also benefit from things that are coming out of the conservation."*
> (Company 1, Operations manager, Tamale, interview on 24.10.2017)

This means the shea certification works like an incentive to be-(come) engaged in the CREMA, the officer further explained:

> *"No, we don't work there [in Kaden]. We were initially thinking of working with them, because they are located close to the park and have the organic collection area. But the NGO mentioned that, as long as they [Kaden] are not willing to sign on to the CREMA management, they should also not benefit from anything that comes because of the CREMA. So it is something that is like a control."* (Company 1, Operations manager, Tamale, interview on 24.10.2017).

This statement also shows that Company 1 would have been interested in buying nuts from Kaden, because of logistical and quantity reasons. As Company 1 was partnering with the NGO, they remained loyal and supported the NGO's view. Another officer underlined: *"If I would go there to buy nuts, it would be somehow a betrayal to the partner [NGO]."* (Company 1, Field officer, Murugu, interview on 14.10.2017).

Kaden's case brings forth that the Company and the NGO have different interests in the shea certification. Company 1 is rather focusing on the economic aspect, while the NGO is more concerned about the conservation aspect of the CREMA. It could be argued that for Company 1 the shea business is the ends, while the conservation is the means and vice versa for the NGO. This links with the argument of Wells et al. (2004: 402) that ICDPs have something to offer to everyone. As the NGO supports the certification mainly for the environmental aspect, they use the fact that Kaden rejected the CREMA, to legitimate Kaden's exclusion from the shea project.

The activities of Company 1 in the Mole area, are spatially bound to the CREMAs. The CREMA thus constructs enclaves and segregates Murugu's and Kaden's abilities to benefit from certified nuts. Kaden's exclusion from the shea certification project shows, how "gaining access" (see Ribot & Peluso 2003) to the organic market can be controlled by NGOs and the companies. The certification does not follow an open market logic. Individual women cannot choose to certify their nuts and sell them to Company 1. The women depend on the location of their community and its choice concerning the CREMA. This means, firstly, the benefits from organic shea nuts depend on traditional authorities to accept the CREMA. Secondly, benefits from organic shea nuts depend on the NGO and the Company 1, who choose, which communities are "legitimated" to benefit from certified nuts. Organizational

and institutional arrangements are determinants, where the shea market is formalized and who actually benefits from the better paid organic shea market.

The ways in which the legalization of the by-laws is used as a strategy to formalize resource access in CREMAs, is explored in the next section.

7.2 Formalization of Traditional Resource Access Regulations

When the CREMA is supported by traditional authorities, resource access can be formalized through the legalization of traditional rules (see Turner 1999). Legalization of traditional regulations is one strategy to gain legitimacy for the CREMA. An NGO officer argued:

> *"The constitution and Assembly by-laws give legitimacy to the CREMAs. The devolution of authority from central government to the CREMAs also gives legal backing to the CREMAs"*
> (NGO officer, email questionnaire on 12.12.2017).

The traditional system of governance is based on regulations and taboos, which are not written down or legally backed. The regulations are part of the general knowledge in the community. Rasmussen & Lund (2018: 395) argue that regulations of new institutions, which emerge in frontier spaces, are often based on such traditional regulations, as they are already legitimated: "rules seem more legitimate if they resemble already existing rules; then the work of legitimation has already been done.". Also Hall et al. (2011: 72), describe CBNRM as a "recognition and entrenchment of existing customary practices through institutionalisation and legitimation". The procedure to formalize resource access in the CREMAs is in the following: The CREMA develops by-laws, which have legal backing and enables the CREMA to punish illegal activities. The by-laws have two sides, on one side traditional regulations are integrated, which are already legitimated (see Putzel et al. 2015: 435). On the other side, the legalization of traditional norms is based on western resource governance approaches. By-laws can thus be seen as a tool that converts traditional regulations to western standards.

The formalization of the CREMA by-laws was desired by the CREMA committee in Murugu. The Murugu- Mognori CREMA struggled to get the by-laws legalized. An NGO officer explained that, for nine years, the CREMA waited for the government's acceptance of the by-laws (Introduction Trip, communities, field diary, 08.09.2017). Only after the by-laws will be accepted by the District Assembly in Damongo, and the Regional Coordinating Council in Tamale (see Figure 6), the regulations could come into force. At the end of the fieldwork in 2017, the by-laws were accepted by the District Assembly in Damongo, but not yet by the Regional Coordinating Council. The Murugu- Mognori CREMA committee, expected from the by-laws, to gain legal backing to stop the logging in the CREMA. The land dispute, discussed in section 5.2.1, was fueled by conflicting interests of land use and unclear land tenure. The CREMA committee stated that they have to wait for the by-laws to be accepted to finally end the land conflict and regulate the logging (Transect walk, Murugu, 13.09.2017, CREMA chairman, Murugu interview on 28.10.2017).

Nowadays, legalization is common for any CBNRM, but legitimation of the formal regulations does not automatically derive from it (Peluso & Lund 2011: 674). As the by-laws were not yet accepted at the end of field work, it cannot be answered, whether the legalization is also followed by a stronger legitimation of the CREMA. A statement from Murugu's youth leader showed, the legalization does not change much, as the by-laws are basically written-down traditional regulations:

> *"there is no difference from the CREMA by-laws and the laws of the Tindaana. There are no changes"* (Youth leader, Interview on 22.09.2017)

Also, in practice, the CREMA committee preferred the traditional way of justice. The legal way is pursued only if legitimacy is missing. The CREMA does not want the state to interfere too much in their matters, as this statement shows:

> *"we have drawn our own punishment, because it is a committee based activity. We don't want to involve the government in certain things, which will cause the people of the community to feel that the program is a government project. It is a self-project, one we are doing ourselves, so we have our local laws of punishment. When we apply our punishment to you, and you refuse it, then, it is a chance to pass it over to the government activities."* (CREMA Committee, Murugu, interview on 14.09.17).

If CREMA's regulations are not different from traditional regulations and the CREMA committee also intends to use traditional ways of punishment, the question arises, why the CREMA is even needed?

7.3 CREMA– Abundant or Needed Institution?

Two narratives are used to legitimate the CREMA and delegitimize traditional authorities' sole power (see Figure 7). Both are embedded in promises of empowerment. Empowerment can be divided in political and economic aspects (Quaedvlieg et al. 2014: 41).[13] The first narrative, bases on a conservation idea and argues that current resource management is not sustainable. It is assumed that communities need to be politically empowered, to manage resources in a sustainable way. The second narrative is about the development/ economic empowerment aspect of the CREMA. It suggests that CREMAs are needed to give communities the opportunity to benefits more from the resources, they shall protect.

7.3.1 Conservation Narrative– Political Empowerment

The conservation narrative, bases on the assumption that the current resource use is not sustainable. It is argued that the unsustainable use, firstly derives from lacking local participation in Ghana's centralistic resource management system. As the central state is responsible for resource management, local people feel marginalized (see statement of a

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[13] "Political empowerment (having a voice based on representation and social organization and increased self-confidence in one's ability to effect change) (…) economic empowerment (increased assets and capabilities that enable them to benefit from new opportunities and freedom to make economic decisions)" (Quaedvlieg et al. 2014: 41)

governmental official in the Introduction). Secondly, it is argued that the ways, in which local people traditionally manage resources, is unsustainable, as this statement of an NGO officer reflects:

> *"Chiefs manage land and natural resources, but the use is not sustainable and resources will eventually be depleted."* (PAMAU conflict workshop, Damongo, participant observation, 25.10.2017).

The informal traditional regulations are seen as a problem of the traditional system, another NGO officer added (email questionnaire on 12.12.2017). According to him, the legalization of traditional regulations through the CREMA, would help that regulations are followed more strictly. It is believed that merging traditional customs with modern governance and conservation knowledge, counteracts unsustainable resource extraction. The CREMA is thus seen as a solution for the resource degradation, as stated in a report from the NGO: "the potential of the CREMA [is] to facilitate the improved management of natural resources in communal lands" (A Rocha Ghana 2007: 17). Conservation, is tried to be reached through political empowerment, by giving the communities the ability to regulate "their own" resources (Asare et al. 2013: 4, Baruah 2017: 372).

7.3.2 Development Narrative – Economic Empowerment

In the time of encounters of tradition and modernity in Ghana, the sole power of chiefs in resource management is questioned repeatedly (see Boamah 2014, Ubink & Quan 2008). The idea of inclusiveness is part of the development aspect of the CREMA, which is related to the economic empowerment of the communities. The second narrative is about the benefit distribution of natural resources, which is perceived as unfair. Different causes are identified, to explain unequal resource access. Firstly, it is argued that the traditional management system is not inclusive: minorities (or people that are not accepted by the chief) do not benefit the same way as others (for example elites) from natural resources (Boamah 2014, Ubink & Quan 2008). Secondly, conservation initiatives come oftentimes hand in hand with exclusion of local people from resource access (e.g. Mole National Park). This means that communities next to Parks, are predestined to feel excluded from resource benefits (cf. Mason & Danso 1995). It is argued that the CREMA is needed, to solve these two problems (especially in communities that are restricted by protected areas). Therefore, the CREMA is presented as an integral concept, which enables also marginalized people to benefit from resources. An NGO officer stated that income generation is central in the CREMA: *"our aim is to leverage on conservation practices to increase and improve the income levels of communities"* (email questionnaire on 12.12.2017). Based on this narrative, many people in the communities, perceive the CREMA as a development opportunity. One woman from Kaden stated: *"What I know about the CREMA: it is a help"* (Kaden, interview on 05.10.2017). The CREMA is needed to provide equal opportunities to benefit from resources (for community members), so the second narrative.

7.3.3 Discussing Conservation and Development Narratives

NGOs', governmental and National Park's officers argue that the CREMA is needed, because the current system of resource management is not sustainable. It is also claimed that traditional authorities do not act in the interest of everyone. Lund & Rasmussen (2018: 392) state: "Frontiers work by delegitimizing prior rights and claims.". It can thus be argued that these narratives are used to question the power of traditional authorities in resource management; and to legitimize the formalization of resource use through the CREMA. Turner (1999) contests the first narrative (that local institutions failed in resource management) and states: "[CBNRM] are often logically reducible to the simple avocation of the formalization of resource access." (ibid. 643). Looking at the first narrative, it can be argued that "desired" political empowerment, is used to hide the "feared" conservation (see also section 6.2) and to increase state control in communities.

Economic empowerment narratives are used, to motivate communities to participate in formalization initiatives, which are believed to make resource management more sustainable. An NGO officer stated:

> *"If a way is provided from the government and the traditional authorities that people can benefit from protecting resources, they will manage them sustainably"* (PAMAU conflict workshop, Damongo, participant observation, 25.10.2017).

Such benefits are in the Murugu- Mognori CREMA reached (among others) through the shea nut certification. The certification project showed that access to a better paid market, is only provided to CREMA communities (see section 7.1). Hence, communities only benefit from development interventions, if they agree to resource access formalization. This means, trade formalization only takes place, if resource access formalization is accepted.

This chapter showed that formalization is embedded in legitimation strategies of different institutions. Communities and traditional authorities, need to accept the CREMA, otherwise the frontier of resource and trade formalization is pushed back. Formalization is not only a process that goes in one direction (from state to peripheral communities). Communities have agency too. Kaden did not accept the "frontier move" from the state and the NGO, which had negative implications on the ability to benefit from shea trade formalization. Kaden was punished for hindering the resource access formalization to take place. In the last part of the chapter, narratives used to legitimate the trade and resource access formalization, are discussed. The state and NGOs claim that CREMAs are needed, to empower communities politically and economically. It can be argued that development narratives are used to make conservation attractive for communities and to justify formalization attempts. Following on that, the next chapter looks critically at different narratives and interpretations, which are used to explain (dis-) empowerment dynamics in Murugu and Kaden.

8 Formalization and Shifting Powers

Formalization happens in frontier spaces, where power to control resources is shifting, Rasmussen & Lund (2018: 393) state:

> "the reconfiguration of frontier spaces involves the re-contextualization and reinterpretation of institutional orders in relation to the new resources, commodities, and people. Reconfiguration of frontier spaces re-orders objects and subjects of control."

Frontier spaces are (in this understanding) sites, where some actors are empowered and the existing power of others is challenged through formalization attempts. In CREMAs, the empowerment of communities is the aim of the formalization (Asare et al. 2013, Blomley 2016, see also section 7.3 in this thesis). CREMAs seek to make communities subjects and not anymore, only objects of resource management (see statement Rasmussen & Lund (2018: 393) above). In Murugu, regulations on land and resource use were formalized. The community (re-)defined the line between legal and illegal activities, which excluded some people from their desired resource use (cf. Callahan, 2004; Goldman, 2011; Neumann, 1998 in Rasmussen & Lund 2018: 394). In Kaden, the distinctions between legal and illegal activities are not revisited, because of the CREMA-rejection. There, the traditional authorities remained the powerful institution in resource management. As the CREMA framework builds on the community scale, the heterogeneity of communities is easily overlooked (see Wells et al. 2004). To understand dynamics of empowerment, it is important to look more closely at different groups within communities, and outside actors, who are engaged in communities.

This thesis is a case study of shea trade and resource access formalization within CREMA territories. Through the CREMA and the certification, the institutional structure of resource management changed. Actors such as the NGO and the Company, as well as the newly established CREMA committee reconfigured the recent authorities of land and resource control (see Peluso & Lund 2011: 668). This chapter traces different narratives and interpretations of empowerment[14] and disempowerment, which are brought in connection with the formalization. The following sections give some ideas, in which ways the formalization can "take place" and what implications it can have for different community members, NGOs and traditional authorities.

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[14] Narayan (2002: 11) defines empowerment as: "the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives". In this thesis, empowerment not only refers to "poor people" but to different kinds of people, institutions and organizations.

8.1 Traditional Authorities' Reconfigured Power

When looking at CREMAs as a formalization attempt at the frontier of land control (see Lund & Peluso 2011), traditional authorities can be seen as hegemonies of the recent past, which have been challenged by the CREMA as a new property regime. Lund & Peluso (2011: 668) refer to the reconfiguration as a "challenging" of the recent authority [15]. Murugu's case thus shows that different narratives are in place, in relation to the reconfiguration of resource authority. Some see CREMAs as a "challenge" for traditional authorities, while others see CREMAs as an "opportunity" for traditional authorities.

Firstly, it is argued that traditional authorities are re-empowered. One governmental official claimed: *"The role of traditional authorities does not diminish, they get strengthened"* (Officer Forestry Commission of Ghana- Wildlife Division, email questionnaire on 12.12.2017). The claim, the Chiefs and Tindaanas are part of the CREMA and thus reinforced, is also argued, by the CREMA committee in Murugu (CREMA Committee, Murugu, interview on 14.09.17). The narrative follows the logic that traditional authorities can gain new power through the CREMA, as a modern instrument of resource management that is legitimated by the state.

The second narrative assumes that traditional authorities lose power, because CREMAs takes over some responsibilities concerning resource management. An ex-NGO officer explained, how CREMAs can weaken traditional authorities' power:

> *"Before the CREMAs, a chief could just come and say anything (...). But in a place where a CREMA concept is actually functioning, the powers of a chief is somehow sliced down."* (Damongo, interview on 18.10.2017).

This statement claims that although the CREMA approach builds on traditional authorities, the CREMA is still challenging the authority of chiefs and Tindaanas concerning resource control.

Both narratives agree that, the current authority of land and resources is changed in some way. But the two narratives disagree upon the question, whether the resource access formalization (through the CREMA) is in favor of the traditional authorities or not. The first narrative interprets the formalization of resource access, as a recognition of traditional regulations and authorities. The by-laws are seen as a "support" of the traditional authorities. If their authority is not legitimated, for example, by outsiders, who are unfamiliar with the traditional resource management system. The second narrative interprets the formalization as

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[15] Peluso and Lund (2011: 668) refer to frontiers of land control as "sites where authorities, sovereignties, and hegemonies of the recent past have been or are currently being challenged by new enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes".

a "control" of traditional authority. Local authorities can be prosecuted, if e.g. activities defined as illegal are not punished by chiefs.

8.2 Empowerment Dynamics of Women and Youth

8.2.1 Narratives of "Women Empowerment" in Murugu

Women are traditionally only marginally involved in political decision making regarding natural resource management in Northern Ghana (Apusigah 2008). The shea certification in Murugu should counteract gender disparities. It is framed as a women empowerment project. The slogan of Company 1 is: "Empowering Ghanaian Women through Shea Butter" (The Savanna Fruits Company 2011). An officer of Company 1 explained that their business is empowerment for the producers:

> *"It is business, doing the certification with the women, but it is also empowerment, because without the certification and the market assurance, they would not make the money, they will be making. So there is empowerment attached to the business we do."* (Company 1, Operations manager, Tamale, interview on 24.10.2017)

The narrative that higher income form shea nuts automatically empowers women, can be contested by looking at different aspects of empowerment. The economic aspect of empowerment (see Quaedvlieg et al. 2014) are increased assets needed to "enable them to benefit from new opportunities and freedom to make economic decisions" (ibid.). In Murugu, several interviewees explained that the additional income does not make a significant difference for women's livelihood opportunities. Women in Murugu said, they would pay school bills, ingredients for cooking and health insurance form the shea income. It is undisputed that the additional income through certified shea nuts is urgently needed. Nevertheless, these statements also show that the higher benefits are not sufficient for women to diversify their livelihood.

The political aspect of empowerment refers to "having a voice" (Quaedvlieg et al. 2014: 41), to "the expansion of (…) capabilities (…) to participate in, negotiate with, to influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives" (Narayan 2002: 11). In Murugu, women are able to contribute in the CREMA. A CREMA committee member said that women participate actively and not only passively as was feared, because of the gendered power structure:

> *"They [women] knew within themselves that they should be part of decision making, but in the past, when women were invited into decision making, they were quiet, they would not say anything. (...). There was a fear and belief that women are to accept, whatever the man says. Now they are beginning to understand that they also have the right to contribute and that their contribution can be accepted."* (Man, Murugu, interview on 21.09.2017)

The shea certification project made women more active and confident to raise their voice in the CREMA, committee member argued (Man, Murugu, interview on 21.09.2017).

Different interviewed women stated that the certification project recognized them as shea producers, which made them feel proud. Nevertheless, some women also criticized Company 1 and said that they just buy nuts like the middlemen, without weighting and handing out of correct receipts:

"We thought that it [selling nuts to Company 1] would be different from how the middlemen buy it. But when they came, they said they will weigh the shea nuts. But now, they are not weighting and they are buying the same way as the middlemen. There is no any difference." (Organic shea collector 5, female, Murugu, interview on 13.10.2017)

When this critique came up, the CREMA committee immediately took responsibility and organized a meeting with Company 1 and the women. A field officer of Company 1 excused himself for the incorrect way of the nut trade and promised to purchase the nuts in the future the way it was defined in the contract (see 2.3). This "incident" shows firstly, that formalized regulations need to be followed so that they make a difference. And secondly, that women raised their voice and were confident to effect change. Which is an indication of empowerment (cf. Quaedvlieg et al. 2014: 41). Narratives about women's and youth's role in the CREMA-decision in Kaden, are discussed in the next section.

8.2.2 Narratives of "Dis-Empowerment" in Kaden

The generational and gender hierarchies are embedded in the African societies (Evans et al. 2015: 25). Elder men are respected and powerful in Ghana, women and younger men have to accept their decisions. Generational and gender power relations shaped Kaden's CREMA-rejection, some women and young men in Kaden argue. The formalization of resource access and/ or trade is desired by some people in Kaden. Different interviews brought up the narrative that the CREMA –decision was made by the powerful in the community and that the youth and women could not influence the decision. A young man from Kaden demonstrates his feeling of powerlessness, concerning the CREMA rejection:

"We the young men, are realizing, that our elders are cheating us, but we have nothing to say about it. We don't know what to do (...) we are only waiting for our turn to come." (Man, Kaden, interview on 05.10.2017).

The same subordination came up in interviews with women from Kaden. One woman described figuratively her powerlessness regarding the CREMA decision:

"You are willing to give the book to me and my father says, I shouldn't collect the book. Can I collect it?" (Magazia, shea collector 1, Kaden, interview on 05.10.2017).

This metaphor shows that even if she would have wanted the CREMA, she felt like she had to accept traditional authorities' decision.

Apart from unequal gendered negotiation power, traditional gender roles also shaped women's low involvement in the CREMA- decision. The exclusion of women from forest matters are described by Husseini et al. (2016). They studied the participation in forest reserve management in Ghana and found women's exclusion from forest management, legitimated by traditional gender roles (ibid. 251f). Some interviews with women in Kaden were in line with Husseini's et al. finding: The interviewed women argued that the CREMA is about forest and land matters and therefore part of men's responsibilities. One woman explained: *"Women don't know about forest/bush matters"* (Shea collector 3, female, Kaden, interview on 06.10.2017). Another statement underlined existing gender roles: *"We are women; we cannot talk about the CREMA. We are just there to marry, but not to focus on such things"* (Shea collectors, female, Kaden, group discussion on 27.10.2017). According to

these statements, the women accepted their gender roles and/or did not have the power to contest them. These narratives of disempowerment showed that women and young men in Kaden did not feel confident to raise their voice and counter CREMA's rejection (cf. Quaedvlieg et al. 2014: 41). The next section looks at the NGO and its entanglement in empowerment dynamics.

8.3 Discussing NGOs' Power Gain

The state has low financial and time capacity to implement and maintain CREMAs (Baruah 2017). NGOs fill this "gap" created by the state. Through that, NGOs can shape frontiers of land control (cf. Peluso & Lund 2011). It is assumed that NGOs gain power through the CREMA: "NGOs are commonly empowered in this process, becoming the key agents in the privatisation and marketisation functions of the government." (Baruah 2017: 371). Decentralization is often mistaken and the power is transferred to non-elected bodies, like NGOs, Baruah (ibid.) argues. Such privatization of resource management responsibilities is based on unclear responsibilities of different involved actors (Ribot 2004: 68 in Baruah 2017: 372). In the case of the CREMAs, the role of NGOs is unclear and only vaguely formulated in policies (Baruah 2017: 380).

The NGOs are needed to assist the community to develop the CREMA. The CREMA, like other ICDPs, is still a top-down approach (Wells et al. 2004: 40). Communities have to be familiarized with the approach first. The CREMA committee, described the role of the NGO as parent-child relationship:

> *"The NGO is a start of the concept. If you give birth to a new born baby, you will eventually teach it how to sit, how to crawl, how to walk. When the child starts walking, then it is a bit matured. Soon it will do his or her walking without your help. So we are still under them, to give us the support. When we get on our toes fully, we can operate on our own, without an NGO."* (CREMA Committee, Murugu, interview on 14.09.17).

The communities are dependent on the NGOs' knowledge and networks to build up the CREMA. A government official defined the NGO's role as a facilitating one and claimed that NGOs do not interfere in the CREMA strategy:

> *"NGOs do not make rules and regulations for the CREMA they can only facilitate development of the rules and regulation through resources and knowledge mobilization"* (Officer Forestry Commission of Ghana- Wildlife Division, email questionnaire on 12.12.2017).

Although, the NGO does not make the regulations, the objectives of the CREMA can be influenced by the NGO. The facilitating role in the development of the regulations, is a powerful one. With their consultant position, they can shape CREMA's objectives, similar to a parent-child relationship (as CREMA committee's statement above showed). It should not be ignored though, that communities have agency too, to counter NGO's opinions (see Holmes 2018: 184). Communities can still decide whether to follow the path suggested by the NGO or not (like Kaden's case showed).

As non-state actors in natural resource management, NGOs, have the choice, who to support and not to support (see Ribot et al. 2008). This makes them agents in choosing, which

community gets the opportunity to be "empowered". Further, it makes people dependent on the relationship between the community and the NGO. Looking at the example of Kaden, the NGO is generally not engaged in Kaden anymore. An interviewee in Kaden confirmed that NGOs do not come to Kaden: *"NGOs either go to Yazori or Murugu, help will not come here [to Kaden]. That means we are losing."* (Man, Kaden, interview on 05.10.2017). From the perspective of the NGO, their non-engagement in Kaden is legitimated, as Kaden was not cooperative. An ex-field officer explained the exclusion by Kaden's dismissive attitude: *"I don't even stop there [in Kaden], because, I don't have enough time to waste on places that I know won't cooperate."* (Ex-NGO field officer, Damongo, interview on 18.10.2017). Kaden's CREMA rejection, resulted in self-exclusion from development interventions from the local NGO.

In a financial respect, the dependency of CREMAs on NGOs is quite strong. The lack of financial resources is a known problem (see Hinneh 2017, Baruah et al. 2016). The government has no budget for CREMAs (ibid.) and donors are interested in community-based initiatives. Funding is increasingly invested not solely in conservation, but in mixed conservation/development approaches, like the CREMA (Murphree 2000: 3). The communities are dependent on a good relationship with the NGO to get support from them. If the relationship with the NGO is tense, no more projects are funded, like in Kaden. NGOs on the other hand also depend on a good relationship with the CREMA communities. They need cooperative communities, to reach the goals. Moreover, successful flagship projects, could attract more international funding. It is argued that donors are more interested in supporting communities with such initiatives (Stanley et al. 2008). This shows that CREMAs create independencies of communities and NGOs.

In a formalization process, authorities are reconfigured, whence some actors gain power and others loose it. Interpretations and narratives of who receives empowerment, shed light on the effects of the accepted or rejected formalization. Chiefs are authorities of the recent past and are "challenged" by the CREMA. This "challenge" is perceived as a threat by some, while others see it as a chance for traditional authorities to regain influence. As traditional authorities' approval is key for the CREMA, the perception of the communities' traditional authorities determines, whether the formalization "takes place" or not. The chapter further showed that traditional power structures influence the level of participation of different community members in political decisions. These power relations are not stable and can change with the reconfiguration of institutions. The involvement of new non-state actors in natural resource management was further discussed. The ways in which NGOs shape formalization of access and trade in natural resources, was shown.

9 Conclusion

The current use of natural resources in Northern Ghana is not considered as sustainable and the traditional management system is not regarded as inclusive (Blomley 2016). The community resource management area (CREMA) approach was brought in by the government, to give local people the power to manage resources sustainably and profit from them. The CREMA promises to be a participative, inclusive decentralization strategy. But it can also be interpreted as a formalization attempts of the state, to gain power in remote communities (Turner 1999). In this case study, formalization is manifested in two ways: Firstly, CREMAs formalize resource access through the legalization of traditional regulations. The shea certification project formalizes secondly, trade in shea nuts.

Formalization takes place at frontiers of land control, Peluso & Lund (2011) argue. Such frontiers are shaped by struggles over authority when new actors and institutions challenge resource and land regimes (Rasmussen & Lund 2018). Local people are oftentimes presented as the "objects", while the state and other more powerful actors are presented as the "subjects" of the resource formalization (Kelly & Peluso 2015, Putzel et al. 2015). Top-down formalization approaches risk to increase inequalities and exclude marginalized groups from resource access and benefits, different scholars argue (Kelly & Peluso 2015, Putzel et al. 2015: 463f). It is further criticized, that formalization follows a capital accumulation logic, by allowing certain people to benefit while leaving others out (Putzel et al. 2015: 466, Kelly & Peluso 2015).

This thesis argued that the occurrence of formalization, depends on histories of relations between communities/traditional authorities and the state. The thesis presented a case of local people's resistance of a formalization attempt and another of local people's acceptance of the formalization. Interestingly, both communities are only 12 kilometers apart. While the "willing" community benefited from projects bound to the CREMA, the other was excluded from these benefits. Women in the first village profited from shea certification, a CREMA project, supported by a local NGO. In the second village, women were excluded from the certification project, as they rejected the CREMA. This created enclaves of the organic market. The resisted formalization marginalized local people and excluded them from better market access.

By looking at different narratives of legitimation and empowerment, the thesis analyzed the conditions under which formalization "took place" or not. It was building on Rasmussen & Lund (2018), who argue that formalization of resource access is always entangled in struggles over legitimacy and authority. The desire, or the fear, of resource and trade formalization, shaped communities' decision to accept or reject the CREMA. In Kaden, the decision was influenced by the tense relationship between the communities and the state due to the Mole National Park. Decision makers in Kaden feared a replication of history and saw the CREMA as a National Park in new wordings. Governmental, NGO and Park officials presented Kaden as a community, which is interested in illegal activities and argued that

Kaden feared stricter regulations and the presence of the state. The CREMA- acceptance in Murugu, was explained through the recovery of trust in the government. It was assumed that Murugu could cure the wounds from the Mole National Park and that they understood the benefits the CREMA would bring them. The thesis showed that different narratives were used to legitimate the CREMA and delegitimize the sole power of chiefs. Development narratives were used by state (and NGOs), to motivate communities to participate in conservation and formalization projects. Hence, formalization of resource access, became a condition for formalization of resource trade.

CREMA's rejection can be interpreted as a clear statement against more state control in Kaden. Nevertheless, empowerment did not automatically derive from the "preserved autonomy". In fact, people in Kaden felt left out from development. Formalization changed access relations, which changed the ability to benefit from things (cf. Ribot & Peluso 2003). The new access to the organic shea market, made resource formalization desired by communities. The shea certification project became an incentive that should motivate communities to "allow formalization to take place". This showed, projects can be politicized instruments, used to tackle selected communities.

Formalization is a process, which has all kinds of effects, some are desired by community members (like higher income through shea certification), while others are feared (like clear regulations and restrictions of activities defined as illegal). The decision to accept or reject the CREMA can be seen as a trade-off between possible positive effects of development and possible restrictions due to conservation (Wells et al. 2004: 411f). This thesis discussed that different actors have different decision power concerning trade-offs between development and conservation. The "taking place" or the "not taking place" of formalization determines gains and losses from the power transfers (through the CREMA) and the projects bound to it (like the shea certification project).

By the end of the field work in 2017 the by-laws of the Murugu- Mognori CREMA have not yet been approved by the regional government. It would be interesting to study, in which ways land control changes, if and when the by-laws are legalized. Questions arise, if the by-laws will be legitimated and effective to counteract illegal activities; or whether the formalization will not change much (see Peluso & Lund 2011: 675). Also of interest, would be a long-term comparison of Murugu and Kaden, to assess the actual effects of the CREMA in terms of conservation and development. This would then give insights in the effectiveness of the CREMA, as a top-down approach with a bottom-up naming.

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Abbreviations

CBNRM   Community-based natural resource management

CREMA   Community-based resource management area

GHS   Ghanaian Cedi

ICPD   Integrated conservation and development project

NGO   Non-governmental organization

NTFP   Non-timber forest product

PAMAU   Protected Area Management Advisory Unit

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All pictures are taken by the Author, during fieldwork in 2017.

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Appendix
Collected Data
List of Interviews

	What	Date	Place	Who
1	interview	12.09.17	Murugu	Organic shea collector 1, female
2	interview	12.09.17	Murugu	Organic shea collector 2, female
3	interview	13.09.17	Murugu	Non-organic shea collector 1, female
4	interview	13.09.17	Murugu	Non-organic shea collector 2, female
5	interview	13.09.17	Murugu	Non-organic shea collector 3, female
6	interview	13.09.17	Murugu	Magazia
7	interview	14.09.17	Murugu	CREMA Committee
8	interview	14.09.17	Murugu	Tindaana
9	interview	21.09.2017	Murugu	Man
10	interview	21.09.2017	Murugu	Organic shea collector 3, female
11	interview	21.09.2017	Murugu	Occasional shea collector, male
12	interview	21.09.2017	Murugu	Organic shea collector 4, female
13	interview	22.09.2017	Murugu	Fulani 1, non-organic shea collector
14	interview	22.09.2017	Murugu	Fulani 2, non-organic shea collector
15	interview	22.09.2017	Murugu	Youth leader
16	group discussion	22.09.2017	Murugu	Organic shea collectors, female
17	interview	06.10.2017	Murugu	Non-organic shea collector 4, female
18	interview	06.10.2017	Murugu	Non-organic shea collector 5, female
19	interview	13.10.2017	Murugu	Organic shea collector 5, female
20	interview	13.10.2017	Murugu	Organic shea collector 6, female
21	interview	13.10.2017	Murugu	Non-organic shea collector 6, female

22	interview	13.10.2017	Murugu	Non-organic shea collector 7, female
23	informal conversation	27.10.2017	Murugu	CREMA chairman
24	group discussion	27.10.2017	Murugu	Organic shea collectors, female
25	interview	05.10.2017	Kaden	Man
26	interview	05.10.2017	Kaden	Magazia, shea collector 1
27	interview	05.10.2017	Kaden	Shea collector 2, female
28	interview	05.10.2017	Kaden	Village elder
29	interview	06.10.2017	Kaden	Chief
30	interview	06.10.2017	Kaden	Shea collector 3, female
31	interview	06.10.2017	Kaden	Shea collector 4, female
32	interview	06.10.2017	Kaden	Shea collector 5, female
33	interview	13.10.2017	Kaden	Tindaana
34	interview	13.10.2017	Kaden	Shea collectors 6,7, female
35	group discussion	27.10.2017	Kaden	Shea collectors, female
36	interview	27.10.2017	Kaden	Men

37	skype interview	03.03.17	Zürich	NGO officer
38	email questionnaire	28.02.17	Zürich	Researcher on shea 1, political ecology
39	email questionnaire	03.03.17	Zürich	Researcher on shea 2, political ecology
40	skype interview	08.03.17	Zürich	Researcher on shea 3, political ecology
41	skype interview	14.07.17	Zürich	NGO consultant, researched in Mole area
42	email	16.07.17	Zürich	Researcher on shea ecology

	questionnaire			
43	short discussion	12.10.2017	Murugu	Company 2, Field officer
44	short discussion	12.10.2017	Kpulumbu	NGO staff
45	information trustfund 1	12.10.2017	Yazori	NGO staff
46	information trustfund 2	12.10.2017	Murugu	NGO staff
47	interview	14.10.2017	Murugu	Company 1, Field officer
48	meeting	14.10.2017	Murugu	Company 1, Field officer& women
49	interview	18.10.2017	Damongo	Ex- NGO field officer
50	interview	21.10.2017	Damongo	Company 2, Field officer
51	interview	24.10.2017	Tamale	Company 1, Operations manager
52	email questionnaire	06.11.2017	Zürich	Mole National Park manager
53	email questionnaire	12.12.2017	Zürich	NGO officer
54	email questionnaire	12.12.2017	Zürich	Officer Forestry Commission of Ghana- Wildlife Division

List of Notes

	What	Date	Place	
1	field diary	08.09.2017	communities	Introduction Trip
2		13.09.2017	Murugu	Transect walk
3	field diary	18.09.2017	Damongo	
4	field diary	02.10.2017	Murugu	
5	participant observation	03.10.2017	Damongo	Meeting shea nursery
6	participant observation	05.10.2017	communities	Information trip shea nursery communities

7	Field diary	06.10.2017	Communities	
8	participant observation	12.10.2017	Murugu	Information trust fund from NGO
9	field diary	14.10.2017	Murugu/Kaden	
10	participant observation	25.10.2017	Damongo	PAMAU conflict workshop
11	participant observation	31.10.2017	Damongo	District Assembly CREMA by-laws

Personal declaration

I hereby declare that the submitted thesis is the result of my own, independent work. All external sources are explicitly acknowledged in the thesis.

Mengina Gilli

Zürich, April 18