



**University of  
Zurich**<sup>UZH</sup>

How Climate Change discourse manifests under a  
right-wing populist narrative framework, based on  
discourse analysis of the Swiss weekly magazine  
"Die Weltwoche"

GEO 511 Master's Thesis

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## Summary

This thesis seeks to analyze the Climate Change discourse as portrayed when based on a right-wing populist narrative framework. Using discourse analysis relevant topics and rhetoric tools are identified to gain an in-depth understanding of the premises underlying the CC narrative. Given the international, national, and sub-national diversity encountered in different modes of right-wing populism, this thesis chose to focus on its Swiss iteration. The primary reason for this choice has been the observation of a research gap in the discussion of right-wing populism in Europe, which only rarely integrates Switzerland into the discussion. The Schweizer Volkspartei (SVP) and the Swiss weekly magazine *Die Weltwoche* have been used to exemplify the state of Right-Wing-Populist dialogue on climate change-related issues in Switzerland.

The thesis is introduced through coverage of fundamental concepts such as the nature of Climate Change discourse, as well as addressing the specific case for democratic regimes, by going over inherent flaws that heighten the effectiveness of right-wing populist tendencies. Consequently, Discourse Analysis is introduced and its role as a methodological tool is explained with specific regard to right-wing populist rhetoric.

A comprehensive analysis of the theoretical background and essential literature on populism in general and right-wing populism in specific is given and connected to the state of right-wing populism across Europe. Due to the comparatively less documented Swiss right-wing populism and its high unprecedented and long-lasting dominance in political and public discourse, the thesis is dedicated to laying a fundament upon which understanding can be built, by offering relevant insights into the history and role of the SVP as a major player in Switzerland political landscape. Consequently, a justification is given for using *Die Weltwoche* as the primary source for the discourse analysis due to its abundance of material and more distinct and clear language used.

The methodology is further elaborated upon by going over the coding utilized to generate knowledge as well as highlighting the most essential topics and rhetorical tools used to create and maintain *Die Weltwoche's* Climate Change narrative.

The results section is dedicated to uncovering the argumentative logic utilized to make statements relating to Climate Change as well as connecting them to the most dominant discursive domains; the State (politics and governance), the Informants (academia and media), the Objectives (economy, energy and migration), and the Adversary culture (the left/woke/green/progressive). The constructed narrative is summarized and graphically displayed once all parameters have been established and an educated overview of *Die Weltwoche's* Climate Change narrative is made possible.

The Thesis concludes with a final summarization of the Climate Change narrative, responses to the research questions, and an acknowledgment of mistakes made and the potential for future research discovered.

## Zusammenfassung

In dieser Arbeit wird versucht, den Klimawandel-Diskurs zu analysieren, wie er auf der Grundlage eines rechtspopulistischen Narrativs dargestellt wird. Mithilfe der Diskursanalyse werden relevante Themen und rhetorische Mittel identifiziert, um ein tieferes Verständnis der dem CC-Narrativ zugrunde liegenden Prämissen zu erlangen. In Anbetracht der internationalen, nationalen und subnationalen Vielfalt der verschiedenen Formen des Rechtspopulismus hat sich die vorliegende Arbeit auf die schweizerische Ausprägung konzentriert. Der Hauptgrund für diese Wahl war die Beobachtung einer Forschungslücke in der Diskussion über den Rechtspopulismus in Europa, die die Schweiz nur selten in die Diskussion einbezieht. Am Beispiel der Schweizer Volkspartei (SVP) und der Wochenzeitschrift Die Weltwoche wird der Stand des rechtspopulistischen Dialogs zu Fragen des Klimawandels in der Schweiz dargestellt. Die These wird durch die Behandlung grundlegender Konzepte wie der Natur des Klimawandeldiskurses eingeführt, sowie durch die Behandlung des spezifischen Falles demokratischer Regime, indem auf inhärente Fehler eingegangen wird, die die Effektivität rechtspopulistischer Tendenzen verstärken. Folglich wird die Diskursanalyse eingeführt und ihre Rolle als methodologisches Instrument im Hinblick auf die rechtspopulistische Rhetorik erläutert. Eine umfassende Analyse des theoretischen Hintergrunds und der wesentlichen Literatur zum Populismus im Allgemeinen und zum Rechtspopulismus im Speziellen wird gegeben und mit dem Stand des Rechtspopulismus in Europa in Verbindung gebracht. Aufgrund des vergleichsweise wenig dokumentierten Schweizer Rechtspopulismus und seiner nahezu beispiellosen und lang anhaltenden Dominanz im politischen und öffentlichen Diskurs widmet sich die Arbeit der Schaffung einer Verständnisgrundlage, indem sie relevante Einblicke in die Geschichte und Rolle der SVP als wichtiger Akteur in der politischen Landschaft der Schweiz bietet. Infolgedessen wird die Verwendung der Weltwoche als Hauptquelle für die Diskursanalyse aufgrund ihrer Materialfülle und ihrer klareren und deutlicheren Sprache gerechtfertigt.

Die Methodik wird weiter ausgeführt, indem die Kodierung zur Wissensgenerierung erläutert und die wichtigsten Themen und rhetorischen Mittel hervorgehoben werden, die zur Schaffung und Aufrechterhaltung des Klimawandel-Narrativs von Die Weltwoche verwendet werden. Der Ergebnisteil widmet sich der Aufdeckung der argumentativen Logik, die für die Aussagen zum Klimawandel verwendet wird, sowie deren Verknüpfung mit den dominantesten diskursiven Bereichen: dem Staat (Politik und Governance), den Informanten (Wissenschaft und Medien), den Zielen (Wirtschaft, Energie und Migration) und der gegnerischen Kultur (die Linken/Wachen/Grünen/Progressiven). Nachdem alle Parameter festgelegt wurden, wird die konstruierte Erzählung zusammengefasst und grafisch dargestellt, so dass ein fundierter Überblick über die Klimawandel-Erzählung der Weltwoche möglich wird.

Die Arbeit endet mit einer abschliessenden Zusammenfassung des Klimawandel-Narrativs, der Beantwortung der Forschungsfragen sowie einer Würdigung der gemachten Fehler und des entdeckten Potenzials für zukünftige Forschung.

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## 1. Introduction

In this thesis, I want to analyze the influence right-wing populism (henceforth RWP) can have on the narrative surrounding Climate Change (henceforth CC<sup>1</sup>). I have used the Swiss weekly magazine *Die Weltwoche* as my primary source and hope to make my case based on the discourse encountered throughout a year's worth of material (October 2021-22). The goal of this thesis is to highlight what I believe to be one of the key hurdles standing in the way of the efficient implementation of environmental policy. Simply put I want to make my case by focusing on the narrative shift that occurs when CC is taken out from the academic discursive domain into the public discursive domain, especially when viewed through a right-wing populist framework.

However, I do not want to get ahead of myself. The claims raised above will be addressed further down the line. I want to use the introduction of this thesis to cover some concepts and thought processes that I view as essential to my choice of topic. I hope that this will provide a clearer understanding of not only my personal interest in the subject matter but why I chose to approach the CC narrative through RWP.

The introduction will span four primary segments. In *1.1 Climate Change*, a quick overview of CC is given, with a focus on the differentiation between CC denial and CC opposition. *1.2 Democracy* highlights some dangers unique to democratic regimes, specifically regarding voting, freedom of speech, and the role of scientific expertise. *1.3 Discourse analysis* serves both as an introduction to the concept as well as a segue into the chapter *1.4 Research Questions*. Finally, the introduction ends with *1.5 Positionality* which serves two roles: increasing transparency and alluding to potential biases from my side.

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<sup>1</sup> Unless specified I will use CC and global warming synonymously.

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## 1.1 Climate Change

*“Human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming, with global surface temperature reaching 1.1°C above 1850–1900 in 2011–2020. Global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase, with unequal historical and ongoing contributions arising from unsustainable energy use, land use and land-use change, lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production across regions, between and within countries, and among individuals (high confidence).” (IPCC, 2023)*

The first thing to address is the level of certainty we have regarding anthropogenic Climate Change, specifically within academia. The IPCC reports are the single largest and most comprehensive summarization of our current, internationally collaborated, scientific

knowledge on Climate Change and the anthropogenic drivers behind it, and their message is quite clear. While policy decisions are debatable, the anthropogenic causes of CC are generally treated as a fact. This certainty in knowledge doesn't necessarily percolate into the public domain, as evidenced by the many people who either claim that CC is not occurring or doubt/reject the notion of an anthropogenic effect (McCright et al., 2016; Poortinga et al., 2019). However, it is important to note that the cause of this can not be simply linked to a lack of sophistication on the subject matter (Lockwood, 2018; Whitmarsh, 2011). Instead, there is clear evidence for the disbelief in CC to be caused by either socioeconomic (Jylhä et al., 2020; Lübke, 2022) or ideological (Hornsey, 2021; Jahn, 2021a; Jylhä & Hellmer, 2020; Lockwood, 2018) factors, or a combination thereof. It is closely affiliated with other anti-mainstream ideologies such as immigration, globalization, and pluralism, which help catalyze the rise of radical RWP parties (Forchtner, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Noury & Roland, 2020). Consequently addressing the denial and/or disbelief in anthropogenic CC is not simply a matter of education but has much deeper roots. While I would argue that education can help address certain aspects of the divide between the academic and public discourse on CC, it would be foolish to ignore the inherent social, economic, and political parameters that maintain this state of opposition.

Therefore I want to differentiate between three primary iterations of the phenomenon.

### **CC uncertainty**

I define CC uncertainty as not being convinced of either CC in general or the anthropogenic effect. People who fall within this category don't necessarily have strong opinions on the subject, making this the mildest of the three forms given that it does not imply an adverse relationship. While CC uncertainty is problematic, it is likely the most receptive to educational treatments out of the three forms I intend to cover.

### **CC denial**

I define CC denial as the strict rejection of CC or the anthropogenic effect. People who fall within this category by definition have a stronger opinion. While in theory educational treatments might help convince the misperceptions the affected hold, in practice, it is less likely to do so given the aforementioned anti-mainstream ideology that pairs well with CC denial.

### **CC opposition**

I define CC opposition as the general opposition towards the "CC agenda". This can include both CC uncertainty and denial but doesn't have to be predicated by a misunderstanding of scientific knowledge. On the contrary CC opposition can – and often is – come from people that are fully accepting of the anthropogenic effect on CC. Instead, CC opposition tends to follow a different argumentative logic, best exemplified in voting patterns around environmental policies. More often than not policies are opposed because they are seen as ineffective and not out of a rejection of anthropogenic CC. Given that the arguments do not



necessarily rest upon a lack of understanding or even rejection of scientific knowledge, I view this as not only the most reasonable of the three forms but also as the most important one for my thesis.

In a democratic setting environmental policy, in its numerous iterations, serves as an instrument to translate scientific recommendations into our political framework. This is of particular importance, given that CC being true does not equate to the necessity or viability of CC-related policy proposals. Even if all actors agree that CC is real and needs to be addressed, they might not agree on the implementation of proposed policies. Therefore, I want to mention some possible approaches before turning to their common weakness. First are Market-based approaches such as cap-and-trade or carbon-tax systems. They are fairly popular and see implementation around the globe. While there are good arguments for their implementation, they fail to provide sufficient results on their own (J. F. Green, 2021; Lohmann, 2010; Nordhaus, 2019). This is particularly true for industries that are still in the early stages of the transition to low-carbon technologies (Sharpe et al., 2019).

Figure 1 shows the progress of industrial sectors and their current state within a low-carbon transition framework. It highlights that market incentives do not work well for industries that are still in their early transitional stages. Radical technological change is perilous and firms are rarely willing to bear the risks and costs of developing completely new production methods while still in their emergence stage. However, the effectiveness of market-based approaches increases during diffusion and reconfiguration, when the best approaches are known but firms and households still need encouragement towards their adoption. Nonetheless, the vast majority of relevant sectors are still far from a state at which the adoption of (solely) market-




Figure 1 Excerpt taken from Sharpe et al., 2019, p. 14 showing the progress of individual sector’s low-carbon transitions and priorities for coordinated international action. Once the reconfiguration stage is reached, market-based approaches yield better results, however during emergence and diffusion they are relatively less effective.

based approaches could yield sufficient results toward a low-carbon transition ([Sharpe et al., 2019](#)).

The second are State-based approaches which seem to be more promising given the added role of authority, transparency, and maneuverability. Green industrial policy is based on the idea of building, restructuring, and transforming the industry through the stimulation and facilitation of the development of environmental technologies ([Allan et al., 2021](#); [Cullenward & Victor, 2021](#); [F. Green & Gambhir, 2020](#)). Policies could include direct capital subsidies, research and development, grants, tariffs, local content requirements, and many more. State-based approaches run into a different set of issues than market-based approaches, because they inherently become more political and thus have to face the scrutiny of political opposition (particularly right-leaning/conservative political parties tend to be opposed to increasing governmental influence given their goal of minimizing state involvement).

The third would be restructuring our operational framework. By this, I mean rethinking parameters such as (infinite) growth. Concepts such as degrowth might help diffuse long-held and intrinsically inefficient paradigms along which the political ecology of CC revolves ([Hickel & Kallis, 2020](#); [Jackson, 2017](#)). This however seems the least feasible given its reliance on an unprecedented level of global cooperation.

While those three general approaches are far from a comprehensive list, I believe they help illustrate a common weakness of our political framework; they all rely on public support. No matter how impactful or sensible a policy approach might seem, it must pass through our institutions. In Western liberal democracies, this can be problematic precisely due to the inherent level of freedom. To properly illustrate this I want to turn to the next segment.

## 1.2 Democracy

While scientific discourse influences public opinion and policy, by doing so it inherently becomes political, consequently changing the types of scrutiny it encounters. This I believe becomes significantly more problematic if we consider the very nature of a democratic and liberal society (particularly free speech and universal voting rights) paired with a concept like the internet in a predominantly capitalistic world.

### 1.2.1 Democracies' inherent flaws

Free speech is one of the most fundamental accomplishments of the modern world however it necessarily entails certain downsides. While we can set clear limits to free speech (e.g. shouting “fire!” in a crowded place) it will inherently allow for a decently stable environment

in which disinformation and misinformation<sup>2</sup> can be perpetuated. This problem is enhanced when paired with universal voting rights given that this disproportionately shifts political agency away from expertise. To illustrate my point I want to cover two examples raised by Socrates in his critique of democracy.

### 1.2.2 Expertise – or lack thereof

The first example is that of a sea fairing journey where Socrates asked who one would want in charge of the vessel. Trained professionals, familiar with the intricacies and dangers of seafaring, or laymen? The same logic he argued applies to elections. To include anyone and everyone in the decision of who should rule, regardless of education on relevant matters, was as responsible as letting laymen set sail during a storm ([The School of Life, 2017](#)).

This exemplifies the diminished role expertise will inevitably have in a democratic regime. While there are multiple ways in which we address this flaw (e.g. Public education, transparent information, free media, expert counseling, ...) voting behavior in a democracy can't be as educated in opinion as an expert panel could be. The average voter is ill-informed on the average subject matter simply due to the complexity of our policy systems paired with the diversity of subjects covered in general elections and is thus reliant on external sources that can help formulate an opinion. Ideally, those sources would be experts within their fields, however, expertise is rarely the sole or even primary criteria along which people will judge the validity of sources. Consequently, there is not only a decline in the general level of expertise present during opinion forming, but expertise itself loses its viability as a source ([Hornsey, 2021](#)).

By that, I do not mean to insinuate that expert sources aren't trusted. Instead – following the aforementioned gap between discursive domains – I want to highlight the difference in the role of expertise in opinion building. Within academic discourse, the scientific method, peer review, and highly specified education cause an environment where the most trusted sources are based on objective viability. This I believe is facilitated given that participants of academic discourse are well-versed in the subject they are discussing. The same does not apply to the public discursive domain given that participants are by no means selected based on their understanding of the subject discussed. While they can trust the experts, without expertise of their own it is difficult to judge the validity of claims which forces the average citizen into a position of blind trust effectively making the trust in experts an argument from authority rather than an actively understood and accepted argument<sup>3</sup>. Thus, if confronted, the citizen

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<sup>2</sup> I distinguish disinformation from misinformation along the axis of intent. Misinformation is therefore unwillingly spread false information, whereas disinformation requires an active intent at deception.

<sup>3</sup> "Trust the science" is a slogan that I believe can be represented both as a logically valid and fallacious. If science is accepted as our best way of acquiring knowledge, scientists are accepted as experts that dedicate their lives to specific subject, and concepts like the Scientific Method and Peer Review are understood, I would argue that – especially for laymen – to "Trust the science" is always the logical approach. If scientists are however portrayed

might not be able to refute counterpoints to the subject matter which primes them for not only disinformation but also misinformation. This opens the door to Socrates' second critique point I want to cover.

### 1.2.3 Charisma and Snake-Oil Salesmanship

The second example is that of a political debate between a doctor and a sweet shop owner. If the sweet shop owner were to address the crowd by noting that the doctor causes them pain or makes them drink bitter medicine, unlike him who offers only the sweetest of goods and brings the people pleasures, unlike anything the doctor could ever match, the doctor could hardly reply to such an accusation efficiently. If he were to state the truth, that he only causes the patient's pain and discomfort to help them, the crowd would revolt at this honest response (The School of Life, 2017). While other professionals would see the truthfulness of the doctor's claim, to the medically uneducated his answer could never suffice without plenty of additional explanation. This is illustrative of the division between academic discourse and public discourse where experts could dismiss the sweet shop owner based on their previous knowledge, whereas laymen would need to go an extra mile (e.g. education on medical procedures and their effectiveness, spotting of logical fallacies, ...).

An eloquent and charismatic speaker will be able to sway public opinion without having to directly address the subject matter, as did the sweet shop owner. He attacked the easily perceived downsides of medical procedures, based on the knowledge that the average citizen will not be able to effectively scrutinize his claims. This I believe is how something like Snake Oil Salesmanship became possible. While the term is nowadays colloquially used to address chicanery I feel it is worth highlighting its framework. I believe the fact that Snake Oil Salesmen could sell their product was based on three criteria. The first is the lack of expertise from the buyer. Medically educated people would be quick to realize that the product offered to them can't match its acclaimed effects. To the untrained eye, this might not occur. The second criterion is the salesman himself. As the idiom goes a good salesman can sell water to a drowning man. I do not possess nearly the psychological expertise to delve into proper detail here, but I feel the idiom encapsulates the effectiveness of charisma and solidifies its role in persuasion. The third criterion I believe is the "idea" of the Snake Oil remedy. A simple solution to cure all your ailments. This simplification of often complex issues is worth specific consideration given its role as a cornerstone of RWP, where the politician is the salesman

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as authority figures who therefore should be trusted, "Trust the science" can appear to be an argument from authority which would make it fallacious. Once properly explained (i.e. that their authority is based on expertise) this no longer applies. However, the average citizen might not be well-versed enough in identifying logical fallacies or understanding the scientific process. If not properly addressed, "Trust the science" can therefore be criticized as if it were a logical fallacy, which I believe further opens the doors to distrust in expertise. I make this distinction given that for RWP "critique of experts" is of particular importance.

offering a simplified outlook on the political scene which is to be solved by a simple solution only they can bring about.

In summary, those two examples raise two fundamental problems of democracy which can not be ignored. The first of which is concerning the expertise of voters (i.e. the public), whereas the second highlights a psychological aspect, such as the possibility for charisma to be more persuasive than facts. These problems further intensify once we recognize that free speech and universal voting rights are quintessential to a free world and could never be withheld. This leaves us in a position where we are fully aware of the downsides of democracy, but we are forced to endure them due to a lack of an alternative.

However, the situation is not quite as dire. Given that, we know about those downsides we can consequently address them. Education can directly help counteract a lack of expertise. Transparent information and the availability thereof (i.e. a liberal and unconstrained media apparatus) can help diminish the influence charismatic speakers can hold over the public. Nonetheless, I felt it was worth highlighting those weaknesses, given that they will play a fundamental role throughout this thesis.

#### 1.2.4 The Internet as a Catalyst

I do not want to delve deep into the internet but feel that some points need to be covered before I proceed. First is the general availability of the Internet in the modern world, whose immense reach means that information can spread faster and further than ever before. Second, is the relevance of the internet particularly for media. By now, not only is every official news outlet represented on the internet, but the very face of news sources has shifted. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have played an ever-increasing role as a news source alternative. By their very nature, they are prone to spreading misinformation (Rhodes, 2022). While all the sites mentioned have undergone significant shifts such as active fact-checking and/or labeling of misinformation, this form of a top-down approach is not applicable universally. Encrypted communication platforms such as WhatsApp, Viber, or Telegram make such a task impossible. Third is the capitalistic nature of the world we live in. This creates an incentive for the media to be attention-grabbing. While this point is not exclusive to the Internet, I believe the Internet has significantly intensified the problem, given that metrics such as screen time, likes, shares, and comments have become essential (Rochlin, 2017). Attention-grabbing headlines were always a thing, but there has never been such a plethora of them. Consequently, the public is bombarded with 24/7 news coverage of matters selected to a large extent on potential profits rather than newsworthiness. Fourth is the role of algorithms. Due to an information overflow, platforms need to be selective in what they display. Given the immense diversity of not only users but also available content, as well as the profit-driven nature of corporations on the internet (i.e. gaining and maintaining interaction with users) algorithms arose as a sorting mechanism. While this selection is

beneficial on many fronts, through it polarization of content is inevitable since over time echo chambers arise, given that like-minded people will be exposed to similar content (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). When this is paired with psychological concepts such as confirmation bias and disconfirmation bias attitudes polarize (Taber & Lodge, 2006).

In summary, the Internet serves as a catalyst, insofar as it facilitates and magnifies the availability and spread of information. However, given its embeddedness in our capitalistic society, it remains a profit-oriented domain. Due to its vastness and diversity of sites, a generalized approach to e.g. countering the spread of misinformation is nigh impossible. To top it off algorithms play a major role in the creation of echo chambers which in turn further promote polarization. While the internet is not a specific subject for this thesis I still see its role as relevant and will be addressing the points raised here throughout the thesis.

Overall this segment's goal was to highlight certain weaknesses inherent to democracies. This is important to keep in mind as we transition to RWP which uses those exact weaknesses to its advantage. However, it is essential to first cover my chosen methodology; Discourse analysis. In the following segment, I wish to introduce the concept, offer some insights into why I've chosen it as my primary analytical tool, as well as tie it into my thesis, i.e. why it matters for the connection between CC and RWP.

### 1.3 Research Questions

As discussed my primary interest for this thesis was to offer some transparency into the portrayal of CC through the lens of RWP. My primary source was the Swiss weekly magazine *Die Weltwoche*. I believe this to be a relevant and understudied connection because I believe people's opinions/stances/decisions/voting behavior/ ... regarding CC can be drastically influenced by their subscription to an RWP worldview.

Thus my primary research question is a simple one:

#### **RQ 1. How does *Die Weltwoche* cover and portray CC?**

Out of this simple leading question, multiple potential follow-up questions arise. I've decided to stick to the following three:

##### **a) Is the portrayal homogenous?**

I.e. is CC strictly regarded as good/bad, or are there exceptions? If specific patterns emerge, what are they and how can they be explained?

##### **b) What role does RWP have at *Die Weltwoche* in general, and specifically regarding the CC narrative?**

I.e. How are the hierarchical (critique of elites) and egalitarian (anti-pluralism) cleavages addressed/presented within the corpus in general? More specifically, is there a mentality spillover that manifests within the CC coverage?

**c) What other topics (next to politics and migration) might influence the portrayal of CC?**

I.e. is the discursive strand of “CC” more or less isolated or does it intertwine with other topics?

Answering those questions would offer a proper insight into not only the portrayal of CC but also the discursive domain of *Die Weltwoche*. This in turn allows me to offer a steelman argument of my reached understanding of *Die Weltwoche*'s CC narrative to ask the following:

**RQ 2. If one were to subscribe/believe the entirety of *Die Weltwoche*, how would one perceive CC?**

This I believe is essential and one of the primary reasons I've chosen discourse analysis as my analytical method. What I believe or what experts believe is utterly irrelevant to this thesis. Instead, I've set out to understand what a *Die Weltwoche* subscriber understands for themselves to be true. I want to understand not only how they understand CC, but also get behind the argumentative logic that leads to the conclusion. In other words, I want to understand the premises upon which the CC narrative rests.

Before I turn to the main corpus of this thesis however I feel that one last introductory chapter is in order; my positionality.

## 1.4 Discourse Analysis

This segment's purpose is to address the chosen methodology of discourse analysis. To portray a comprehensive overview, two primary subchapters shall be covered. The first serves as an overview of discourse (analysis), i.e. answer *what* discourse is and how one might choose to analyze it. The second subchapter serves as an argument for *why* discourse analysis has been chosen as the primary methodological tool of this thesis.

### 1.4.1. What is Discourse Analysis?

To properly understand what discourse is, why we might want to analyze it, and what the role of an analyst might be one might fathom the example of an old newspaper. While the paper itself is sure to cover specific events in history, we can extract far more information from the paper by not looking at it as a mere data entry, but rather as a collective of preconceived ideas and notions prevalent at the time of writing. While an article can be seen as such a data entry, i.e. the covered event, the time and date of occurrence, the people involved, etc. the language employed is more than the sum of its parts, i.e. it can convey more than the literal words might

on their own. Topics such as class, gender, race, the nature of employment, and many more can help portray a clearer picture of the socio-political frameworks of the times. One would not have to travel far into the past to come across headlines that would be unthinkable within the current zeitgeist, yet they were seen as perfectly valid at the time of writing. The portrayal of non-whites, women, or other second-class citizens can be quite indicative of the worldviews held by (at least) a significant proportion of the populous. Through analyzing the discourse of the time we can extract knowledge about social practices that prevailed during the period of writing. Alternatively, discourse analysis could also be more linguistic, and choose to focus on the rhetoric applied within the newspaper article to portray the development in stylistic, morphological, phonological, and semantic methods employed within the newspaper article, and compare it to contemporary journalism.

Simply put Discourse Analysis can be understood as “*the close study of language and language use as evidence of aspects of society and social life.*” (S. Taylor, 2013, p. 7). However, it is pertinent to note that this is but one of many definitions of the concept due to its widespread use for a multitude of theoretical and occasionally discipline-specific practices (Wodak & Meyer, 2014). While this diversity can come at the cost of clarity, it also enables a more plentiful range of approaches each with individual benefits or drawbacks that facilitate the topic-specific application of analytical methodology. Therefore I opt to introduce the concept by covering one of the most influential thinkers and arguably the father of discourse analysis; Michel Foucault.

#### 1.4.2. Michel Foucault on Knowledge and Power

The first thing to note is that Foucault rarely if ever spoke directly of discourse analysis. Rather his influence on shaping our understanding of the interplay between knowledge and power served as the underlying template that led to our modern-day understanding and interpretation of discourse (analysis) (Wodak & Meyer, 2014).

To gain a better of Foucault's ideas on knowledge and power ought to first highlight the three primary forms of power distinguished in Foucault's empirical work; *sovereign* power, *disciplinary* power, and *biopower*.

*Sovereign* Power alludes to the stereotypical pyramid-like power structures found for example in an absolute monarchy (Lynch, 2010). The sovereign (top of the pyramid) utilizes those below him (middle) to enforce his/her rule on the general population (bottom). The sovereign is in the position of exerting power over its dominion and its subjects to the extent that he/she holds the power of subtracting wealth, services, products, and labor. However *sovereign* power does not lead to the ability to control life in the same sense *disciplinary* power does (May, 2011).

*Disciplinary* Power concerns itself with the notion of individuals – who themselves are a product of disciplinary power (Hoffman, 2011). Disciplinary power results in the manifestation



of “rational self-control” (Vintges, 2011) which gets internalized to the point where a continuous exertion of external force towards its maintenance is no longer required. In this sense, disciplinary power – unlike sovereign power – is not strictly oppressive but rather productive, given that it aims to reconstruct behavioral patterns with the end goal of shaping the individual's internalized thought. Foucault refers to schools, prisons, factories, and the like as examples of the machinery that produces disciplinary power through the utilization of rules, guidelines, exams, and other controlling mechanisms (Oksala, 2011). This primes the bodies for pre-determined outcomes, which are themselves desired due to the very nature of disciplinary power. Using a school as an example, it is not merely the fact that the school teaches children to listen to the teacher, be present at the ring of a bell, and compete in exams, but it primes the students to do so voluntarily. To be shaped into individuals who not only accept the power structure within which they find themselves but to want to thrive in it. A good student does not talk back to the teacher, is there on time, and excels at exams, and if they do so, the student is likely to actively take enjoyment in the power systems, including its rules and regulations (Moore, 2021). Foucault himself refers to the panopticon – Jeremy Bentham’s idea of the ideal prison – as a vivid example of the implementation and exertion of disciplinary power. The panopticon would be a circular structure where inmates are kept isolated in their cells. An outside window for daylight’s sake and an inside window, directed toward the guard tower at the building's center. The prisoners themselves could never be certain if they are being watched at any given moment, which would result in their internalization of the disciplinary power thrust upon them and lead to a self-governance of behavioral patterns due to the assumption that they might be observed at any given moment. While such systems still partake in the exertion of sovereign power, their influence expands upon this regime through disciplinary power that actively influences individuals' behavior by achieving a self-regulating and predetermined mindset. Importantly this influence remains tied to individuals – unlike biopower which addresses the general population.

*Biopower* refers to power over the population through the power over life itself. Like disciplinary power, it relies on internalized norms rather than maintenance through external forces. In a sense, Biopower, therefore, implements disciplinary mechanisms, meaning that it is expressed through disciplinary power, with the main difference being the target of said influence; populations rather than individuals (C. Taylor, 2011). Biopower aims at the maintenance of norms within a population, and the eradication of deviations from said norms. The regarded attributes can be far-ranging, covering health-related topics such as life expectancy and birth rates, but can also be more abstract, covering topics such as migration and crime (C. Taylor, 2011). Within his lectures on the concept Foucault rarely spoke directly of Biopolitics – i.e. a governmental system implementing biopower – but rather chose to focus on the governmental changes that facilitated its emergence, which Foucault credits with the emergence of liberalism (Guignion, 2020). To put this into the right perspective one has to acknowledge the underlying idea of liberalism, i.e. a government that seeks to minimize governmentality while maximizing the productivity and/or control over bodies (Guignion, 2020). Foucault notes this to be an exceptional shift in human history given that under

previous regimes the people always lived under some form of sovereign, exerting power over them and telling them what to do. The underlying idea of liberalism, i.e. less control and more freedom, is, therefore, something that on the surface seems to lessen the level of control exerted by the government, however, Foucault notes that instead of lessening the control, it shifted its nature, effectively perfecting it. Much akin to the aforementioned concept of the panopticon, the behavior shifts to the point where one does not need to be told what to do and how to behave, but rather one does so willingly. One accepts the “proper” way to behave, primed by underlying power mechanisms that manage to shape and control behavior without the subject necessarily being conscious of that process (Guignion, 2020). Foucault, therefore, relates the emergence of biopower to liberalism because, under the logic of less control, a concomitant belief emerged that social reactions would be more natural given the absence of a despot demanding them. Through this, a norm emerges that is perceived as more truthful due to its freedom from coercion, which in turn led to the establishment of a form of control not only over peoples individual bodies, but rather a homogenization of all bodies in relationship to the perceived norm (Guignion, 2020; C. Taylor, 2011). Important to note is that under biopolitics, i.e. a regime expressing biopower, death has not left the equation but is rather justified and restructured by reasoning inspired by the new mode of thinking. Using a modern-day example one can take a look at body shaming, or fatphobia. There is a perceived norm of what a normal and healthy body looks like. If a person who deviates from said norm were to die, their death would be attributed to their deviation from the norm. While in this case the “norm” is less arbitrary, the argumentative logic can be extrapolated, given that the individual's body is no longer viewed as such but rather the focus lies on its deviation from the norm. Foucault argues that this logic is partially to blame for the emergence of state racism. Under biopolitics and the insurgence of such norms, this can lead to the consolidation of ideas such as racial purity (Guignion, 2020). This is a slippery slope that can lead to extraordinarily harsh extremes such as Nazi Germany, where the eradication of the Jewish population as well as the mentally and physically disabled (deviants from the norm) was justified under the logic of being a threat to the German health. Consequently governmental spendings ought to be directed at viable Germans (within the norm) (C. Taylor, 2011).

In summary, Foucault makes clear that the traditional modes of power fail to encapsulate the entirety of the picture. As Foucault himself put it:

*“... first of all because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations. The State is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth.” (Foucault, 1980, p. 122).*

Foucault agrees that such forms of power are still power, but his primary notion is that this is at best a superficial understanding of power, that fails to encapsulate the proper reality of power relations influencing everyday life experiences. As Agamben put it:

*“One of the most persistent features of Foucault’s work is its decisive abandonment of the traditional approach to the problem of power, which is based on juridico-institutional models (the definition of sovereignty, the theory of the State), in favor of an unprejudiced analysis of the concrete ways in which power penetrates subjects’ very bodies and forms of life.”* (Agamben, 1998, p. 10)

How does Foucault's concept of knowledge translate within this context? Simply put the conventional way of thinking about the relationship is traceable to the ancient Greeks and the aforementioned (1.2.2. Expertise – or lack thereof) example of the ship of state, i.e. our political leaders rely on accurate and relevant knowledge to utilize power efficiently (Moore, 2021). Foucault on the other hand assumes a more radical relationship between power and knowledge, with the key claim being that power dictates the terms of knowledge (Moore, 2021). In other words, this means that power defines what things there are and by which means they can be known. This is in a way an extension of Aristotle's stance on the role of politics. As phrased in his work, the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that politics

*“[...] is the one that prescribes which of the sciences ought to be studied in the cities, and which ones each class in the city should learn and how far[.]”* (Irwin, 1999, pp. 1094a-1094b).

Foucault however takes this logic further and states that if power dictates what should be studied and to what extent, then power in a sense dictates what is true or even what can be knowable (Moore, 2021). As prof. Moore phrased it

*“Power has a kind of appetite for knowledge because a knowable thing is something categorizable, it has definite limits. And if it can be known, it can be controlled.”* (Moore, 2021).

This stands in contrast to the notion of an adversarial relationship between truth and power as might have been the case for some of history’s great thinkers who spoke truth to power. But Foucault posits a very different relationship, where power produces knowledge. In a Foucaultian sense therefore power is not interested in the suppression of knowledge (e.g. the Galilean trials) but is much more interested in knowledge’s proliferation. The more things are identified, the more things can be categorized and redefined and with each further distinction, power advances its reach<sup>4</sup>. By this logic, once people become objects of knowledge, they become subjects to power (Foucault, 1980).

To further emphasize this idea, one can turn to Foucault's notion of “pouvoir/savoir” (power/knowledge). Foucault utilized this term to denote the type of knowledge that is both considered common sense, and that maintains this status through the influence of power. Thinking back to the panopticon, “pouvoir/savoir” refers to a form of power that not only establishes a norm but also enforces this norm upon its subjects (Feder, 2011). The influence

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<sup>4</sup> An example of this (which ties well into RWP and the dangers I see within it) might be migration. If the voters have no knowledge of migrants, one can not truly influence the voters. If however one “arms” the voters with knowledge, one can shift their behaviour. A simple example would be whether one frames migrants as something akin to “innocent people in desperate need of help” or “parasites that want to profit from our welfare”. Both are partly true, but depending on which narrative dominates the truthfulness of one claim becomes more established, thus reducing the viability of the other.

of this manifestation of power grows, the more omnipresent the norm becomes. I.e. once the norm becomes internalized and institutionalized, it becomes part of the common sense, therefore being perceived as natural and normal (Feder, 2011). Once this state has been achieved, the common sense type of knowledge begins affecting explicit (i.e. scientific) knowledge. Feder uses the example of Gender Identity Disorder (GDI) to illustrate this point. According to her GDI arose from the underlying “common sense” premise “the world consists of men and women.” If a child's behavior was considered inappropriate for the prevalent gender norm, the child was forced to adapt to it. This exemplifies the notion of power/knowledge since the psychiatric “treatment” (i.e. forcing the children to comply with gender norms) arose from the common sense premise that the world consisted of *only* men and women. Consequently, a new type of diagnosis arose, accompanied by not only a new type of subject but also an entire body of knowledge surrounding it (Feder, 2011).

In summary, one can see why Foucault’s notion of the relationship between power and knowledge has been quintessential for a post-structuralist line of thinking. Foucault takes issue with the idea of “absolute truth” and forces us to rethink that which we believe to be absolute or certain. Instead, he states that the things we perceive as such are historically contingent (D. Taylor, 2011). This mode of thinking is further elaborated upon in Foucault’s *L’archéologie du savoir* (eng. *The archeology of Knowledge*) from 1969 in which he rephrased and fortified certain aspects covered in his previous work *les mots et les choses* (eng. *The order of things*) from 1966. In those works, he addresses how unities of statements can come into existence, i.e. how any form of confluence can arise from seemingly distinct statements creating a category that can not only be understood as such but itself be utilized for attaining knowledge (Guignion, 2022). To facilitate this line of thought one might use chemistry as an example. Whether we talk about Niels Bohr or John Dalton, we talk about chemistry. Although they lived within the same century and primarily covered the same topic (atoms), their understanding of this same subject is vastly different, yet we facilitate things by categorizing them both as chemists. This clumping together not only allows for advances within the field to occur (i.e. a structure of commonalities arises) but also enables outsiders to approach and study said field (Guignion, 2022). However for such different ideas and things to converge into one identifiable and understandable category we rely not only on an agreement about what *is* chemistry but – as Foucault might note – an agreement on what *is not* chemistry.

Such an aggregate, or using Foucault's terminology ‘discursive formation’ is fundamentally linked to society, given that it is a manifestation of the colloquial way of thinking about this topic (e.g. chemistry) within that society (S. Taylor, 2013). This could for example be seen in the reverence directed toward certain universities and their faculties which would let us grasp the notion that chemistry is not only accepted as a legitimate field of knowledge but one that is actively admired and held in high regard. On the other hand, we might note the way people talk about ‘chemicals’ in their food or the environment, and see that chemistry can also be perceived negatively, especially when taken out of the academic context. Through discourse analysis, we can then study these notions and connect them to underlying presuppositions that enable the respective mode of thought. Sticking to the above example, the high regard

directed toward chemistry at certain faculties might stem from our society's (unspoken) agreement that (1) higher education is desirable, (2) chemistry is a complicated subject, thus worthy of respect, or that (3) chemistry is beneficial for our lives (batteries, medication, pest control, ...). On the other hand, the negative aspects might be caused by our society's tendency to (1) regard chemicals as poisonous, thus (2) contrasting the 'chemical' with the 'natural'. Given our society tends to see 'natural' as positive and good for your health, (3) 'chemical' is perceived as bad for your health.

This type of analysis however is not only tied to natural sciences but can be applied to a vast array of topics and ideas<sup>5</sup>. This leads to a multitude of iterations each tailored to fit the needs of the subject analyzed. Next to "Foucaultian discourse analysis", there is critical discourse analysis (largely indebted to Ruth Wodak), the discourse-historical approach (Martin Reisigl), critical discourse studies i.e. the sociocognitive approach (Teun van Dijk), the dialectic-relational approach (Norman Fairclough), dispositive analysis (Siegfried Jäger, Florentine Mayer), and many more. Covering all of these would far exceed not only the scope of this thesis but also not all of them would be valid means of approaching a topic such as RWP. Therefore, instead of covering them in detail, I opt to highlight some of their similarities. Their primary commonalities lie in their focus on ...

- Naturally occurring language
- Beyond sentence grammar (i.e. units of speech larger than individual words or even sentences)
- The analysis of various "phenomena" arising from text, grammar, and language use
- Inclusion of non-verbal aspects
- The function of social contexts (Wodak & Meyer, 2014)

Therefore, independent of the particular iteration of discourse analysis, one can summarize that

"Discourse research involves the analysis of language data as evidence of social phenomena, theorizing language as communication, practice or selective constructions derived from accrued social meanings." (S. Taylor, 2013, p. 27)

### 1.4.3. Why Discourse Analysis?

Within this section, I would like to make my case for why Discourse analysis has been chosen as the methodological tool by which I want to analyze the RWP portrayal of CC.

Simply put I believe that one of the underlying objectives of a RWP narrative lies in the promotion of their views and interpretations with the end goal of affecting the norm around topics of interest, which in turn facilitates not only a continuous spread of the narrative but

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<sup>5</sup> Arguably Discourse Analysis particularly finds use within social sciences.

allows the populists to hold more power since, through acceptance and internalization, it becomes a viable source of knowledge generation. In the most basic sense, RWP claims an inherent socio-political/cultural struggle between the *good people* and the *corrupt elite*, which is further backed by a perceived egalitarian struggle commonly phrased through means of othering to incite an *us against them* mentality (Böhmelt, 2021; Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021; Ortu, 2015; Reusswig et al., 2020). This narrative, especially its maintenance, demands not only backing but a certain level of proliferation to become a viable mode of thought within a population. The proliferation of a RWP narrative is often achieved through speech, text, or other forms of public discourse thus lending themselves well to a discourse analytical approach. I am primarily interested in the portrayal of CC or rather the narrative surrounding CC as constructed through RWP. I believe that RWP has a vested interest in affecting how people talk about CC and how they understand its politicization. The end goal of this is to better fit CC into other narratives strung by the RWP framework, such as the aforementioned hierarchical (*good people vs. corrupt elite*) and egalitarian struggle (*us vs. them*). As covered in the previous chapter, following Foucaultian thought, the better understood a subject/entity becomes, the more categorized and simplified it becomes, and the more power can be exerted through/over it. Hence RWP tries to establish control over the CC narrative such that it can become a more dominant mode of thinking within the population. Through dissection and analysis of RWP text corpora, I hope to illustrate the ways by which the populists achieve such a feat. By analyzing discursive connection, the portrayal of relevant people, the environment from which the texts emerge, etc.. I hope to add transparency to what is understood when talking about “CC”, while embedded within a RWP discursive domain. Simply put I want to highlight not only how CC is portrayed, within the chosen corpus, but also what discursive logic leads to this stance, i.e. what is CC, what is positive/negative, and what the role of the state/individuum is. More detail is provided in “1.3 Research Questions”, as well as “2.5 Die Weltwoche”. The methodology will be covered in “3. Methodology”.

## 1.5 Positionality

My goal throughout this thesis is to address the arguments regarding CC, raised by *die Weltwoche*. Importantly this includes offering as adequate and accurate of a representation as possible, providing a steel-man argument of *Die Weltwoche*'s opinions, arguments, and comments concerning CC. An integral part of this is providing insights into my positionality to increase the transparency of this thesis. I want to highlight two specific categories; education and political orientation.

### 1.5.1 Education

Throughout my Bachelor’s, I’ve studied Geography as a major and Astronomy & Astrobiology as a minor. I’m currently doing my Master’s in Human-geography, with this thesis focusing on political geography. I highlight this to indicate that I see myself fit to address and comprehend arguments raised concerning CC. Particularly the scientific aspects through which we understand the veracity of CC should not get past me, i.e. critique that takes the form of CC denial is something I can easily address. However, this does not mean that I’m well-versed enough to identify fallacious reasoning if it is based on arguments outside my field of expertise. Given the nature of Environmental Policy, the arguments can revolve around economics, politics, philosophy, or other subjects and thus my coverage of them might be skewed.

Nonetheless, I intend to offer as objective of an analysis as I can, to provide an accurate representation of the arguments raised, without straw-manning *Die Weltwoche*.

1.5.2 Political Orientation

To further the transparency I want to offer some insights into my political orientation such that potential skewness of interpretation on my part might be better anticipated. This I find of particular importance given that *Die Weltwoche* aligns with right-wing conservatism which directly opposes my stance on politics. To illustrate this I’ve done a questionnaire on Swiss politics (<https://parteienkompass.ch>) to find my alignment with the different Swiss parties.

In summary, the Swiss political landscape is made up of seven major parties whose political orientation is displayed in Figure 2, alongside my personal position (blue dot). My closest party alignment (80.8%) is with the *SP* (*Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz*), marked by the red dot in Figure 2. Given that *Die Weltwoche* most closely aligns with the *SVP*, the party for which I have the least compatibility, I feel my interpretations might be affected by biases (e.g. confirmation bias, disconfirmation bias, partisan motivated reasoning, ...). As stated above, I intend to provide as accurate of an interpretation as possible and will actively consider if biases are clouding my judgment, however, getting rid of them




Figure 2 Swiss Political Landscape represented through party positions along left-right and liberal-conservative axes. The Blue dot represents my personal position according to <https://parteienkompass.ch>. The Red dot represents closest party affiliation. My overall party-compatibility was 80.8% SP, 78.3% GDP, 63.3% EVP, 61.7% GLP, 55.8% Mitte, 45.8% FDP, 31.7% SVP.

entirely is unrealistic and thus I felt that providing transparent insights into my political orientation will help the objectivity of this thesis by providing a metaphorical counterweight to my analysis. This alone however doesn't fit the entire picture. After discussing this with Prof. Korf, we've concluded that I need to further elaborate on my stance, especially regarding *Die Weltwoche*.

After gathering and analyzing the material for a year now, there is no other way of phrasing this than to admit that I've grown to despise *Die Weltwoche*. Throughout this year of work, I've never lost any long-term motivation, however, I've had to quit working for the day on multiple occasions, simply because I couldn't force myself into absorbing more of the vile, hateful, and frankly disgusting coverage provided in *Die Weltwoche*. I consider myself quite resistant to such commentary seeing as the political right has been of some interest to me over the last couple of years. I've heard a lot of bigoted, ill-structured, and hateful comments, but I've never forced myself to analyze them as thoroughly as I've done with this thesis. I want to stress that this does not apply to the entirety of *Die Weltwoche*, some articles and authors are perfectly fine and raise fair arguments. However others (e.g. Anabel Schunke, Linus Reichlin, Beat Gygi, Andreas Thiel, ...) I would consider to be legitimate threats to the sanity of *Die Weltwoche's* readers. I can only speak for myself, but once I had grown accustomed to the type of coverage provided by those authors, I felt – for the lack of a better word - despair as soon as I saw that the next article to analyze had been written by them.

As I've alluded to before, I intend to offer an objective analysis. However, it felt essential to clarify that I do not merely oppose the political stance of *Die Weltwoche* but have actively grown a severe disdain for a large portion of the corpus analyzed. Given that the entirety of the analysis has been structured by myself, paired with the subjectivity of discourse analysis in general, it is very evident to me that I might overinterpret some of the things being said or criticize implications that might not have been made. Thus I assume that if my analysis is skewed, it will be to the more extreme, i.e. I will portray *Die Weltwoche* as worse than it truly is.

## 2. Right-Wing Populism; Theory and background information

Populism as a phenomenon can take many forms and is thus difficult to unify under a comprehensive definition. One of the defining aspects of a populist regime/party/rhetoric is that it claims to be representative of the “will of the people” (Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021; Greven, 2018; Noury & Roland, 2020; Ortu, 2015). This generalization tends to display the political landscape as a dichotomy where the populist leader(s) stand representative of what “the people” want while contrasting views are directly opposed. Once a populist view has been expressed



*“...it is treated as a fixed, uniform and collective view that encapsulates the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the entire society and which can be understood and represented by a single leader or party in perpetuity” (Collins & Evans, 2019, p. 203)*

Insofar both a democratic regime and a populist regime are both a form of “rule by the people”, however, there is a distinct sociological division between the frameworks. In any working democracy the “will of the people” is to be represented. However, it is quintessential that (particularly) minority views are actively promoted in the participation of political and public discourse. Respect for minority views is expected to be upheld regardless of the political landscape.

In contrast, Populism tends to set aside the democratic principles that maintain respect for minorities, instead framing opposing views as something to be denounced (Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021; Noury & Roland, 2020). A rise in populism is consequently a potential risk present in any democratic regime. Once a party/leader starts to put too much weight on their own supporters and ignores or even actively denounces opposing/minority views the outcome can be an increasingly populist regime. Democracies have checks and balances in place that help to stabilize and protect a shift into a predominantly populist regime such as freedom of speech, a free press, a multiparty system, separation of legislative, judicial, and executive powers, and many more. However, a great danger of populism is that it tends to attack those very checks and balances. For this, we can turn to Donald J. Trump and his promotion of a “fake news” narrative. By constant reinforcement of this narrative, trust in media is slowly chipped away until a significant share of the population reaches the point where they distrust media (Collins & Evans, 2019). While one can’t pinpoint the beginning of such a shift, a moment worth highlighting is Trump’s inauguration, where he claimed – directly opposing clear, transparent photographic evidence – that his inauguration crowd far exceeded President Obama’s. Once confronted with this claim, his then-media correspondent Kellyanne Conway explained the now infamous “alternative facts”. While many see this as a moment only fit for ridicule, importantly this opinion is not universal. Among his followers, some accepted it. And once they accept such an evidently counterfactual claim, they were primed to believe more. Therefore I do not believe that this should be dismissed as some form of a foolish misstep, but rather as a quite intentional strategy. Collins and Evan (2019) phrased it quite distinctly by stating:

*“The idea of ‘alternative facts’ is intended to redefine the balance of power between the political leadership and independent experts when it comes to the production of truth.” (Collins & Evans, 2019, p. 211)*

If this had been an isolated incident I believe it would have fallen victim to public ridicule. However, the Trump administration kept doubling down, not only on this but on numerous other counterfactual claims, thereby establishing the fundament needed to sustain even more ludicrous statements, including Trump's counterfactual opposition to CC (Collins & Evans, 2019). While such views go against the scientific consensus, this becomes dangerously

irrelevant. If the will of the people is the highest priority, and scientific experts do not fall within this interpretation, the primed supporters are now ready to not only dismiss but actively oppose scientific experts. This brings us to a second fundamental characteristic that tends to be shared amongst populist narratives; critique of elites.

To more properly understand this I want to shed some light on the distinctions between left-wing populism (henceforth LWP) and RWP by covering their basic framework along egalitarian and hierarchical cleavages.

### 2.1 Left-wing and Right-wing Populism

To illustrate the basic framework along which populism operates we need to cover two divisional axes (Figure 2). The first distinction to be made is along the hierarchical cleavage. The *good people* are portrayed as the morally pure, common folk who stand in direct opposition to the *corrupt elite* who, detached from the regular population, prioritize their own interests over the common good (Ćetković & Hagemann, 2020; Jylhä & Hellmer, 2020).

Depending on the political orientation the corrupt elite can take different forms. Within a LWP narrative traditionally those would be financial/business elites. Bernie Sanders and his fight against the “1%” is an example of the corrupt elite through a LWP lens, where the corporate elite is hoarding the vast majority of wealth and using the good people as labor tools to maintain said wealth. The good people are excluded from proper participation in wealth accumulation through active top-down exclusionary mechanisms that perpetuate and maintain class structures to further the interests of business moguls.




Figure 3 Graphic illustration of a populist narrative framework. Inspired by Reusswig et al. (2020)

The second distinction to be made is along the egalitarian cleavage. Here an “Us against them” mentality takes hold which distinguishes two exclusionary groups. Importantly those groups are not the same as the division between the good people and the corrupt elites, but take place along egalitarian lines (Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021; Noury & Roland, 2020; Selk & Kemmerzell, 2021). Forms of othering become common rhetorical tools to distinguish between the perceived in-group and out-group (Greven, 2018). Sticking to the example of the US, Sanders’ LWP framework sees “them” as a group primarily distinct through political orientation or class. The conservative voters who go along with corporate interests, oppose increased taxation, and maintain oppressive business structures are the out-group. Importantly this doesn’t mean that they are the ones to blame. More often than not “they” are being manipulated by the elites to do their bidding for them. Bernie Sanders’ focus on class issues makes it quite clear that “they” aren’t the enemy, but a roadblock strengthened by the immense influence of corporate elites. This is quite indicative of why LWP is commonly referred to as social populism. In summary, this makes the hierarchical cleavage the severely predominant one in a LWP narrative framework. The egalitarian cleavage, while present, takes a secondary role and is of significantly less relevance.

Through a RWP lens, the corrupt elite (hierarchical cleavage) tends to take the form of political and/or bureaucratic elites (Böhmelt, 2021; Greven, 2018). The government is portrayed as betraying the interests of the good people (Küppers, 2022). The Trump presidency or rather the MAGA movement is indicative of the additional inclusion of Media elites who are seen as cooperating with the political elites through instrumentalization and promotion of their narrative (i.e. “Fake-News”). While the “elites” can differ, and the critique of elites is by no means exclusive to populism, it is an inherently defining characteristic, regardless of political leniency.

In stark contrast, RWP tends to define “them” along nationalist and/or cultural lines. For Trump’s MAGA movement, this can include migrants, homosexuals, communists, or any other iteration that stands in opposition to an evangelical, nationalist, and conservative worldview. The good people, therefore, become victims of the alliance between the establishment and social minorities, whose interests have been adopted by the former. Thus a symbiotic co-instrumentalization is perceived, where the corrupt elite uses the voting power of minority groups to keep their position, while “they” profit from the alliance through over-proportional political representation.

While both LWP and RWP operate along similar axes, their political leniency significantly alters the characterization of the underlying terminology. As such they manifest in different ways, focus on different topics, assign blame to different groups, and are overall quite distinct besides their common claim to be representative of the “will of the people”. This difference is insofar relevant as it helps me explain why I will be disregarding LWP for my thesis and instead focus on RWP. Specifically when it comes to topics like CC or rather environmentalism, the stances differ immensely. When measuring the impact of populist parties on Greenhouse gas (henceforth GHG) emissions a trend becomes visible where LWP parties tend to lower GHG

emissions, whereas RWP tends to increase them (Jahn, 2021b). While GHG emissions themselves are not indicative enough for a definitive statement I feel they imply the difference in political ideology that leads to such a distinction. This is enhanced by literature on the influence of RWP on environmentalism (Böhmelt, 2021; Huber et al., 2021; Jylhä et al., 2020; Lockwood, 2018; Ortu, 2015; Selk & Kemmerzell, 2021) who overwhelmingly find a distinct anti-environmentalism stance correlated with RWP. However, to claim RWP despises the environment would clearly be a misrepresentation. Instead, I argue that due to the political nature of environmentalism, specifically being a topic of interest among left-leaning parties, RWP tends to adopt an oppositional stance based on political reasoning (i.e. preference for a smaller government, less regulation, ... ).

In summary, I will be focusing solely on RWP. Firstly this is due to the common oppositional stance towards environmentalism/environmental policy (Böhmelt, 2021; Huber et al., 2021; Jahn, 2021b; Żuk & Szulecki, 2020) and secondly, because I feel that RWP alters the CC narrative to a severe degree by reshaping arguments raised regarding Environmentalism. To properly illustrate my second claim I want to return to the framework introduced in Figure 3 and expand upon it.




Figure 4 RWP narrative framework adapted from Figure 2

Due to the portrayal of the egalitarian and hierarchical cleavages a dichotomy arises where clear sides are drawn. On the one hand, we have the interaction of “Us” and “the good people” who make up the in-group or in other words the status quo. They are viewed as morally

superior and indicative of the will of the people. This In-group becomes an inherently allied structure where topics and concepts brought forth by in-group members tend to be viewed as the correct and desirable stance.

On the other hand, we find the out-group which is made up of the “corrupt elites” and “them/the others<sup>6</sup>”.

The out-group is not a mere opposition but is often portrayed as actively villainous making them enemies rather than opponents. This makes the out-group an adverse and strictly distinct demographic from the allied in-group. Through such a portrayal the relationships between them become more intertwined, raising a political conflict between “us” and the “corrupt elites” as well as a social conflict between the “good people” and “them”. This intertwined nature, while seeming to complicate things, I view as an absolute simplification of a worldview. By connecting the hierarchical and egalitarian separations an even stronger dichotomy arises simplifying the political landscape into a bipolar divide manifesting in a socio-political conflict between strictly adversary groups as can be seen in Figure 5.

This is one of the primary dangers around which I want to structure my thesis. I would argue that CC in itself is a scientific issue that is and should be debated within the academic discursive domain. However, given how democracies operate, it isn’t academia but politics that implements proposed solutions. Once we start addressing it through policy proposals, CC is integrated into the political discursive domain.

Here economy and politics play a predominant role in estimating the feasibility of the proposed environmental policy. However, I would argue that RWP simplifies the socio-political landscape to such a severe degree that scientific arguments (primary form within academic discourse), or even economic and political arguments (primary form within political discourse), while still relevant, take a secondary role. Instead,

I argue that within an RWP narrative domain, the source of the argument holds primary relevance, i.e. whether the argument originates from “allies” or “enemies” is detrimental in assessing its feasibility. In other words, once an argument originates from “enemies” it is high




Figure 5 Simplified model of the socio-political landscape as portrayed through RWP. The morally superior allies are struggling against the dominant enemies.

<sup>6</sup> Given the intense use of othering when addressing “them” I find “others” to be an arguably more fitting term than “them”. However, given the established terminology of an “Us against them mentality” I will stick to using “them”. Nonetheless I wanted to clarify that I view those terms as synonymous.

impossible to be accepted by the allies simply due to the nature of its origin, rather than a failure in argumentative logic.

## 2.2 USA vs. Europe

The US has sparked my initial interest in this subject matter through the rhetoric used by Trump and his MAGA movement. However, due to the immense diversity of populist movements, I had to decide on a more specific case rather than focusing on a generalized approach toward the influence of RWP on the CC narrative. I ended up focusing on a rather niche subset – the German speaking part of Switzerland – but I feel I need to elaborate on why I did so.

The USA is a rather well-studied country specifically regarding the use of misinformation in media and politics (Badrinathan, 2021). But this was only part of the reason why I did not want to focus on the United States. More importantly, I found that when looking at the US context I've encountered more of what I would classify as CC denial rather than opposition. As mentioned in part 1.2.4. I am much more interested in CC opposition rather than denial given that it does not presuppose a lack of understanding of CC-related matters but rather focuses on more reasonable critiques of environmental policies. While I would not claim that CC denial can not be found in the European context I feel that overwhelmingly European populists tend to accept the reality of CC and instead criticize (often fairly) policy proposals or governmental officials who push them. Examples such as US Congressman Inhofe walking into Congress (2015) with a snowball in hand thinking this disproves global warming, are hard to find in Europe.

Once I had decided to focus on Europe over the US the question remained on which RWP regime/party/outlet I would base my thesis on. RWP is very prevalent throughout Europe and seems to be gaining traction over the recent past (Greven, 2018; Lockwood, 2018; Noury & Roland, 2020). Multiple countries are regularly addressed when discussions revolve around RWP in Europe but importantly the diversity remains too large for a unified approach (Noury & Roland, 2020). While there are similarities that tie RWP together such as the “critique of elites” often being concentrated on the EU, and nativism and anti-pluralism manifesting in a generally adverse stance towards migration (particularly from Islamic countries), the specific iterations of European RWP remain heterogeneous as a whole (Buzogány & Četković, 2021; Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021; Greven, 2018; Ortu, 2015). Italy or Greece would have made for great case studies if I wanted to focus on immigration. Poland and Hungary would have made for great case studies if I wanted to focus on the deterioration of democracies under RWP regimes. Parties like the Rassemblement Nationale (until 2018 Front Nationale), the Alternative für Deutschland, or the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs would have made great case studies if I wanted to focus on political parties (specifically within a central European context). But then it struck me how few mentions of the Schweizer Volks Partei I've

encountered during my research<sup>7</sup>. This I found particularly interesting given that I would argue that the SVP is one of if not the most successful RWP parties in Europe, which might be precisely why they fly under the radar of common discussions regarding RWP in Europe. Switzerland seems to have an aura of success that clouds criticism, especially as long as more extreme countries (such as Poland or Hungary) remain at the center of discussion. The same seems to apply to political parties, i.e. as long as more extreme Parties (such as AfD, RN, or FPÖ) remain at the center of discussion, the SVP remains a comparably harmless specimen. Of particular interest in this regard are the FPÖ and the AfD given that they share not only a language but arguably more cultural context with Switzerland (at least the German speaking part of the country). Notable is that unlike the FPÖ or the AfD, the SVP is the dominant political party in its country, making it – relatively speaking – more successful.

## 2.3 Switzerland and the SVP

Switzerland is in many ways a success story and rightly held in high regard when it comes to the vast majority of issues. However, I feel this allows it to elude the mainstream conversation when it comes to certain topics. As mentioned above populism in Europe is a highly discussed topic, both in media and academic literature. However, due to the prevalence of more severe cases across Europe, the Swiss populists can often fly under the radar. Therefore I want to shine some light on the SVP which I would argue is one of if not the most successful RWP party in Europe.

This chapter will be separated into five sections, the first of which will serve as a historical overview of the party, i.e. its roots, and general political orientation. The second will cover the SVP's performance over the recent past within the bicameral political system of Switzerland. The third will be an overview of relevant demographics aimed at providing a clearer understanding of its voter base. The fourth section will be dedicated to highlighting some of the SVP's political stances as stated on their party website ([svp.ch](http://svp.ch)), and finally the fifth will be the dissection of a video produced by the SVP and uploaded to YouTube on May 16<sup>th</sup>, 2021 called "9 Jahre nach Corona" ("9 years after corona"). This video analysis is intended to provide some insights into narrative presuppositions and shall serve as a jumping board to segway into the discourse analysis of this thesis.

### 2.3.1 Roots and recent history of the SVP

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<sup>7</sup> Even specific searches yield far fewer results. E.g. Google Scholar provides 11'300 results for AfD AND Populism, 10'000 for RN AND Populism, 8'570 for FPÖ AND populism, but only 3'990 results for SVP AND populism. One simple explanation is that the SVP is less populist than the mentioned counterparts which I would largely agree with. Nonetheless, I view the SVP as clearly populist and arguably more efficient in spreading and maintaining its narrative within a large part of the population. Arguably this indicates a relative research gap when it comes to the Swiss iteration of Populism.

The SVP's roots go back to the *Bauern-, Gewerbe- und Bürgerpartei (BGB)* which officially became a Swiss political party in 1936. The BGB was a secession of the FDP that arose out of the increasing economic and political cleavage between farmers and small traders on the one hand and the industrial corporations on the other.

The 1980s were deciding formative years for the characterization and identification of the SVP in its modern iteration due to arising intraparty conflict between the relatively liberal wing of the party – primarily represented in the cantons Graubünden and Bern – and Zürich's cantonal party - led by arguably Switzerland's most famous politician Christoph Blocher – which took a more conservative stance on societal issues and foreign policy. The foreign policy aspect ended up being a deciding factor in determining the future of the party when the SVP passed its referendum against the EWR contract in 1992. This has since cemented the SVP as Switzerland's leading voice in opposing foreign policy relations with the EU<sup>8</sup>.

Since the 1990s the SVP has also crystalized its stance on other major political issues. Primarily a strong stance on foreigners and asylum seekers, Law and Order, the nuclear family, and lowering of taxes as well as state interventions and expenditure with exceptions for agriculture and the military.

By 1999 the SVP held the second-largest representation in the *Nationalrat*, only trailing behind the SP which they overtook in 2003, while also gaining a second seat in the *Bundesrat*. This is particularly relevant because this altered the long-upheld "Zauberformel"<sup>9</sup> that had been maintained in the Bundesrat for over four decades. The political shift toward a more conservative stance yielded great success in the form of increased political representation and influence which made less conservative voices within the party lose traction. This cumulated in the secession of the less conservative fraction of the SVP in 2008 through the foundation of the BDP (Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei).

This conservative stance further manifested in the recent past when the SVP shaped the Swiss political landscape regarding its stance on foreigners and migration by passing the initiatives "Zur Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer" (initiative "For the deportation of criminal foreigners") in 2010 and "Gegen Masseneinwanderung" (initiative "against mass-migration") in 2014.

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<sup>8</sup> The SVP is not strictly opposed to the EU but rather opposed to what they view as a submissive relation towards the EU. This stance becomes clear in the first of five points stated in the SVP's campaign pledge (SVP, 2019) which will be covered shortly.

<sup>9</sup> «Zauberformel» refers to the composition of the Bundesrat that had been maintained since 1959. The then leading parties (FDP, CVP, SP and SVP) agreed upon a governmental representation that took the form of 2:2:2:1. The FDP, CVP, and SP would each name two *Bundesräte* and the SVP one. In its modern iteration, following the resignations of Samuel Schmid and Evelin Widmer-Schlump, the SVP first held no seat, then in 2008 gained it back through the election of Ueli Maurer and finally reacquired its second seat in 2016 with the election of Guy Parmelin. Currently the "Zauberformel" remains 2:2:2:1 with the SVP and CVP (now Mitte) swapping places.



On August, 31<sup>st</sup> 2019 the SVP candidature gave a campaign pledge which should serve as an “up-to-date” reflection of the current foci of the party. I will translate the statements to the best of my capability<sup>10</sup>.

- I. We want Switzerland to be free. We do not want a contract of submission to the EU and no acknowledgment of foreign judges so that Swiss citizens remain capable of determining for themselves what they do or do not want.
- II. We want Switzerland to be safe. Our government must provide security without ifs and buts. Therefore violent criminals shall be harshly punished and criminal foreigners deported.
- III. We want Switzerland to be worth living in. We say no to exorbitant immigration and a 10-million-Switzerland so that we can continue living in a beautiful and intact home.
- IV. We want Switzerland to be cosmopolitan, and to foster relations with all nations across the globe. We will not be oppressed and we will not distribute even more billions to foreign countries, while our AHV is running out of money.
- V. We do not want new laws, restrictions, or regulations that increase taxes and fees for all. Because we want the middle-class to have more money in their pockets at the end of the month.

I highlight the campaign pledge for two reasons in specific. First, I want to provide the most honest representation of the SVP's stance and believe their own words to be the fairest approach. But second is its political rhetoric, i.e. its ability to say a lot and nothing at the same time. It is clear in its message and yet vague in its actualization, which makes it a perfect example of not only why I believe a discourse analysis to be a promising approach but also why I did not end up focusing on the SVP itself. I do not intend to go into more detail yet, given that discourse analysis as a concept will be covered in a separate section but I want to note the strong dichotomy between what is said and what might be implied. This interpretative range is nothing remarkable for political discourse given that an underlying goal remains to reach as many people as possible with its message. While the SVP is no stranger to being provocative in its messaging, a political party will think through the phrasing of such statements in great detail. This vagueness of political speech clouds the clarity of potentially generated knowledge, which is why I ended up basing my discourse analysis on *Die Weltwoche* instead, which I would argue is a more translucent representation of a remarkably similar political orientation, given that it is less bound by the general need for widespread political acceptance and can thus be more direct in its phrasing.

### 2.3.2 the SVP's Performance within the Swiss political system

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<sup>10</sup> Nonetheless, the original German phrasing can be found by following this link to verify the accuracy of my translation: <https://www.svp.ch/positionen/wahlversprechen/>

Within this section, I want to cover the general performance across the *Bundesrat*, *Ständerat*, and *Nationalrat*, in this order.

The *Bundesrat* is made up of seven seats and can be largely summarized by Consociationalism that manifests in some form of the Zauberformel (2:2:2:1). The only real deviation from this standard arose due to the success of the SVP over the recent past, where the traditional makeup was two seats for FDP, CVP, and SP and one for the SVP. In the 2003 elections, the SVP gained a seat at the cost of the CVP. While there was some fluctuation over the next years since the Election of Guy Parmelin in 2016 the SVP seems to have successfully shifted the makeup of the Zauberformel to a new 2:2:2:1 balance and has held two seats up to date.

When it comes to the bicameral system the SVP's performance is quite divided. Overall one could say that the SVP tends to do very well within the *Nationalrat* but relatively poorly within the *Ständerat*.

Figure 6 shows the composition of the Nationalrat over time. Of particular interest is the dark green line representing the SVP. Over the depicted period three phases stand out. The first is a relatively stable phase where the SVP slowly gained favor, almost reaching 15% of the seats (1971-1995), the second is marked by a steep incline more than doubling its presence in the Nationalrat and becoming the majority party in 2001, a position they hold to date. The third phase is marked by some turbulence around this newfound popularity.




Figure 6 Party strength in the Nationalrat from 1971-2019, color-coded. Graph taken from <https://parteienkompass.ch/de/parteien/entwicklung>

Of particular interest to me is the shift from the 2015 to 2019 compositions which was marked by an unprecedented decline in power for the SVP, mostly losing votes at the cost of the increasing popularity of the GPS (Grüne Partei Schweiz) and the glp (grünliberale Partei). I view this as essential when it comes to the formation of attitudes regarding CC or rather

Environmentalism. While the glp is a fair bit more left-leaning than the GPS, both are fundamentally liberal which makes them directly opposed to the right-conservative nature of the SVP. This does not imply that these parties must stand on opposite sides of an argument, but they are more likely to do so on most issues. Given that Environmentalism is a key issue for both the glp and the GPS the potential for party-motivated reasoning arises, where attitudes might be shaped to oppose environmental policy based on its political origin rather than its scientific, economic, or social merit.

Overall the SVP has been very successful in the Nationalrat maintaining its position as the primary party since its acquisition. This can largely be attributed to the voting systems in place. The 200 seats in the Nationalrat are distributed by proportional representation. Given the SVP’s popularity and its relative isolation as the sole right-wing conservative party in the Swiss political landscape, this commonly results in a dominant performance within the Nationalrat. The same can not be said for the Ständerat whose 46 seats are distributed by a majority system, where each canton gets two seats (with half cantons given one seat each). This manifests in the SVP holding relatively fewer seats in the Ständerat.





Figure 7 Party strength in the Nationalrat from 1971-2019, color-coded. Graph taken from <https://parteienkompass.ch/de/parteien/entwicklung>

Figure 7 depicts the relative composition of the Ständerat over the same period as Figure 6. Notably the first two phases mentioned in Figure 6 can also be seen in Figure 7, with a relatively stable level of popularity, followed by a decent although less severe incline over the 1991-2003 period. The aforementioned third phase played out quite differently. While continuously gaining seats in the Nationalrat until 2007, the SVP peaked in 2003 in the Ständerat. After the decline stabilized, the SVP managed to gain seats in the Ständerat from

2015-2019, the same period that marked an unprecedented decline for the party in the Nationalrat.

In summary, one can say that the SVP has always found decent success in both of Switzerland's governmental chambers, but tends to perform better under proportional elections (i.e. better performance in the Nationalrat) than they do under a majority system (i.e. worse performance in the Ständerat). The party's strength has significantly increased compared to premillennial performance, and although it has suffered some setbacks over the recent past, the SVP is clearly an essential and highly successful player within the Swiss political landscape.

### 2.3.3 SVP's Voter Profile



Quelle: Bundesamt für Statistik (BFS), Statistik der Wahlen und Abstimmungen  
© Bundesamt für Statistik, ThemaKart, Neuchâtel 2010-2019

Figure 8 SVP party strength during 2019 Nationalrat election, based on municipalities. This Map was taken from <https://parteienkompass.ch/de/parteien/portrait/svp>

This section aims to go over some key demographics to portray a better picture of the average SVP voter. This will be done based on data from the 2019 Nationalrat election given both its availability and recency. These elections were marked by an unprecedented loss for the SVP, decreasing its proportion of votes by 3.8% and losing 12 seats. Nonetheless, the SVP remained the party with the largest voter proportion at 25.6%.

Firstly I want to highlight the geographic distribution of the voter base given the apparent divide between the urban and the rural parts of Switzerland. Figure 8 shows the distribution

and strength of SVP votes during the 2019 Nationalrat election. Of particular note is the strong dichotomy between the larger cities and the agglomeration and rural regions, with the proportion of votes differing by over 40% in some cases.

The following Figures (taken from [Parteienkompas.ch](https://www.parteienkompas.ch), n.d.), based on an election survey by Select) shall serve to further elaborate on the socioeconomic distribution of the SVP's voter base based on Sex (Figure 9), Age (Figure 10), confession (Figure 11), education (Figure 12), employment (Figure 13), professional position (Figure 14), occupational sector (Figure 15), household income (Figure 16) and region (Figure 17). The voting proportion of 25.6% is indicated in each of the graphs in the form of a dotted line. All figures are grouped for ease of access on pages 23-25.

Figure 9 shows that out of all the women who voted during the 2019 elections, 22.7% of them voted for the SVP, and out of all men who voted, 29.1% voted for the SVP. This indicates quite a significant gap between sexes, with the male vote dominating the female proportion by 6.4% and deviation from the average reaching -3.1% for women and +3.5% for men.

Figure 10 separates the voter base into seven age divisions and indicates that voting proportion seems to correlate with age. All brackets above the age of 55 performed above the average of 25.6%, while none of the brackets below the age of 55 managed to surpass the average. The range is quite significant with the best performing group (age 65-74) reaching 30.5% (+4.9% above average) while the least performing group (age 25-34) only reaches 19.7% (-5.8% below average).

Figure 11 alludes to the confession of the voter base and indicates that the SVP does best among the protestant population with 30.2% of protestant votes going to the SVP (+4.6% above average). Confessionless and catholic voters tend to favor the SVP in the same. Outside those confession groups, the SVP does not perform quite as well with only 13.9% of "others" voting for them.

Figure 12 distinguishes seven levels of education, ranging from obligatory school to university. Voter representation seems to be negatively correlated with the level of education, with education around "Berufsmaturität/DMS/FMS" being the cutoff. Peculiar outliers are the "Höhere Berufsbildung/Höhere Fachschule" where the fraction spikes to 25.9%. and the obligatory school whose proportion is far lower than that of "Berufslehre". The Range is quite significant with the best-performing demographic being "Berufslehre" at 39.9% (24.3% above average) and the least-performing being "Universität/ETH" at only 11.0% (15.6% below average).

Figure 13 indicates a gap between voters who are still in training (14.2%) or are working under part-time employment (17.6%) and voters who are working full-time (28.2%) or pensioners (30.1%), meaning the deviation reaches from -11.4% below to +4.5% above the average value.

Figure 14 indicates a strong preference amongst self-employed individuals (38.2%), with other employment statuses hovering around similar values (ranging from 23.2%-25.1%). Here the

deviation is positively skewed given that values only reach -2.4% below but reach +12.6% above the average value.

Figure 15 shows that the SVP does well amongst voters employed in the private sector (29.9%), does worse among the mixed (17.7%) and public (16.3%) sectors, and struggles with voters employed for Non-profit organizations (5.9%). The value range is negatively skewed ranging from -19.7% below to +4.3% above the average value.

Figure 16 shows the most diversity given that there is no apparent trend, i.e. the proportion of voters when distinguished by household income fluctuates quite significantly. While the least-earning category (people with negative household income, i.e. expenditures exceed income) is an absolute maximum (37.5%) the highest-earning category (15'001+ CHF) is a relative maximum (20.7%). The values range from -10.3% below to +11.9% above the average value.

Figure 17 reestablishes what was shown in Figure 9, i.e. that the SVP performs significantly worse amongst cities than it does in the agglomeration and the countryside.

In summary, the stereotypical SVP voter would be a male protestant pensioner who did a "Berufslehre" and worked self-employed in the private sector, currently living on a (below) average household income outside the city. While this generalization fails to encapsulate the voter base's inherent diversity, I felt it worth mentioning given that it is a collection of its best-performing demographics.

Consequently, I will not be going into a more elaborate discussion of these datasets but rather wanted to mention them to offer some objective insights into not only key demographics but also their severity and range, particularly given that some are more indicative than others. Instead, I want to turn to the next section, where I want to cover the "Umwelt" ("environment") part of the SVP's "Parteiprogram 2023 bis 2027". Nonetheless, I want to highlight specific aspects I deem relevant for gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the underlying narrative structures spun by the SVP's rhetoric. I argue this is essential because a solitary focus on CC or even Environmentalism and Environmental Policy is to narrow a lens to properly comprehend the entirety of the intertwined narrative structure surrounding CC. This is of particular importance due to the nature of RWP which I argue inherently tends to simplify issues through its bipolar worldview. In other words, attitudes toward certain topics become more influenced by attitudes toward other topics, because the RWP narrative preemptively structures them in a binary manner.

Figure 9 SVP vote proportion by Sex (Nationalratswahlen 2019). The dotted line represents the average voterproportion of 25.6% and is depicted in all graphs. All graphs (Figures 11-18) were taken from [Parteienkompass.ch](https://parteienkompass.ch/de/parteien/portrait/svp?activeTabIndex=1&showOrganizationSmartspider=false&showVoterSmartspider=false), (n.d.), and can be retrieved at <https://parteienkompass.ch/de/parteien/portrait/svp?activeTabIndex=1&showOrganizationSmartspider=false&showVoterSmartspider=false>




Figure 10 SVP vote proportion by Age (Nationalratswahlen 2019).




Figure 11 SVP vote proportion by confession (Nationalratswahlen 2019).




Figure 12 SVP vote proportion by education (Nationalratswahlen 2019).




Figure 13 SVP vote proportion by employment (Nationalratswahlen 2019)




Figure 14 SVP vote proportion by occupational position (Nationalratswahlen 2019)






Figure 15 SVP vote proportion by occupational sector (Nationalratswahlen 2019)




Figure 16 SVP vote proportion by household income (Nationalratswahlen 2019)





Figure 17 SVP vote proportion by region (Nationalratswahlen 2019).



### 2.3.4. SVP's Stance on the Environment

This segment will offer some insights into the SVP's official positions regarding the environment as stated in their "Parteiprogramm 2023 bis 2027"<sup>11</sup> (SVP Schweiz, 2023).

The entirety of the corpus is 130 pages long, with the section on the environment covering pages 81-85. While neither order nor length of segments strictly implies a hierarchy of relevance, I believe they are somewhat indicative, given that other major topics such as "Aussenpolitik" (foreign policy), "Finanzen, Steuern und Abgaben" (finances, taxes, and levies), "Energie" (energy), "Ausländerpolitik" (migration politics), "Asylpolitik" (asylum politics), "Sicherheit und Ordnung" (safety and order) and "Landwirtschaft" (agriculture) all precede the segment on the environment while also being elaborated upon in greater detail (up to double the length).

The "Environment" contains six subchapters:

1. title page: «Eine Lebenswerte Umwelt für heute und morgen»<sup>12</sup>
2. «Schweiz steht mustergültig dar»<sup>13</sup>
3. «Aufgaben eines sinnvollen Umweltschutzes»<sup>14</sup>
4. «Umweltschutz nicht den linken überlassen»<sup>15</sup>
5. «Sozialismus als grösste Umweltkatastrophe»<sup>16</sup>
6. «Standpunkte»<sup>17</sup>

I intend to go over them individually, with a focus on the implications inherent in the texts. While a clear narrative can hardly be extrapolated, due to the limited amount of text, I will present the intentions as I interpret them, after a year-long confrontation with RWP text corpora. Throughout this thesis, I believe enough evidence is provided to retroactively affirm my reading of the intentions alluded to through chosen rhetoric.

#### **Title page: «Eine Lebenswerte Umwelt für heute und morgen»**

Sets off with a positive appeal to the necessity of the environment and that it is in everyone's favor to protect it. They note that individual action and following the science yield the best results. Then they note that leftist prohibitionism and fundamentalist state and educational coercion are bad advisors and that voluntariness and moderation are preferable. While this is

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<sup>11</sup> Retrievable at [https://www.svp.ch/wp-content/uploads/230509\\_Parteiprogramm.pdf](https://www.svp.ch/wp-content/uploads/230509_Parteiprogramm.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> "An environment worth living in for today and tomorrow"

<sup>13</sup> "Switzerland is exemplary"

<sup>14</sup> "tasks of sensible environmental protection"

<sup>15</sup> «Environmental protection not left to the left»

<sup>16</sup> "Socialism as the greatest environmental disaster"

<sup>17</sup> «Viewpoints»

a somewhat expected stance from a right-wing conservative party I find the addition of a quote to the title page adds transparency towards its populist leniency. While the SVP promotes following science and chooses a scientist to quote, two things need to be highlighted. Firstly, the scientist quoted is an engineer, thus a peculiar choice for the lead quote on the “environment”. While carrying a major role in the solving of environmental issues, it is noteworthy that the SVP hasn’t chosen an environmentalist of some form<sup>18</sup>. The second is the quote itself:

*«Die unkontrollierte Zuwanderung zerstört unsere einzigartige Natur: Jedes Jahr muss Platz für 55'000 neue Haushalte geschaffen werden. Durch die Zubetonierung verschwinden Grünflächen, Naherholungsgebiete und wertvolles Ackerland. Sagen wir deshalb jetzt Nein zur 10-Millionen Schweiz – unserer Umwelt zuliebe!»* (SVP Schweiz, 2023, p. 81)

The first thing the SVP chooses to highlight when it comes to the environment is to shift the blame on migrants who come and “destroy” our unique nature. While it is true that more citizens equate to more energy consumption and the need for expanding infrastructure, the means of othering are quite transparent due to the wording used. They (the migrants) are coming to *destroy* our unique nature. A phrasing that not only separates the migrants from the Swiss citizenry but also does so by indirectly appealing to patriotic lines, i.e. our “unique nature”.

### **“Schweiz steht mustergütig dar”**

This segment is introduced by noting that the sole reason for Switzerland's declining GHG emissions is the autonomous action of the economy and citizenry, achieved *despite* the evergrowing population (due to migration) and without a culture of prohibition and paternalism. The next section of the segment can be summarized as a case of whataboutism, comparing Switzerland to Eastern Europe and proclaiming that Switzerland's GHG emissions make up only around 1% of the global output (which is a peculiar claim given that Switzerland makes up around 1% of the global population). Finally, they address the decline in agricultural areas and blame it on *excessive water protection* (“*übermässiger Gewässerschutz*” (SVP Schweiz, 2023, p. 82)) and the expansion of forest area (both metrics that might not be expected to be seen as negative, particularly in a segment that appeals to Swiss exceptionalism).

### **«Aufgaben eines sinnvollen Umweltschutzes»**

In summary, they state that the SVP sees “sustainability” as the maintenance of the lasting and unabated performance of our environment regarding its safety, health, and utility

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<sup>18</sup> My assumption is that the primary reason is that “*Environmental experts*” are seen as part of the problem. This will be reevaluated within the results section.

function. This segment is rather short and offers a typical case of political speech, i.e. saying a lot without saying anything.

### «Umweltschutz nicht den linken überlassen»

This segment serves to position the SVP as the party that “actually cares” about the environment while accusing other parties of hypocrisy, incompetence, or ulterior motives. This is best exemplified by the introductory sentence:

«Die SVP vertrat schon grünes Gedankengut, als die Grünen ihr rotes Gedankengut noch nicht zu verstecken versuchten. Der Umweltschutz ist ein zu wichtiges Anliegen, um es den Linken und Grünen zu überlassen.» (SVP Schweiz, 2023, p. 83).

Other parties (i.e. left & green) are blamed for a *constant state of hysteria* regarding CC, acidic rain, forest decline, particulates, ozone, etc. while never having solved any problems on their own. (SVP Schweiz, 2023, p. 83)

Some “proper solutions” are offered (e.g. technological progress) and the claim is raised that prices, prohibitions, and limitations are incapable of progressing environmental protection. Towards the segment’s end, a peculiar statement is offered:

«Unser Logo bleibt auch grün, wenn man daran kratzt. Bei allen anderen erscheint früher oder später die Farbe Rot» (SVP Schweiz, 2023, p. 84).

This in itself is not as telling, given that red typically stands for social democracy, however, due to the following segment it becomes clear that the political opposition is not perceived as social democrats, but rather as socialists.

### «Sozialismus als grösste Umweltkatastrophe»

This segment is introduced through the means of othering. This time it is not directed against migrants, but rather against the *Grüne* party, whose members live in *trendy cities and agglomerations*, while the SVP knows about the value of our rural areas. This appeals to the significant urban-rural divide (SVP doing exceptionally well in rural areas, and tends to be ill-represented in cities). They address the farmers and their families who for generations have kept our environment intact and relate them to the SVP’s voter base. This is contrasted with the *Grüne* politicians who are equated to socialists, comparable to China, Venezuela, or the USSR. Finally, the segment ends with the following phrase:

«Kein Wunder also, wählen Umweltpraktiker nicht die Grünen. Denn die bislang nachhaltigste Katastrophe für die Umwelt trägt einen Namen. Und der heisst Sozialismus.» (SVP Schweiz, 2023, p. 84)

## “Standpunkte”

This segment offers bullet points on what the SVP stands for regarding the environment and how they hope to achieve this, while also offering a short list of “benefits” offered through the SVP’s agenda, portrayed in Figure 18. Of particular noteworthiness, I find the appeal against migration, the clear statement that *any* new or increased duties, fees, and taxes within environmental and climate policy are to be opposed, as well as the first “benefit” offered, which is “less ideology and fearmongering”. This last point I view as rather indicative of the SVP’s position regarding CC as exaggerated and part of a leftist agenda that uses the mentioned tools to achieve its goals through indoctrination and fear.

### Standpunkte

#### Die SVP ...

- befürwortet sinnvolle Bestrebungen zur Erhaltung, Wiederherstellung und Verbesserung der natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen im Einklang mit der Umwelt und der Landwirtschaft;
- steht ein für geeignete Massnahmen im Bereich Raumplanung, Gewässerschutz, Luftreinhaltung sowie für eine damit zusammenhängende unabhängige, wirtschaftliche und umweltfreundliche Energiepolitik;
- widersetzt sich der Musealisierung der Landschaft durch überbordende Schaffung subventionierter Naturparks oder Schutzzonen mit bürokratischen Auflagen für Landwirtschaft, Gewerbe, Tourismus und betroffene Regionen;
- will, dass die negativen Folgen der Zuwanderung auf die Bodenversiegelung, die Infrastruktur, den Energie- und Wasserverbrauch, die (CO<sub>2</sub>-)Emissionen usw. mitberücksichtigt werden;
- fordert eine Anpassung des Raumplanungsgesetzes, mit dem Ziel, den Kantonen ihre verfassungsmässige Kompetenz über die Raumplanung zurückzugeben, damit alle Regionen genügend Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten haben;

- wehrt sich gegen jegliche neuen oder die Erhöhung bestehender Abgaben, Gebühren und Steuern im Bereich der Umwelt- und Klimapolitik;
- befürwortet steuerliche Anreize im Umwelt- und Klimabereich, zum Beispiel einen 100-prozentigen Steuerabzug beim Heizungs- und Boilerersatz.

#### + Vorteile

##### Das bringt mir:

- ✓ als Bürger weniger Ideologie und Panikmache;
- ✓ als Familie eine intakte und saubere Umwelt, auch für unsere Nachkommen;
- ✓ als Investor mehr Planungssicherheit und weniger Bürokratie bei der Realisierung von Projekten;
- ✓ als Gewerbetreibendem und Bauern weniger Auflagen und mehr Freiraum in meiner unternehmerischen Tätigkeit.

Figure 18 Summarized Viewpoints of the SVP regarding the environment. Excerpt taken from (SVP Schweiz, 2023, p.85). The original within context is retrievable at [https://www.svp.ch/wp-content/uploads/230509\\_Parteiprogramm.pdf](https://www.svp.ch/wp-content/uploads/230509_Parteiprogramm.pdf)

By and large, the SVP’s narrative surrounding CC (or rather environmentalism) is largely portrayed through means identifiable as RWP. However, it is impervious to note, that this segment in itself is hardly enough to properly identify such a narrative. While this is the official position of the SVP, it is phrased in such a manner, that the underlying narrative is hidden behind their more overt standpoints. Consequently, one more body of evidence shall be provided to add transparency to some key issues revolving around CC. For this, we turn to the next segment, in which the video “9 Jahre nach Corona” (SVP Schweiz, 2021) will be covered.

### 2.3.5. "9 Jahre nach Corona"

This segment covers a YouTube video<sup>19</sup> uploaded to the official account "SVP Schweiz" (<https://www.youtube.com/@svpch>), which was uploaded in response to the "CO2 Initiative"<sup>20</sup>. It is presented in a Swiss dialect, but German subtitles are given and thus those will be used for representation. A closer inspection of audio and visual cues throughout the video eludes proper translation into text. Therefore this segment's intent is primarily to cover the video based on what is being said (and implied). Nonetheless, they are essential for the atmosphere aimed at and the narrative constructed. The video is a short dialogue between a father and his son, covering a rather broad array of issues. Therefore I opt to first highlight audio and video cues in the introduction of the video, then present what was said, and finally go over the content, covering the implications raised and the narrative constructed through chosen rhetoric.

It opens with slow and somber music playing, while the camera pans over the living/dining room. In the background (later a close-up shot is given) we see the portraits of Simonetta Sommaruga (former Bundesrat, SP politician), Alain Berset (current Bundesrat, not running again in 2023, SP politician), and Balthasar Glättli (president of the glp) framed in a style much akin to the portraits of communist leaders/dictators such as Kim Jong Un and Kim Jong Il, or Mao Zedong, utilizing the "rising sun" imagery as can be seen in Figure 19.



Figure 19 Juxtaposition in the portrayal of leading Swiss left-wing politicians, in the SVP's video "9 Jahre nach Corona" (top-left), with that of communist leaders/dictators like Mao Zedong (bottom-left), Kim Jong Il (top-right) and Kim Jong Un (bottom-right).

This is a deliberate choice to set the mood while also giving strong implications for the type of leadership the SVP expects from its political adversaries. Interestingly enough the video is structured in such a manner that it can effectively be read as a steel-man argument from the SVP, portraying what they believe to be the outcome if the green and left-leaning parties take charge of future developments in Switzerland. To get a clearer picture we turn to the dialogue itself. I used the subtitles from the video and marked the speakers as S (son) and F (father).

<sup>19</sup> the video can be retrieved using the following link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4NwMxdt0ZQ>

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/abstimmungen/20210613/co2-gesetz.html>

**S:** «Ich musste heute morgen schon kalt duschen, in der Schule war es auch kalt, funktionieren die Scheiss-Heizungen wieder nicht?»

*\*gets tablet\**

«Und der Akku ist auch leer!»

**F:** «Du weisst ja, wenn es zu wenig windet produziert das Windrad zu wenig Energie.»

**S:** «Können wir denn nicht anders heizen?»

**F:** «Konnten wir noch bis letztes Jahr, jetzt ist es aber verboten. Ausserdem können wir uns das gar nicht mehr leisten.»

**S:** «Aber Mutter hat doch wegen der Frauenquote nun einen Job im Management, deshalb ist sie doch ständig fort, nicht?»

**F:** «Ja sie verdient schon viel, aber 60% davon gehen als Steuern an den Staat.»

**S:** «Uff...»

*\*puts on jacket\**

**F:** «Auch du wirst noch früh genug merken, dass nicht alles dir gehört was du bekommst.»

**S:** «Warum arbeitest du eigentlich nicht?»

**F:** «Tja, weisst du, die Branche, in der ich damals die Ausbildung gemacht habe, die gibt es seit Corona nicht mehr.»

*\*camera turns focus to Alain Bersait's portrait in the background\**

**S:** «... anderes Thema: Wie sieht es mit Ferien aus?»

**F:** «Das habe ich dir doch schon einmal erklärt! Seit Corona müssen alle mehr Steuern zahlen und seit wir mit dem CO<sub>2</sub>-Gesetz etwas für das Klima tun, fliegen wir nicht mehr und das Autofahren wird demnächst auch verboten und überhaupt, zuhause ist es doch auch schön!»

**S:** «Aber Habte und seine Familie besuchen doch auch zwei Mal pro Jahr die Grossmutter in Eritrea und sie leben von Sozialhilfe, wie kann das sein?»

**F:** «Sprich nicht so! Das sind Flüchtlinge. Und wir sind solidarisch mit Ihnen!»

**S:** «Wie auch immer. Lukas' Vater sagte schon immer, dass wir nur so arm dran sind, weil ihr früher die Grünen und die Linken gewählt habt!»

**F:** *\*stares directly into the camera for multiple seconds\**

*\*text fades in\**

«Auch gegen linke Bevormundung? NEIN zum CO<sub>2</sub>-Gesetz. SVP, die Partei des Mittelstands»

The dialogue in this video is quite indicative of some issues raised by the SVP and how they are seen as related.

**S:** «Ich musste heute morgen schon kalt duschen, in der Schule war es auch kalt, funktionieren die Scheiss-Heizungen wieder nicht?»

*\*gets tablet\**

«Und der Akku ist auch leer!»

**F:** «Du weisst ja, wenn es zu wenig windet produziert das Windrad zu wenig Energie.»

The initial issue is the lack of energy due to an exaggerated (sole?) reliance on wind turbines for energy generation. In this portrayal, the energy is so inefficient, that the heating systems of both the school and the home are out of order, and the electronic devices are not charged, implying a severe lack of energy that spans both the public sector (i.e. the school) and the private household (i.e. home heating and personal electronic devices). Given the current availability of both the implication is clear that a once-stable system has been disrupted and things we take for granted now are going to vanish under the imagined leadership.

**S:** «Können wir denn nicht anders heizen?»

**F:** «Konnten wir noch bis letztes Jahr, jetzt ist es aber verboten. Ausserdem können wir uns das gar nicht mehr leisten.»

This part addresses the felt prohibitionism applied by the left, which as the video implies led to vehicular transport being outlawed, followed by the statement that they couldn't afford it anyways. This once again implies a stark contrast between how it is now (where driving is legal and the Swiss citizenry can still afford everyday commodities) and how it will be under the imagined leadership. The lack of financial means is further elaborated in the next segment.

**S:** «Aber Mutter hat doch wegen der Frauenquote nun einen Job im Management, deshalb ist sie doch ständig fort, nicht?»

**F:** «Ja sie verdient schon viel, aber 60% davon gehen als Steuern an den Staat.»

**S:** «Uff...»

*\*puts on jacket\**

**F:** «Auch du wirst noch früh genug merken, dass nicht alles dir gehört was du bekommst.»

Here we learn that the mother has got a management position due to gender quotas being implemented, which is why she is always gone. This invokes a couple of different implications. Firstly the Mother is given a job while the father is at home which goes against conservative gender roles and the image of a nuclear family as it is commonly portrayed under conservative leniency. Secondly, we learn that the reason the mother got the job was not her qualification for the job but rather her gender. This implies that “gender issues” outrank quality perceptions which might hint at why the “current” state of affairs – as they are being portrayed in the



video – is as dire. Thirdly the fact that the mother is always gone could be interpreted as to further imply that traditional family structures are being disrupted by the new operational framework. Fourth is the implication that even while holding a management position the family can barely afford heating or driving (as alluded to in the aforementioned segment), given that there is a 60% income tax. I find it worth noting that no insights are offered regarding taxation, i.e. why it is so high or where it ends up. This might be due to the length of the video, but I felt it worth noting given that the SVP is typically against taxation and the absence of an explanation is likely purposeful since this further amplifies the notion that taxes are rather the state robbing you, than a monetary collection system for the benefit of society by and large. This notion finds further backing through the father implying that the son will eventually learn that not all that he gets belongs to himself.

**S:** «Warum arbeitest du eigentlich nicht?»

**F:** «Tja, weisst du, die Branche, in der ich damals die Ausbildung gemacht habe, die gibt es seit Corona nicht mehr.»

This section turns to the question of why the father is unemployed. We learn that his occupational expertise no longer exists “since Corona”. A more detailed explanation is not given, thus it is hard to formulate a properly educated reading of this segment. However, two things are worth highlighting.

First is the Swiss educational system or rather the “Lehre” (vocational training) segment of it. In Switzerland, the vast majority of the population does not pursue higher education (BFS, 2023). Instead, the Swiss are commonly (and rightly so) proud of their work-oriented “Lehrsystem” which enables children to enroll in vocational training that primes them for work within a specific field, which leaves Switzerland with a relatively larger portion of its citizenry having “Sekundarstufe II” level education (Figure 20). This appeals to the vast majority of the Swiss citizenry and is likely to be the path the father pursued. Consequently, the father's statement adds to the relatively common notion of redundant sectors in a modern-day economy (e.g. due to automation) by adding a hint of patriotic relatability.




Figure 20 Educational niveau of Swiss working population in 2022. Graph was taken from the Swiss Bundesamt für Statistik. The original can be retrieved at <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/erwerb/erwerbstaetigkeit-arbeitszeit/merkmale-arbeitskraefte/bildungsniveau.html>

The second thing I found worth noting is the vagueness of the Corona explanation. While it is unclear how exactly the pandemic leads to the father's job becoming redundant, the SVP has often portrayed corona-specific policy issues as the government overstepping its boundaries resulting in the loss of personal freedom<sup>21</sup>. Paired with the implied prohibitionism exerted by the left it is likely to assume that the father's occupation hasn't per se become redundant but has rather become prohibited by the imagined leadership, which is further supported by the camera zooming into Alain Bersait's portrait in the background.

**S:** «... anderes Thema: Wie sieht es mit Ferien aus?»

**F:** «Das habe ich dir doch schon einmal erklärt! Seit Corona müssen alle mehr Steuern zahlen und seit wir mit dem CO<sub>2</sub>-Gesetz etwas für das Klima tun, fliegen wir nicht mehr und das Autofahren wird demnächst auch verboten und überhaupt, zuhause ist es doch auch schön!»

Here we get multiple reasons why vacations have changed under the imagined leadership. Firstly the monetary aspect is reiterated stating that due to increased taxation (since the pandemic) the family in question likely can not afford to go on vacation (at least abroad, as implied by the last sentence "... zuhause ist es doch auch schön!". Secondly, the CO<sub>2</sub> initiative is blamed for restricting air travel. Interestingly it is not strictly the monetary aspect that gets raised (even though the acceptance of the CO<sub>2</sub>-Initiative would have increased prices for air travel (BAFU, 2021)) but rather the implication "seit wir [...] etwas für das Klima tun" shifting the blame towards being proactive towards CC. This is followed up by the soon-to-be-implemented prohibition of personal vehicular transport further reiterating the expected leftist prohibitionism.

**S:** «Aber Habte und seine Familie besuchen doch auch zwei Mal pro Jahr die Grossmutter in Eritrea und sie leben von Sozialhilfe, wie kann das sein?»

**F:** «Sprich nicht so! Das sind Flüchtlinge. Und wir sind solidarisch mit Ihnen!»

This section is of particular importance given that it utilizes an "us against them" mentality. It not only mentions that the foreigners living in Switzerland live under some form of special treatment by implying that they can afford what remains restricted to the Swiss citizenry but also portrays them as parasitic, i.e. living off the Swiss welfare system. As the son questions how this is possible, the father doesn't offer a proper explanation but rather highlights that they are refugees and proclaims solidarity with them. While out of context this might carry a different meaning, within the established framework of the migrants living off of the Swiss welfare system, while being granted benefits that the Swiss are excluded from, the implication is clear that this ought to be the portrayal of a dogmatic leftist slogan, where foreigners (especially refugees) are not to be questioned. This is likely a reference to what the SVP feels is already happening, i.e. that one can not criticize refugees, no matter the reasoning behind

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<sup>21</sup> While I will not be going over a more detailed Corona narrative I recommend Maxie Bernhard's thesis (Bernhard, 2021) on the Swiss narrative surrounding the pandemic.

it. This pairs with the Covid narrative where the left-leaning part of the society called for nationwide vaccinations articulated through a call for solidarity, which the right-leaning part of society often opposed based on the argumentative logic of individual freedom. Combining the two implies that those that do not oblige with the leftist worldviews are branded as egoistical and racist, without hearing out their arguments. Therefore the son gets shut down by this dogmatic phrase, rather than a proper explanation of how it can be that a family of refugees, living off welfare, can afford multiple vacations abroad, whereas the Swiss family can't even though the mother is employed in a management position. Delving deeper into the reasoning behind this would offer a more accurate and insightful reading of what is being implied, but sadly this is not given. Nonetheless following this argument to its conclusion seems to yield the following possibilities:

1. **The management salary has significantly decreased.** In 2023 the estimated average salary lies around 148'500 CHF/year ([Glassdoor, 2023](#)). Therefore an unprecedented drop in salary would be required to cause the impossibility of vacation. A possible explanation might be the implantation of gender quotas. This could have decreased the viability/quality of the management positions leading to a decline in salary. Another possibility primarily raised through the portrayal of the political left as socialists/communists would be that a management position simply is not what it was under the free market. If governmentally organized financial distribution were to reach significant levels, this might be a possible explanation for why even in a management position one can't afford vacations. This however would also exclude the welfare-reliant refugee family from taking vacations, leading to the second possibility.
2. **Welfare yields more than regular salaries.** In this case, one might explain why it is that the welfare-reliant can afford that which regularly employed citizens can not. However, finding a viable explanation for how a government might operate if welfare outperforms the salary of a management position is unfeasible. Therefore the sole conclusion in this case would be the implication that the government doesn't operate and it is only a matter of time until the leftist leadership runs Switzerland into ruin through unprecedented social welfare programs. However, this would still leave the question open as to why the Swiss family (i.e. the father) does not apply to or already benefit from said welfare program, leading to the third conclusion.
3. **Refugees get special treatment.** This seems to be the most plausible for two primary reasons. Firstly it solves the implausibility issues of the aforementioned two conclusions. Secondly, it fits well into the dogmatic response given by the father given that it implies that even if social injustice is observed, so long as the targets are refugees one can not speak up or else risks being branded a racist.

No matter the actual explanation the creators of the video might give, it appears that the primary goal of this portion of the dialogue is to evoke a distinction between the opportunities given to refugees and those denied to Swiss citizens. A clear distinction is made between the implied outgroup (i.e. the refugees) and the in-group (i.e. the Swiss). Paired with the strong

implications of a governmental elite that established or even enforced those parameters, the RWP tendencies of this dialogue become quite evident. Both the egalitarian cleavage (i.e. us vs. them mentality) as well as the hierarchical cleavage (good people vs. corrupt elite) are strongly implied, making this fall right within the RWP framework introduced at the beginning of chapter 1.3.

**S:** «Wie auch immer. Lukas' Vater sagte schon immer, dass wir nur so arm dran sind, weil ihr früher die Grünen und die Linken gewählt habt!»

**F:** \*stares directly into the camera for multiple seconds\*

\*text fades in\*

«Auch gegen linke Bevormundung? NEIN zum CO<sub>2</sub>-Gesetz. SVP, die Partei des Mittelstands»

This is the final piece of dialogue, where the quiet implications are now clearly stated. The scapegoat for the current circumstances is identified as the "... Grüne und die Linken ...". The stare was followed up by the final frame, calling for a no-vote regarding the CO<sub>2</sub>-Initiative. This is accompanied by the notion that leftists' tutelage/infantilization is the adversary, while also positioning the SVP as the party of the middle class (i.e. the "common people").

In summary, this video covers a lot of ground which is precisely why it was selected for this thesis, given that it addresses a particular notion that needs to be highlighted when it comes to the SVP's narrative surrounding CC. That is the intertwined portrayal of CC as part of a larger problem, framed as a piece of a leftist agenda supposed to facilitate a power grab. The SVP clearly is interested in protecting the environment, however, they do not view their perspective of "environmentalism" as in any way synonymous with what their political counterparts would refer to when using the term. The "environmentalism" the left speaks of is seen as a tool used to promote an expansion of the government's reach into the market and individuals' lives. CC, therefore, is mostly accepted, even its anthropogenic roots are rarely denied. Instead the argumentative logic of opposing "Environmentalism" is the framing of it as a wolf in sheep's clothing. It becomes more than just a way to address our changing climate and rising temperatures but rather is seen as part of the leftist agenda to promote a further-reaching government, which the right-leaning and conservative parties will naturally oppose. At this point in the thesis, this might still feel slightly farfetched and be nested upon very liberal interpretations. The so-far covered bodies (the Parteiprogramm and the "9 Jahre nach Corona" video), would not suffice to read them in such a way as has been offered. For this a broader examination is required, which is hard to be made through the material provided by the SVP alone. This has two primary reasons. Firstly, the SVP is a very broad party. Given that it is the only truly right-wing and conservative party in Switzerland, it covers a lot of ground and includes a vast array of different opinions and ideas. Consequently, individual politicians can hardly be viewed as representatives of the entirety of the party, significantly reducing the number of representative sources. Secondly, the SVP has a rather small "footprint". The "Parteiprogramm 2023 bis 2027" is the largest single corpus provided to get a certified and agreed-upon understanding of the SVP's positions. Other than that the SVP is rather inactive

on social media or other potential outlets where their stances (particularly regarding CC) can be analyzed in a representative manner. This scarcity of sources (arguably part of what makes the SVP relatively more successful than other RWP parties) is what led to the choice of the *Weltwoche* as the primary source for the RWP narrative surrounding CC in Switzerland. Before introducing the *Weltwoche*, it is worth first covering its editor-in-chief; Roger Köppel.

## 2.4. Roger Köppel

Roger Köppel is rather well-known in and around Switzerland, not only but partially due to his provocative stances, paired with undeniable eloquence. He is currently working as the editor-in-chief for *Die Weltwoche*, however, there are some aspects of his career I wish to highlight, before turning to the *Weltwoche* itself.

Roger Köppel studied philosophy and economic history at the universities of Zürich and Stuttgart (1989-1995), beginning his journalistic career in parallel at the *NZZ* (Neue Zürcher Zeitung), where he spent seven years covering different areas (primarily within the sports and film editorial offices). In 1994 he became a cultural editor at the *Tages-Anzeiger* where he rose to editor-in-chief within the next three years, leading its weekend supplements (1997-2001).

In 2001, he got offered – and consequently accepted – the position of editor-in-chief at *Die Weltwoche*, which had been suffering from declining circulation for a couple of years. This paired with *Die Weltwoche* being sold to Tito Tetteganti (State Council, CVP), ushered in a new era at the weekly magazine. Its newspaper format was exchanged with a magazine format, and the editorial staff was reorganized, with some authors and editors leaving in protest. In 2004 he accepted a position as editor-in-chief for *Die Welt*, however, he returned to *Die Weltwoche* by 2006. This time around he was not only editor-in-chief but also became its publisher, after acquiring the majority of shares within the newly founded *Weltwoche Verlags AG*.

His political career began in 2015 when he ran for the National Council as a member of the SVP. His primary reasoning was the Swiss political landscape, primarily its fond relationship with the European Union (Wedl, 2015). While being placed 17<sup>th</sup> on the SVP's party list, he managed to not only outperform other prominent figures (e.g. Christoph Mörgeli, Hans Fehr, and Ernst Schibli) but managed to break the Swiss record for the highest amount of votes (178'090 votes) achieved by a single member during the National Council elections (SRF, 2015). During the next election period, he again managed to maintain a leading position garnering the most votes within the canton Zürich's election (121'098 votes) for the National Council.

He also ran for the upper chambre<sup>22</sup> (Ständerat) where he was short on votes (107'528 votes) and thus he withdrew his candidacy to not take away votes from fellow Burgeois/civic candidate Ruedi Noser (FDP).

In 2023 Köppel made clear that he would not be running for office again and would rather focus on *Die Weltwoche*.

I do not intend to go into more historical details regarding Köppel, but instead want to offer my personal estimation of his persona. Unlike many other right-wing conservative figures (e.g. Trump) Köppel is exceptional at walking the fine line between the politically provocative and reprehensible. He is extremely eloquent and well-read which, paired with his quick wit, places him in a class above other “like-minded” politicians. I believe that he is very talented in framing otherwise extreme positions in a digestible manner, camouflaging them as the status quo position, which allows him to evade a lot of criticism that might stick to other people. This paired with his populist tendencies exemplifies what I believe the primary danger of Swiss RWP is. They are strategic, eloquent, and comparatively appear harmless. Right-wing extremism, while present, seems to have a lesser hold on the Swiss populists than it does in other European countries (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Germany, France, ...) which allows them to fly under the radar and thus spread their message with greater efficiency. With a “spokesperson” like Köpper, the RWP narrative’s spread is significantly facilitated, since it manages to situate itself as the rational conservative position instead of an extremist party wing. I believe *Die Weltwoche* is an excellent example of exactly that, and given Roger Köppel’s long-lasting position as editor-in-chief I found *Die Weltwoche* to be the perfect source for my thesis.

## 2.5 Die Weltwoche

This section shall serve as an introduction to *die Weltwoche*. Its current day iteration, i.e. post-transformation (after 2001) towards a right-wing conservative weekly magazine will serve as the primary point of interest.

Established in 1933, *Die Weltwoche* was for a long time a weekly newspaper written from a politically centrist viewpoint. Critiques of Communism, as well as National-Socialism, were common at the time of the establishment and the newspaper maintained this position – with slight fluctuations – up until 2001 when right-wing conservative Tito Tettamanti became the primary shareholder and Roger Köppel was situated as its editor-in-chief (and later as its

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<sup>22</sup> Note the aforementioned distinction between the Swiss political chambers. To become a member at the Ständerat, candidates are required – more so than in the Nationalrat – to be capable of garnering a majority of the votes across the entirety of the political spectrum. Köppel, being the polarizing figure he is, is immensely popular within likeminded voters, but equally unpopular amongs those with diverging opinions. This I believe helps explain his dominance within the Nationalrat (proportional vote), althwhile shortcoming within the Ständerat (majority vote).

publisher). Under the new leadership, *Die Weltwoche* shifted towards a more bourgeois-conservative position, that is by now identifiable as right-wing populism (Eurotopics, 2023).

### 2.5.1. Publication guidelines of Die Weltwoche

In 2011 Roger Köppel published the «Publizistische Leitlinien der Weltwoche» (Köppel, 2011) which deserves coverage given that it offers the best insights into not only how *Die Weltwoche* portrays itself, but also into what *Die Weltwoche's* role in journalism is. They consist of four primary points:

1. **Die Weltwoche pflegt einen kritischen Recherchejournalismus** aus allen Bereichen der Politik, der Kultur, der Wirtschaftspolitik und der Gesellschaft. Sie deckt Missstände auf und bleibt hartnäckig an wichtigen Themen dran.
2. **Skeptisch ist die Weltwoche gegenüber dem Staat und seinen Organen**, die sie durch eine kontinuierliche Berichterstattung aus liberaler Warte durchleuchtet. Die Weltwoche ist politisch unabhängig, vertritt aber ein freiheitliches, unternehmerisches Weltbild. Parteien und Politiker jeglicher Couleur werden kritisch hinterfragt.
3. **Die Weltwoche wagt auch brisante Themen aufzugreifen**, an die sich andere Zeitungen noch nicht herantrauen. In grossen Debatten gibt die Weltwoche Gegensteuer zum Mainstream, nicht aus Rechthaberei, sondern weil sie sich um echte Meinungsvielfalt in einer oft eintönigen Medienlandschaft bemüht.
4. **Die Weltwoche pflegt bewusst die Kultur der Rede und Gegenrede.** Debatten sollen in ihrer ganzen Spannweite ausgetragen werden. Der Weltwoche-Journalismus ist nicht eitler Selbstzweck. Über allem steht der ehrliche und ernsthafte Einsatz für eine unabhängige, vernünftige und wettbewerbsfähige Schweiz

There is not much to uncover within these, however after having read a year's worth of material, I feel some points need to be highlighted. The first thing to note is that these guidelines are in no way out of the ordinary. They are phrased in a relatively neutral manner, covering points one would hope to hear addressed by any magazine/newspaper. However, this I feel is a façade. This is a clever portrayal outwards, given that it not only reassures people who already subscribe to *Die Weltwoche* (and its narrative) but much more importantly it addresses those who do not. By portraying themselves as journalists dedicated to critical research (1.), remaining skeptical (2.), unafraid of tackling difficult topics (3.), and encouraging debate (4.) *Die Weltwoche* is positioned as the rational spectator. Beneficial self-portrayal is a given for any enterprise, however, I felt this exemplifies an aspect that needs to be stressed precisely when analyzing discourse; the role of the reader. Once a statement has been made,

it is up to the listener/reader/recipient to interpret the statement. A reader who is not familiar with *Die Weltwoche* or its positions and narratives might interpret these four statements as perfectly rational – even expected – for any type of magazine<sup>23</sup>. However, if one is well-versed in the narrative, certain implications arise and this same text can serve as a dog-whistle. To properly illustrate my point I want to go over *Die Weltwoche*'s guidelines and highlight some potential implications<sup>24</sup>.

The first guideline addresses politics, culture, economic policy, and society. It is claimed that “critical research journalism” is directed at all facets of those topics, however, once one has read *Die Weltwoche* some patterns become evident. While coverage does spread surprisingly wide, the type of coverage differs within the topics. This might mean that within politics, praise is more likely to be directed towards right-wing conservatives and critique towards left-wing liberals. Within the culture, the “Swiss”, the conservative, and the “good old days” are likely portrayed positively, while the youth, transgenderism, and wokeness are more likely to be portrayed negatively. The same goes for society and economic policy. *Die Weltwoche* writes rather subjectively and it is evident, depending on the topic and subjects within the topic, which type of coverage will be given. This already alludes to the bipolar dichotomy raised through RWP (i.e. who is an ally, who is an enemy. See Figure 4), simply masquerading as objective journalism.

The second guideline serves a similar purpose as the first. What is objectively being said is that *Die Weltwoche* is politically independent and intends to cover the state and its organs impartially, although through a libertarian and entrepreneurial lens. Here I want to note the singling out of the state (and its organs). While this is essentially the role journalism serves as the fourth pillar of democracy, this “critique of the state” when done by *Die Weltwoche* takes the form of the perceived hierarchical cleavage RWP tends to claim (i.e. the *good people* vs. the *corrupt elite*).

The third guideline serves to portray *Die Weltwoche* as opposing the “mainstream” and being brave enough to address issues others dare not. Subjectively those issues are an overtly racist portrayal of migrants, a conservative (and occasionally sexist) stance on gender roles and gender issues (primarily transphobic), being against any form of social policy, speaking out against Corona safety regulations, and taking an astoundingly pro-Russian stance on the Ukraine war. However, using *Die Weltwoche*'s phrasing none of this is evident at first sight. What the unfamiliar reader sees is a magazine not afraid of asking difficult questions, aligning perfectly with its slogan; “*Die Weltwoche – das ist die andere Sicht!*” (“*Die Weltwoche – that’s the other perspective!*”).

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<sup>23</sup> i.e. these guidelines are in no way specific to *Die Weltwoche* but could be assigned to a vast number of newspapers and magazines. Although the specific critique of the state and its organs helps identify its political leniency somewhat, being cautious of the state and its machinations is by no means out of the ordinary, or partisan.

<sup>24</sup> I am rather lenient with the potential implications. I do not mean to claim that they are strictly implied, but rather want to offer a steelman portrayal of the way I understand *Die Weltwoche*'s portrayal/coverage.



The fourth guideline states the approval of open debate. However, I see the second part as more important, particularly the adjectives used to describe the desired state of Switzerland. “unabhängig” (independent) in this case relates not only to Swiss sovereignty but stands for a clear opposition towards the EU and any regulatory policies that might affect Switzerland. A critique of the EU is quite exemplary of European RWP in general and thus garners some special consideration (Inglehart & Norris, 2017; von Homeyer et al., 2021). “vernünftig” (rational) is another quite subjective term, especially when it comes to policy. *Die Weltwoche* is much more likely to portray conservative and libertarian policies/strategies/developments as “rational”, and portray those with opposing viewpoints as “irrational”. “Wettbewerbsfähig” (competitive) can be understood as viewing the economy as having the utmost priority. Anything that hinders, lowers, or in any other manner negates potential growth is to be opposed. Prominent examples could be humanitarian issues such as the *Konzernverantwortungsinitiative* which sought to hold Swiss-based companies to the same human rights and environmental protection standards abroad as they are domestically, or the aforementioned *CO<sub>2</sub>-Initiative*. Both are sure to be opposed, given that they are not economically lucrative. Alternatively, this stance also holds when it comes to taxation, especially if this taxation is directed at companies and enterprises.

In summary, *Die Weltwoche* portrays itself as the rational spectator, unafraid of asking questions, and always seeking the truth. However, in my biased opinion, this could not lie further from the truth, as I hope will become evident once the topics of interest are being covered. These publication guidelines were highlighted because I believe them to be the most accurate and fair representation I can give, but also as a note that with *Die Weltwoche* the adage of “what you see is what you get” does not apply. The proper understanding of what is being implied can only be reached once one has delved deep enough into the narrative constructed by *Die Weltwoche*. Only once one has understood their stance on a multitude of topics and how they are not only perceived/presented but (almost more importantly) how they are intertwined, one reaches somewhat of an understanding of what is being said.

### 2.5.2. How far does *Die Weltwoche*'s influence reach?

*Die Weltwoche* has been struggling with the circulation of physical copies for quite some time. While regularly selling over 100k copies before the year 2000, the physical copies sold have been in decline since then reaching slightly below 80k by 2001. A temporary recovery occurred after 2001, with Tito Tettamanti as the primary shareholder, and Roger Köppel as editor-in-chief, with the sales rising back to 91k by the end of 2003. Then, the open endorsement of Christoph Blocher and the SVP, authored by Köppel himself, led to a lot of criticism directed towards *Die Weltwoche* for being the SVP's mouthpiece, resulting in a loss of around 12k from the autumn of 2003 to the summer of 2004. By this time Roger Köppel switched to being the editor-in-chief for the German daily newspaper *Die Welt*. Simon Heusser served as editor-in-chief for a year but quit due to political differences within the editorial staff. Jürg Wildberger took over in September of 2005 and managed to regain around 2k sold copies per year by

2006. In November of 2006 *die Weltwoche Verlags AG* split off the *Jean Frey AG* and Roger Köppel bought 60% of the shares for the newly established *die Weltwoche Verlags AG* and sales went back up to approximately 86k. However, since then the sold copies have been in constant decline, reaching slightly above 38k in 2022. Nonetheless, the readership at the time was approximated at 144k meaning that *Die Weltwoche* maintained a reach of around 3% within the German-speaking part of Switzerland (approx. 4.8 million people). The declining sales thus do not necessarily reflect the state of *Die Weltwoche's* popularity, especially once YouTube is accounted for. DIE WELTWOCHEN is a YouTube channel with (August 2023) 172k subscribers, and 2.2k uploaded videos. The vast majority of those

videos take the format of Rogr Köppel giving his take on current events and the current edition of *Die Weltwoche*, dubbed “*Die Weltwoche daily*”, which is typically uploaded five days a week. They regularly exceed 30k views and occasionally receive upwards of 100k views. In summary, one can say that the declining sales do not necessitate a decline in outreach. Taking a look at the *Tarifdokumentation 2022 (Weltwoche, 2022i)* of *Die Weltwoche* we get the table depicted in Figure 21. Note that the predominant reader is male and above 55 years of age, reaffirming some of the patterns evident in the SVP’s voter base.

In summary, one can state that *Die Weltwoche* is by no means the predominant magazine/newspaper in the German-speaking area of Switzerland. Nonetheless, its reach is quite substantial at the approximated 3% (which is likely to be higher, given the spread through the internet e.g. YouTube). Thus *Die Weltwoche* deserves to be regarded as an established journalistic institution in the Swiss media landscape that – while outperformed by some competitors – maintains a significant influence on Swiss (public) discourse. With this out of the way, we turn to the next section, in which some data as well as the intended methodology is presented.

## Leserschaft

### Auflage und Erscheinung

Deutschschweiz:	144 000 Leser, 3.0 % Reichweite
Total verbreitete Auflage:	38 328 Exemplare
Total verkaufte Auflage:	37 056 Exemplare

	Leser/Tsd.	Anteil	Affinität
<b>Geschlecht</b>			
Frau	53	36.7%	73
Mann	91	63.3%	127
<b>Alter</b>			
14 bis 34	22	15.1%	51
35 bis 54	47	32.8%	95
55+	75	52.1%	146
<b>Schulbildung</b>			
obligatorisch	19	13.1%	81
mittel	58	40.3%	81
hoch	67	46.6%	138
<b>Haushalts-Einkommen</b>			
über CHF 10 000.–	33	23.1%	112
über CHF 15 000.–	16	11.1%	137
<b>Art der Erwerbstätigkeit</b>			
oberste Führung, angestellt	6	4.2%	144
mittlere Führung, angestellt	29	20.0%	144
Unternehmer/-in, Inhaber/-in	10	6.8%	187

Quellen: MACH-Basic 2021-2,  
WEMF-Auflagenbeglaubigung 2021

Figure 21 *Die Weltwoche* readership, as portrayed in the *Tarifdokumentation 2022 (Weltwoche, 2022)*.

## 3. Methodology

Within this section, the fundamental methodology shall be introduced. Chapter **3.1 Analyzed Timeframe**, covers the temporal frame of the conducted analysis. Chapter **3.2 Data selection** covers the initial data selection and refinement while introducing a baseline overview of the analyzed corpus. Chapter **3.3 Coding** goes into more detail regarding the utilized code, i.e. the selection and distribution of identified passages within the corpus, and finally Chapter **3.4 Portrayal of Topics** covers the approach taken to cover specific topics.

### 3.1 Analyzed timeframe

The first thing to establish was the temporal frame the analysis would cover. For this two primary criteria were to be considered.

The first is to cover a sufficient enough time frame to gather enough material, and yet hold it to a manageable degree for this thesis. The initial idea was to cover four years of *Die Weltwoche*, however, this timeframe was considered at an early phase, where the number of articles viable for consideration (over a specific period) was unclear. One of the initial hypotheses that led to this thesis, was that CC would be a rarely discussed topic and thus a longer period would need coverage. However shortly after the gathering of material had begun, it became evident that CC was a decently substantial part of *Die Weltwoche's* coverage. Especially once the intertwined portrayal of CC became evident, it had been decided that a year's worth of material was already exceeding the number of articles that could be sufficiently covered within this thesis. Nonetheless, the timeframe was set in a year, with the full knowledge, that a vast part of the corpus would not be covered in detail within the thesis, but only serve as statistical backing, especially to portray the prevalence of the CC narrative within *Die Weltwoche*.

The second thing to consider was how to set the timeframe. Three primary options came to mind.

1. The beginning and end of the coverage could be set to cover the exact year, i.e. 01.01.2022 – 31.12.2022
2. The beginning and end of the coverage could be set by the starting date of my thesis. Given that I began working on this project at the end of September of 2022, the thesis could cover the last year's worth of articles, i.e. 01.10.2021 – 30.09.2022.

3. The beginning and end of the coverage could be set around the coverage of specific discursive events<sup>25</sup>. Fridays-for-future parades came to mind given they are commonly critiqued by RWP (Berker & Pollex, 2021). Alternatively, the CO<sub>2</sub>-Initiative (BAFU, 2021) would offer country-specific insights, given its application to domestic politics.

If the object of interest had been more specified fractions of the CC discourse, the third option would have been the superior approach, diverting more attention to a niche development within the larger strand. However, the third approach has not been chosen based on the following reasoning. The idea of this thesis is to untangle the entirety of the CC narrative and not individual strings within it. A generalized approach felt more encompassing and allowed me to evade the potential of nut- and/or cherry-picking on my behalf. Choosing specific discursive events is an active approach from my side, which can skew the data. As mentioned the general and consistent portrayal of CC over time is of great interest to me, thus actively choosing a specific discursive event felt like deliberately initiating a dataset with outliers. Wanting to maximize randomness the first two options (i.e. not orient the timeframe around specific events) felt more consistent. There would still be discursive events arising within the analyzed timeframe, however, I would not be the one deliberately setting the parameters around including (or excluding) them within my analysis.

The first and second options are essentially the same, with the slight alteration that in the first one the full data set would not yet have been available at the beginning of writing, given that this thesis began in the autumn of 2022. Shifting the coverage to 2021 would get rid of this problem, however at the cost of losing the recency of the material.

Consequently, the second option was chosen, and the timeframe to be analyzed was set at 01.10.2021 – 30.09.2022.

## 3.2 Data selection

The Data selection can be distinguished into three phases; Raw selection, refinement, and reevaluation.

### 3.2.1 Raw selection

Before garnering a more thorough understanding of how *Die Weltwoche* operates, i.e. how narratives are constructed, the underlying hypothesis was that CC would be a rather isolated

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<sup>25</sup> “discursive events” refers to events that garnered particular media attention and are of sufficient power to alter the direction and quality of a discursive strand (e.g. CC). This definition follows the one set by Jäger in his book on critical discourse analysis:

«Als diskursive Ereignisse sind nur solche im Diskurs angesprochene Ereignisse zu fassen, die medial groß herausgestellt werden und als solche medial groß herausgestellte Ereignisse die Richtung und die Qualität des Diskursstrangs, zu dem sie gehören, beeinflussen oder wesentlich bestimmen.» (Jäger, 2016, p. 80)

discursive strand. However, this needed to be clarified, which was done by reading through the entirety of the magazines published during the period of interest. *Die Weltwoche* is published on Thursdays every week, except for calendar weeks 30 (Labor Day) and 52 (end of the year). Consequently, this thesis covers the 46. – 51. Editions of *Die Weltwoche* from 2021 as well as 01. – 29. & 31 – 45. Editions of *Die Weltwoche* from 2022. This timeframe consists of 3372 articles. After the first screening, 371 of those (approximately 11%) had been deemed relevant to the understanding of the CC narrative. At this point, two things need to be emphasized.

The first is to highlight the notion of “relevant”. By this point, while already utilizing an initial code system, the primary criteria were to distinguish between articles that affect the notion of CC and those that do not. Using the code “politics” as an example, this did not mean to find all articles and/or passages that covered politics in general but to identify those that, while primarily covering political issues, speak to the notion of climate change in some form. This could mean that the politics discussed are directly linked to CC, such as policies seeking to restructure our energy needs towards a more sustainable source, e.g. the utilization of solar and wind power. On the other hand, this could also include articles that speak to the general state of politics so long as this portrayal spills over into the CC narrative such as the constant negative portrayal of Simonetta Sommaruga as a corrupt and inefficient politician (Bodenmann, 2021; Gygi, 2021, 2022; Mooser, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2022d, 2022e, 2022f, 2022g, 2022h; Mörgeli, 2021; Odermatt, 2021, 2022; Rentsch, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022a). She is of special relevance given her twelve years (2010-22) of service as not only a member of the *Bundesrat* but also for taking over the role of superintendent for the UVEK (*Eidgenössisches Departement für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie und Kommunikation*) in 2019, meaning that she held arguably one of, if not *the* leading positions of power regarding CC policy in Switzerland.

The second thing is to note that the label “relevant” is largely subjective. While there are some clear-cut cases like when CC is being directly addressed and referred to as such, the goal of analyzing discourse is to go beyond that and to analyze the underlying structure upon which a narrative rests. This includes many indirect linkages to the topic, and how those are defined is rather subjective. If this analysis had been done by another person – even of a similar educational and political background – the selection would have deviated from mine. While I would wager that the number of articles deemed relevant would not deviate far from my selection, this becomes much less true for individual passages. Thus, one needs to keep in mind that what is found to be relevant can and will deviate based on the reader/analyst.

Figure 22 displays the distribution of *relevant* articles gathered over the established timeframe. At this point, little knowledge can be extrapolated from the figure, however, some characteristics need to be addressed before continuing to the next phase of my analysis.

The first thing to note is the fluctuating nature of the corpus. While CC is constantly being covered (i.e. no edition of *Die Weltwoche* during the observed period had zero *relevant* articles), the intensity of coverage, or in other words the proportion of the edition dedicated to topics relating to the CC narrative fluctuates quite significantly. As mentioned, the overall

average of *relevant* articles lies at 11%, however, the edition-specific values ranged from 1.5% (1/67 articles in edition 18, 2022) - 33.3 % (22/66 articles in edition 42, 2022).




Figure 22 percentage of "relevant" articles, proportional to the entirety of the edition. Displayed are all the editions covered, beginning with edition 46 from 2021 and ending with edition 45 from 2022. Out of 3372 articles, 371 have been deemed relevant (11%).

The second thing to note is the trendline. While included, I do not wish to grant too much weight to the upward trend. The data is driven by large fluctuations which are often driven by specific events – or the lack thereof. Thus, concluding that CC is increasing in relevancy within *Die Weltwoche's* publications, while possible, cannot be concluded based on such a subjective analysis. It is important to emphasize that the trend in relevant articles would have been altered if the starting/ending points had been set differently. Nonetheless one also needs to acknowledge the difference between the first and second halves of the data set. Editions 46-20 drop below 5% on eight occasions (editions 1, 6, 9, 12, 14, 15, and 18), and only exceed 15% thrice (editions 51, 8, and 16). Meanwhile, editions 21-45 never dropped below 5% and exceeded 15% six times (editions 22, 25, 34, 37, 40, and 42) with plenty more coming close to the 15% margin (editions 27, 29, 32). Consequently, it is worth keeping in mind that there appears to be an upward trend in the number of CC-related articles, however, given the event-driven nature of coverage, this fact should not be given much weight beyond its recognition. On average it suffices to say that within *Die Weltwoche* more than one in ten articles are directly or indirectly relatable to the notion of CC, making it a significant discursive strang within *Die Welwoche's* coverage. This is further emphasized once the overall spread of editions is distinguished by the percentage dedicated to CC-related topics as can be seen in Figure 23. Figure 23 consists of ten brackets, each responding to the (below) specified ranges, making the positive skewness of the data evident. In other words, during the analyzed period, it had been significantly more common that an edition will have fewer articles of relevancy

than to exceed the average of 11%. This means that the observed 11% are being inflated by more extreme values that far exceed the average.




Figure 23 Die Weltwoche editions sorted into (ten) brackets based on the percentage of relevant articles within the edition. The vast majority of the corpus dedicates less than 20.6% (47/50 editions) to CC-related (i.e. “relevant”) articles, with 60% if the corpus (30/50 editions) falling within the range of 4.7-14.2%.

The outliers are in part due to the addition of *Weltwoche Grün*, a special edition, that accompanies the regular magazine on an irregular basis (approx.. (bi)monthly. *Weltwoche Grün* was first introduced in edition 08, 2022, and was released on six other occasions. *Weltwoche Grün* will be dedicated to a separate chapter where more detail will be given, however, it was essential to allude to its existence to clarify the distribution of *relevant* articles.

Once all the relevant articles had been identified and their viability reevaluated, the CC narrative became much more transparent and allowed for a more dedicated coding system which will be covered in the following chapter.

### 3.3 Coding

This section shall serve as an overview of the coding system utilized for the analysis, There are two primary categories (*Topics* with overall 1985 marked passages, and *Rhetoric Tools* with 2185 marked passages) which will be covered individually. Within both, a further distinction is established between primary codes (i.e. directly addressing the topic at hand) and secondary codes (help the understanding of the established narrative).

### 3.3.1. Code – Topics (primary)

The first category is dedicated to topicality. These follow a hierarchy of relevance with “Environmentalism/Climate Change” being the primary code of interest. It includes sub-codes structured as follows:

- **Environmentalism/Climate Change** (293/479)
  - o **“Agenda”** (40)
  - o **CC denial** (23)
  - o **CC opposition** (74)
  - o **WW approved** (49)

The numbers refer to the number of passages marked by the referring codes, which are to be briefly introduced individually:

#### **“Agenda” (40):**

refers to the claim of a CC agenda, primarily following the implication that those driving it (i.e. the state/government as well as mainstream media) utilize it as a political tool to enforce control over the population (Bodenmann, 2022c; Gygi, 2022f; Millius, 2022c; Mohr, 2022; Odermatt, 2021; Zimmermann, 2022e), for personal enrichment regardless of effectiveness or cost to the population/nature (Baur, 2022e; Gygi, 2021b; Mooser, 2022i; Reichmuth, 2022a; Sarrazin, 2021), while shutting down opposing voices (Gygi, 2022e; Mooser, 2022q; Reichmuth, 2022b) and utilizing fearmongering and alarmism as an intended tool for social control (Gygi, 2021a; Holmes, 2022b; Locher, 2021; Mooser, 2021b, 2022c, 2022j; Rothenbühler, 2022a; V. Weber, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f). A fitting quote encompassing most of these talking points can be found in Hubert Mooser's article<sup>26</sup>

«**Mit der Brechstange ins Eldorado** - Klima-Goldgräber hebeln Volksrechte aus und werfen mit Milliarden-Subventionen um sich. Die Politiker im Bundeshaus verändern die Schweiz im Schnellverfahren.»:

*«Es stellt sich die Frage: Geht es bei all diesen Projekten tatsächlich um die Energieversorgung? Oder geht es ums Geldabholen in Bundesbern? Es entsteht der Eindruck, die Schweiz verkomme zum Eldorado von energiepolitischen Glücksrittern. Immer deutlicher zeigt sich, dass der Ukraine-Krieg, die Unsicherheit bei der Energieversorgung und eine von Linken erfundene Klimakrise für Vorhaben benutzt werden, die bei nüchternem Abwägen wohl durchfallen würden.» (Mooser, 2022i, p. 2)*

Within this quote, the underlying reasoning is second-guessed by implying that the *real* reason for the implementation of the alluded policy is the personal enrichment of the involved politicians. It is implied that the war in Ukraine, and its consequent lack of security within the

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<sup>26</sup> The Articles title will be accompanied by the subtitle, given that most of the relevant information is implied within the subtitle, thus aiding the clarity of the message. Consequently the subtitles are of substantial interest.



energy supply, paired with the *invented* climate crisis are utilized as tools to push an agenda, rather than to solve problems.

### **CC denial (23):**

As covered in Chapter 1.1 Climate Change, a distinction had to be made between the mere opposition to CC policies and the vehement denial of the veracity of CC as a scientific fact (Baur, 2022b; Blum, 2022; Gygi, 2021a; Mooser, 2022i; Müller-plath, 2022; Reichmuth, 2022a; Schärer, 2022; Shellenberger, 2022a). While there are some fluctuations behind the reasoning CC is perceived as a lie/invention, such as criticizing the models, the scientific process, or second-guessing via association to the perceived “Agenda”, the overlapping criterion for this code was the strict denial of CC. What can be said is that strict CC denial is not as prevalent in *Die Weltwoche*, but rather the overarching position portrayed is one of opposition. Nonetheless claims that ought to be classified as CC denial are present within the corpus. Although strict denial is not often implied, the notion of CC is very heavily questioned, commonly with strong implications that the scientific claims behind CC are exaggerated, fail to encapsulate the full picture, are part of an ideology/agenda, or are biased in some shape or form (see Chapter 4. Results) To give an example, two quotes that indicate this stance can be found in Gisela Müller-Plath’s article

«**Europa trocknet aus** - Meldungen über Dürren häufen sich. Oft ist der Wassermangel menschengemacht, aber mit dem Klimawandel hat es nichts zu tun.»:

«*Zusammengefasst unterstützt die Empirie nicht die allenthalben geäußerte Behauptung, Dürren und Waldbrände seien Folgen des anthropogenen Klimawandels.*» (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 7)

«*Die Analyse der europäischen Dürregeschichte und der Wetterdaten der letzten 150 Jahre zeigt, dass die menschengemachten CO<sub>2</sub>-Emissionen kaum zu solchen Ereignissen beitragen können. Es fällt nicht weniger Regen als früher und auch nicht anders verteilt.*» (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 9)

These quotes strictly go against scientific facts. The increased speed of the water cycle paired with rising temperatures has been clearly linked to the alteration of weather patterns (IPCC, 2014, 2023). Nonetheless, the author simply claims that this is not the case, without any form of explanation.

### **CC opposition (74):**

This code referred to segments that invoked opposition to the mainstream CC narrative. This could take the form of cherry-picking (false) experts to allude to the fact that opposing the CC narrative has science behind it (Gygi, 2022e; Mörgeli, 2021a; Renggli, 2021a; Weltwoche, 2022m, 2022d), claiming the inefficiency of environmental policies (e.g. decarbonizing our energy sources) (Baur, 2022d; Gygi, 2022f; Häring, 2022a; Herodot, 2022a; Mooser, 2022j; Weltwoche, 2022f), claiming that they are counterproductive (Eichenberger, 2022e; Häring, 2022b; Kessler, 2022; Mooser, 2022l, 2022e, 2022i; Mörgeli, 2022g; Schunke, 2022l) or at the

cost of the general population (Gygi, 2022d; Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022; Odermatt, 2022a; Schindler, 2022c; V. Weber, 2022). In its least severe iteration, CC (policies) are portrayed as wishful thinking/naivety (Hildbrand, 2022; Mooser, 2022q) however much more severe connections are alluded to such as CC policy being an early stage of Nazism and Stalinism (Shellenberger, 2022a). As an example citation we turn to Beat Gygi's

«**Die Standardmeinung** - Mit seinen Berichten kanalisiert der Weltklimarat die weltweite Diskussion in Klimafragen. Die Kritik an der Auswahl der Wissenschaftler und Themen wird lauter.»:

*«Die wenigsten werden jedoch die ganzen dicken Berichte lesen. Der Klimarat liefert deshalb immer auch eine «Zusammenfassung für Politiker» mit, die allerdings nicht nur eine Zusammenfassung ist, sondern auch eine propagandagerechte Dramatisierung, Zuspitzung und Verzerrung der Originalberichte.» (Gygi, 2022e, p. 2)*

The existence of the summary for policymakers is essential because the reports are multiple thousands of pages long and their original format predicates a level of scientific sophistication the average politician can not be expected to have. The summary of policy thus serves as an efficient way of getting the message across in a timely and realistic manner. *Die Weltwoche* however not only utilizes this to delegitimize politicians (by implying laziness/unwillingness) and scientists (by implying fraudulent selection), but further implies that it is not a summary, but a perversion of the original report, twisted into a propaganda tool.

#### **WW approved (49):**

This code served to highlight those aspects of Environmentalism/Climate Change that are approved of by *Die Weltwoche*. Primary examples are the promotion of nuclear energy as a viable alternative (Baur, 2022f, 2022d; Bigler, 2022; Gygi, 2022f, 2022n; Häring, 2022a; Mooser, 2022m, 2022o; Prasser, 2022b; Reichmuth, 2022e; Sarrazin, 2022b; Schilliger, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022c), the acceptance of strategies that do not harm the economy (Gygi, 2021b; Kessler, 2022; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022k), letting the free market drive innovations (Agnolazza, 2022; Baumann, 2022a; Bodenmann, 2021; Gygi, 2022k; Schwab, 2022a; Weltwoche, 2022b, 2022f), the opposition towards a centralized management organ (e.g introduction of a climate council) (Mooser, 2021b) or claims that either oppose the scientific consensus on CC (Hank, 2022; Häring, 2022b; Renggli, 2021a) or the promotion of solar and wind energy (Eichenberger, 2022c; Odermatt, 2022a; Prasser, 2022a; V. Weber, 2022; Zeller, 2022a). As an exemplary quote, we turn to Olivier Kesslers

«**Umweltschutz braucht freie Menschen und Unternehmen** - Die Modelle des Weltklimarats ergeben völlig unzuverlässige Voraussagen des Klimas. Die Wissenschaft taugt nicht als Rechtfertigung für Eingriffe in die Freiheitsrechte.»

*«Wer sich also für die Ökologie engagieren will, muss sich für ein Wirtschaftssystem aussprechen, das den Lebensstandard möglichst vieler Menschen anhebt. Nur so können sich immer mehr Leute dem Umweltschutz widmen. Dabei spielen Unternehmen, die frei sind in*

*der Suche nach Innovationen, eine Schlüsselrolle. Erfahrungsgemäss führt einzig eine Politik, die sich weitgehend aus dem Wirtschaftsleben heraushält, zu diesem Ergebnis. Was die Umwelt also braucht, sind liberale Reformen.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 5)*

This quote not only implies that a libertarian<sup>27</sup> approach is the most lucrative but claims that it is the *only* viable approach. Thus if one were to be interested in ecology, one ought to seek out libertarian policies and abide by them. This implies fewer/no regulations to be the only viable approach, effectively excluding a vast majority of environmental policies and protections. The preference for the economy is masked as the *real* ecological approach.

### **Environmentalism/Climate Change (293):**

This was the primary code, i.e. the aforementioned subcodes were part of it. However this code also served its own purpose, specifically for capturing all that does not fall neatly into one of the subcodes. Initially, two additional subcodes (solar and wind energy) existed but were later fused with this one for a lack of clarity in the distinction between the two subcodes<sup>28</sup>. This code, or rather its contents and arguments will be covered in more detail within Chapter **4. Results** and thus won't be elaborated upon further within this segment. The only relevant mention at this point is the distinction between "Environmentalism" and "Climate Change". This underlies the logic that *Die Weltwoche* authors could largely be identified as environmentalists so long as this pertains to a respect for nature, and a willingness to protect it. Where disagreement arises is with the notion of CC, which is overwhelmingly opposed based on any one (or multiple) of the arguments addressed within the introduction of the subcodes. In other words, *Die Weltwoche* is not strictly against conserving and protecting nature and/or animals but rather opposes what is perceived as a political fearmongering tool, utilized for the promotion of a self-centered agenda.

#### 3.3.2 Code – Topics (secondary)

Given the intertwined nature of the CC narrative, simply focusing on CC and/or Environmentalism would not have sufficed to encapsulate the entirety of the fundament upon which the CC narrative rests. The secondary codes can be further distinguished between topics that are inherently connected to CC (e.g. energy, politics, economy, ...) and those that create a connection via the RWP rhetoric that is prevalent in their portrayal (media, migration, wokeness, ...). They consist of the following codes (in alphabetical order):

- **Academics**

**(3/77)**

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<sup>27</sup> Note that the term used is liberal, however the political leniency and argumentative logic of *Die Weltwoche* makes me identify the line of reasoning as libertarian rather than liberal.

<sup>28</sup> Solar and wind energy are commonly presented alongside each other to the point where a distinction seems arbitrary. Additionally they are as common of a scapegoat/poster child that they become synonymous with the notion of CC.

○ Negative	(66)
○ Positive	(8)
- Economy <sup>29</sup>	(70)
- Energy	(101)
- Feminism	(63)
- Gender issues	(206)
- Government	(122)
- Media	(105)
- Migration	(67)
- Politics	(260/305)
○ Agenda	(45)
- Race	(37)
- Wokeness <sup>30</sup>	(225)

Given the self-explanatory nature and the following detailed coverage in Chapter 4. **Results** the topics won't be further specified within this segment. Nonetheless, it is worth repeating that the codes were not used to encompass the entirety of passages dedicated to the specific topic. E.g. **Economy** was not used to identify all passages referring to the economy, but rather to identify passages whose primary focus is the economy, but they relate in some form to the CC narrative. As an example, we turn to Beat Gygi's article

«**Klima am Schreibtisch – Versuch und Irrtum**»:

«*Alles in allem sind Banken, Vermögensverwalter, Versicherungs- und Beratungsunternehmen in Kooperation mit Soft Law und Regulatoren zu einem privat-staatlichen Kraftwerk der Klimapolitik geworden.*» (Gygi, 2022n, p. 2)

This quote implies that climate policy holds a vast influence over many sectors of the economy. Paired with the aforementioned preference for libertarian policies this portrays climate policy as limiting and over regulating the economy which should be free of outside influences.

### 3.3.3 Code – Rhetoric Tools (primary)

The second coding structure served to identify the usage of rhetoric tools utilized within the analyzed corpus. One of the primary interests of this thesis was to identify patterns used to communicate a message by *Die Weltwoche*. The first part of the primary rhetoric tools serves

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<sup>29</sup> Fused with the preexistent code "technology". The segments of interest that were previously identified as such, proved to be inherently economic in nature, given the criterion of being connected to CC. In other words, the passages marked were arguments for free markets and the promotion of innovation to help curb CC. Consequently the two codes were fused.

<sup>30</sup> Fused with the preexistent code "veganism". The segments of interest that were previously identified as such proved to be part of what is perceived as "wokeness" by *Die Weltwoche*. Paired with the relatively rare mentions of Veganism, (especially without immediately tying the concept to wokeness) the codes were fused to aid the transparency of the data.

to identify the portrayal of topics through the lens of RWP, by identifying passages directly relating to the egalitarian and hierarchical cleavages upon which the RWP narrative framework rests:

- **Corrupt Elite/them** (108)
- **Us/the good people** (70)

These are not necessarily tied to a topic but rather refer to the utilization of an argumentative logic that invokes criteria such as an “us against them” mentality (egalitarian cleavage) or a struggle between the “good people” and the “corrupt elite” (hierarchical cleavage)<sup>31</sup>.

For an example of the interplay between these cleavages and how they are portrayed, we turn to Anabel Schunke’s article

«**Wann ist genug?** – Bereits jetzt sind mehr Menschen nach Deutschland eingewandert als im Jahr 2015»:

*«Denn natürlich wird den Menschen etwas weggenommen. Vor allem am unteren Ende der Nahrungskette. Jeder Euro kann nur einmal ausgegeben, jede bezahlbare Wohnung nur einmal vermietet werden. Es sind die sozial Schwachen, die, anders als die grüne Bourgeoisie, nicht die Möglichkeit haben, ihr Kind auf eine andere Schule in einem Stadtteil mit weniger Migrantenkindern zu schicken. Sie sind es, die an vorderster Front die Entscheidungen einer politischen Kaste ausbaden, die sich bis heute weigert, zu akzeptieren, dass Kapazitäten auch in der Bundesrepublik endlich sind.» (Schunke, 2022t, p. 3)*

This quote implies numerous things. First is the normalized stance that one would want to send his children to a school with fewer migrants. This can not only be seen as a means of othering (i.e. “our” children are not the same as “migrant children”, who ought to be avoided, arguably due to a perceived negative influence) but also evokes the perception that the “socially weak” i.e. the “common folk” (the in-group) are those that are affected by the negative effects of migrants. Second, is the portrayal of the “Grüne Bourgeoisie<sup>32</sup>” as the upper social cast that enforces such a separation while avoiding the consequences (further implying that they themselves do not want their children to go to schools with more migrants). As the first sentence implies, the state is taking away something (in this case affordable housing) from you/us and giving it to them/the others (the migrants) at the cost of the good people who themselves can barely afford housing. All this happens as enforced by the corrupt political (and green?) elite, who themselves not only do not have to deal with the ramifications of their policies but actively avoid them, further implying that they themselves try to avoid migrants at all costs, which in turn further normalizes a disdain of migrants.

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<sup>31</sup> Note that the code was not structured as Corrupt elite/the good people or us/them. This serves to identify the portrayal of the perceived allied ingroup (i.e. Us/the good people) against the perceived antagonistic outgroup (i.e. Corrupt Elite/them), akin to the bipolar dichotomy alluded to in Figure 4.

<sup>32</sup> Note the usage of the term green. This arguably has nothing to do with ecology or green policy, but the term is used to connect the left with the ecology bringing them closer together and unifying the antagonistic outgroup.

The second part of the primary rhetoric tools is dedicated to the most common logical fallacy observed within the corpus: the strawman argument, as well as the umbrella term loaded language which has been used to identify actively subjective phrasing, typically utilized to imply specific stances on the topics covered:

- **Strawman** (154)
- **Loaded Language** (1264)

The strawman argument, i.e. “[...] the logical fallacy of distorting an opposing position into an extreme version of itself and then arguing against that extreme version. In creating a straw man argument, the arguer strips the opposing point of view of any nuance and often misrepresents it in a negative light.” (Kramer, 2022), holds special relevance given its plentiful appearances throughout the body. The nature of a straw hat argument however raises the question of intent, i.e. was the argument presented in such a manner because the author is trying to deceive (which would make it disinformation) or because the author isn’t sophisticated enough to provide a proper argument (which would make it misinformation). To solve this I want to highlight the following quote from Gottfried Locher’s article

«**Habt keine Angst!** – Ein Weihnachtstipp für alle die nicht den ganzen Tag Harfe spielen: Habt keine Angst!»

*«Wo sind die Meinungsmacher? Sie sitzen zum Beispiel in den Medienhäusern. Medienarbeit kommt nicht aus ohne Meinung. Es wäre ein Irrtum, zu meinen, Meinungen würden einzig in Kommentarspalten geäußert. Alles ist Meinung, alles ist Moral: die Schlagzeile jedes Artikels, die Bildwahl, der Zusammenschnitt des Interviews, der Aufbau der Story. Immer spielt die eigene Überzeugung mit. Meinung ist sogar das, was weggelassen wird: die Nachrichten, die nicht ausgestrahlt werden, die News, die nicht gedruckt werden. Totschweigen ist die ultimative Macht des Meinungsmachers.»* (Locher, 2021, p. 4)

Personally, I would have leaned toward respecting the authors enough to grant them that they thought out their arguments and opinions in a sufficient manner. Paired with the quote from Locher’s article I feel reassured in this approach and will be treating the corpus as such. Following this logic, Strawman’s arguments are consequently presented with the full intent of deception and not as the result of a mere misunderstanding of the discussed subject matter. This is especially relevant because the intent behind the action shifts *Die Weltwoche* from a passive spectator and commentator toward a role of active participation in the construction of narratives. This gives every one of the 154 identified Strawhat arguments additional weight. To illustrate I want to highlight two passages from Kurt W. Zimmermann’s article

«**Niedrigwasser bei der “Tagesschau”** – Der Wetterbericht stand früher für sachliche Information. Das ist Regen und Schnee von gestern.»:

*«Ich wollte mich also über das historische Hochwasser informieren. Ich schaltete dazu die «Tagesschau» ein. Über das historische Hochwasser vom letzten Freitag sendete die «Tagesschau» nicht eine Sekunde.»*

*Das war erstaunlich. Denn über den gegenteiligen Fall, über den ebenso seltenen Fall von Niedrigwasser, hatte sich die «Tagesschau» in den Tagen zuvor geradezu überschlagen. Sendung für Sendung präsentierte sie irgendwelche Flussbetten, die zu wenig Wasser führten.*

*«Dürre in Europa» lautete der Titel eines Beitrags. «Trockenheit in Europa» lautete der Titel des nächsten Beitrags. «Trockenheit und Dürre in Europa» lautete der Titel des nächsten Beitrags. Und so fort.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 2)*

*«Flüsse mit Niedrigwasser stützen die Weltsicht, wonach der überbordende Kapitalismus die Welt in die Klimakrise gestürzt und dies nun nur mit zentralstaatlicher Verbotspolitik korrigiert werden kann. Darum sind Flüsse mit Niedrigwasser ein Hammerthema, das hochgeschraubt werden muss.*

*Flüsse mit Hochwasser hingegen sind ideologisch störend, weil sie sich der Theorie entziehen, wonach die Erde systematisch verdorrt, und stattdessen zeigen, dass die Natur halt gelegentlich Kapriolen macht. Die drei schlimmsten Hochwasserkatastrophen der Neuzeit erlebte die Schweiz im 19. Jahrhundert. Damals schrieb kein Journalist von Klimawandel.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 3)*

This quote exemplifies how *Die Weltwoche* utilizes strawman arguments. The underlying logic is the fact that extreme weather events are seen as evidence for CC. Zimmermann fails to understand (or chooses to ignore) that this does not apply only to periods of little precipitation but also to those with extreme precipitation. Thus the fact that the *Tagesschau* did not cover flooding events implies that they follow an ideological agenda where events that reaffirm their stance (i.e. droughts) are covered, but those that oppose it (i.e. floods) are actively ignored. This is not only a severe misrepresentation of the connection between CC and extreme weather events (i.e. both droughts and floods) but actively accuses the *Tagesschau* of subjective and ideologically motivated coverage. This is especially effective given that the increased regularity of flooding events could likely be traced to the alterations within the water cycle, thus proving the opposite of what Zimmermann is trying to claim. However, by adding the objectively false premise that “floods disprove CC” Zimmermann shifts the narrative. Instead of being further proof of our changing climate, the floods are used to construct a narrative where CC is not only ideologically driven and replicated in media, but that those covering it are fully aware of this fact and thus only chose to cover that which reaffirms their worldview, which in turn portrays them as hypocrites which further serves to portray CC in a negative light. As mentioned before this could be seen as a mere misunderstanding of the relationship between CC and the water cycle, however following Locher’s logic, this is done with intent behind it.

In summary, the Strawhat argument was the most used logical fallacy within the analyzed corpus and is likely to be actively utilized such that the authors have a weaker version to address while also corrupting the actual argument brought forth by the opposition.

Loaded Language was by far the most prevalent rhetoric tool identified. While analyzing the corpus I've operated with the following definition in mind:

*“Loaded language is wording or phrasing that attempts to influence what people do, think, or say by using emotional appeal. The emotional connotation may be either negative or positive, depending on the direction of sway desired. It also is known as emotive or high-inference language, as well as language persuasive technique. This technique does not necessarily contradict logic or reason, but the culture in which a person is present influences whatever connotations are within the language.”* (Thibodeaux, 2023)

I want to address the number (1264) of passages identified as *Loaded Language*. There are two primary reasons for the count being this high. The first of which is that *Die Weltwoche* is about as far from objective journalism as it gets. While *Die Weltwoche* claims to be objective, each title, subtitle, and passage is written in a subjective manner<sup>33</sup> that either directly or indirectly influences the mindset of the reader, thus leading to the immense number of passages identified as *Loaded Language*. The second reason is that quite often single words were enough to be identified as *Loaded Language*, whereas for most other topics and rhetoric tools I typically marked entire passages<sup>34</sup>. This leads to a natural inflation of the number of markings. However, this is not to say that this was the sole reason. Rather I want to highlight that the emotional appeal is the by far most utilized tactic within *Die Weltwoche*'s narration, but I also want to relativize the immense number of passages by acknowledging that within this code it happened regularly that a single word elicited a codification. The best examples of such cases could be found within Michael Bahnert's repertoire. He often writes about patriotic topics in a melancholic style alluding to the “good old days”. Two great examples can be found in his article

**«Das letzte bisschen naive Unschuld – Ich hatte mein Leben, die Welt ihres, das war meine Normalität.»**

*««The fun has gone», jedenfalls scheint es gerade so. Da war bis vor zwei Jahren diese Normalität, alles war normal, das Glück, das Leid, die Probleme, das Leben, ich mochte mein kleines Land vor allem in der Unendlichkeit seiner Berge, ich war dankbar um das Staatswesen ab und an, auch wenn der Staat uns zusehends mit jederzeit melkbaren Cashcows verwechselte.»* (Bahnerth, 2021a, p. 3)

Within this quote the usage of the past tense, i.e. «[...] ich *mochte* mein kleines Land [...]» and «[...] ich *war* dankbar um das Staatswesen [...]» while only applied to single words carries a lot of weight. It strongly relies on a “good old days” type portrayal of things which in turn pairs well with the conservative stance of *Die Weltwoche* while also implying that Switzerland and its government are no longer something worth appreciating, further implying that something has gone wrong along the line. Paired with the current dominance of left-liberal politics a lot

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<sup>33</sup> Which is the primary reason why I chose to include the subtitles when directly addressing articles, seeing as they make the subjectivity of coverage immensely transparent.

<sup>34</sup> To clarify: Single-word-markings were more common in Loaded Language than other codes, but they still made up a minority of the codified segments.



can be implied about the state of the country/politics through something as small as the usage of the past tense in a verb.

### 3.3.4 Code – Rhetoric Tools (secondary)

Next to the primary rhetorical tools, multiple other codes were identified. However, given their relative scarcity, they will be mentioned (by name and the number of marked passages) but will not be further elaborated upon (besides some exceptions). They consist of the following (in alphabetical order):

- **Assertion** (39)
- **Bogeyman** (49/74)
  - **Direct accusation** (25)
- **Christian values** (5/9)
  - **War on Christmas** (4)
- **Confirmation Bias** (4)
- **Doublespeak** (4)
- **Exaggeration** (10)
- **Facts over feelings** (4)
- **False connection** (6)
- **Fearmongering** (46)
- **Good old days** (29)
- **Incitement** (10)
- **Migrants** (17/59)
  - **Efficient** (4)
  - **Lazy/parasitic** (25)
  - **Othering** (13)
- **Moral high ground** (22)
- **Nationalism** (33)
- **Nut-/cherrypicking** (17)
- **Patriotism** (21)
- **Persecution** (46)
- **Race** (24)
- **Simplification** (67)
- **“snowflake”** (19)
- **Unaddressed problems** (4)

Most of these codes are rather self-explanatory, however, some need further clarification.

**Facts over Feelings** and **“snowflakes”** were marked because of their common usage within US right-wing conservative circles. Often the conservatives are portrayed as those who stick to “facts over feelings” (prime examples are Ben Shapiro and Dr. Jordan B. Peterson) while

portraying their political opposition (i.e. liberals) as “snowflakes”, i.e. people who perceive themselves as special and/or are too easily offended or upset. Once those lines of argumentation had been encountered I expected them to be much more prevalent, consequently creating the codes. However, the argumentative patterns of *Die Weltwoche* proved to be less similar to their US contemporaries (or at least the slang used does not translate). Nonetheless, the code remained, because the lack of overlap in rhetoric approaches between *Die Weltwoche* and US outlets like *Fox News*, *Breitbart*, or right-wing conservative sections of YouTube is in itself noteworthy.

Codes that have direct counterparts in the *Topics* section, specifically **Race** and **Migrants** were included in the rhetoric tools section because within certain passages the topic was not of primary interest, but rather the way one talks about the topic was. I.e. their *Topic* counterparts identified *what* is being said about Race/migration, whereas the *rhetoric tools* codes referred to *how* those topics are covered.

**Persecution** (paired with **Christian values** and its subcode **War on Christmas**) refers to the perceived persecution of those who oppose a “woke” worldview. For *Die Weltwoche* this refers to white, male, Christian, conservative, and above a certain age, whose lifestyle is perceived as threatened and who are portrayed as being persecuted by minorities. However, I do not feel this persecution is anything more than perceived, following the adage “When you’re accustomed to privilege, equality feels like oppression”. Nonetheless to the readership of *Die Weltwoche*, this perception is reality and thus deserves coverage.

**Doublespeak** was introduced as a code in response to the misuse of Orwellian portrayals within *Die Weltwoche* (Bangerter, 2022b; Millius, 2022a; Schunke, 2022a; Thiel, 2022d; Wernli, 2022d). The code’s initial purpose was to identify segments that would be perceived as bad/good depending on who the subject was, but independent of the phrasing utilized. However, the code was quickly dismissed because of insufficient material. Nonetheless, it was kept as a reminder that some of the authors within *Die Weltwoche* are very loose in their recognition of “Orwellian” attributes. Specifically, references to *Newspeak* were identified as the most common (Typically when addressing gender issues, specifically gender-neutral language), however, those will be further addressed in Chapter 4 Results and Discussion.

## 4. Results and Discussion

The initial section of the results, Chapter **4.1 CC/Environmentalism** shall serve to portray *Die Weltwoche*’s coverage of strict CC/Environmentalism to help distinguish between what *Die Weltwoche* opposes and what it agrees with. This is done by firstly presenting lines of reasoning offered by *Die Weltwoche* alongside corresponding references to the articles in question. Consequently, some keystone articles will be highlighted in Chapter 4.1.4 Listing of

CC-articles. The full reference list of the articles that have been deemed as primarily covering CC will be attached in the appendix (page 153). After this Chapter 4.2 is dedicated offering a graphic representation of the CC narrative, and Chapter 4.3 covers other relevant articles that tie into the larger CC narrative and help support the argumentative logic behind it. Chapter 4.4 goes over some honorable mentions for the expansion of the analysis, such as topics and authors.

## 4.1 CC/Environmentalism

The first distinction to be made is between what is understood as Environmentalism and what is understood as CC. While *Die Weltwoche* does not strictly distinguish the terminology, I've chosen to do so to portray the dichotomy within the two perceived forms. This distinction helps to distinguish between that which *Die Weltwoche* agrees with and even sees as necessary (Environmentalism) and that which *Die Weltwoche* vehemently opposes based on multiple different yet intertwined lines of reasoning (CC).

### 4.1.1 Environmentalism – What *Die Weltwoche* agrees with

What has been dubbed *Environmentalism* shall serve as an umbrella term to encapsulate the segments of the larger CC concept, which *Die Weltwoche* agrees with. For this, it is important to specify that *Die Weltwoche* would portray itself as environmentally oriented/interested. However, a distinction is made between *true* Environmentalism and what *Die Weltwoche* perceives as a leftist agenda (more details will be offered in the following chapter).

Three primary lines of reasoning have been identified which portray the aspects *Die Weltwoche* agrees with.

#### **1. true environmentalism promotes nuclear energy over alternative energy sources.**

(Baumann, 2022b; Baur, 2022e, 2022f; Bilanz, 2022; Blum, 2022; Bodenmann, 2022b; Boulouchos, 2022; Eichenberger, 2022a, 2022f, 2022e; Gygi, 2021b, 2022q, 2022f, 2022t, 2022n, 2022e, 2022m, 2022g, 2022j; Hank, 2022; Häring, 2022a; Herodot, 2022a; Heumann, 2022a; Kneissl, 2022; Köppel, 2021d; Koydl, 2022a; Lomborg, 2022; Mooser, 2022s, 2022e, 2022b, 2022m, 2022o, 2022c, 2022i, 2022j, 2022q; Mörgeli, 2021a, 2022e; Odermatt, 2022d; Prasser, 2022a; Rohner, 2022; Schilliger, 2022; Schindler, 2022c; Schuler, 2022b; Schunke, 2022l; Shellenberger, 2022a; Thess, 2022; Van Huisseling, 2022c; L. Weber, 2022; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f; Zeller, 2022a)

*Die Weltwoche* sees nuclear energy as the only viable option to guarantee the future of our energy supply. This is arguably the strongest argument raised by *Die Weltwoche* with decent argumentative backing. The critique of the Swiss nuclear phase-out is viable and deserves

proper consideration. The dedication towards promoting nuclear energy even manages to overcome the typical disdain toward the EU, whose taxonomy system grades nuclear energy as an environmentally friendly source and is praised for doing so. Otherwise, the EU's taxonomy system is strictly opposed based on the grading offered for alternative energies and/or fossil fuels (Baumann, 2022b; Eichenberger, 2022a; Gygi, 2021b, 2022q, 2022j, 2022m; Hank, 2022; Prasser, 2022a; Rohner, 2022; Schilliger, 2022; Schuler, 2022b; Thess, 2022).

It is worth noting that nuclear energy is mostly addressed to counterargue the advancements in solar/wind energy and only rarely as an alternative to fossil fuels.

Fossil fuels, while not per se promoted, are commonly presented either as a necessity or as a necessary evil<sup>35</sup> that will be addressed in time through the free market. (Baumann, 2022b; Baur, 2022e, 2022f; Bilanz, 2022; Blum, 2022; Bodenmann, 2022b; Eichenberger, 2022e; Gygi, 2021b, 2022t, 2022m, 2022e, 2022f, 2022n, 2022g; Hank, 2022; Häring, 2022a; Haupt, 2020; Herodot, 2022a; Heumann, 2022a; Kneissl, 2022; Köppel, 2021d; Koydl, 2022a; Lomborg, 2022; Mooser, 2022o, 2022b, 2022c, 2022m, 2022s, 2022j, 2022q, 2022i, 2022e; Mörgeli, 2021a, 2022e; Prasser, 2022a; Schindler, 2022c; Shellenberger, 2022a; Van Huisseling, 2022c; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f; Zeller, 2022a)

## **2. true environmentalism means protecting native land and wildlife**

(Baur, 2022e; Bögli, 2022; Eichenberger, 2022a; Gygi, 2022l, 2022f; Köppel, 2021c; P. Meier, 2022; Mooser, 2022p, 2022o, 2022f, 2022s, 2022c, 2022l; Mörgeli, 2021b; Rothenbühler, 2022c; Schindler, 2022c; V. Weber, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f)

*Die Weltwoche* claims to favor the conservation of the native landscape and wildlife. However, this line of argument is uttered almost exclusively in opposition to projects that fall under the “CC agenda” like the establishment of solar and/or wind plants. *Die Weltwoche* mourns the loss of habitat, and desecrated landscapes, often paired with an appeal to patriotism/patriotic duty. It is worth noting that the general attitude when addressing Swiss natural landscapes comes out of – what appears to be – an honest and heartfelt position. This is to say that *Die Weltwoche* and its authors are actively interested in environmental conservation. They by no means wish direct harm to the environment. However, what is perceived as environmentally harmful is distinct in its interpretation. Direct interference, like the aforementioned establishment of solar panels above the village of Grengiol in the alps, is overwhelmingly opposed largely based on wanting to conserve landscapes and protect nature (Bodenmann, 2022a, 2022b; Mooser, 2022c, 2022i, 2022f, 2022s). However, the less directly visible aspects of environmental degradation (often occurring on a transnational-global scale), such as

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<sup>35</sup> This distinction is made to highlight that some articles acknowledge the problems of fossil fuels and the fossil fuel industry, thus referring to them as a metaphorical “necessary evil”. Meanwhile other articles fail to recognize the (or any) problems associated with fossil fuels, thus covering them as a necessity for our energy system. This is relevant because of the way those portrayals affect the narrative around fossil fuels. The former, through acknowledgment of the issues, paints a neutral or even slightly negative picture of fossil fuels. Meanwhile the latter shifts the narrative toward a very positive association of fossil fuels.

habitat loss, rising sea levels, increased temperatures, carbon levels, the pace of the water cycle, etc. do not appear to resonate at the same level. These are often perceived as “natural” thus humanity has no control over, the jurisdiction of, or duty to uphold. Paired with the common opposition towards the idea of an anthropogenic effect on CC, and the association of these broader, less immediate concepts to the perceived CC agenda, *Die Weltwoche*'s interest in environmental conservation becomes largely defined by national lines. That is to say that domestically speaking *Die Weltwoche* is a strong voice for protecting our environment. The beauty of Switzerland's natural landscapes is held in high regard and its conservation is not only supported but seen as a patriotic, or even nationalistic duty (Bahnerth, 2022d; Baumann, 2022b; Baur, 2022e; Bigler, 2022; Blocher, 2022; Bodenmann, 2021, 2022a, 2022b, 2022e; Bucheli, 2022; Eichenberger, 2022a; Gygi, 2022b, 2022t; Heumann, 2022a; P. Meier, 2022; Millius, 2022b; Mooser, 2022s, 2022c, 2022i, 2022o, 2022p, 2022f, 2022e; Prasser, 2022a; Schindler, 2022c; Walser, 2020; V. Weber, 2022; Wyder, 2022). Outside of domestic lines, *Die Weltwoche*'s stance shifts, with environmental projects/policies being largely opposed. Compared to the national scale, the stance on global-scale environmentalism focuses on a different set of factors (e.g. claims of a CC/leftist agenda, denial of scientific consensus/accuracy/trustworthiness, libertarian free-market mode of thinking) that ultimately reverse the argumentative patterns encountered (Bangerter, 2022b; Blocher, 2022; Gygi, 2022m, 2022r, 2022n, 2022f, 2022p; Hank, 2022; Häring, 2022b; Köppel, 2021d; Matuschek, 2022b; Millius, 2022c; Mohr, 2022; Mooser, 2022h, 2022a, 2022e; Mörgeli, 2022f, 2022g, 2022b; Prasser, 2022a; Reichmuth, 2022a; Rothenbühler, 2022d; Schunke, 2022k, 2022b, 2022e; Shellenberger, 2022a; Wyder, 2022; Zimmermann, 2022a).

### **3. true environmentalism means individual and economic freedom**

(Eichenberger, 2022d, 2022f; Gygi, 2022c, 2022h, 2022s, 2022o; Köppel, 2021c; Lomborg, 2022; Reichlin, 2022c; Rothenbühler, 2022c; Schunke, 2022l; Weltwoche, 2022f)

This is the most representative/stereotypical economic and socio-political argument raised by *Die Weltwoche*. It is implied on numerous occasions that CC cannot be addressed through laws and regulations but only through the liberation of the market and citizens. *Die Weltwoche* shows strong libertarian patterns and strictly opposes any form of governmental/political meddling for the sake of CC. Instead, they argue that the market will naturally drive innovations toward the most ecological solution. Notably this line of reasoning never addresses the temporal aspects which are one of the primary critiques of market failures regarding CC, i.e. even accepting the premise that the free market could achieve such a feat, does not mean that the transition occurs in time to efficiently address the looming dangers of CC.

In summary, *Die Weltwoche* is for *Environmentalism* as long as this means no meddling with nature, no governmentality, and the maximization of freedom, both in the market and among

individuals. Nuclear energy is presented as the sole viable option to adequately address future energy needs which is used to further the notion of non-viability for alternative energy sources.

It is important to note that these arguments seem to have two primary effects on the narrative construction. The first is to strengthen the opposition to the “CC agenda” by offering arguments that can be understood as *true* environmentalism, thus solidifying *Die Weltwoche* as a viable participator in the CC debate. If *Die Weltwoche* were to strictly oppose Environmentalism this might have an alienating effect on (parts of) the readership. By offering insights and backing national environmentalism *Die Weltwoche* portrays itself as the ones *actually* caring for the environment and trying to achieve this via *true* environmental policy. Secondly, the arguments raised, especially when isolated from the rest of the corpus, are rather viable. The promotion of nuclear energy, the utilization of the free market, and the conservation of native wildlife/landscape are all sound (and popular) stances. It is only through context that the manipulative nature of those arguments becomes visible. For this, we need to turn to what *Die Weltwoche* understands when addressing “Climate Change” and why they vehemently oppose all of it:

#### 4.1.2 Climate Change – What *Die Weltwoche* opposes

What has been dubbed Climate Change shall serve as an umbrella term for the aspects that are opposed in *Die Weltwoche*'s CC narrative. These have been summarized into four lines of arguments

##### **1. Scientific Elite misunderstands or even misuses CC**

(Bahnerth, 2022b; Eichenberger, 2022a, 2022e, 2022d, 2022f; Gygi, 2022e, 2022i, 2022f, 2022q; Hank, 2022; Häring, 2022b, 2022a; Kessler, 2022; Köppel, 2021c; P. Meier, 2022; Millius, 2022c, 2022b; Mooser, 2022k, 2022m, 2022p; Mörgeli, 2022e; Müller-plath, 2022; Reichmuth, 2022a, 2022c, 2022d; Sarrazin, 2021, 2022b; Schindler, 2022c; Schunke, 2022v; Shellenberger, 2022a; Tettamanti, 2021; Thess, 2022; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022l, 2022a, 2022f, 2022m; Zimmer, 2022; Zimmermann, 2022e)

The notion of CC – as informed by the scientific elite – is criticized based on two interpretations. The first of which is the misunderstanding/misinterpretation of scientific claims raised when addressing CC. The prime example of this is found when relating to the anthropogenic causes, where *Die Weltwoche* will often second guess or outright deny scientific backing. The second is the misuse/manipulation of scientific data which paired with the position of authority the scientific elite holds is perceived as a political tool used to proliferate the political elite's interests.

It is claimed that there is an interplay between the scientific and political/governmental and occasionally economic elites that serve to push each other's interests. This perceived CC

agenda is achieved via “climate propaganda” (Eichenberger, 2022a, 2022f, 2022d, 2022e; Gygi, 2022i, 2022t, 2022e, 2022q, 2022f, 2022p; Häring, 2022a, 2022b; Kessler, 2022; Lomborg, 2022; Matuschek, 2022a; Millius, 2022c, 2022b; Mohr, 2022; Mooser, 2022p, 2022m, 2022o, 2022k; Mörgeli, 2021b, 2022b, 2022e; Müller-plath, 2022; Odermatt, 2022d; Reichmuth, 2022c, 2022a; Rothenbühler, 2022d, 2022c; Sarrazin, 2021, 2022b, 2022a; Schindler, 2022c; Schunke, 2022y, 2022l, 2022v, 2022r; Shellenberger, 2022a; Tettamanti, 2021; Thess, 2022; Thiel, 2022e; L. Weber, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f, 2022l; Zimmer, 2022; Zimmermann, 2022e, 2022i). The scientific elite shapes the narrative through simplification, exaggeration, dramatization and overinflation of the Climate Crisis (Bahnerth, 2022b; Eichenberger, 2022d, 2022f, 2022e, 2022a; Gygi, 2022m, 2022f, 2022p, 2022e, 2022o, 2022i; Häring, 2022a; Heumann, 2022b; Kessler, 2022; Koydl, 2022b; Locher, 2021; P. Meier, 2022; Millius, 2022c, 2022b; Mooser, 2022m, 2022k; Mörgeli, 2022b, 2022g, 2022e; Müller-plath, 2022; Reichmuth, 2022d, 2022a, 2022c; Sarrazin, 2022a; Schindler, 2022c; Schunke, 2022y; Shellenberger, 2022a, 2022b; Thess, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022l, 2022g, 2022f, 2022m; Zimmermann, 2022i, 2022e) which finds fertile grounds due to rhetorical manipulation such as fearmongering, alarmism, emotional appeals, claims of philanthropy and/or moral/ethical grounds, or the demonization of those who oppose the agenda (Bahnerth, 2022b; Bangerter, 2022a; Baur, 2022e; Gygi, 2022f, 2022n, 2022e, 2022p, 2022m, 2022l; Hank, 2022; Häring, 2022a; Heumann, 2022b; Kessler, 2022; Koydl, 2022b; Locher, 2021; J. Meier, 2022b; Mohr, 2022; Mooser, 2022k, 2022m; Mörgeli, 2022b; Müller-plath, 2022; Odermatt, 2022d; Reichmuth, 2022c, 2022b; Rothenbühler, 2022d, 2022b; Sarrazin, 2021, 2022a; Schindler, 2022a, 2022c; Schunke, 2021a, 2021b, 2022r; Shellenberger, 2022a; Thiel, 2022t, 2022e; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022a). The reliance on the environmental branch of academia is used to discredit the feasibility of the CC agenda, by claiming that other arguments are forgotten or ignored. The prime example is whataboutism which manifests as the constant critique of economic viability. Ecological arguments are shut down through economic arguments which are perceived as the de facto more essential mode of thinking (Bodenmann, 2022c; Gygi, 2021b, 2022o, 2022q, 2022f, 2022m, 2022j; Hank, 2022; Heumann, 2022a; Köppel, 2021c; Mohr, 2022; Mooser, 2022j, 2022m, 2022b, 2022s, 2022p; Reichmuth, 2022d; Sarrazin, 2021, 2022a, 2022b; Shellenberger, 2022b; L. Weber, 2022; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f, 2022c, 2022h).

## **2. Greens/Leftists want to get rid of nuclear and fossil energy sources**

(Baur, 2022e; Bodenmann, 2022c; Eichenberger, 2022d; Gygi, 2022g, 2022d, 2022e, 2022m, 2022f, 2022o; Häring, 2022b; Heumann, 2022a; Lomborg, 2022; Mooser, 2022j, 2022m, 2022e, 2022o; Mörgeli, 2021b; Odermatt, 2022d; Rentsch, 2022b; Sarrazin, 2021, 2022a; Schunke, 2022l; Shellenberger, 2022b; Tettamanti, 2021; Thess, 2022; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022h, 2022f, 2022c)

The above claim while obvious, deserves closer inspection due to the argumentative logic upon which it rests. The reasoning behind *why* the Greens/Leftists want to get rid of fossil fuels and nuclear energy is essential for understanding the resulting opposition towards the notion. The Greens/Leftists are presented as both *ignorant* and *aware* of the fact that alternative energy sources can not compete with their counterparts. They are ignorant insofar as they are presented to be guided by wishful thinking and a misunderstanding of the efficiency of different energy sources (Baumann, 2022c; Bodenmann, 2022c, 2022f; Eichenberger, 2022a, 2022d; Gygi, 2022t, 2022g, 2022f, 2022q; Heumann, 2022a; Mooser, 2022c, 2022p, 2022j, 2022e, 2022b, 2022m; Sarrazin, 2021; L. Weber, 2022; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f, 2022c). They are aware insofar as they are presented as having a hidden agenda, where they seek the establishment of prohibitionist mechanisms because they know that without it greener forms of energy generation will not succeed in their current states. (Bodenmann, 2022f; Eichenberger, 2022d, 2022a; Gygi, 2022j, 2022f, 2022e, 2022g; Mooser, 2022e, 2022j, 2022m; Rentsch, 2022b; Sarrazin, 2022a; Thess, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f). However, the people pushing this agenda don't do this because of an interest in environmentalism. Instead, they thrive on the promotion of alternative energies over fossil fuels based on corrupt prohibitionism motivated by personal enrichment (Bangerter, 2022a; Baur, 2022e; Gygi, 2022j, 2022t, 2022q, 2022g, 2022s; Hank, 2022; Heumann, 2022a; Lomborg, 2022; Mooser, 2022s, 2022b, 2022c, 2022o, 2022e; Sarrazin, 2022a; Schunke, 2022l; Thess, 2022; L. Weber, 2022; Weimann, 2022). They achieve this through the utilization of the corrupt government (in the form of state law/funds/subsidies/...) and politicians (e.g. Sommaruga, Bersait, Glätti, ...) and mainstream media as well as state-run media (such as SRF, especially SRF Meteo) (Bangerter, 2022a; Baur, 2022e; Bodenmann, 2022f, 2022c; Gygi, 2022s, 2022c, 2022j, 2022q, 2022i, 2022g, 2022p, 2022o, 2022f, 2022e; Häring, 2022b; Köppel, 2021c; Millius, 2022b, 2022c; Mohr, 2022; Mooser, 2022p, 2022b, 2022c, 2022l, 2022m, 2022o, 2022k; Mörgeli, 2021b; Odermatt, 2022d; Rentsch, 2022b; Rothenbühler, 2022b, 2022c; Sarrazin, 2021, 2022b; Schuler, 2022b; Schunke, 2021a, 2021b, 2022l, 2022y, 2022v; Shellenberger, 2022b; Tettamanti, 2021; L. Weber, 2022; V. Weber, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022j, 2022f, 2022a; Zimmer, 2022; Zimmermann, 2022e) which allows them to take over large segments of the economy and further spread their agenda (Bodenmann, 2022c; Gygi, 2022f, 2022m, 2022j, 2022n, 2022g; Mooser, 2022p, 2022m; Rentsch, 2022b; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f).

They do this fully aware of the fact that the consequences of their actions will not be harming them but rather occur at the cost of others (i.e. the common folk/the good people, nature, the socially weak) (Baumann, 2022c; Baur, 2022e; Bodenmann, 2022c, 2022a; Eichenberger, 2022a; Gygi, 2021b, 2022q, 2022o, 2022j, 2022f, 2022c, 2022i, 2022s, 2022m, 2022g; Köppel, 2021c; Lomborg, 2022; Mooser, 2022f, 2022j, 2022p, 2022b, 2022m, 2022c, 2022l, 2022s, 2022o; Mörgeli, 2021b; Sarrazin, 2021; Schuler, 2022b; Schunke, 2021b, 2021a, 2022r, 2022v; Shellenberger, 2022b; Tettamanti, 2021; L. Weber, 2022; V. Weber, 2022; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f, 2022h). They are willing to integrate large world events into their agenda, which causes topics like the Covid pandemic and the Ukraine war to be perceived as Trojan



Horses used to further their agenda by decreasing/stealing liberties and expanding the state (Bodenmann, 2022f; Lomborg, 2022; Millius, 2022b; Mooser, 2022e; Odermatt, 2022d; Schunke, 2022l; Weltwoche, 2022a).

### **3. CC policy is not what *the people* want**

(Baur, 2022e; Bodenmann, 2022c; Gygi, 2022m, 2022o, 2022q, 2022e, 2022f, 2022c; Mooser, 2022d, 2022o, 2022s, 2022m, 2022c, 2022p, 2022f; Odermatt, 2022d; Rothenbühler, 2022c; Sarrazin, 2021; Schindler, 2022c; Schunke, 2021a, 2022r, 2022l, 2022y; Shellenberger, 2022b; V. Weber, 2022; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f)

*Die Weltwoche*, much in a populist fashion, claims to be representing *the people*. Their opinions and stances are normalized whereas opposing views are perceived as not being part of the *will of the people*. To properly elaborate this stance one has to note the perceived difference between how things truly are and how the “mainstream/leftist-media” portrays them to be. This is to say that under *Die Weltwoche*’s narrative, the picture portrayed by public media is strongly skewed thus overrepresenting the popularity of what is effectively a fabricated mainstream stance. The *real* people, those who do not buy into the media narrative, are the same ones who don’t find representation through the media, thus being perceived as less popular/common than they are. This reiterates common populist themes such as the perceived suppression of popular (and conservative) viewpoints, through a leftist media landscape and a corrupt government i.e. the hierarchical cleavage between the good people and the corrupt elites.

### **4. CC is a quasi-religious, dogmatic ideology infecting (especially the youth) through propaganda**

(Gygi, 2022r, 2022q, 2022i; Häring, 2022a; Köppel, 2021c; Matuschek, 2022a; J. Meier, 2022b; Millius, 2022b; Mooser, 2022m; Mörgeli, 2022e; Odermatt, 2022d; Rothenbühler, 2022d, 2022c; Sarrazin, 2021; Schindler, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c; Schunke, 2021a, 2022b, 2022r, 2022l, 2022y, 2022m, 2022v; Tettamanti, 2021; Thiel, 2022t, 2022e)

CC or the Climate agenda, is commonly referred to as a quasi-religious ideology that rests upon dogmatic beliefs such as blind trust in scientific “experts”, the government, and the media. This line of argument pairs immensely with what *Die Weltwoche* perceives as “woke(ness)”. CC amalgamates with topics such as gender issues (especially LGBTQ+), cancel culture, feminism, or veganism. (Gygi, 2022r; Köppel, 2021c; J. Meier, 2022b; Mooser, 2022m; Rothenbühler, 2022d, 2022c; Schindler, 2022c, 2022a, 2022b; Schunke, 2021a, 2021b, 2022m, 2022v, 2022b, 2022y, 2022r, 2022l; Thiel, 2022t, 2022e; Zimmermann, 2022i). This dogmatic mode of operation allows the political left to enforce social control/regulation without resistance (Gygi, 2022i, 2022j, 2022c, 2022m; Heumann, 2022b; Köppel, 2021c; Matuschek, 2022a; Millius, 2022b; Rothenbühler, 2022b; Schindler, 2022b, 2022c, 2022a; Schunke, 2021a,

2021b, 2022b, 2022l, 2022y, 2022r; Tettamanti, 2021; Thiel, 2022t, 2022e; V. Weber, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022a; Zimmermann, 2022i) going as far as equating it to socialist and/or communist regimes such as Nazism/Stalinism/Leninism (Matuschek, 2022a; Schindler, 2022c; Schunke, 2022y). This line of argument follows the populist framework through the identification of the egalitarian cleavage (us vs. them). Notably, the struggle of an “us vs. them” mentality as perceived through a RWP lens, commonly results along national lines (i.e. antipluralism in the form of natives vs. migrants/refugees). While this is still the case in *Die Weltwoche* it is worth noting that nationality/race is not the primary target of othering. Instead the “adversary culture”, i.e. the young, naïve, misinformed, queer, liberal, vegan, weak, privileged, etc. are unified under the term “woke” and become the primary target of othering. They are the audience of the corrupt elites (political and academic) who use their loud voice to influence and shift politics and culture. Their goals stand in direct opposition to the status quo “we/us/the good people” enjoy and seek to maintain. “Woke” topics are vehemently opposed thus having a spillover effect on CC via association. Simply put *Die Weltwoche* (especially its readers) opposes woke topics, and by defining the leftist CC agenda as part of a woke narrative, the perceived CC agenda gains more reasons to be doubted and opposed.

#### 4.1.3 The intertwined nature of *Die Weltwoche*'s CC narrative

To visualize the level of connection between the CC discourse and other discursive topics the overlap between marked passages has been analyzed. In Subchapter 3.3.2 Code – Topics (secondary) the analyzed topics have been introduced. They are Academics (77 marked passages), Economy (70), Energy (104), Feminism (63), Gender Issues (206), Government (122), Media (105), Migration (67), Politics (305), Race (37), and Wokeness (225). To offer a measure of how directly they relate to the marked Climate Change (479) passages, their level of overlap has been measured. This means that (using MAXQDA's Code-Relation Browser), the passages that are found no more than one paragraph away from a CC marking are identified. These were viewed as direct links between discursive topics, whereas related claims that were found more than one passage away from CC markings were identified as indirect links. The result of these findings is displayed in Figure 24. Using Politics as an example: There have been 305 markings for Political statements that help establish/inform *Die Weltwoche*'s CC narrative. 148 of those were raised within the same paragraphs as at least one of the 479 CC markings. This means that approximately half of the relevant political claims are raised accompanying CC discourse making the two discursive topics share a strong and direct linkage. Whereas the other half, while still informing the dialogue, is seen as indirectly tied to the CC narrative. This level of connection equates to the level of sophistication one needs to develop for *Die Weltwoche*'s CC narrative to understand how the topic covered affects it. This means that the perceived effect of topics like Energy (0.66 overlaps), Economy (0.56), and Politics (0.49) is more intuitive and therefore much simpler to grasp than that of Gender Issues (0.07) or

Feminism (0.05) which need a deeper and more detailed analysis of the narrative to become transparent. However, this does not necessarily imply that Gender Issues or Feminism have little to no impact on informing the CC narrative, but rather that they assume a deeper appreciation of the unspoken premises upon which *Die Weltwoche's* narrative rests.

4.1.4 Rhetoric Tools that help inform the CC narrative

As was done with the topics, the same form of overlap has been identified for rhetoric tools identified in the manipulation/construction of *Die Weltwoche's* CC narrative. To properly visualize them the primary (Chapter 3.3 Code – Rhetoric Tools (primary)) and a summary of the secondary (Chapter 3.3.4 Code – Rhetoric Tools (secondary)) have been joined and their overlap with the CC markings noted. The resulting graph is displayed in Figure 25.




Figure 24 Level of intertwined discourse ordered by magnitude of absolute numbers of marked passages. The numbers in brackets refer to the overall number of markings. The numbers in the boxes refer to number of overlapping markings (first) percentage of direct overlap with the discursive topic (second).




Figure 25 Rhetoric Tools utilized to establish/construct the CC narrative, ordered by magnitude of absolute numbers of marked passages. The numbers in brackets refer to the overall number of markings. The numbers in the boxes refer to number of overlapping markings (first) percentage of direct overlap with the discursive topic (second).

The most identified rhetoric tool was the usage of Loaded Language (1264) which is found across the vast majority of the corpus and appears intrinsic to *Die Weltwoche's* rhetoric style. (Alinejad, 2022; Altwegg, 2022; Bahnerth, 2021a, 2022c; Bangerter, 2022b, 2022a; Baumann, 2021, 2022c; Baur, 2022f, 2022a, 2022e, 2022c, 2022d; Bilang, 2022; Blocher, 2022; Blum, 2022; Bodenmann, 2021, 2022f, 2022g, 2022e, 2022c, 2022a, 2022d; Boulouchos, 2022; Hendryk M Broder, 2022; Henryk M Broder, 2022; Burchill, 2021, 2022; Cavelty, 2022; Cerutti, 2022; Eichenberger, 2022d, 2022c, 2022f, 2022a, 2022b; Federspiel, 2022a, 2022b; Frenkel, 2022; Gehriger, 2022a, 2022b; Gygi, 2021b, 2021a, 2022t, 2022l, 2022g, 2022r, 2022b, 2022f, 2022j, 2022e, 2022d, 2022h, 2022q, 2022n, 2022c, 2022p, 2022s, 2022a, 2022u, 2022m, 2022i; Häfliger, 2022; Hall, 2022; Hank, 2022; Häring, 2022a, 2022b; Heer, 2021; Herodot, 2022c, 2022b; Heumann, 2022b, 2022a; Hildbrand, 2022; Hollstein, 2022b, 2022c, 2022a; Holmes, 2022a, 2022b; Hürzeler, 2021; Kern, 2022; Kessler, 2022; Köppel, 2021d, 2021c, 2021a, 2021b, 2021e, 2022; Koydl, 2022c, 2022b, 2022a; Kutschera, 2022c, 2022a, 2022b; Locher, 2021; Lomborg, 2022; Lüders, 2022; Martenstein, 2022; Matuschek, 2022b, 2022c, 2022a; Matussek, 2022b, 2022a; J. Meier, 2022b, 2022a; P. Meier, 2022; Millius, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c; Mohr, 2022; Mooser, 2021a, 2021b, 2022p, 2022n, 2022h, 2022a, 2022i, 2022c, 2022f, 2022q, 2022r, 2022j, 2022e, 2022m, 2022k, 2022g, 2022l, 2022d, 2022b, 2022o, 2022s; Mörgeli, 2021b, 2022d, 2022i, 2022e, 2022b, 2022f, 2022a, 2022c, 2022g, 2022h; Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022; Morris, 2022; Müller-plath, 2022; Nef, 2022; Odermatt, 2021, 2022f, 2022b, 2022g, 2022d, 2022c, 2022h, 2022a; Pelda, 2022; Pines, 2022; Pitteloud, 2022; Rasmussen, 2022; Reichlin, 2021, 2022f, 2022e, 2022d, 2022a, 2022c; Reichmuth, 2022d, 2022c, 2022b, 2022a; Reinacher, 2022; Renggli, 2021a, 2022; Rentsch, 2022b, 2022a; Ric, 2022;

Rothenbühler, 2022b, 2022d, 2022a; Sarrazin, 2021, 2022a, 2022b; Schilliger, 2022; Schindler, 2022c, 2022d, 2022a, 2022b; Schlumpf, 2022; Schneider, 2022; Schuler, 2022b, 2022a; Schunke, 2021a, 2021e, 2021d, 2021b, 2021c, 2022p, 2022c, 2022b, 2022k, 2022h, 2022l, 2022m, 2022o, 2022w, 2022d, 2022g, 2022t, 2022n, 2022q, 2022i, 2022f, 2022y, 2022v, 2022e, 2022r, 2022x, 2022a, 2022j, 2022z, 2022s, 2022aa; Schwab, 2022b; Shellenberger, 2022a, 2022b; Stämpfli, 2022; Stephan, 2022; Sternstein, 2022; Stock, 2022; Stöhlker, 2022; Tettamanti, 2021; Thess, 2022; Thiel, 2022s, 2022b, 2022d, 2022h, 2022k, 2022t, 2022j, 2022n, 2022e, 2022g; Van Huisseling, 2022a, 2022b; von Thurn & Taxis, 2022; Walser, 2020; D. Weber, 2022; V. Weber, 2022; Weder, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022b, 2022a, 2022d, 2022f, 2022g, 2022c, 2022m, 2022j, 2022h; Wernli, 2021a, 2021b, 2022j, 2022d, 2022e, 2022b, 2022g, 2022i, 2022h, 2022c, 2022a, 2022f; Widmer, 2022; Young, 2022; Zimmer, 2022; Zimmermann, 2021c, 2021a, 2021b, 2022h, 2022g, 2022f, 2022e, 2022d, 2022i, 2022c, 2022b, 2022a; Zweifel, 2022)

The most identified logical fallacy was the strawman argument (154) which can be understood as ranging from simple misinformation based on a lack of the author's sophistication to conscious manipulation of argumentative logistics, making them an active attempt at deception, definitionally making them disinformation.

(Alinejad, 2022; Baur, 2022e, 2022b; Bodenmann, 2021; Burchill, 2021; Eichenberger, 2022e, 2022a; Frenkel, 2022; Gehriger, 2022a; Gygi, 2021b, 2021a, 2022h, 2022e, 2022q, 2022c, 2022g, 2022m, 2022u; Häring, 2022a; Herodot, 2022b; Heumann, 2022a; Hollstein, 2022a; Kern, 2022; Kessler, 2022; Kutschera, 2022b, 2022c; Lüders, 2022; Mooser, 2021a, 2022o, 2022k; Mörgeli, 2021b, 2022a, 2022c, 2022g; Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022; Morris, 2022; Müllerplath, 2022; Odermatt, 2021; Pelda, 2022; Pines, 2022; Reichlin, 2021; Reichmuth, 2022a, 2022d; Renggli, 2021a; Sarrazin, 2021; Schilliger, 2022; Schindler, 2022a, 2022c; Schuler, 2022a; Schunke, 2021c, 2021a, 2022y, 2022u, 2022e, 2022z, 2022q, 2022w, 2022i, 2022d, 2022c; Shellenberger, 2022a; Tettamanti, 2021; Thess, 2022; Thiel, 2022t, 2022n, 2022i, 2022q, 2022d; Van Huisseling, 2022a; D. Weber, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022f, 2022m, 2022d, 2022c; Wernli, 2021a, 2022f, 2022d, 2022g, 2022b; Widmer, 2022; Zimmer, 2022; Zimmermann, 2021b, 2021a, 2022a, 2022e, 2022c, 2022g; Zweifel, 2022)

RWP rhetoric tools (178), i.e. the allusion to an “us against them” narrative equating to the egalitarian cleavage, and a “good people against the corrupt elite” narrative equating to the hierarchical cleavage.

(Baur, 2022e; Gehriger, 2022a; Gygi, 2021b, 2022r, 2022q, 2022m, 2022s; Hollstein, 2021, 2022b; Köppel, 2021b, 2021a, 2022; Locher, 2021; Matussek, 2022b, 2022a; Millius, 2022c; Mohr, 2022; Mooser, 2022k, 2022m, 2022i, 2022a, 2022b, 2022r, 2022e, 2022q, 2022o, 2022c; Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022; Odermatt, 2021, 2022a, 2022f, 2022g; Renggli, 2021b; Sarrazin, 2022a; Schindler, 2022a; Schuler, 2022b; Schunke, 2021a, 2021d, 2022x, 2022u, 2022g, 2022d, 2022w, 2022h, 2022z, 2022t, 2022o, 2022r, 2022s, 2022n; Shellenberger, 2022a, 2022b; Stämpfli, 2022; Tettamanti, 2021; Thiel, 2022c; Van Huisseling, 2022b; Walser, 2020; V.

[Weber, 2022](#); [Weltwoche, 2022a](#); [Wernli, 2022j](#); [Widmer, 2022](#); [Young, 2022](#); [Zimmer, 2022](#); [Zimmermann, 2021b, 2022f, 2022g, 2022c](#))

The “Secondary Rhetoric Tools” category serves as a summarization of the less prevalent methods used. The five most common are the Bogeyman (i.e. scapegoating) (74), the use of simplification (64), the speech patterns relating to migrants (59), fearmongering (46), and the invoking of a persecuted white, conservative, Christian Populus (46).<sup>36</sup>

#### 4.1.5 Listing of CC Articles

Next to the coding system which was designed for individual statements/passages, the articles whose primary focus is CC have been selected. While an in-depth analysis of each of them exceeds what can be covered within this thesis, it is pertinent to take note of them. Hence, they will be listed (in chronological order of their publishment) by title and subtitle as well as expanding commentary/paraphrases in the appendix. This is done to strike a balance between the quantity and quality of the analysis. The titles and subtitles are quite indicative of the narrative they aim to construct. Additionally, it is safe to assume, that they are the first thing that strikes a potential reader's mind and are thus more meaningful than the average passage within the articles themselves. The “CC-articles” include 77 out of the 371 analyzed articles and will be listed in chronological order of their publishment. However, covering them all at once would harm the work-flow of the thesis. Consequently, it has been decided to extract some token articles from the list and attach the full listing in the appendix. The articles that will be covered within this chapter instead of the appendix have been chosen based on their exemplary value for the portrayal of specific attributes upholding *Die Weltwoche's* CC narrative.

- **Europa trocknet aus** ([Müller-plath, 2022](#))
- **Die Standardmeinung** ([Gygi, 2022e](#))
- **Propaganda Maschine ETH** ([Mooser, 2022k](#))
- **Wo Wetter plötzlich Klima ist** ([Millius, 2022c](#))
- **Niedrigwasser bei der Tagesschau** ([Zimmermann, 2022e](#))
- **Angriff auf Natur und Demokratie** ([V. Weber, 2022](#))
- **Grüner Albtraum** ([Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022](#))
- **Umweltschutz braucht freie Menschen und Unternehmen** ([Kessler, 2022](#))
- **Ich will das Klima nicht retten** ([Schindler, 2022c](#))
- **Grüne Früchte, braune Wurzeln** ([Koydl, 2022b](#))
- **Apokalypse im Museum** ([Shellenberger, 2022a](#))

These eleven articles were chosen because they were deemed the most quintessentially representative. All of them tie multiple narrative strings together but they also each

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<sup>36</sup> They were spread sporadically across the entirety of the corpus. As a consequence they will not be referenced on a single-article basis but will rather be referred to as underlying the narrative apparatus in it's entirety.

individually help establish the cornerstones of the argumentative logic upon which *Die Weltwoche*'s narrative lays its foundation. They will be presented in an order that aims to portray a decent journey through the narrative that should help inform **RQ 2: If one were to subscribe/believe the entirety of *Die Weltwoche*, how would one perceive CC?**

**Europa rocket aus** (Müller-plath, 2022) was chosen as a starting point because it can be seen as planting the seeds of doubt in the reader by covering current droughts and second-guessing the causality behind anthropogenic CC. If the reader is interested in further informing themselves, they might turn to articles like **Die Standardmeinung** (Gygi, 2022e) which is representative of *Die Weltwoche*'s coverage of the IPCC reports, a widely quoted reference point for our current understanding of CC, which is portrayed in a negative light. The article alludes to over-politicization and questions the credibility of the scientific elite. It also discretely alludes to the perceived association between the CC agenda and wokeness by mentioning that while diversity of gender and nationality is enforced, there is no difference in opinion. This shifts the narrative of scientific consensus on the issue towards that of an echo chamber irresponsive to diverging opinions. While the article covers the global/international scale, the reader can also learn about the domestic state of CC politicization through articles like **Propaganda Maschine ETH** (Mooser, 2022k). This article reaffirms that the leftist overly politicized CC agenda is not only present at the international scale (such as with the IPCC) but has actively infected us domestically. The ETH, commonly used as the token of prestigious Swiss academia, is not only overtly politicized by the left. Instead of just being subjects of the political apparatus they are elevated to the role of active participators and thus co-conspirators of the CC agenda. The academic, political, and governmental elites cooperate to establish a narrative that aids the CC agenda. The reader learns from articles like **Wo Wetter plötzlich Klima ist** (Millius, 2022c) how state media (and therefore taxpayer money) is being used to propagate this agenda. The Swiss meteorological forecast *SRF Meteo* is presented as the metaphorical lovechild of the governmental and political elites, where through hypocrisy and fearmongering the CC agenda proliferates the public space. Besides the state-operated media apparatus, the reader can learn that mainstream media has bought into the agenda and helps replicate the narrative framework through articles like **Niedrigwasser bei der Tagesschau** (Zimmermann, 2022e). Articles like **Angriff auf Natur und Demokratie** (V. Weber, 2022) and **Grüner Albtraum** (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022) inform the reader how the leftist political elite enforce the agenda by ignoring or even actively subverting democratic principles. Their plans are harmful not only to the Swiss landscape – whose presentation is accompanied by a strong appeal to nationalism – but also to the Swiss citizenry. *They* are getting rich at the cost of *our* suffering. The reader can then learn how CC *should* be addressed through articles like **Umweltschutz braucht freie Menschen und Unternehmen** (Kessler, 2022). They can best be summarized as a libertarian stance on a free market, as well as a strong opposition to any regulations, prohibition, or taxation. The reader is reaffirmed that what is being sold as CC measures is part of an agenda that is willing to cut down on civic liberties and personal freedom to achieve their goal. The articles up to this point were sufficient to serve as an introduction to the CC narratives. Both the one perceived as the ominous CC agenda and the

one portrayed and constructed by *Die Weltwoche*. They might suffice for a reader to conclude a stance akin to the one offered in **Ich will das Klima nicht retten** (Schindler, 2022c). The primary reason given for «not wanting to save the climate» is the ideology behind it. It is portrayed as quasi-religious and dogmatic as well as accused of heavy rhetoric manipulation through strategies such as fearmongering, alarmism, and dramatization. This ideology is further defined through articles like **Grüne Früchte, braune Wurzeln** (Koydl, 2022b) which builds upon the perceived ideology by tying it to other topics that are vehemently opposed, such as wokeness, gender, or LGBTQ+ issues. The recipients of the ideology that results from the leftist CC agenda are primed for left-wing extremism by associating them with nazis or communists. How severe this gets is best emphasized in the article **Apokalypse im Museum** (Shellenberger, 2022a) where numerous direct implications are offered. Through the equation of the woke/CC agenda with nazism, communism, and socialism a severely negative connotation is bestowed upon the agenda. This causes the opposition towards the perceived CC agenda to not only be based upon disbelief in the science behind it, but upon a belief in a corrupt and immensely successful elitarian machinery that has taken hold over our government and utilizes academia and media alike to push an agenda that allows not only social control through the establishment of an extremist leftist oppression state, but has also found footing in our culture by infecting a significant part of the population with their dogmatic narrative framework.

A more in-depth inspection of these articles is given below, in the same order as they were introduced in the previous paragraph:

- **Europa trocknet aus** – Meldungen über Dürren häufen sich. Oft ist der Wassermangel menschengemacht, aber mit dem Klimawandel hat es nichts zu tun. (Müller-plath, 2022)

This article addresses the increase in droughts and water scarcity and questions whether this can be linked to anthropogenic CC:

*«Was steckt dahinter? Werden Böden in Europa tatsächlich immer trockener, Flüsse wasserärmer, Waldbrände häufiger? Wie weit ist es eine natürliche oder eine vom Menschen verursachte Entwicklung? Seit Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts scheinen sich Dürrejahre zu häufen: Als besonders heiss und trocken gelten in Mitteleuropa 2003, 2015, 2018. Ist das klimatisch ungewöhnlich, oder gab es das früher auch?»* (Müller-plath, 2022)

The connection is relativized by alluding to the historic drought of 1540 which is used to discredit an anthropogenic cause:

*«Die bislang wohl schlimmste Dürrekatastrophe Mitteleuropas seit Menschengedenken, welche die Geschehnisse des 21. Jahrhunderts bei weitem übertraf, ereignete sich 1540.»* (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 2)



«Dass es 1540 ohne den künstlich verstärkten Treibhauseffekt zu einer noch schlimmeren Hitze gekommen sei, relativiere die Beurteilung des menschlichen Einflusses auf das Wetter 2003.» (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 3)

This is followed up by a strawman argument that implies that the role of precipitation changes are at fault, while failing to recognize that those too are tied to anthropogenic CC:

«Umgekehrt ist es mit genügend Regen auch bei hoher Temperatur nie zu einer Dürre gekommen; man vergleiche mit den Tropen. Daher erscheint es schwer vorstellbar, dass ein Temperaturtrend allein ohne Niederschlagsveränderungen zu einem Dürretrend führen kann.» (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 6)

The article concludes by claiming that anthropogenic CC cannot be linked to droughts and forest fires or changes in precipitation patterns:

«Zusammengefasst unterstützt die Empirie nicht die allenthalben geäußerte Behauptung, Dürren und Waldbrände seien Folgen des anthropogenen Klimawandels.» (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 7)

«Die Analyse der europäischen Dürregeschichte und der Wetterdaten der letzten 150 Jahre zeigt, dass die menschengemachten CO<sub>2</sub>-Emissionen kaum zu solchen Ereignissen beitragen können. Es fällt nicht weniger Regen als früher und auch nicht anders verteilt.» (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 8)

- **Die Standardmeinung** – Mit seinen Berichten kanalisiert der Weltklimarat die weltweite Diskussion in Klimafragen. Die Kritik an der Auswahl der Wissenschaftler und Themen wird lauter. (Gygi, 2022e)

The article seeks to discredit the IPCC based on it being too political and non-responsive to diverging opinions. The prognoses are presented as “certain” through the lens of climate activists, but “flimsy/unreliable” through the lens of critics. The fact that politicians mainly read the summary for policymakers is used to claim that the summary is inherently propaganda:

«Die wenigsten werden jedoch die ganzen dicken Berichte lesen. Der Klimarat liefert deshalb immer auch eine «Zusammenfassung für Politiker» mit, die allerdings nicht nur eine Zusammenfassung ist, sondern auch eine propagandagerechte Dramatisierung, Zuspitzung und Verzerrung der Originalberichte.» (Gygi, 2022e)

The IPCC is further discredited based on an anonymous source, who out of fear of repercussions does not want to be named. The conclusion is that the IPCC management is political and not scientific:

«Die oberste Führungsebene wird also politisch, nicht wissenschaftlich bestimmt.» (Gygi, 2022e, p. 2)

The IPCC is further discredited by claiming that the primary intent behind cooperation is gaining access to the climate funds which further alters the interests of the council:

*«Dass die Umweltministerien vieler Länder grün geprägt und der Grossteil der IPCC-Staaten Gelder aus dem Grünen Klimafonds der Uno erhalten, färbt auf die Zusammensetzung und die Interessenlage des Gremiums ab.» (Gygi, 2022e, p. 2)*

The last statement worth highlighting is the notion of diversity. It is stated that the council seeks diversity in gender and nativity but not in opinion, shutting down anyone who criticizes the alarmism. This connection pairs well with how *Die Weltwoche* perceives wokeness and associates it with the CC movement. Enforced diversity in skin color and gender at all costs, but critique or difference in opinion are vehemently opposed:

*«Laut Schilderungen Involvierter gibt es zwar Diversität bei Geschlecht und regionaler Herkunft, aber nicht bezüglich Meinungsspektrum in der Klimadiskussion: Kritiker der Alarmlinie würden ausgegrenzt.» (Gygi, 2022e, p. 3)*

- **Propaganda Maschine ETH** – Professoren missbrauchen das Prestige der Spitzenhochschule zur politischen Einflussnahme. Die Tendenz geht zu Rot-Grün. (Mooser, 2022k)

This is a lengthy article whose primary focus lies in discrediting the ETH by portraying them as political operatives willing to spread propaganda and take the country hostage to gratify personal disappointments:

*«Gehört es zum Lehr- und Forschungsauftrag dieser Hochschulen, auch die Richtung für die EU-Politik vorzugeben? Die ETH Zürich scheint auf Abwege geraten zu sein. Schon länger nutzen Professoren dreist das Image und Prestige dieser Schule für politische Einflussnahme. Wie statthaft ist es, ein ganzes Land in Geiselhaft zu nehmen, damit ein paar Wissenschaftler sich besser fühlen?» (Mooser, 2022k)*

This train of thought continues paired with the lie that unlike Switzerland the EU has no high-ranking universities:

*«Die ETH nehme niemanden in Geiselhaft, wehrt sich eine Sprecherin auf Anfrage. Aber man dürfe sich zu Debatten äussern, die den Lehr- und Forschungsauftrag gefährdeten. Nun lässt sich darüber streiten, ob eine Nichtteilnahme am EU-Forschungsprogramm tatsächlich Lehre und Forschung hierzulande gefährdet. Jedenfalls gibt es keine Universität in der EU, die zur obersten Weltklasse zählt.» (Mooser, 2022k, p. 2)*

It is further implied that the ETH actively manipulates members of parliament and adds that this only finds traction amongst SP, Grüne, and glp, the three parties *Die Weltwoche* most opposes. Through this, a link is established that implies that the educational elite is

cooperating with the political elite to further an agenda that is perceived as harmful to the people:

*«Solche Ausführungen belegen aber vor allem eines: dass die ETH die Parlamentarier offenbar systematisch und erfolgreich bearbeitet. Das war wohl auch die Absicht Hengartners, als er die Brüssel-Visite nutzte, um Politiker der Bildungskommission des Nationalrates (WBK), die ebenfalls in die belgische Hauptstadt gereist waren, zu einem Gespräch einzuladen. Aber ausser Kommissionspräsident Fabien Fivaz (Grüne), der SP-Nationalrätin Valérie Piller Carrard und dem Grünliberalen Thomas Brunner zeigte niemand Interesse daran.» (Mooser, 2022k, p. 3)*

This notion is reiterated and strengthened by an appeal to the ivory tower:

*«Die Einmischung der Hochschule in die Politik geht aber längst über das europapolitische Engagement hinaus. Sie wird zunehmend zu einer Propagandamaschine für den rot-grünen Mainstream. Mit dem Klimawandel und der Corona-Pandemie sei die Stimme aus dem Elfenbeinturm der Universitäten so laut geworden wie seit den sechziger Jahren nicht mehr» (Mooser, 2022k, p. 3)*

As another example of political activism from the ETH, the Trinkwasserinitiative<sup>37</sup> is used. It is implied that the scientists were very vocal in support of the initiative but haven't been heard from again since the initiative failed at the urn:

*«So trat damals die Wasserforschungsanstalt der ETH, die Eawag, mit der These an die Öffentlichkeit, der Einsatz von Pestiziden in der Landwirtschaft gefährde die Wasserqualität in der Schweiz. «Negative Effekte auf Fortpflanzung, Entwicklung und Gesundheit von Pflanzen, Tieren und Mikroorganismen müssen befürchtet werden», war in einem Eawag-Faktenblatt zu lesen. Es gab etliche Stellungnahmen von ETH-Forschern in dieser Richtung, die unter dem Titel Wissenschaft für die Trinkwasserinitiative und die Pestizidinitiative trommelten. Besonders die Landwirte bekamen ihr Fett ab. Trotzdem wurden die Initiativen im Juni 2021 dann mit über 60 Prozent der Stimmen an der Urne verworfen. «Seither haben wir nichts mehr gehört über die angeblich schlechte Qualität des Trinkwassers»» (Mooser, 2022k, p. 4)*

The missed prognosis for the spread of Corona is mentioned and associated with the CC movement seeking to discredit the accuracy of climate models. Religious vocabulary is used to further the notion of a quasi-religious ideology while also implying that the scientists want to garner a position of higher influence/power:

*«Obwohl sich in der Pandemie zeigte, wie weit die Modellbauer selbst bei kurzfristigen Prognosen danebenliegen können, wollen nun die ETH-Klimapropheten unter Führung ihres Medienstars Reto Knutti voraussagen, wie die klimatischen Verhältnisse auf der Erde in fünfzig Jahren sein werden. Knutti trat in jüngerer Zeit mehr als Klimaaktivist auf und weniger als*

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<sup>37</sup> See <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/abstimmungen/20210613/volksinitiative-fur-sauberes-trinkwasser-und-gesunde-nahrung.html>

*Klimaforscher. Trotz seines Daueralarms fiel die Abstimmung übers CO2-Gesetz im Juni 2021 aber gegen ihn aus. Nun fordert er eine Klima-Task-Force, die den Bundesrat in Klimafragen beraten soll – wohl auch, um direkt auf Entscheide Einfluss nehmen zu können.» (Mooser, 2022k, p. 5)*

The article concludes by implying that ETH researchers are using fearmongering/soothsaying tactics to further their agenda by getting the media on their side. This allows them to circumvent democratic processes and dictate how people have to heat their homes and drive their cars, furthering the notion of a hierarchical divide where the elite (academic and political) dictate the lives of the common folk:

*«Derzeit sind die ETH-Glaziologen mit ihren Weltuntergangsszenarien hoch im Kurs, etwa Matthias Huss. Sie machen in den Medien Stimmung, um die Debatte über die Gletscherinitiative und einen Gegenvorschlag in die Richtung ihrer eigenen Forschung zu lenken. Unter dem Eindruck eines Medien-Bombardements über schwindende Gletscher und Wasserreserven hat das Parlament nun einen Gegenvorschlag gezimmert, der faktisch die Umsetzung der Initiative ohne Abstimmung bedeutet. Finanziert wird die Forschung zu Klima und Gletscherschmelze mit beträchtlichen Geldmitteln aus Forschungsprogrammen wie Horizon. Die Forscher liefern daraus die Ergebnisse, aufgrund deren die Regierung dem Volk dann vorschreiben kann, wie man heizen und Auto fahren soll.» (Mooser, 2022k, p. 5)*

- **Wo Wetter plötzlich Klima ist** – Die «Meteo»-Macher missbrauchen die beliebte TV-Sendung für politischen Aktivismus. Allen voran der Chef, Redaktionsleiter Thomas Bucheli. (Millius, 2022c)

The article covers SRF Meteo and specifically Thomas Bucheli and implies that they overtly politicize CC. The article is initiated by covering an event where activists let a balloon with the message “Heiss? Klimaschutz!” fly into view of the ongoing Meteo broadcast. Although it is acknowledged that SRF Meteo distanced themselves from this occurrence, it is implied that this is contrived:

*«SRF distanzierte sich umgehend von der Aktion der grünen Aktivisten. Die Sendung sei für eine politische Kampagne missbraucht worden. Die Aufregung wirkte gekünstelt. Denn die Sendung wird schon seit Jahren missbraucht – von ihren eigenen Moderatoren.» (Millius, 2022c, p. 2)*

The notion that SRF Meteo is being misused to push the CC agenda is addressed by this statement:

*«Vorläufiger Höhepunkt: Mitte Juni 2022 forderte Moderator Gaudenz Flury vor laufender Kamera die «Durchsetzung von griffigen Klimamassnahmen». Aber der politische Aktivismus beschränkt sich nicht auf «Meteo». Interviews, Vorträge, Online-Beiträge: Die Macher der*

*Wettersendung lassen keine Gelegenheit aus, um vor dem Klimawandel zu warnen und für dessen Bekämpfung zu werben.» (Millius, 2022c, p. 2)*

The article then lists multiple occasions where SRF moderators allude to the fact that CC is changing weather patterns. The dogmatic nature is alluded to by highlighting that debate around the topic is prohibited as seen in the following passage:

*«In einem Beitrag der «Meteo-Stories» auf Srf.ch hiess es im Mai 2022, dass die Zahl der Hitzetage weiterhin steigen werde, aber «mit ausgeprägten Klimaschutzmassnahmen liesse sich die Zunahme deutlich eindämmen». Und Gaudenz Flury erklärte in der Schweizer Familie: «Den Klimawandel gibt es, und der ist menschengemacht. Punkt. Das ist wissenschaftlich bewiesen, darüber lässt sich nicht diskutieren.» Keine Diskussion. Punkt.» (Millius, 2022c, p. 3)*

The article concludes by highlighting that SRF Meteo is financed by the state, thus implying that taxpayer money is being wasted on leftist propaganda and reiterating that divergent opinions are silenced:

*«Das ist die Haltung des gebührenfinanzierten Senders. Der Stammtisch soll gefälligst schweigen, ebenso Wissenschaftler, die etwas anderes sagen – und die gibt es durchaus.» (Millius, 2022c, p. 4)*

Finally, it is implied that the people dislike this manipulation of taxpayers by referencing Bucheli stating that most reclamations come in when CC is addressed in the broadcast. This however is implied to be a diversion tactic such that failed prognoses do not attract attention:

*«Nicht alle Zuschauer finden diese politische Beeinflussung des zahlenden Publikums lustig. Laut Thomas Bucheli gibt es nie so viele Beschwerden, wie wenn in seiner Sendung der Klimawandel thematisiert wurde. Vielleicht ist das der wahre Grund für das politische Engagement von «SRF Meteo»: ein Ablenkungsmanöver von gelegentlichen Fehlprognosen.» (Millius, 2022c, p. 4)*

- **Niedrigwasser bei der Tagesschau** – Der Wetterbericht stand früher für sachliche Information. Das ist Regen und Schnee von gestern. (Zimmermann, 2022e)

The article's primary focus is the occurrence of floods in Switzerland. It misconstrues the occurrence of floods as counterevidence for droughts and portrays this as an event deliberately suppressed by state- and mainstream media. The alleged reason behind it is that it does not fit the CC agenda and would expose the lack of foundation behind it. This is done by first addressing the *Tagesschau* (Swiss state media outlet) by implying that it is biased for not covering floods to the same extent as droughts:

*«Ich wollte mich also über das historische Hochwasser informieren. Ich schaltete dazu die «Tagesschau» ein. Über das historische Hochwasser vom letzten Freitag sendete die*

«Tagesschau» nicht eine Sekunde. Das war erstaunlich. Denn über den gegenteiligen Fall, über den ebenso seltenen Fall von Niedrigwasser, hatte sich die «Tagesschau» in den Tagen zuvor geradezu überschlagen. Sendung für Sendung präsentierte sie irgendwelche Flussbetten, die zu wenig Wasser führten.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 2)

This is followed up by implying that state media actively suppresses the event, thus requiring the author to turn to the free press. The *Tages-Anzeiger* (Swiss newspaper with widest circulation<sup>38</sup>) is mentioned, however it too did not cover the flood, furthering the notion that both state and mainstream media cannot be trusted:

«Gut, dachte ich, wenn der Staatsfunk wichtige News unterdrückt, dann informiere ich mich halt in der freien Presse. Ich wandte mich also an den *Tages-Anzeiger*, das grösste Blatt des Landes, um mich über das historische Hochwasser zu informieren. Über das historische Hochwasser schrieb der *Tages-Anzeiger* nicht eine Zeile.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 2)

What has been implied is now stated clearly; the reason for the lack of coverage is the left/green ideology that has infected the *Tages-Anzeiger* (and likely other media outlets):

«Es ist klar, woher die eklatanten journalistischen Fehlleistungen rühren. Die Fehlleistungen sind ideologisch unterfüttert. Auf den Redaktionen von «Tagesschau» und *Tages-Anzeiger* arbeiten zu 70 Prozent oder mehr links-grüne Journalisten. Das merkt man.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 3)

This is explained through the strawman argument that droughts fit the CC narrative, whereas floods do not. As a comparison, it is stated that the largest floods in recent history (in Switzerland) occurred in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and yet no one blamed CC at the time:

«Flüsse mit Niedrigwasser stützen die Weltsicht, wonach der überbordende Kapitalismus die Welt in die Klimakrise gestürzt und dies nun nur mit zentralstaatlicher Verbotspolitik korrigiert werden kann. Darum sind Flüsse mit Niedrigwasser ein Hammerthema, das hochgeschraubt werden muss.

*Flüsse mit Hochwasser hingegen sind ideologisch störend, weil sie sich der Theorie entziehen, wonach die Erde systematisch verdorrt, und stattdessen zeigen, dass die Natur halt gelegentlich Kapriolen macht. Die drei schlimmsten Hochwasserkatastrophen der Neuzeit erlebte die Schweiz im 19. Jahrhundert. Damals schrieb kein Journalist von Klimawandel.»* (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 3)

The article then disproves its implications by acknowledging that other media outlets did cover the flooding events (NZZ, Blick, TeleZüri, St. Galler Tagblatt, 10 vor 10). This however is construed in a manner to imply the severity of ideological journalism at the *Tages-Anzeiger*:

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<sup>38</sup> Excluding free newspapers like *20Minuten* or *Blick*.

«Dass zu den ideologischen Ausreißern die «Tagesschau» gehört, ist wenig überraschend. Es ist ein gutes Beispiel dafür, wie die Informationspflicht, der sie unterliegt, für die Redaktion allzu oft nur noch lästig ist.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 3)

This line of reasoning is further strengthened by implying that CC has turned the weather forecast political instead of factual:

«Es zeigt sich darin auch ein grundlegender Trend: Das Wetter und der Wetterbericht wandelten sich im Journalismus von einem Thema zu einer Thematik. Mit dem Klimawandel wurde die nüchterne Perspektive abgelöst durch die politische Optik.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 3)

This is reiterated for the state-run SRF Meteo weather broadcast, which is accused of political activism and “cheap leftist propaganda”. The last sentence of the article however states that it is by no means cheap, implying that this state-run and thus tax-financed propaganda tool wastes the salary of twenty people for a mere three-minute broadcast:

«Zuletzt etwa forderte «Meteo»-Moderator Gaudenz Flury in der Sendung die «Durchsetzung von griffigen Klimamassnahmen». SVP-Nationalrat Christian Imark nahm die Steilvorlage natürlich sofort an. Es handle sich um «billige, linke Propaganda des Staatsfernsehens». In einem Punkt hatte Imark unrecht: Billig ist das nicht. Für drei, dreieinhalb Minuten «Meteo» arbeiten zwanzig Leute.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 4)

- **Angriff auf Natur und Demokratie** – Energiepolitik auf Abwegen: Mit erschreckender Selbstverständlichkeit und horrendem Tempo hat das Parlament den Landschaftsschutz und die Mitspracherechte der Bevölkerung ausgehebelt. (V. Weber, 2022)

The article covers the building of photovoltaic plantations in the Alps and portrays the prioritization of this project as harmful and ignorant. The article is introduced by stating that Swiss nature and landscape conservation are being sacrificed at the altar of climate protection. This phrasing not only implies the notion that the CC agenda is harmful to the environment but also furthers the notion that the CC agenda is a quasi-religious ideology:

«Da wurden kurzerhand der Natur- und Landschaftsschutz sowie die Schweizer Alpen auf dem Altar der Energieversorgung und des Klimaschutzes geopfert.» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 2)

The opposition to the project is further intensified by an appeal to nationalism by playing with imagery associated with the Swiss national hymn which can serve to intensify the animosity toward the CC agenda:

«Der in der Nationalhymne besungene Alpenfirn soll sich in Zukunft nicht mehr röten, sondern im Strahlenmeer der Solarpanels ertrinken. Betet, freie Schweizer, betet!» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 2)

The notion that fearmongering is used as a tool to establish the agenda is stated:

«Angst und Panik zu schüren, hat sich als wirkungsvolle Methode etabliert, um dem Volk «aussergewöhnliche» Massnahmen «beliebt» zu machen.» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 2)

This is followed up by implying that the situation is going to get worse because the timing of the advancement was strategically placed to avoid scrutiny. This statement is further clad in a dose of patriotism and the implication of destroying our most pristine environments:

«Und dies ist erst der Anfang, denn in der Wintersession soll ein weiteres dringliches Gesetz «zur Beschleunigung von fortgeschrittenen Windparks und von grossen Vorhaben der Speicherwasserkraft» verabschiedet werden. Das ganze Vorgehen ist derart gut inszeniert, dass Medien wenig kritisch die Absicht des Bundesrates und des Parlaments flankieren, Tausende von Sonnenkollektoren und Windrädern in unseren schönsten Landschaften zu installieren.» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 2)

While stomping out democratic procedures at a rapid pace which will lead to the destruction of our landscapes:

«Im Expresstempo wurden die üblichen demokratischen Prozesse in Grund und Boden gefahren.» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 3)

«Nachdem der Rechtsstaat unterlaufen und die direkte Demokratie demontiert wurde, befiehlt das Parlament den uneingeschränkten Angriff auf unsere (noch) intakte Natur und unsere wertvollen Landschaften, auf die wir viel dringender angewiesen sind als auf einen zufälligen Zusatz von elektrischem Strom.» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 3)

An additional appeal to emotion and nationalism is used to further cement the opposition to the project:

«Zudem brauchen wir Räume mit unberührter Natur für unsere Gesundheit und unser seelisches Gleichgewicht. In unserer zunehmend verstädterten Welt gewinnt der Erholungswert der Natur an Bedeutung, sie wird als Urlaubsziel, für Sonntagsausflüge oder zum Wandern gesucht und ist Teil unserer Identität. Die bereits erwähnte Schweizer Nationalhymne besingt die «Schönheiten des Vaterlandes, die zur ergriffenen Seele sprechen»» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 4)

Interestingly this article addresses the idea of utilizing existing infrastructure (like rooftops) to expand photovoltaic panels in a positive light. This is something Simmonetta Sommaruga has long advocated for and *Die Weltwoche* has ridiculed on numerous occasions.



- **Grüner Albtraum** – Der «Klimaplan» der Schweizer Umweltschützer ist linksextrem und diktatorisch. Eine Umsetzung wäre eine Katastrophe für Wohlstand, Markt und Gesellschaft. (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022)

This article addresses the perceived CC agenda and portrays what that entails. As the subtitle implies, the agenda is perceived as extreme and dictatorial. Its consequences are portrayed as all-encompassingly negative. The article is initiated by the “commanded” tempo limitations in Zürich, which is portrayed as a direct invasion into everyday life and the economy:

*«Wieder einmal auf der breiten Ausfallstrasse in Zürich stadtauswärts geschlichen, mit Tempo dreissig, wie seit kurzem befohlen. Die rot-grünen Regierungen in den Schweizer Städten mischen sich immer konkreter ins Alltagsleben ein. Und ins Geschäftsleben, in die Wirtschaft.»* (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022, p. 2)

The will to reduce traffic is presented as an invasion not only into personal travel but personal property:

*«Also nicht nur der Individualverkehr, sondern auch das Individualeigentum wird bekämpft. Das alles sind Spielarten der Enteignung.»* (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022, p. 3)

The invasion into private life and especially the economy (with a focus on small corporations) evokes the hierarchical struggle between the political elite who enforce their agenda at the cost of the common folk:

*«Besonders einschneidend sind die Forderungen nach einem «grundlegenden Wandel» in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, nach drastischen Staatseingriffen. Es gehe um nicht weniger als die «historische Verantwortung an der globalen Klimaerwärmung» unseres Landes. Diese Verantwortung besteht bekanntlich aus einem Tausendstel des weltweiten menschengemachten CO2-Ausstosses, global irrelevant. Nur würde diese Erkenntnis auch die Grünen und deren Politik irrelevant machen. Grüne Politik heisst immer mehr Auflagen für Gebäude und Fahrzeuge, staatlich befohlene Beratungen, eine Bürokratisierung von allem, was mit Energieanwendungen zusammenhängt, und Hunderttausende schikanierte KMU.»* (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022, p. 4)

The necessity of environmental policy is downplayed through CC denial by claiming that in the preindustrial era, the climate fluctuated more than it does nowadays and that the Green Party purposefully left out this fact because it would ruin their case. Instead, the Green Party utilizes war, water scarcity, migration, and the economy to fit further their agenda by invoking alarmism across multiple topics:

*«Das Papier der Grünen verschweigt, dass schon die Temperaturen der vorindustriellen Zeit starken Schwankungen unterworfen waren und das heutige Wärmeniveau erheblich übertroffen haben. Die heutige Erwärmung ist im Rückblick auf die zurückliegenden Tausenden von Jahren weder einzigartig noch dramatisch. Der Bericht instrumentalisiert extreme Wetterereignisse, zeichnet die Apokalypse aus Wassermangel, Migration, Wirtschaftskrisen*

*und Kriegen. Dabei ist die Bedeutung des Klimawandels für die Migrantenströme absolut nicht nachgewiesen.» (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022, p. 5)*

Towards the end of the article, it is implied that the Green Party despises anything to do with the economy and wants to enforce contentment in the population:

*«Die Grüne Partei verachtet alles, was mit wirtschaftlich-schöpferischem Antrieb zu tun hat, und will vor allem Genügsamkeit, Einschränkung, Gürtel eng schnallen.» (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022, p. 5)*

- **Umweltschutz braucht freie Menschen und Unternehmen** – Die Modelle des Weltklimarats ergeben völlig unzuverlässige Voraussagen des Klimas. Die Wissenschaft taugt nicht als Rechtfertigung für Eingriffe in die Freiheitsrechte. (Kessler, 2022)

This article is one of the most essential to this thesis because it is a prime example of CC denial within *Die Weltwoche's* corpus and thus deserves closer inspection. It is introduced by stating that governments limit personal freedom and rights for the sake of CC:

*«Weltweit greifen Staaten immer massiver in Freiheitsrechte ein, um den Klimawandel zu bekämpfen. Dennoch ertönen täglich Stimmen, die meinen, die jetzigen Massnahmen gingen zu wenig weit. Sie fordern noch mehr Kompetenzen für die Politik und folglich eine noch weitergehende Einengung der Bürger und Unternehmen.» (Kessler, 2022)*

This is followed up by a strawman argument highlighting that the anthropogenic link is no longer questioned. Instead of seeing this as a consequence of scientific consensus, this tries to portray the climate debate as closeminded, unscientific, and indifferent to skepticism:

*«Die These, wonach der Klimawandel hauptsächlich vom Menschen ausgehe und er diesen durch Massnahmen aufhalten könne, darüber wird in der medialen Debatte kaum noch diskutiert. Warum auch hinterfragen, was «wissenschaftlich bewiesen» ist? Gerade die Skepsis gegenüber weit herum geglaubten Annahmen ist aber eine wesentliche Quelle wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts, die nicht leichtfertig über Bord geworfen werden sollte.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 2)*

Another Strawman argument is presented by stating that scientific observations/procedures do not translate because the atmosphere – unlike the laboratory – is a closed system and thus cannot be evaluated:

*«Die Naturwissenschaft kann zwar die Wirkung von CO<sub>2</sub> auf die Temperatur in einem geschlossenen System (in einem Laborexperiment) feststellen. Unser Planet ist allerdings kein geschlossenes System. Es bestehen verschiedene Einflüsse auf die Temperatur wie etwa Sonnenaktivität, Luftfeuchtigkeit, Niederschlag, Wolken. Das bedeutet: Es handelt sich beim Weltklima nicht um ein beliebig wiederholbares Laborexperiment.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 2)*

“Follow the science” is then presented as an argument from authority instead of acknowledging that it simply implies listening to the best-informed people (see chapter 1.2.2 Expertise – or lack thereof, specifically footnote number 3):

*«Die oft gehörte Aufforderung «Follow the science» ist in diesem Zusammenhang schlicht unsolid, weil man die Menschen im Grunde auffordert, willkürlich auserlesenen Experten zu folgen und andere Expertenmeinungen zu ignorieren.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 3)*

Another strawman is used to claim that due to the varying nature of influential factors it cannot be scientifically proven if humanity has any effect on the climate:

*«Weil niemand mit Sicherheit sagen kann, welche Faktoren zu welcher Zeit wie stark auf das Weltklima einwirken, bleibt auch die Rolle des Menschen ungewiss. Es gibt schlichtweg keinen wissenschaftlichen Nachweis dafür, dass der Mensch hauptsächlich für den Klimawandel verantwortlich ist.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 3)*

This claim finds further backing by stating that even if the scientific community agreed on the matter, this line of reasoning is fallacious because it is an argument from popularity:

*«Selbst wenn eine grosse Mehrheit aller Klimawissenschaftler zur Ansicht gelangen sollte, dass der Mensch hauptsächlich dafür verantwortlich sei, bleibt diese Behauptung spekulativ. Historisch gibt es spektakuläre Fälle von weitreichender Bedeutung, in denen die Mehrheit irrt.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 3)*

Further, it is implied that CC is not a priority issue. Firstly, it is implied that if anything global warming is desirable because the cold kills more people than the heat. This is followed up by offering other problems that kill more people annually and claiming that the CC agenda steals the resources that would otherwise be allocated to “real” problems:

*«Fakt ist: Für Menschen stellt Kälte ein deutlich grösseres Problem dar als Hitze. Weltweit betrachtet, sterben achtzehnmal mehr Menschen an Kälte als an Hitze. An Durchfall sterben jährlich fast 300-mal so viele Menschen wie an klimabedingten Katastrophen. Und 3500-mal so viele an Herz-Kreislauf-Erkrankungen. Wir sterben zu ziemlich genau 100 Prozent an anderen Ursachen als an Klimafolgen. Die Bekämpfung realer globaler Probleme wie Tuberkulose oder Durchfallerkrankungen wird durch die geforderte Konzentration aller Kräfte und Mittel auf die CO2-Reduktion behindert.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 4)*

This line of argument is extended and paired with a perceived attack on personal liberty, paired with a critique of environmentalism as the morally right thing to do:

*«Die Klimapolitik nötigt die Menschen, ihre Mittel anders zu verwenden, als sie es sonst getan hätten. Wer zum Beispiel Ressourcen lieber in die Krebsforschung investiert hätte, dem wird eine andere Prioritätensetzung aufgezwungen. Eine etatistische Klimapolitik ignoriert somit das inhärente Bedürfnis, ein selbstbestimmtes Leben zu führen, sich seine eigenen Ziele zu setzen und diese mit selbstdefinierten Mitteln zu erreichen – auch in Unternehmen. Es ist ein direkter Angriff auf die menschliche Würde und die Errungenschaften des Humanismus. Es ist*

erstaunlich, wie die Vertreter einer solchen Politik es schaffen, sich als moralisch überlegen darzustellen.» (Kessler, 2022)

Toward the end of the article, it is claimed that there is no proof that state intervention can help the environment. To illustrate the opposite a peculiar case of nut picking is presented:

*«Ein grosser Irrtum ist es auch, dass Klima- und Umweltschutz staatlichen Eingreifens bedürfen. In der Wissenschaft gibt es keinerlei Hinweise darauf, dass ein Mehr an staatlicher Planung und Intervention einen besseren Umweltschutz zur Folge hätte. Ganz im Gegenteil. Ein Beispiel ist die DDR, die den Umweltschutz zur staatlichen Priorität machte und dennoch einen wesentlich höheren CO<sub>2</sub>-Ausstoss aufwies als die BRD und in der jeder zweite Fluss biologisch tot war. Umweltschutz braucht keine Bevormundung.»* (Kessler, 2022, p. 4)

Finally, the article concludes with the statement that only personal, economic, and corporate freedom can lead to ecology:

*«Wer sich also für die Ökologie engagieren will, muss sich für ein Wirtschaftssystem aussprechen, das den Lebensstandard möglichst vieler Menschen anhebt. Nur so können sich immer mehr Leute dem Umweltschutz widmen. Dabei spielen Unternehmen, die frei sind in der Suche nach Innovationen, eine Schlüsselrolle. Erfahrungsgemäss führt einzig eine Politik, die sich weitgehend aus dem Wirtschaftsleben heraushält, zu diesem Ergebnis. Was die Umwelt also braucht, sind liberale Reformen.»* (Kessler, 2022, p. 5)

- **Ich will das Klima nicht retten** – Weil ich mit dieser Anmassung nichts anfangen kann. Und eine Ideologie-Allergie habe. Gegen den Machbarkeitswahn hilft im Grunde nur: Demut. (Schindler, 2022c)

The article's primary focus lies in portraying CC as a quasi-religious and dogmatic ideology full of alarmism and fearmongering. Comparative examples given as proof of overexaggerated alarmism are the forest decline and the hole in the ozone layer<sup>39</sup>.

The quasi-religious and dogmatic nature behind climate activism is exemplified by the following statements:

*«Nicht für Klima-Ideologen, die sich am Dogma des anthropogenen Einflusses festkrallen, inklusive Inanspruchnahme päpstlicher Unfehlbarkeit.»* (Schindler, 2022c, p. 3)

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<sup>39</sup> The ozone layer is of specific interest. It is a prime example of how science and politics can cooperate to identify and tackle an issue. Given the successful global effort in tackling the diminishing ozone layer this could be seen as proof of how science and politics can accomplish unprecedented feats of global cooperation. Instead – because the project was successful and thus the crisis averted – this is flipped into an example of false alarmism. In other words: A real threat, avoided through cooperation, is now perceived as non-problematic to begin with. While those counter measures are addressed, it is stated that their role in diminishing the ozone hole is not proven: “Inwieweit es an den Massnahmen lag, (...), ist disputabel.” (Schindler, 2022c, p. 3)

«Worauf basiert der klimareligiöse Aktivistenterror tatsächlich?» (Schindler, 2022c, p. 4)

«Wenig verwunderlich also, dass ausgerechnet die Klima-Missionare sich in ihrem Moralismus nicht zügeln können – ihr Absolutismus verlangt radikale Unterwerfung. Allein: Wollen wir so miteinander leben? Als stünden wir permanent vor dem Jüngsten Öko-Gericht? Wozu das Fortbestehen der Menschheit sichern, wenn unser gesellschaftliches Zusammenleben auf Gängeln, Überwachen, Bestrafen basiert? Ergo: auf Herzlosigkeit.» (Schindler, 2022c, p. 5)

The fact that climate activists critique the pace of the democratic process is understood as a wish for a dictatorship:

«Gesinnungsgenossin Neubauer, gewohnt flapsig, beschwerte sich bei einem «Lanz»-Talk, dass demokratische Prozesse zu langsam seien, um den Klimawandel aufzuhalten. Wer allerdings eine «Ökodiktatur» wittert, wehe dem – und das ist noch freundlich – Ewiggestrigen.» (Schindler, 2022c, p. 4)

Lastly, it is worth taking note of the statement that claims that under the CC ideology, the youth is sterilizing itself to avoid carbon emissions from the children. While this is a bizarre and evident lie, it serves to further the narrative of how pervasive the ideology truly is:

«Es sind nicht einfach «Fridays for Future»-Flausen, wenn junge Frauen in den Gebärstreik gehen und junge Männer sich sterilisieren lassen, da sie eigene Kinder wegen ihres hohen CO2-Ausstosses ablehnen.» (Schindler, 2022c, p. 4)

### **Grüne Früchte, braune Wurzeln (Koydl, 2022b)**

The article tries to group the perceived leftist ideology (environmentalism, wokeness, feminism, veganism, vaccination, attack on Christian values) and portray it as a form of Nazism. This extreme comparison helps invoke the notion that the leftist ideology is overtly evil and must be opposed. This is done by first appealing to Hitler's popularity as an indirect appeal to the popularity of the leftist ideology:

«Gewöhnungsbedürftig mag der Führerkult samt «deutschem Gruss» gewesen sein. Aber nennenswerter Widerstand war nicht zu beobachten. Im Gegenteil: Hitler hätte jeden Popularitätswettbewerb gewonnen.» (Koydl, 2022b, p. 2)

The “parallels” of Christian persecution under the nazi regime<sup>40</sup> and the advent of feminism<sup>41</sup> are used for comparison:

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<sup>40</sup> Note that Nazism was overtly Christian in nature. Hitler appealed to Christianity as the primary reason behind his actions as stated in “Mein Kampf”. Additionally, the Nazi regime had very close ties to the Vatican. To state that Christians were prosecuted under Nazism is historic denial. But portraying it as such fits *Die Weltwoche*'s narrative. Further note that the leftist ideology is claimed to persecute Christians as a way to accommodate muslims. This claim should by itself be sufficient to portray the folly of this argument.

<sup>41</sup> Which mostly resulted from a lack of labour personal.

«Wirklich überraschend sind die Parallelen zwischen der Nazi-Ideologie und dem links-grünen Vormundstaat moderner Prägung, die der Autor – vermutlich unabsichtlich – aufdeckt. Da ist etwa die Entchristlichung des Weihnachtsfestes. Die Nationalsozialisten wollten es germanisieren, heute sollen christliche Symbole geopfert werden, um Muslimen entgegenzukommen. Oder die politische Instrumentalisierung der Frau. Es waren die Nazis, die den Muttertag zu einem Feiertag machten, es war der rot-rot-grüne Senat in Berlin, der den Internationalen Frauentag für arbeitsfrei erklärte.» (Koydl, 2022b, pp. 2–3)

Next vaccination mandates, veganism, and environmentalism (via recycling) are addressed:

«Ominöse Echos klangen während der Corona-Pandemie an, als Impfen, Masken oder Quarantäne zur quasinationalen Pflicht erhoben wurden. Das unterschied sich nicht wesentlich von dem Nazi-Motto, dass Krankheit ein «Pflichtversäumnis» eines jeden Volksgenossen sei. Der Volksgesundheit im Dritten Reich dienten auch staatliche Ernährungsvorschriften, wie etwa der Erlass, in Betriebskantinen Rohkost auf die Speisekarte zu setzen – der veggie day lässt grüssen. Recycling hiess Wertstoffgewinnung und war schon damals keine Privatangelegenheit, sondern diente dem Wohl des Volkes. Heute nimmt man es eine Nummer grösser: Wir trennen Müll, um den Planeten zu retten.» (Koydl, 2022b, p. 3)

Lastly, gender quotas in the workplace are connected to Hitler awarding leading position based on character rather than merit:

«Dazu gehört auch, klaglos Mitbewerbern den Vortritt zu lassen, wenn es eine Quote verlangt. Wie aktuell tönen da Hitlers Worte: «Für die Besetzung von führenden Stellen in Staat und Partei ist die charakterliche Haltung höher zu werten als die nur wissenschaftliche oder vermeintliche geistige Eignung.»» (Koydl, 2022b, p. 3)

- **Apokalypse im Museum** - Klimaaktivisten beschädigen Kulturschätze. Warum tun sie das? Aus Frustration über sich selbst und aus Langeweile. (Shellenberger, 2022a)

This is one of the most noteworthy articles in the analyzed corpus. Its primary focus is the climate activists who throw paint over important works of art. However, the narrative quickly shifts to equate climate activists/leftists to Nazism.

The introduction of the article is dedicated to portraying climate activists as egotistical and disillusioned. This accumulates by equating them to social nihilism/social Darwinism, following an apocalyptic religion of climate fanaticism informed by elite institutions (universities):

«In einer Reihe von Artikeln habe ich kürzlich argumentiert, dass hinter dem Klimafanatismus und dem Narzissmus eine apokalyptische Religion stecke, die aus dem Nihilismus geboren wurde. Die Macht der Wissenschaft, Erklärungen zu liefern zum Platz des Menschen im Universum (etwa mit Blick auf Urknall, Evolution durch natürliche Auslese), hat dazu geführt, dass in den Elite-Institutionen der Gesellschaft seit über hundert Jahren die Auffassung

vorherrscht, dass das menschliche Leben keinen inhärenten Sinn oder Zweck habe. Das ist Nihilismus. Wir sind nur Tiere wie alle anderen auch.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 3)

«Diese deprimierende Geschichte führte dazu, dass die angeblich säkulare Elite, die an Universitäten ausgebildet und indoktriniert wird, die den Nihilismus als nicht hinterfragbares wissenschaftliches Evangelium lehren, dazu gebracht wurde, eine neue apokalyptische Religion – die der Klimakatastrophe – zu schaffen, und zwar in aller Vollständigkeit, mit einem neuen Opfergott (Natur), einem neuen Grund für Schuld (Sünden gegen die Natur) und einem Weg zur Erlösung (erneuerbare Energien und Niedrigenergie-Lebensweise). Sie und die breiter ausgerichtete Woke-Religion haben in der Zeit seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg von Denkern wie Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Malthus und Michel Foucault einigen intellektuellen Ballast erhalten.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 3)

It is stated that this however is insufficient to portray the reasoning behind the fanaticism and thus raises the question of what inspires it and how it can be opposed:

«Wer genau sind die Klimafanatiker? Und wie kann ihre Macht über das kulturelle und politische Leben des Westens verringert werden?» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 4)

For an answer to this question, the author turns to Eric Hoffer's "The True Believer", a book that covers communism and Nazism. The author states how many parallels can be drawn between Nazism/communism, modern climate fanaticism, and the woke craze:

«Hoffer befasste sich hauptsächlich mit Nazis und Kommunisten, aber seine Beobachtungen sind unglaublich frisch und relevant. Ich habe den grössten Teil des Buches in einem einzigen Durchgang verschlungen, viele Sätze unterstrichen und mir zugerufen: «Ja! Das ist es!», als ich mir vergegenwärtigte, wie gut dies gerade auch den Klima-Fanatismus und den Woke-Wahn im weiteren Sinne beschreibt.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 4)

This notion is further cemented via an indirect association with social studies and arts which are perceived as fundamental to the current leftists while claiming that fanaticism is born out of the frustration of the untalented:

«Hoffer argumentiert, dass Fanatismus aus persönlicher Frustration geboren wird. Fanatiker sind Menschen mit mehr Ehrgeiz als Talent. Hoffer bemerkt: «Die meisten Nazi-Größen hatten künstlerische und literarische Ambitionen, die sie nicht verwirklichen konnten. Hitler versuchte sich in Malerei und Architektur, Goebbels in Drama, Roman und Dichtkunst, Rosenberg in Architektur und Philosophie, von Schirach in Dichtkunst, Funk in Musik und Streicher in Malerei. Fast alle sind gescheitert, nicht nur nach dem üblichen ordinären Erfolgskriterium, sondern auch nach ihren eigenen künstlerischen Kriterien.»» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 4)

The notion that the CC/leftist agenda is religious zealotry is stated as follows:

«Alle Massenbewegungen seien religiöse Bewegungen, sagt Hoffer. Sowohl das Hakenkreuz als auch Hammer und Sichel sind Versionen des Kreuzes. «Das Zeremoniell der Aufmärsche ist wie das Zeremoniell einer religiösen Prozession.» Solche Bewegungen sind nicht nur religiös,

*sie können auch nationalistisch oder kommunistisch sein. Aber es sind Bewegungen, die ihren wahren Gläubigen das Gefühl der Unsterblichkeit vermitteln. Heute können wir solche religiösen Rituale in dem von «Black Lives Matter»-Aktivisten geförderten Niederknien sehen, auch (oder gerade) an säkularen Orten wie der übermässig woken Ausflugsinsel Martha's Vineyard.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 5)*

It is further implied that this fanaticism results from the boredom of elites who have no meaning in their lives because they don't pursue any meaningful labor. Prinz Harry and Meghan Markle are used as examples which further the notion of disassociation between *them* and *us*:

«Bei den ersten Fanatikern handle es sich oft eher um gelangweilte Eliten als um ausgebeutete oder unterdrückte Opfer, schreibt Hoffer. Aber dies ist eine «Langeweile» der Nihilisten. «Das Bewusstsein einer öden, sinnlosen Existenz ist die Hauptquelle der Langeweile», schreibt er. Solchen Menschen fehlt die Erfahrung des «Flows», die sich aus der Beschäftigung mit einer fesselnden, sinnvollen Arbeit ergibt. Dreinschlagender Aktivismus bietet eine Art Hochgefühl. Es ist das Gefühl der Macht, das entsteht, wenn man die Regeln bricht. «Die Regeln sind für dich, nicht für mich», sagt der Gesetzesbrecher. Für einige, wie Prinz Harry und Herzogin Meghan Markle, die immer wieder dabei erwischt werden, wie sie zu Uno-Klimakonferenzen jetten, ist die Heuchelei das Entscheidende.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 6)

The perception of feminism (i.e., the liberation of women such as the decreased force to get married) is used to further equate the woke/leftist agenda with Nazism:

«Umgekehrt steht die Ehe dem Aktivismus entgegen, weil dieser den Frauen einen «neuen Lebenszweck, eine neue Zukunft und eine neue Identität bietet [. . .] Die Langeweile der Junggesellinnen und der Frauen, die in der Ehe keine Freude und Erfüllung mehr finden, rührt aus dem Bewusstsein eines unfruchtbaren, verwöhnten Lebens. [. . .] Hitler zog vollen Nutzen aus den abenteuerlustigen Damen der Gesellschaft, die ihr leeres Leben satt haben und keinen «Kick» mehr in Liebesaffären finden.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 7)

The overtly negative portrayal that has been building up to this point is reiterated/summarized by the following passage:

«Wer also sind dann die Klimafanatiker? Sie sind frustriert, bedürftig und einsam. Sie sind im Griff des Nihilismus und narzisstisch verwundet. Sie sind spirituelle Sucher und kreative Versager. Sie haben ein starkes Bedürfnis, sich besonders und mächtig zu fühlen, aber auch sich in der Gruppe zu verlieren. Es sind Menschen, die sich verzweifelt vor der Auseinandersetzung mit sich selbst und der Konfrontation mit ihren inneren Dämonen drücken wollen, die für ihr persönliches Wachstum notwendig wäre.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 7)

The last two passages worth highlighting are firstly the association of environmental protection agencies such as Greenpeace with Leninism/Stalinism:



«Die malthusianischen und klimaapokalyptischen Institutionen (etwa Greenpeace, Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council / NRDC) bestehen seit über einem halben Jahrhundert. Lenin war ebenso ein Mann der Tat wie Stalin.» (Apokalypse im Museum, S. 8)

Second is the quick mention of Black-lives-Matter. It is phrased in a way to portray the movement as “complaining even though things are good” while completely failing to address the racially motivated police brutality that led to the movement:

««Black Lives Matter» begann 2015, als Amerika einen schwarzen Präsidenten hatte und die Wirtschaft sich seit sechs Jahren im Aufschwung befand.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 8)

#### 4.2 Graphic representation of *Die Weltwoche*'s CC narrative

The increased transparency provided by the analyzed articles allows for the narrative framework to be mapped based on a more educated understanding of the nature of *Die Weltwoche*'s CC discourse. Figure 26 serves as a rearrangement of Figure 24, where the topics have been grouped into four categories. These categories are continuous and interact with one another, thus making it impossible to define clear boundaries. However, accepting this caveat the categories shall serve to simplify the understanding of the major players in *Die Weltwoche*'s CC narrative.




Figure 26 Rearrangement of Figure 24. Serves to portray the major players/concepts at hand in *Die Weltwoche*'s CC narrative.

The Government and Politics have been dubbed “The State”. They represent the political elite that enforced the CC agenda through legislature and jurisdiction. “The Objectives” are the topics that are deemed as “at stake” in the CC debate. Innately the discussion revolves around Energy and the Economy, however, Migration is another relevant topic for the conversation. Migration is perceived as problematic since the increased population will put a bigger strain on our energy supply and environment. “The Informants” are academia and media. Academia arms the state and the adversary culture with the pretense of expertise behind their arguments, while Media helps the agenda from top to bottom (i.e. spreading it from the corrupt elite to the adversary culture), as well as from the bottom to the top (i.e. the adversary culture informs and legitimizes the state's agenda). “The Adversary Culture” is the recipient of the CC agenda. It is made up of the woke, the liberal, the left, the queer, the green. Misinformed by the informants, they help maintain the CC agenda pushed by the state.

For a proper illustration of this interaction, we turn to Figure 27 where the same overlap method has been used, however this time with the accumulated topics as introduced in Figure 26, which is the summarized and simplified graphic representation of *Die Weltwoche’s* CC narrative.




Figure 27 Graphic representation of *Die Weltwoche’s* CC narrative, as informed by the four identified discursive strands that help in its construction and maintenance.

Note the patterns that emerge in the overlap factors. The bottom-left half shows a more direct linkage between the discursive strings. The State and Objectives show a greater overlap factor with not only Climate Change but also with the rest of the dialogue. This can be read as the more visible, and accessible part of the narrative. On the surface, the CC dialogue revolves around the government and politics, and how those will achieve or affect objectives of

interest, such as energy security, the economy, or migration. Statements that construct the CC narrative are more directly stated and can be picked up from a surface-level reading.

The top-right, although having a comparable number of absolute markings, shows much smaller overlap factors. This can be read as the connection of dialogues occurring on a less observable basis. A more in-depth approach to the narrative construction, method, and mentality is required to unburrow them. The role of the State (government and politics) and the Objectives (economy, energy, and migration), are uncovered upon surface-level reading. Statements are commonly stated literally, what one sees is what one gets. The role of the adversary culture (wokeness) and the informants on the other side is – metaphorically speaking – between the lines. One needs to invest more time in reading *Die Weltwoche* to pick up on the clues underlying the narrative. The more time invested, the more intricate connections are established and what might have seemed like meaningless statements beforehand, can become effective narrative constructors hidden behind dog whistling.

#### 4.3 Other relevant articles.

While the CC narrative is the primary focus of this thesis, with the four domains (State, Informants, Objectives, and adversary culture) upon which the narrative rests, an additional set of articles deserves mention. The article covered in Chapter 4.1.5 Listing of CC articles, all have CC as the core topic around which the articles revolve. However numerous articles are better positioned outside the immediate discussion of CC matters, and yet are non-disposable in the construction of the CC narrative. There have been 41 articles which were marked as quintessential to *Die Weltwoche*'s CC narrative, without dealing primarily with CC (Altwegg, 2022; Bahnerth, 2022a; Eichenberger, 2022d; Federspiel, 2022b; Hollstein, 2022a; Köppel, 2021b, 2021e; Kutschera, 2022c; Matuschek, 2022b; J. Meier, 2022b; Mörgeli, 2022f; Odermatt, 2022g; Reichlin, 2022b, 2022e; Schindler, 2022a, 2022b; Schneider, 2022; Schunke, 2021b, 2022v, 2022s, 2022t, 2022w, 2022k, 2022l, 2022q, 2022x; Tettamanti, 2021; Thiel, 2021c, 2021a, 2022r, 2022l, 2022o, 2022j, 2022m, 2022e, 2022a, 2022u, 2022p; Zimmermann, 2022c, 2022i; Zweifel, 2022). Four of them (one for each domain) will be used as examples by being covered in more detail. Like has been done with the previous set of eleven (CC) articles, they too can tell a story sufficiently encompassing most of *Die Weltwoche*'s narrative strings to portray a representative picture of it.

- **Die linken haben gewonnen** (Tettamanti, 2021)
- **Wann ist genug?** (Schunke, 2022t)
- **Von der Schlagzeile zur Schlagseite** (Zimmermann, 2022i)
- **Wokeness** (Thiel, 2022t)

Beginning with the *State* the reader encounters articles like **Die linken haben gewonnen** (Tettamanti, 2021). The article covers the perceived complete dominance of left-progressive discourse in modern-day society. It alludes to the fact that politics, the government, and media

are a conglomerate that reproduces and establishes the left-progressive ideology to such an extent that culture is shaped through a new mode of societal discourse. Noteworthy is that this expanse of a left-progressive mode of discourse is part of a decade-long agenda that can be traced to left-extreme philosophers like Foucault, Derrida, or Lacan. Their ambitious undertaking has found success by perpetuating a perceived mode of discrimination. Those who feel discriminated against blindly reproduce the leftist (post-Marxist) agenda without understanding the ramifications of their doing. The reader learns that the agenda has an all-encompassing hold over society, infecting politics, academia, media, and the general public, as well as being incited to help overthrow their rule.

Articles like **Wann ist genug?** (Schunke, 2022t) offer insight into the *Objectives* domain. The article covers migration and portrays it as being completely out of control. Outliers (due to the 2015/16 refugee crisis and the 2022 Ukraine war) are used to establish a norm of millions of refugees entering Germany unencumbered by law. This occurs because the left-progressive and woke has infected the state-apparatus and the general population to such a degree that law-enforcement is prevented from doing their job, out of fear of the “anti-racist’s” retaliation. Consequently, uncontrolled numbers of parasitic migrants enter the country and leech on social benefits, affordable housing, schools, and other facets of life. The article portrays the egalitarian cleavage between the good hardworking German who can’t afford what is given to the lazy/privileged refugee and connects it as a manifestation of the hierarchical divide between the working-class and the elite, who while enforcing this state, do not feel the consequences because of financial privileges. The problem of migration is therefore closely tied not only to energy (migrants are blamed for increased energy consumption) but also to the economy (migrants compete for/steal livelihoods).

If the reader wants to learn why such a thing is not covered more commonly, articles like **Von der Schlagzeile zur Schlagseite** (Zimmermann, 2022i) give insight into the *Informants*. The article covers the state of modern-day journalism and contrasts it with the “good-old-days” journalism the author participated in. The two are vastly different insofar as the old guard chased after the story, regardless of political affiliation. Meanwhile, the new guard seeks to print what is deemed acceptable in the dominant cultural (woke) discourse, which dictates what can be printed and how it has to be covered. The reader learns of the intricate collaboration between the left-progressive political, media, and academia apparatus and how they enforce the state of public discourse through manipulation, hypocrisy, and overlooking each other's mistakes so long as it helps them maintain power/control. The Climate Party, Woke Party, Migration Party, and Corona Party stand on top of the discourse dominance hierarchy and exclude the conservative and dissident voices from the dialogue.

If the reader wants to learn more about the *adversary culture* that seems to dictate dialogue, articles like **Wokeness** (Thiel, 2022t) can provide answers. The article – like most of Andreas Thiel’s work – is satire. Nonetheless, it is highly representative of how Wokeness is being portrayed within *Die Weltwoche*. It portrays the woke as false philanthropists who claim moral high ground because of their stances, without acting upon them. Hypocrisy is implied and

woke lines of thought are intertwined now only with racism and gender issues, but also CC with a slight hint at a possible connection to Nazism. The article itself is multilayered and manages to imply a lot through a few words. Insofar as it is a great piece of satire, however, it is pertinent to note that because of its satirical nature, it leaves a lot of room for interpretation. Thus two readers might come to different conclusions as to how much of it is satirical, and how much of it is grounded in reality.

**Die linken haben gewonnen** – Die Postmarxisten haben die Herrschaft über die gesellschaftlichen Debatten erlangt. Was können die Bürgerlichen der Meinungsdictatur noch entgegensetzen? (Tettamanti, 2021)

The article covers the perceived state of societal discourse and portrays it as overwhelmingly in the hands of the extreme progressive left.

«(...) die heute die Politik bestimmende Präsenz der progressistischen Linken in der kulturpolitischen Debatte.» (Tettamanti, 2021, p. 2)

The article then introduces influential leftist thought leaders such as Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan who are portrayed as the root of the progressive left's discourse. They are portrayed as post-marxists whose agenda can be achieved by gaining control over societal discourse, which would in turn allow them to control society:

«In der Politik, so lautet eine der Kernaussagen, ist die ideologische Herrschaft über den Diskurs entscheidender als die reine ökonomische Macht.» (Die Linken haben gewonnen, S. 2)

«Wir kommen zum Kern: Weil die marxistische Revolution der Arbeiterklasse eine Illusion sei und bleibe, solle, ja müsse die liberaldemokratische («neoliberale») Gesellschaft von innen ausgehöhlt und dekonstruiert werden, und zwar durch die Erlangung der ideologischen Herrschaft über den Diskurs.» (Tettamanti, 2021, p. 3)

As a method of achieving a state where society is primed and therefore responsive to the agenda, a perpetual sense of perceived discrimination has to be achieved. This is attained through intellectuals which reaffirms *Die Weltwoche's* perception of cooperation between the political and academic elites:

«Macht durch Diskurshoheit – wie könnte das aber erreicht werden? Mittel zum Zweck ist ein herbeizuführender «Aufstand der Diskriminierten». Der Weg führt über mehrere Etappen: Zunächst ist ein Zustand zu erreichen, in welchem sich möglichst viele diskriminiert fühlen. Intellektuelle helfen dabei, dieses Gefühl zu generieren, dasjenige eines vermeintlich ungerechten Zustandes.» (Tettamanti, 2021, p. 3)

The article states that the advancement of the progressive, revolutionary left has to be opposed:

*«Das Ankommen der progressistischen, revolutionären Linken an den Schalthebeln der Macht muss Konsequenzen haben.» (Die Linken haben gewonnen, S. 3)*

What follows is the justification for the opposition in the form of a rundown of the other major parties in Swiss politics.

The SP is presented as the once-great and sensible party that stood for meaningful socio-political reform but has now turned into a radical left-progressive party that aims not just at participation in power, but total power.

The FDP is portrayed as betraying its roots as a once proud and essential member of parliament. What was once a cornerstone of Swiss politics has succumbed to the pressure of mainstream discourse and is now under strong progressive influence.

The Mitte is brushed aside by reference to the positions of many left-Catholics/Reformed as well as priests and pastors. Reference is given to Italian politics, where Catholics vote for the once-communist party Partito Democratico.

The most essential (for the CC narrative) is the portrayal of the Grüne and Grünliberale. They are seen as co-evolved from the left-progressive cultural debate. They – as well as the entire climate movement – are presented as the prime culprits. They are the recipients of the discrimination narrative, which can only be addressed by overthrowing them:

*«Grüne und Grünliberale sind die Erscheinung der jüngeren Zeitepoche. Beide Parteien haben sich parallel zur links-progressistischen Kulturdebatte entwickelt und stehen dieser sehr nah. Kein Zufall: Die gesamte Umweltbewegung und an ihrer Spitze Greta Thunberg – sie alle betrachten sich als «Diskriminierte» und gleichzeitig als von den traditionellen Strukturen «Bedrohte». Da hilft nur der Umsturz.» (Tettamanti, 2021, p. 5)*

What follows is an appeal to democratic principles like free speech and an unbiased marketplace of ideas. The article questions whether the dictatorship of the discriminated even allows debate, and clarifies that this is not the case. “the other opinion” gets blocked before it can be uttered because it is not deemed socially acceptable. The state of public discourse is consequently presented as totalitarian and the end of Renaissance ideas:

*«Erlaubt es uns die Diskursdiktatur der «diskriminierten» Mehrheit aber überhaupt noch, zu debattieren? Leider nein. Es ist oft unmöglich, andere Ideen zu vertreten. Sie werden vorher bereits blockiert, indem man sie der Debatte und der Konfrontation nicht einmal als würdig betrachtet. Die «andere Meinung» ausserhalb der «Debattokratie» wird nicht als salonfähig betrachtet, um im Kampf der Ideen vertreten zu sein. Letztlich kann es so gar keinen Kampf der Ideen mehr geben. Es ist eine Form des Totalitarismus. Und das Ende der Ideen der Aufklärung.» (Tettamanti, 2021)*

Next, an appeal to academia is offered. While academia is typically perceived as participating, even dictating, discourse, this article paints the opposite side of the interaction. It mentions

the suppression of opposing voices at universities and professors who are forbidden from having their own opinions, depending on whether they are deemed socially acceptable.

The conflict between the Burgeois and the Progressive by questioning how the Burgeois should proceed. It is stated that the few that are left need to set aside their conflict and act, by identifying the real “enemy”:

*«Wie sollen die «Bürgerlichen» (gibt es sie noch?) und ihre Parteien reagieren? Streiten sich die wenigen verbliebenen Wirtschaftsliberalen und aufrechten Ordnungspolitiker lieber noch weitere dreissig Jahre, anstatt zu erkennen, wo der wahre «Feind» sitzt?» (Tettamanti, 2021, p. 6)*

A page is dedicated to reiterating the need for the right to cooperate so that they can squash the uprising (mild) communism. It is stated that we all believe that society should become better over time, an idea made possible through capitalism and a social and liberal market economy. However, this is at stake if we do not stand up, demask, and oppose the post-Marxist agenda that is taking hold over society.

The article concludes with a summary of all the aforementioned talking points. Those who feel discriminated against are the ones instrumentalized by the Marxists, without noticing what they are contributing to. The Burgeois parties need to set aside their discursive aberration and identify the enemies motives:

*«Letztlich sind alle sich diskriminiert Fühlenden nur von den Marxisten Instrumentalisierte, die nicht bemerken, wozu sie da beitragen: zur Ausbreitung der postmarxistischen Idee. Es ist höchste Zeit, dass «bürgerliche» Parteien ihre eigene Diskurs-Verirrung und die «feindlichen» Motive erkennen.» (Tettamanti, 2021, p. 6)*

**Wann ist genug?** – Bereits jetzt sind mehr Menschen nach Deutschland eingewandert als im Jahr 2015. (Schunke, 2022t)

The article covers migration to Germany and portrays it as an out-of-control problem that the politicians are unwilling to address. The article is introduced by listing numbers that help portray the situation. Notably, there is no reference to how extraordinary the 2022 spike due to the Ukraine war has been<sup>42</sup>, and the numbers referenced are exclusively asylum applications<sup>43</sup>.

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<sup>42</sup> Since (and before) the 2015/16 crisis, the number of asylum applications never exceeded 250k. By the end of 2022, there have been 1.3 million asylum applications, over 80% of which were ukrainian refugees. Thus, while stating the truth, *Die Weltwoche* shifts the asylum-narrative by choosing not to cover/address the circumstances.

<sup>43</sup> The relative acceptance rate did increase in 2022 (56% instead of 40% and 43% in 2021/20), however this can likely be tied to the increased ease of entrance for ukrainian refugees due to implemented policies. Even at 56%, the number between asylum seekers, and those that are granted asylum are vastly different. The utilization of applications however helps further exaggerate the situation which aids *Die Weltwoche*'s narrative.

The article then alludes to the perceived anti-racism that has taken hold over society (i.e. one of the manifestations of wokeness) that serves as a fearmongering tool. The Asylants will be granted the veil of antiracism, which will take power away from the executive branch. This furthers a whole host of migration narratives, most specifically the notion of criminal “refugees” being granted free entry and then cultural immunity which shields them from being properly prosecuted by the law (enforcement):

*«In einem Land, in dem sich die Polizei bereits dem Vorwurf des Rassismus ausgesetzt sehen muss, wenn sie die entsprechende Klientel anhand äusserlicher Merkmale an den Bahnhöfen kontrolliert, gibt es keine effektive Eindämmung illegaler Migration.»* (Schunke, 2022t, p. 2)

The situation is portrayed to be even more dire once one accounts for those who can't be deported, which are estimated at 800k<sup>44</sup>.

It further alludes to the fact that migrants all need a place to live, energy, gas, and places in schools and kindergartens, all things of scarce availability.

*«Sie alle benötigen Wohnraum mitsamt Strom und Gas, Verpflegung sowie Kita- und Schulplätze. Und das in einem Land, in dem von all dem schon vor 2015 nicht genug vorhanden war.»* (Schunke, 2022t, p. 3)

Finally, the egalitarian struggle between us and them is summarized. Important to note for the following paragraph are the two versions of “them” that are being appealed to. The first is the refugees/migrants, who come and take away things that the regular Germans can't afford and are not being granted. The second “them” is the upper class, those that would also oppose migration if they were to feel its consequences. However, they can afford to send their children to schools with fewer migrants<sup>45</sup> and do not have to fear a lack of affordable housing.

*««Niemandem wird etwas weggenommen, weil Flüchtlingen geholfen wird», sagte der ehemalige Unions-Fraktionschef Volker Kauder einmal im Hinblick auf die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen in Deutschland. Es sollte sich, wie so viele Sätze, die in dieser Zeit gefallen sind, als Lüge herausstellen. Denn natürlich wird den Menschen etwas weggenommen. Vor allem am unteren Ende der Nahrungskette. Jeder Euro kann nur einmal ausgegeben, jede bezahlbare Wohnung nur einmal vermietet werden. Es sind die sozial Schwachen, die, anders als die grüne Bourgeoisie, nicht die Möglichkeit haben, ihr Kind auf eine andere Schule in einem Stadtteil mit weniger Migrantenkindern zu schicken. Sie sind es, die an vorderster Front die Entscheidungen einer politischen Kaste ausbaden, die sich bis heute weigert, zu akzeptieren, dass Kapazitäten auch in der Bundesrepublik endlich sind.»* (Schunke, 2022t)

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<sup>44</sup> Based on numbers by the AfD, instead of a state organized bureau. Political parties are generally likely to be biased, however the AfD, with its overtly adversarial opposition towards migrants, is hardly a credible source.

<sup>45</sup> Note how the school with/without migrants is perceived. The context implies that schools with more migrants are the worse schools. But more than that it also normalizes this statement by implying that the upper class, who themselves are an adversarial group, actively seek to avoid migrants by sending their children to schools with fewer migrant children.



**Von der Schlagzeile zur Schlagseite – Wie konnte es geschehen, dass sich Journalisten nicht mehr für knallige Storys interessieren? (Zimmermann, 2022i)**

This article covers the state of journalism. Journalism is perceived as having moved away from the fact-based and neutral style of reporting where journalists chase the “crisp” story, toward a heavily politicized and ideologically driven style of reporting where journalists chase the “right<sup>46</sup>” story.

The article is introduced by referencing a discussion the author had with some young colleagues. He gives an example of how they went after SVP-Bundesrat Rudolf Gnägi and SP-Bundesrat Pierre Aubert one after the other. This prompts his colleague to question whether they didn't have a position, which is denied stating that their sole goal was to find the best story for their title page:

*«Mal gegen rechts, mal gegen links – hattet ihr denn damals keine Haltung?», fragte mich einer der jungen Journalisten. «Nein, wir hatten keine Haltung», sagte ich, «unser einziges Ziel war es, möglichst knackige Storys auf die Titelseite unseres Blatts zu bekommen.» (Zimmermann, 2022i, p. 3)*

The looks he received for his response, made it clear that this style of journalism has become antiquated and obsolete:

*«Die jungen Journalisten schauten mich an, und ich wusste genau, was sie dachten. Sie dachten, der Mann ist aber ziemlich von gestern.» (Zimmermann, 2022i, p. 3)*

The author's response to this is that they are right. The journalists of his time have been replaced with journalists whose primary goal is finding the socially acceptable article that is dictated by the academically oriented juste milieu, that is left-green, multicultural, critical of the economy, and woke:

*«Stimmt. Wir gestrigen Journalisten, deren Ziel die knackige Story ist, sind ersetzt durch die heutigen Journalisten, deren Ziel nicht die knackige, sondern die richtige Story ist. Die richtige Story ist die Story mit der richtigen Haltung. Die richtige Haltung ist die Haltung des akademisch geprägten Justemilieu, links-grün, gendernd, multikulti, wirtschaftskritisch und woke.» (Zimmermann, 2022i, p. 3)*

The article goes on to allude to the collaboration of the left-green journalists with the left-green politicians, reaffirming the narrative that media is controlled and exploited by politicians:

*«(...) die enge Liaison der links-grünen Journalisten mit den links-grün-liberalen Politikern. [...]. Beide kennen die sozial schwachen Milieus nur vom Hörensagen, und beide grenzen die Meinungen Andersdenkender, zumal politisch Konservativer, aus.» (Zimmermann, 2022i, p. 3)*

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<sup>46</sup> “right” in this sense does not refer to factually correct, but to being ideologically correct. That is to say that journalist's publishing style is defined by the leftist ideology that dictates speech and therefore narratives in modern day societal discourse.

The article goes on to imply that a primary reason for the recreation of such an environment is the sufficiently widespread presence of like-minded politicians who “back their own”, willing to oversee failures so that they too can get a free pass:

*«Man schont die Seinigen. Das erklärt, warum ein Bundesrat Alain Berset trotz seiner fliegerischen und amourösen Abenteuer auf fast allen Redaktionen mit Milde rechnen kann. Es erklärt, warum die Mainstream-Medien die gescheiterte Energiestrategie des grünen Präsidenten Balthasar Glättli nicht hinterfragen und ihn lieber unbeirrt zum Bundesrat hochschreiben. Es erklärt, warum die Journalisten zu den Sparappellen von Simonetta Sommaruga nicht ein paar flockige Details aus deren eigenem Dusch- und Energieleben recherchieren. Und Fragen zu den gesundheitlichen Folgen der Corona-Impfung sind ebenfalls tabu, obschon sie Potenzial für zünftige Headlines hätten.»* (Zimmermann, 2022i, p. 3)

The article finally concludes by stating that the Swiss media landscape has devolved into a narrative style dictated by the party press. However, this time around the parties’ names have changed to Climate Party, Woke Party, Migration Party, and Corona Party:

«Heute sind wir oft nicht weit davon entfernt. Nur die Parteinamen haben geändert. Die Parteien heissen jetzt Klimapartei, Wokepartei, Zuwanderungspartei und Coronapartei. Sie sind die informellen Herausgeber und geben vor, was und wie berichtet wird.» (Zimmermann, 2022i, p. 4)

### **Wokeness** (Thiel, 2022t)

The article is a satirical piece covering the dialogue between Müller and Meier, which revolves around wokeness. Throughout the dialogue a plethora of different narrative strings are included, making them hard to summarize without proceeding row by row.

Meier asks what wokeness is and gets the response that it is the sensibility toward racist and sexist discrimination, cultural appropriation, and climate-damaging cultural practices:

«Meier: Was ist Wokeness?

Müller: Wokeness ist die Sensibilität für rassistische und sexistische Diskriminierung, kulturelle Aneignung und klimaschädliche Kulturtechniken.» (Thiel, 2022t, p. 2)

When Meier seeks inquiry into the meaning of “climate-damaging cultural practices” he gets a response a multilayered response.

Müller offers the cosmetic industry as an example, due to the amounts of waste produced due to its intense reliance on packaging. However, he makes sure to acknowledge that it would be sexist to blame women for CC seeing as it is men who force them to wear make-up in the first place. This reply strings multiple narratives together. By offering an honest critique (i.e. the cosmetic industry does produce a lot of waste) and shutting it down with an unrelated response Thiel creates a narrative of hypocrisy and homogeneity. Those who pretend to care

for the climate don't properly criticize problems, because their beliefs on gender issues don't allow them to:

«Meier: *Was sind klimaschädliche Kulturtechniken?*

Müller: *Schminken beispielsweise ist eine klimaschädliche Kulturtechnik. Keine Industrie ist so verpackungsintensiv wie die Kosmetikindustrie. Aber da es sexistisch wäre, Frauen für den Klimawandel verantwortlich zu machen, ist es wichtig zu betonen, dass Frauen von Männern gezwungen werden, sich zu schminken, um ihnen zu gefallen.» (Thiel, 2022t, p. 2)*

Meier then seeks to inquire if lesbians have to wear make-up. Müller responded that they could still do so, but would be doing it for themselves (and not to please the patriarchy). Besides, they can't help being lesbians, unless they choose to.

This portion of dialogue serves to further the perceived silliness of the notion of a patriarchy. Note that it also makes a quite clear statement on homosexuality by implying that sexual orientation can be changed:

«Meier: *Lesbische Frauen müssen sich nicht schminken?*

Müller: *Höchstens, um einander selber zu gefallen, aber das tun sie ja dann freiwillig. Ausserdem können sie nichts dafür, dass sie lesbisch sind, ausser sie haben es selber gewählt.» (Thiel, 2022t, p. 2)*

The last segment of this first portion of the dialogue is the most intricate one. Meier inquires whether lesbians wearing make-up is harmful to the environment, and Müller replies that it isn't. It is just woke:

«Meier: Dann ist Schminken auch für sie klimaschädlich?

Müller: Nein, nur woke.» (Thiel, 2022t, p. 2)

This is an interesting line of thought. According to the premises laid out by the author, cosmetics are harmful to the environment. However, women, who drive the industry, are excused from their consumer habits, because they are enforced by men and the patriarchy. Lesbians should therefore be alligable to blame for consuming cosmetics since their sole reason for doing so is to please themselves. So how come Müller replies by stating that their consumption of cosmetics isn't environmentally harmful but woke? To properly grasp this notion we can utilize the definition given. It is a *sensibility* for racial, sexual, environmental, and cultural injustice. However, this does not entail acting upon this sensibility. This is a common tactic used when portraying the woke. The woke appeal to the moral high ground, without ever acting upon it. That is to imply the hypocrisy and ineffectiveness of the woke community at large.

The second part of the article covers cultural appropriation. Meier seeks to inquire about it and Müller states that a Swiss doing the Hitler salute would be cultural appropriation because it would be discriminating against the Germans:

«Meier: Und was ist kulturelle Aneignung?

Müller: Wenn ein Schweizer den Hitlergruss macht, ist das kulturelle Aneignung, weil er damit die Deutschen diskriminiert.» (Thiel, 2022t, p. 2)

This response is peculiar insofar as it seems to respond less to the question of *what* cultural appropriation is, and more so offers an explanation of why it occurs. In other words, it is less relevant that the Hitler salute is cultural appropriation, but more so why it is seen as such. The response to this is that it would discriminate against the Germans. This plays with the narrative of the perceived discrimination by the left but also vows in the failure to oppose the salute based on what it is. This implies that so long as it were to pass the “offensiveness test”, the woke wouldn’t have a problem with the Hitler salute. While this might seem like grabbing at straws at first, this line of reasoning is immediately followed up. This time Meier asks whether the Germans didn’t steal the salute from the Romans. Müller replies that not just that, but that’s also where they got fascism from. And they got the antisemitism from the French, which makes national socialism culturally appropriated and ought to be opposed because of it:

«Meier: Haben die Deutschen den Hitlergruss nicht den Römern abgeschaut?

Müller: Ja, und den Faschismus ebenfalls, und den Antisemitismus den Franzosen. Insofern war der Nationalsozialismus eine einzige kulturelle Aneignung und wäre schon rein nur deshalb abzulehnen gewesen.» (Thiel, 2022t, p. 2)

Meier then wonders which gender a woke Hitler would have associated with and inquires whether one can also choose one's race. Müller at first only replies to the race question, stating that yes one can change it, so long as one isn’t white:

«Meier: Als welches Geschlecht hätte sich Adolf Hitler wohl gefühlt, wäre er woke gewesen? Und kann man seine Rasse auch selber wählen?

Müller: Ja, ausser als Weisser.» (Thiel, 2022t, p. 2)

This section of the dialogue again addresses multiple stings of the underlying narrative. The equation of woke with queer is snuck in, by wondering what gender woke Hitler would feel as. This ignores that Hitler per definition can not be woke, and even if he was, being woke has no effect on being queer. The next thing to note is the race question. Firstly by equating a race change with a sex change, they are brought to the same level. The idea of changing one’s race is absurd which via association spills over to the idea of changing sexes. Secondly, Müller’s response reaffirms the notion of separate rules for the whites. Fitting this in with the usual narrative around the prosecution of the white, male, Christian, and conservative, it is implied that they are the ones being suppressed.

The article concludes with Meier restating his question by inquiring whether that means a woke Hitler could choose his sex but not his race. Müller responds by stating that had he been woke, he would have accepted that he was born racist:

«Meier: Ein woker Hitler hätte also sein Geschlecht selber wählen dürfen aber nicht seine Rasse?»

Müller: Wäre er woke gewesen, hätte er akzeptiert, dass er als Rassist geboren ist»  
(Thiel, 2022t, p. 3)

The ending of the article feels off due to the claim of being born a racist, when it seems intuitive that this is impossible. Two possible explanations come to mind. The first is to tie this back to queer issues. The origin of sexual orientation has already been implied to be a choice. By stating that racism is something born with, the line of reasoning is simply reversed. I.e. If one were to say “You can’t be born racist” under this narrative it would set the stage for a response like “You can’t be born gay”. Additionally, there is a more severe connotation that might arise. Note how in the first half it has been implied that while the woke are aware of injustice, they do not necessarily act upon it. They find excuses that alleviate them from blame. Like the lesbians are woke when using make-up so too Hitler could be woke while committing genocides, given that wokeness only implies awareness and not a commitment to act upon said awareness.

#### 4.4 Honorable Mentions

This sub-chapter shall be dedicated to the coverage of some topics and concepts that have not been properly accounted for throughout this thesis. They can be seen as gaps that could be expanded upon through future research which would greatly help in the proper embedding of the expansive narrative network that informs the CC discourse.

##### 4.4.1 Topics; Corona, Ukraine War, and Religion

While the thesis managed to cover an intricate array of narrative strings, some were lost due to the nature of the analysis. As alluded to at the beginning of the thesis, it had been decided to steer clear of the Corona Pandemic and the Ukraine War. This was done due to overlap with other theses, but also because those are topics vast enough to be worthy of their own analysis. It has been deemed too expansive to try and include them in the analysis of the CC narrative, however by the time of finishing this thesis it has become evident that they are sufficiently important to deserve proper recognition. This is primarily because of one line of thought that pairs them neatly with CC: The use of alarmism and fearmongering to dramatize global events with the end goal of expanding the state’s reach. This is perceived to be done so that the state gains more control over society and individuals. The dangers of COVID-19 are largely seen as

overrated. Instead, the narrative around COVID seems to paint it as governments using the flu to enforce social regulations which pairs neatly into the narrative of a suppressive and corrupt elite. The Ukraine War is commonly perceived as a Trojan Horse for enforcing nonsensical CC proposals that otherwise would not pass. This not only ties the Ukraine War into the CC narrative but again helps in establishing the narrative of a manipulative media ecosystem that operates at the behest of the CC agenda as instrumentalized by the corrupt political elite. In both cases, we, the good people are the ones that suffer. Limitations of personal freedom and expression (Covid) and higher costs paired with energy scarcity (Ukraine War) are thrust upon us because of the machinations of a socio-political apparatus that enforces its self-serving agenda. These lines of thought play into multiple defining lines of RWP discourse:

Antipluralism manifests from the egalitarian cleavage through an “us against them” mentality and means of othering (Bosworth, 2020; Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021; Forchtner, 2019; Huber et al., 2021; Krange et al., 2021; Noury & Roland, 2020; Selk & Kemmerzell, 2021; Žuk & Szulecki, 2020), whose primary recipient and reproducer is the adversary culture.

Critique of the Elites which manifests from the hierarchical cleavage through a perceived corrupt political apparatus that enforces its bidding on the good people (Böhmelt, 2021; Forchtner, 2019; Forchtner & Lubarda, 2022; Greven, 2018; Huber et al., 2021; Jylhä & Hellmer, 2020; Krange et al., 2021; Lockwood, 2018; Noury & Roland, 2020; Selk & Kemmerzell, 2021).

Being representative of the *will of the people* which stands in opposition to the dominant elite’s agenda (Bosworth, 2020; Buzogány & Četković, 2021; Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021; Četković & Hagemann, 2020; Forchtner, 2019; Forchtner & Lubarda, 2022; Greven, 2018; Jylhä et al., 2020; Jylhä & Hellmer, 2020; Krange et al., 2021; Küppers, 2022; Lockwood, 2018; Lübke, 2022; Noury & Roland, 2020; Petri & Biedenkopf, 2021; Žuk & Szulecki, 2020).

Even without a specific focus on those topics, and the added caveat to steer clear from them unless necessary, the Ukraine War was referenced in 60 out of the 374 analyzed articles (Bangerter, 2022b; Baumann, 2022c; Bigler, 2022; Blocher, 2022; Blum, 2022; Bodenmann, 2022e; Gehrig, 2022a; Grenacher, 2022; Gygi, 2022t, 2022i, 2022b, 2022s; Häfliger, 2022; Hank, 2022; Herodot, 2022a; Holmes, 2022b; Kneissl, 2022; Köppel, 2022; Lomborg, 2022; Lüders, 2022; Matuschek, 2022c, 2022a; J. Meier, 2022a; Millius, 2022c; Mooser, 2022i, 2022e, 2022j, 2022c, 2022b, 2022a, 2022q; Mörgeli, 2022d, 2022b, 2022e, 2022i; Odermatt, 2022d; Pitteloud, 2022; Prasser, 2022b; Reichlin, 2022c, 2022f; Reichmuth, 2022e; Reinacher, 2022; Rentsch, 2022a; Schneider, 2022; Schunke, 2022u, 2022w, 2022z, 2022aa, 2022y; Sommer, 2022; Stöhlker, 2022; Thiel, 2022u; Weder, 2022; Weimann, 2022; Weltwoche, 2022e, 2022c; Wernli, 2022g; Zeller, 2022a; Zimmermann, 2022a, 2022b).

The Corona Virus has been referenced in 77 out of 374 analyzed articles (Bahnerth, 2021b, 2022d; Bangerter, 2022b; Baumann, 2021, 2022c; Blocher, 2022; Bodenmann, 2022e; Bucheli, 2022; Gygi, 2021b, 2022n, 2022p; Hank, 2022; Kessler, 2022; Köppel, 2021d, 2021e, 2021b, 2021c, 2021a, 2022; Koydl, 2022a, 2022c, 2022b; Kutschera, 2022c; Lomborg, 2022;

Martenstein, 2022; Matuschek, 2022c, 2022b; P. Meier, 2022; Millius, 2022c, 2022b; Mooser, 2021b, 2022i, 2022e, 2022b, 2022g, 2022p, 2022n, 2022h; Mörgeli, 2021a, 2022b, 2022e; Odermatt, 2022c, 2022d, 2022e; Prasser, 2022b; Reichmuth, 2022e; Reinacher, 2022; Rentsch, 2022a; Schindler, 2022a; Schneider, 2022; Schuler, 2022b; Schunke, 2021c, 2021a, 2022n, 2022y, 2022v, 2022h, 2022b, 2022g; Shellenberger, 2022a; Thess, 2022; Thiel, 2022u, 2022m; Van Huisseling, 2022b; Weltwoche, 2022a; Wernli, 2021a, 2022g; Zeller, 2022b; Zeyer, 2021; Zimmer, 2022; Zimmermann, 2021b, 2021a, 2022b, 2022i, 2022g, 2022h, 2022a). A more in-depth analysis could help shine a light in the form of added transparency on the narrative network that underlies *Die Weltwoche's* rhetoric, especially concerning its RWP tendencies.

Religion is another topic that would be worthy of closer inspection. Initially, it seemed that religion had little to no impact on the narrative construction, however, some interesting links have been noted and shall now be introduced.

First is the position of *Die Weltwoche* and its readers. While *Die Weltwoche* is not overtly religious in its dialogue, it is worth noting that Christianity is portrayed as the normal/ the status quo. Switzerland is portrayed as a Christian nation and to an extent the Swiss citizenry is portrayed as innately tied to the norms of Christianity (e.g. multiple allusions to “Christian values” are made throughout the analyzed corpus, a prime example of which is the opposition to abortion based on the biblical understanding of life beginning at conception).

The second is the use of Religion as a tool of othering. Given that the Swiss citizen is portrayed as a Christian, it can serve as a further distinction point between natives and migrants, who are commonly Muslim. The faith of Islam is criticized on numerous occasions and is most commonly accompanied by the negative connotation of criminal migrants, sexists, or discriminatory mindsets.

The third is that although scarce, religion is a constant in *Die Weltwoche*. Each magazine has a dedicated article on the bible and even outside of those it is not uncommon to encounter articles that primarily revolve around religion.

The fourth is the portrayal of the CC agenda as a quasi-religious and dogmatic ideology. This is one of the most commonly referenced vantage points when criticizing the perceived CC agenda. A closer analysis of this line of thought, especially when contrasted with the rhetoric used to cover Christianity and Islam might unburrow some intricate discursive connections that can hardly be grasped from a surface-level reading.

Lastly, religion is a fascinating concept for analysis because of its common authority as a counter-position to science. It is a mode of thought that inspires a vast section of the population and can be among the most influential behavioral control mechanisms in a person's life. In other words, while religion is insignificant to some, to others it can be the most relevant topic and thus significantly alter the world-view of those maintaining such a position.

Religion has been referenced in a more general approach in 28 out of 374 analyzed articles (Bilang, 2022; Bucheli, 2022; Burchill, 2021; Federspiel, 2022b; Grau, 2022; Gygi, 2022n, 2022p; Hollstein, 2022a; Köppel, 2021c, 2021d; Kutschera, 2022c; Matuschek, 2022c; Matussek, 2021, 2022b; Mooser, 2022i, 2022d, 2022e; Pelda, 2022; Prasser, 2022a; Ric, 2022; Schunke, 2022i; Shellenberger, 2022a; Stöhlker, 2022; Thiel, 2022f, 2022n; Wernli, 2022a; Widmer, 2022; Wyder, 2022).

Christianity has been directly referenced in 12 out of the 374 analyzed articles<sup>47</sup>(Bahnerth, 2022d; Federspiel, 2022b; Grau, 2022; Köppel, 2021c, 2021d; Reichlin, 2022c; Ric, 2022; Schneider, 2022; Sommer, 2022; Thiel, 2022p; L. Weber, 2022; Zimmermann, 2022a).

Islam has been directly referenced in 21 out of the 374 analyzed articles (Alinejad, 2022; Burchill, 2021; Heumann, 2022b; Kneissl, 2022; Köppel, 2022; Koydl, 2022b; Pelda, 2022; Reichlin, 2022c; Schindler, 2022b; Schunke, 2022i, 2022a, 2022k, 2022aa, 2022h, 2022n, 2022e, 2022w, 2022j, 2022z, 2022c, 2021a; Stämpfli, 2022; Zimmermann, 2021b).

In summary, the understanding of *Die Weltwoche's* CC narrative rests upon topics that have been covered and discussed in detail (State, Objectives, Informants, and Adversary culture). Nonetheless, its transparency could be greatly expanded upon through an increased understanding of the narrative roles of COVID-19, the Ukraine War, and Religion.

#### 4.4.2 Authors; Gygi, Köppel, Mooser, Mörgeli, Schunke, Thiel

Another area where more scrutiny could be applied would be the analysis of narratives spun by individual authors. The 374 analyzed articles were written by 101 different authors. Nonetheless, this does not equate to each author contributing three articles to the analyzed corpus. The majority of authors contribute very little to the narrative construction, however, there is a minority of highly influential authors who strongly shape the CC. They do so both through the quality of their writing style, coverage of specific topics, and the sheer quantity of articles contributed. To offer some insight a non-comprehensive list of six authors will be introduced detailing how many articles have been marked, as well as why the particular author has been deemed worthy of closer inspection.

#### **Beat Gygi, Hubert Mooser, and Christoph Mörgeli**

These three authors are quintessential to *Die Weltwoche's* coverage of the domestic political scene and how it relates to the CC narrative.

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<sup>47</sup> Note that none of the fifty Bible articles (one in each volume of *Die Weltwoche*) has been marked as impactful for the CC narrative thus decreasing the perceived role of religion (especially Christianity) on the larger narrative structure found in *Die Weltwoche*.



Beat Gygi has worked as a member of the economic editorial department from 1990 to 2015. Since then he has been a member of the editorial board of *Die Weltwoche*, leading the economic department. His work might be the best go-to summary of *Die Weltwoche's* coverage of the CC conspiracy between academia, politics, and culture. His work largely fits the criteria to be identified as CC denial which ranges from a strong disbelief in an anthropogenic effect to implications of conspiratorial behavior between the scientific and political elites. His works make up 23 out of the 374 marked articles.

Christoph Mörgeli is an influential SVP politician. In 1997 he became a member of the cantonal council of Zürich and moved on to the national council in 1999. He maintained the position until a failed reelection in 2015, and 2019. Ever since 2001, he maintained the position as SVP ZH's head of the program commission. He has been working as a journalist at *Die Weltwoche* since 2015 and has worked as Roger Köppel's research associate for the national council since 2016. He covers primarily political issues that he is highly critical of, such as the over-politicization of media, migration endangering the safety of our energy supply, and the green-leftist agenda. His works make up 13 out of the 374 marked articles.

Hubert Mooser is the editor for the Bundeshaus. He has a regular column dubbed "Bundeshaus Bern" in which he offers insights into current political events. He is one of the leading participants in the demonization of Simmonetta Sommaruga, is highly critical of anything that has to do with CC, and portrays the CC agenda as part of the culture war that endangers the status quo. He is also one of the authors most commonly asserting that academia has been lost to the culture war and is now enforced by the political elite to further their agenda. His works make up 22 out of the 374 marked articles.

Together these three authors exemplify the economic and governmental perspectives on CC. Given the frequency of their articles and their established roles at *Die Weltwoche*, their work is representative of how *Die Weltwoche* approaches the CC narrative.

### **Roger Köppel**

Köppel has been sufficiently introduced in chapter 2.4 Roger Köppel. Nonetheless, a sufficiently in-depth coverage of his work would be highly interesting given his position as editor-in-chief. His editorial style dictates *Die Weltwoche's* editorial style, more so than anyone else. His works make up 6 out of the 374 marked articles.

### **Anabel Schunke**

Anabel Schunke is arguably the most extreme voice among *Die Weltwoche's* authors. She primarily covers the culture war and its presence over a plethora of different topics. She utilizes the RWP's narrative framework more closely than any of the other authors, cladding every statement into either a hierarchical struggle (against the corrupt elite) or an egalitarian one (us against migrants/liberals/wokeness), commonly both. She maintains these positions to a level that is arguably closer identifiable as right-wing-extremism than right-wing-populism. Thus a close inspection of her work would be a great asset for exploring the

development from populism to extremism. Her works make up 32 out of the 374 marked articles.

### **Andreas Thiel**

He is a self-proclaimed artist and philosopher. He is a very skilled satirist and his work could serve as a perfect case study of hidden meanings in more complex linguistic structures than regular language. He is witty and his satire is well-crafted, which makes it difficult to cover for someone untrained like myself. This is why I believe that a closer inspection of his work would not only greatly elaborate on the usual narrative strings that dictate CC discourse within *Die Weltwoche* but could serve as a great case study of how more severe and extreme messaging can be transmitted if rhetoric devices are used efficiently, such as hiding the narrative behind a veil of satire. His works make up 33 out of the 374 marked articles.

## 5. Conclusion

This thesis' goal was to gain a better understanding of *Die Weltwoche's* CC narrative, as an example of how a RWP narrative framework alters the perception of CC. What resulted was a deep dive into *Die Weltwoche's* corpus to untangle unspoken premises and lines of thought that would help explain why the stance on CC manifests in the way it does. For this, an initially basic question was formulated:

### **RQ 1. How does *Die Weltwoche* cover and portray CC?**

The coverage of CC has been unexpectedly manipulative. There have been 2134 marked passages that showed some form of rhetoric tool usage to manipulate the CC narrative. Most common of which was the use of Loaded Language. That is to say that a vast portion of the statements found within *Die Weltwoche* are formulated in a manner that results in an emotional response from the reader. The narration style is overtly subjective with subtiles sufficing to inform the reader about the author's take on anything it covers. Logical fallacies are more abundant than initially expected, reaching hundreds of occurrences. In particular, the strawman argument is a highly favor tool to misrepresent the opposition's arguments, thus giving the authors a simpler time countering them. While *Die Weltwoche* at large seems to be accepting of a changing climate, the vast majority of the corpus vehemently rejects an anthropogenic causality. The scientific basis of CC is actively undermined with multiple articles being indicative of CC denial. Underneath it all *Die Weltwoche* portrays CC as part of a larger culture war, that originates from the interplay between the corrupt elite and the proponents of adversarial culture. Notably the typical RWP narrative framework is slightly reorganized. The hierarchical cleavage is not just invoking critique of political elites but expands this critique to the academic/scientific elite as well. The egalitarian cleavage is not just evoking antipluralism directed against foreigners/migrants but arguably more so against the liberal, the left, the green, the queer, the weak, the discriminated, and the philanthropic, all of which

are shoved into the category of wokeness. The perceived CC agenda is being portrayed as part of the adversary culture and is thus vehemently opposed based on ideological grounds, in addition to opposition based on political/economic schools of thought.

**a) Is the portrayal homogenous?**

This question aimed to clarify whether all of CC is bad/good within *Die Weltwoche's* CC narrative. As Chapter 4.1 CC/Environmentalism has shown this is not the case. There is a distinct bipolar dichotomy that occurs within *Die Weltwoche's* perception of CC. *Die Weltwoche* shows clear signs of valuing the environment and commonly speaks out for its protection. Being environmentally friendly, however, does not equate to what is understood when speaking of CC. CC is perceived as a perversion of a surface-level noble cause that is used as a vessel to infect society with communist and socialist ideals. Politicians, academics, and “mainstream” society and media are all victims of its quasi-religious ideology. Thus the term CC and what is understood as being included in the terminology does not equate to environmentalism. Insofar as one can summarize *Die Weltwoche's* authors and editorial staff are environmentalists who strictly oppose anything that has to do with CC.

**b) What role does RWP have at *Die Weltwoche* in general, and specifically regarding the CC narrative?**

*Die Weltwoche* utilizes a RWP narrative framework as the basis for most of its arguments. All the narratives are prefaced with the premises of hierarchical and egalitarian cleavages which accumulate in the perception of a constant, all-encompassing culture war. Notably, the critique of elites which is traditionally directed at politics includes the academic elite when directed at CC discourse. A similar metamorphosis occurs with antipluralism which is traditionally directed against minorities, most commonly foreigners. Within the CC narrative, the woke seems to evolve into the primary recipient of critique, and primary contributor to the adversary culture. Another tool typical for RWP is the portrayal of *Die Weltwoche's* opinion as the opinion of the people. This holds true for not only the egalitarian and hierarchical cleavages but also for the general style of reporting which has proved essential to the stance on CC issues. *Die Weltwoche* portrays CC in a manner that heavily implies that its stance (and therefore the public stance) is adversarial toward the entire notion, as informed by what is the perceived extreme leftist agenda that is being fed to the public.

**c) What other topics might influence the portrayal of CC?**

This question was phrased to widen the parameters of identification for what informs the CC narrative. As expected, topics that result from the RWP framework (such as politics) were found in abundance. However, the role of media, academia, and culture have proven as much more influential than initially expected. The perceived conspiracy that spreads across the mainstream socio-political apparatus and seeks to establish a cultural revolution akin to Marxism is much more common and elaborate than anticipated. To properly understand *Die Weltwoche's* CC narrative one requires a deep understanding of the adversarial culture and how via association with it, CC is portrayed as a cultural issue more so than a scientific one.

The role of academia deserves special attention, given that *Die Weltwoche's* stance on the scientific roots of CC is not as simple as believing or disbelieving. It is much more the case that scientific credibility is not granted, because of the perception of academia as a political tool used to further an agenda.

Once a sufficient level of understanding was reached the essential question remained of steelmanning *Die Weltwoche's* CC narrative. This is done in response to the second research question:

**RQ 2. If one were to subscribe/believe the entirety of *Die Weltwoche*, how would one perceive CC?**




Figure 28 *Die Weltwoche's* Climate Change narrative

In summary, the CC narrative revolves around four primary domains: The State, the Adversary culture, the Informants, and the Objectives. The interactions have been coded to ease the explanation of the interactions.

**The interaction between CC and the State:**

- A<sub>1</sub> :** CC dictates the state of politics and government. It structures the direction of political discourse and makes it impossible for dissenting voices to be heard. The promotion of conservative political development is made impossible through the dictates of CC.
- A<sub>2</sub> :** The state utilizes CC as an excuse to establish/further an agenda of self-serving interests. Personal enrichment drives the effort afforded to Climate Policies, the costs of which will affect the common folk, but not the elite that enforces them.

### **The interaction between CC and the Informants:**

- B<sub>1</sub> :** CC drives the narrative replicated by the media ecosystem. Affirmative journalism finds success, whereas dissenting voices will be shut out of the conversation. This singular mode of thought has affected academia to the point where complete homogeneity of opinion has been reached and is not being replicated.
- B<sub>2</sub> :** The CC narrative is distributed and maintained in the public eye through a combination of favorable media coverage and the appearance of expertise-based backing through academia.

### **The interaction between CC and the Adversary Culture:**

- C<sub>1</sub> :** The CC agenda dictates the dogmas of its ideological followers through manipulation tactics such as claims of philanthropy, fearmongering, the perception of discrimination, and the offering of scapegoats for blame.
- C<sub>2</sub> :** The adversary culture upholds the CC ideology through quasi-religious behavior and elevates it to a dominant topic of modern-day discourse. They are the primary recipients of the CC agenda and are therefore also the ones that give it life.

### **The interaction between CC and the Objectives:**

- D<sub>1</sub> :** CC reevaluates the relevance of objectives by altering their perception. The economic feasibility is ignored the viability of measures (e.g. electrification through alternative energy sources) is disregarded, and topics like migration are barred from the conversation due to being socially unacceptable under the CC ideology.
- D<sub>2</sub> :** Economic and energetic unfeasibility is used to strengthen the call for more funding allocated to the CC agenda.

### **The interaction between the State and the Informants:**

- a<sub>1</sub> :** The state utilizes media to spread its agenda into the public eye and uses academia as an argumentative backing which serves as an allusion to expertise. In return, the State offers financial benefits to media and academia that help it perpetuate the agenda.
- a<sub>2</sub> :** The media apparatus is used to sway the representation of the State and thus dictates who will fall from or remain in the grace of the public eye. Academia primarily dictates political discourse through the infiltration of a woke/left/liberal/green mindset.

### **The interaction between the Informants and the Adversary Culture:**

- b<sub>1</sub> :** The informants replicate cultural interests (media) or co-create them (academia).
- b<sub>2</sub> :** The adversary culture serves the role of consumer and therefore dictates the direction of academia as well as what resonates in media.

### **The interaction between the Adversary Culture and the Objectives:**

- c<sub>1</sub>** : The adversary culture evaluates the relevancy of the objectives. Migration is not allowed scrutiny, the Economy is not important and Energy is only addressable through alternative sources.
- c<sub>2</sub>** : The objectives fail to communicate their relevancy when being received by the adversary culture.

### **The interaction between the Objectives and the State:**

- d<sub>1</sub>** : The objectives fail to have an impact on the state's behavior, primarily due to the over-politicized and left-dominated nature of the government and politics.
- d<sub>2</sub>** : The state should aim at accomplishing the objectives, however fails to properly address them again primarily due to the over-politicized and left-dominated nature of the government and politics.

### **The interaction between the State and the Adversary Culture:**

- e<sub>1</sub>** : The adversary culture is what maintains the dominance of the political elite. They are the recipients of the CC agenda and they are the ones that replicate it, thus ensuring its prosperity. They are tools that instrumentalize the bidding of the corrupt elite.
- e<sub>2</sub>** : The State pushes a narrative and maintains it through means of societal and discursive control. It uses the public as pawns for private interests with those falling in the definition of adversary culture being the ones that have fallen for the CC agenda.

## 5.1 Reflexion

By and large, I am happy with the outcome of the thesis. I have garnered a substantial amount of information and gained invaluable insights into the intertwining nature of RWP discourse through the lens of *Die Weltwoche*. However, I can't help but notice that I bit off more than I could chew. The general undertaking, my style of approach, and the time dedicated did not properly estimate the depths such an analysis can reach. In retrospect the analysis might have been more beneficial and be clearer in its translation of topics had I chosen a smaller subcategory instead of focusing on CC as a whole. The relationship between CC and the economy, COVID, religion, wokeness, or energy would have already offered sufficient material for a thorough thesis. By seeking to provide a more comprehensive approach to the CC narrative, insufficient attention to detail was given. This is an undertaking that would be fit for doctoral research but vastly exceeds the limitations of a Master's thesis. With the benefit of hindsight, I can confidently say that one should rather focus on specific topic interactions instead of the narrative as a whole. However, I am nonetheless glad I did so because this far-fetched approach to understanding the CC narrative allowed for insights that would have eluded a more specified analysis. The primary example of this is the quintessential role of

culture in the CC debate. Initially, I knew that *Die Weltwoche* was a RWP magazine and thus expected a strong correlation with topics that have been of historical importance to Swiss RWP such as a critique of the EU and an opposition to migration. By casting a wider net the role of woke-ideology was uncovered and has proven to be an arguably more important narrative pillar to the CC discussion at large. In other words, this thesis managed to answer the questions it raised, but it also uncovered more unanticipated questions that could not be further pursued due to the limitations of the thesis.

As for Discourse Analysis, it is a tool I have been unfamiliar with until the writing of this thesis and I believe that a person who has had more education and experience with it would have achieved greater results than I. Nonetheless, I am as sure as can be that it was the right methodology for approaching this topic. It allowed me to get an in-depth analysis of not only what is directly stated, but more importantly what is being implied. Given that I set out wanting to understand how a right-wing-populist perceives CC, the unspoken word was much more informative than any literal sentence could have been. It allows insights into premises and enables one to not only seek but also find an accurate understanding of the views and beliefs a subscriber of *Die Weltwoche* might have.

Lastly, I want to note the replicability of this thesis. Firstly I want to re-emphasize that while I gave it my best to analyze the corpus objectively it would be foolish to assume that I am exempt from biases. Another student, even with similar political orientation and educational background likely would have found slightly different patterns or paragraphs worth marking. Nonetheless, I am confident that my findings are as objective as possible and that any deviation occurring based on a different analyst would be a minor one. Secondly, I want to emphasize an expansion of this work. If I – or anyone else – ever decides to undergo a similar analysis in a more lenient setting (e.g. doctoral research) I believe it would be a magnificent topic to cover. Right-wing-populism is an important topic that ought to be understood due to it being a constant danger for any democratic regime. On top of the studies of European RWP indicate strong national and even sub-national disparities between different forms of RWP populism, meaning that a more detailed target like *Die Weltwoche* is a prime target for research. And thirdly I want to address replicating the thesis myself. Seeing as I've already alluded to what I would change in my approach, I want to mention a different issue and that is the one of mental exhaustion. I am extremely glad to be over with this thesis and I was extremely motivated throughout the year to learn more about RWP in Switzerland. However, the more I dealt with *Die Weltwoche* the more I became sick of reading it. While there are definitely much more taxing, disturbing, or outright horrid concepts to cover, it nonetheless felt appropriate to allude to the sense of anguish one feels when dedicating this much time to properly analyzing the narrative. While I've previously advocated for an expansion of this research through a bigger undertaking (e.g. doctoral research) I believe that such research might best be undertaken in pairs or even by entire research groups. This would not only allow for more objective coverage by increasing the number of observers/analysts but I also believe it would aid the quality of each researcher's work. I myself felt how I became more biased over time because I had – for lack of a better word – overdosed on *Die Weltwoche* to the point

where I had to stop myself on multiple occasions from overinterpreting meanings hidden deeper in the narrative structure.



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## Appendix

### 1. **Prinz Jammeri** – Guter Rat ist nicht teuer und erst noch klimaneutral: Hör stets auf deine Grossmutter! (Wernli, 2021b)

Prinz Harry's actions (flying to the UN summit) and persona (privileged "snowflake") are portrayed negatively. This is then tied to the UN climate summit which is discredited via association.

### 2. **Operation Blackout** – Die Klimakonferenz in Glasgow hat die fixe Idee gestärkt, der Ausstieg aus der fossilen Energie sei unumgänglich. Die gewaltigen Kosten zeichnen sich bereits ab. (Gygi, 2021b)

The UN is an organized cartel that pushes "CC" in order to have free reign over the economy and society. They know that alternative Energy does not suffice and will harm the common folk but they do not care about that, exemplified by the following statement:

*«Was die Klimapolitiker in Glasgow taten, ist im Prinzip, dass sie ein Loch in die Suppenteller der Armen in den Entwicklungsländern schlugen.» (Gygi, 2021b, p. 6).*

Gygi uses rhetorical tricks to shift the narrative of the newly established taxonomy (which helps distinguish investments based on their sustainability) through statements such as

*«Die Notengebung reicht von gut (Solar, Wind) bis böse (fossil).» (Gygi, 2021b, p. 4).*

This implies that the dichotomy isn't good vs. bad, but good vs. evil, appealing to a more emotional/moral sense.

- 3. Sommarugas geheimer Klimaplan** – Hinter verschlossenen Türen legt die Energieministerin die Karten auf den Tisch. Obwohl das Volk das CO<sub>2</sub>-Gesetz ablehnte, will die SP-Bundesrätin noch schärfere Massnahmen. (Odermatt, 2021)

A prime example of the perceived hierarchal struggle connected to CC. Sommaruga goes against the will of the people, who oppose her CC propaganda. As implied by the subtitle, she has a secret agenda and operates behind closed doors. This is exemplified by the following statements:

«Bundesrätin Sommaruga stellt ihre persönliche Überzeugung über das demokratische Mehrheitsprinzip.» (Odermatt, 2021, p. 2)

«Die Marschbefehle der Klima-Elite von Paris und Glasgow sind ihr wichtiger als die Umsetzung des Entscheids ihrer eigenen Bevölkerung.» (Odermatt, 2021, p. 3)

- 4. Sehnsuchtsort für Beamte** – In Glasgow hat sich die Schweiz vertraglich verpflichtet, ihr CO<sub>2</sub> auf Vanuatu zu kompensieren. Der Ablass ist dem Bundespersonal eine lange Flugreise wert. (Mörgeli, 2021b)

The primary topic is Climate agreements between Switzerland and the island state of Vanuatu. It is strongly implied that the politicians utilize CC to get paid vacations to tropical islands. An entire passage is used to describe the beauty of the island, pristine beaches, and warm weather in exuberant detail, so long as it serves the narrative of portraying the politicians gaining paid vacation in paradise. Later the tone shifts, and Vanuatu is portrayed overtly negative (such as association with human rights abuses and even cannibalism) under the narrative that Switzerland is extraordinary when it comes to ecology. It is implied that Switzerland deals with its own problems and so should the Vanutans. In other words, Switzerland should not seek Climate agreements with foreign nations but rather deal with their own problems as implied by the following statement:

«Auch verstehen die Vanuatuer nicht, dass sich im reichen Westen viele Menschen kein eigenes Haus und keine Wohnung leisten können.» (Mörgeli, 2021b)

- 5. Ernstfall für die Grünen** – Die Grünen sind der Hase, der in der Jagd auf utopische Energieziele durch die Furche hetzt. (Sarrazin, 2021)

Relatively fair article. Raises questions about the economic feasibility of Climate policies, without severely twisting reality or overinflating the issues. Nonetheless, it is directly implied that shifting our energy sources toward alternative means is wishful thinking and will not work.

- 6. Schlechtwetterfront** (Thiel, 2021b)

Imagined conversation between some prominent (Swiss) politicians. They talk about weather patterns and consequent Climate policies in a manner that is equated to Corona vaccination mandates, with the apparent end goal of portraying both as nonsensical while also implying that they utilize (fake) morals and a (fake) sense of solidarity to enforce their policy:

Alain: Das schlechte Wetter werden wir erst endgültig besiegt haben, wenn die gesamte Bevölkerung gegen schlechtes Wetter geimpft ist.

Ueli: Aber ein grosser Teil der Bevölkerung will sich nicht gegen schlechtes Wetter impfen lassen.

Simonetta: Das ist unsolidarisch. Nur weil sich ein paar Egoisten nicht gegen schlechtes Wetter haben impfen lassen, haben wir jetzt schlechtes Wetter.

Alain: Diesmal müssen wir sie zum Impfen zwingen.

Ueli: Alle?

Alain: Ja, und vor allem auch die Kinder. Kinder sind besonders für das schlechte Wetter verantwortlich. ([Thiel, 2021b, p. 2](#))

**7. «Wir sollten uns nicht zu Sklaven machen»** – Der frühere Chef der katholischen Glaubenskongregation, Gerhard Kardinal Müller, über den Machbarkeitswahn der Politik und Corona als Hebel zur Unterdrückung von Menschen. ([Köppel, 2021c](#))

As implied in the subtitle, this article is an interview that nests on the premise that Corona and CC are overinflated because they, through alarmism, serve as efficient tools for societal control. Both are heavily ridiculed, and their opposition is incited. “We ought not to become slaves” to the government, but only to God. Later in the interview, CC is portrayed as a quasi-religious ideology as exemplified by the following passage:

Weltwoche: Wie müssen die Kirchen mit religionsähnlichen Phänomenen wie der Klima-Ideologie umgehen?

Müller: Wir müssen solche Ideologien relativieren. Es gibt innerweltliche Fragen, die wir mit der praktischen Vernunft beantworten können: Wo kommt die Energie her? Wie können wir eine Infrastruktur bereitstellen? Falsch ist, solche innerweltlichen Fragen mit ersatzreligiösen Vorstellungen zu befrachten. Wir könnten sicher einiges tun, um die Umwelt schonender zu behandeln. Aber wir können nicht die ganze Welt neu erschaffen. Wir können unsere Hoffnung nicht auf Klimapropheten setzen, sondern allein auf Gott. Im Alten Testament heisst es: «Verflucht ist der Mann, der auf Menschen vertraut.» ([Köppel, 2021c, p. 5](#))

**8. «Vor 500 Jahren hatten wir das gleiche Wetter wie heute»** – Mit Waldameisen gegen Nasa-Satelliten: Der Muotathaler Wetterschmöcker Martin Horat hält die Klimadebatte für übertrieben. Er hat gute Argumente. ([Renggli, 2021a](#))

Quasi-Interview with Martin Horat, a Muotathaler Wetterschmöcker<sup>48</sup>. He is presented as an expert whose observations/predictions oppose the “scientific narrative”. CC is relativized and stated as just the regular fluctuations in weather patterns. The article is littered with Strawman representations of the scientific experts, whose reasoning/knowledge is severely misrepresented such as the implication that axial tilt is not being accounted for, or that their prognoses are precocious and lacking the understanding of historic developments as exemplified by the following passages:

«So kommt Martin Horat zu einem anderen Schluss als die akademische Konkurrenz: «Es stehen uns in Mitteleuropa wieder kältere Zeiten bevor.» Die Erdachse verschiebe sich, und deshalb kühle sich das Klima in unseren Breitengraden wieder ab.» (Renggli, 2021a, p. 3)

«Horat stellt die Zahlen der Nasa nicht grundsätzlich in Frage, deren Interpretation aber schon: «Wir befinden uns in einer Phase mit steigenden Temperaturen. Ob es sich aber wirklich um eine Klimaerwärmung handelt, lässt sich erst in tausend Jahren sagen.» Es gelte: «Das Klima befindet sich in einem ständigen Wandel. Man muss die historische Entwicklung kennen, um die Gegenwart zu verstehen.»» (Renggli, 2021a, p. 3)

«Vor 500 Jahren hatten wir dasselbe Wetter wie jetzt, obwohl es damals noch keine Autos und Fabriken gab. Die paar Autos, die hier rumfahren, können das Klima doch nicht beeindrucken.» (Renggli, 2021a, p. 6)

**9. «Trainingslager fürs Klimaregime»** – Der liberale Ökonom Philipp Bagus erklärt, warum die Menschen ihre Freiheitsrechte abgeben. (Gygi, 2021a)

Interview with Philipp Bagus about the utilization of fearmongering in the cases of Corona and CC to limit personal freedoms/liberties through a vast expansion of the state. Science is discredited through the heavy implication that scientific sources on both topics are ideological and dogmatic. Whoever disagrees with them is branded as a heretic. Exemplified by the following statements:

Bagus: Bei Corona und dem Klima ist es ähnlich, das Vorgehen trägt religiöse Züge. Da kommen Propheten wie die Star-Virologen und die berühmten Klimaforscher, die verkünden, wie die Zusammenhänge sind und welche Regeln man einhalten muss. Wer sich dann brav impfen lässt oder grüne Umweltvorschriften befolgt, kann sich von der Schuld freikaufen, erhält sozusagen den Ablass. (Gygi, 2021a, p. 3)

[...]

Weltwoche: Man kann doch widersprechen und diskutieren.

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<sup>48</sup> Muotathaler Wetterschmöcker are (usually elderly) hobby-meteorologists from central Switzerland. They base their forecasts on direct environmental observations such as the thickness of antlegs. More detail can be found on [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Innerschwyz\\_Meteorologen](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Innerschwyz_Meteorologen)

Bagus: Nicht wirklich. In beiden Gebieten kommt die Obrigkeit daher mit der Formel: «Die Wissenschaft sagt...». Wer etwas anderes sagt, gilt als nicht wissenschaftlich, gar als Leugner, wird ausgegrenzt und verunglimpft. Wer nicht an die kommende Klimakatastrophe oder die Richtigkeit der Pandemiepolitik glaubt, ist ein Häretiker. Es ist schwierig geworden, in der Corona- wie auch in der Klimapolitik Dinge in Frage zu stellen, kritisch zu hinterfragen. Das ist bedenklich. (Gygi, 2021a, p. 4)

[...]

Weltwoche: Ist das neu, dass Diskussionen über wissenschaftliche Aussagen schwierig sind?

Bagus: Diese Entwicklung gibt es in meinen Augen schon länger, dass bestimmte Meinungen zunehmend ausgegrenzt werden. Zumindest in Deutschland hat sich nach meinem Eindruck in den letzten zwanzig Jahren ein Meinungsmonopol herausgebildet, das durch links-etatistische Ansichten beherrscht ist. Mainstream-Medien helfen mit, abweichende Positionen ins Abseits zu drängen und als radikal darzustellen. Ihre eigene Meinung stellen sie dann als wissenschaftlich dar oder versuchen ihr einen wissenschaftlichen Anstrich zu geben – und mit der Formel «Die Wissenschaft sagt...» verunmöglichen sie eine echte wissenschaftliche Debatte. Die Folge ist eine Spaltung der Gesellschaft, in der das eine Lager dem andern wissenschaftliche Kompetenz abspricht. (Gygi, 2021a, p. 4)

**10. Brüssel hats begriffen** – Die EU stuft Kernenergie neu als klimafreundlich und nachhaltig ein. Sie hört auf die Wissenschaft. Die Schweiz ist noch nicht so weit. (Schilliger, 2022)

Praises the EU for identifying nuclear power as sustainable. The article implies that this is a rare case where “real” science – instead of ideology – is used to inform climate policy as exemplified by the following statement:

«Dass die Europäische Kommission für ihren Beschluss auf die Wissenschaft und nicht auf ideologisch motivierte Einwände gehört hat, ist erfreulich.» (Schilliger, 2022)

**11. Die Erderwärmung macht pause** (Baur, 2022b)

Uses data from surface temperatures over the last seven years to imply that global temperatures are not rising. While the article later acknowledges the El Niño/La Niña Southern Oscillation (ENSO) as the reason for this, it is simply brushed aside. Instead, the Climate models are again portrayed as quasi-religious prophecies, linked to Corona models, and consequently denounced. This is exemplified by the following statements:

«Klimamodelle leiden an dem gleichen Manko wie Prophezeiungen der Epidemiologen in der Covid-Krise: Sie stimmen selten mit der Realität überein.» (Baur, 2022b)



«Wir wissen, dass sich das Klima in der Vergangenheit dauernd änderte. Mal war es wärmer als heute, mal war es viel kälter (was für uns Menschen viel bedrohlicher war). Über die Ursachen gibt es viele denkbare Thesen. Gewiss ist nur eines: Am Menschen lag es früher sicher nicht.» ([Baur, 2022b, p. 2](#))

## **12. SRF: Kosten und Klima spielen keine Rolle**

The primary focus lies on the SRF's outside-broadcast vehicle and the fuel it consumes. SRF is commonly portrayed in a negative light and is often perceived as a state-run propaganda tool for furthering the CC agenda. This article seeks to expose the SRF as hypocrites. The conclusion is summarized by the following statement:

*«Damit ist klar: 1. CO2-Ausstoss und Klimawandel kümmern SRF nicht im Geringsten. 2. Der SRF-Slogan «Die Schweiz im Herzen» ist Schall und Rauch. 3. SRF hat viel zu viel Geld.»* ([Weltwoche, 2022j, p. 2](#))

## **13. Klimainflation – Je erfolgreicher die Umweltaktivisten sind, desto teurer wird das Leben der normalen Leute.** ([Gygi, 2022o](#))

Climate policy is blamed for increased oil and gas prices. This is used as an example of how the common folk (i.e., the good people) suffer under the influence of the EU's climate policies. It is further claimed that climate policy is not pushed because of environmental reasons but out of political correctness (i.e., "wokeness") as exemplified by the following statement:

«[...] die Finanzbranche beeilt sich, die grüne Finanzregulierung der EU umzusetzen, die in ihrem Nachhaltigkeits-Beurteilungsraster alle Investitionen in Öl-, Kohle- und Gasexplorationen mit Minuspunkten versieht. Die westlichen Rohstoffkonzerne sind unter Druck, sich vom fossilen Geschäft zu distanzieren. Vernachlässigung der Energievorsorge, steigende Risiken und Preise, dafür politisch korrekte Klimapolitik.» ([Gygi, 2022o, p. 3](#))

## **14. Erstes klimaneutrales Krematorium** ([Hendryk M Broder, 2022](#))

On the one hand an almost irrelevant article. It covers a German crematorium that switched from petroleum to Bio-methane gas to reduce carbon emissions. Additionally, the waste heat generated during the cremation process is used to heat nearby homes. However, the last sentence paragraph suddenly shifts towards concentration camps as can be seen in the following statement. The only explanation that might come to mind for this is that the author seeks to imply that carbon neutrality is being prioritized/valued more than human lives.

*«Bedauernswert ist nur, dass diese fantastischen Neuerungen nicht früher eingeführt wurden. Mit der «Abwärme» des Konzentrationslagers Buchenwald hätte man halb Weimar beheizen können. Ökologisch, nachhaltig, preiswert und vor allem: klimaneutral.»* ([Hendryk M Broder, 2022, p. 2](#))

## **15. Bauern entdecken die Gentechnik – Die Landwirtschaft ist unter Druck, weniger Pflanzenschutzmittel einzusetzen. Sie findet Hilfe bei einer segensreichen Wissenschaft.** ([Gygi, 2022a](#))

The article covers new means of maximizing produce through bioengineering. This is one of the rare articles that portray academia/science in a positive light. This is especially interesting considering the context, that science taught us about over-fertilization, and it was scientists that inspired the decrease of pesticides in agriculture (e.g. CO<sub>2</sub>-Initiative), which *Die Weltwoche* (and the SVP) vehemently opposed.

- 16. Klima heiligt Aktivistin** – Die Amerikanerin Jennifer Morgan von Greenpeace wird deutsche Klimabotschafterin. Eigentlich verrückt: Die Ex-NGO-Chefin darf sechs Milliarden Euro an NGOs verteilen. ([Schuler, 2022b](#))

Most of the article's content is implied through its subtitle. Jennifer Morgan's nomination for climate ambassador is perceived as corruption due to her past as a Greenpeace lobbyist. Her salary and the number of people she oversees are stated. Arguably this is done to distinguish her from the common folk (who rarely if ever earn as much) as well as to allude to her political influence.

- 17. Zaubertricks der Energiewender** ([Baur, 2022f](#))

Heavily criticizes SRF for the models used to evaluate the CO<sub>2</sub> equivalence of Swiss energy sources. It is claimed that the data is wrong, and the article provides the "real" data (which upon checking with data provided by the Bundesamt für Energie (BfE) proved to be wrong). Later in the article, it is addressed that the numbers deviate from what *Die Weltwoche* provides because their models include UBP's (Umweltbelastungspunkte). Instead of addressing this, it is simply brushed aside as can be seen in the following statement:

«Dieser rechnet mit «Umweltbelastungspunkten» (UBP), welche auf einer «ökologischen Knappheit» beruhen. Was immer damit gemeint sein mag – die Kernenergie kommt nun plötzlich auf einen ähnlich schlechten Wert wie Erdgas, während Biogas auf dem Papier grünt.» ([Baur, 2022f, p. 3](#))

- 18. Wie verhindern wir den Blackout?** – Kohle, Öl und Gas haben die Zivilisation beflügelt. Nun will man um jeden Preis von den fossilen Energien wegkommen. Was das für die Zehn-Millionen-Schweiz bedeutet. ([Boulouchos, 2022](#))

Well-written (outsourced) article by Prof. Boulouchos. It covers many problems and portrays a decent picture of our reliance on fossil fuels. However, the article has no traction (7 recorded interactions, no comments).

- 19. Mit der Klimhysterie verspielen wir die Zukunft** – Die meisten Regierungen wollen die CO<sub>2</sub>-Emissionen radikal verringern. Das wird teuer. Wenn wir die Klima- und Energieprobleme wirklich lösen wollen, müssen wir die heutigen Technologien verbessern. Wind- und Sonnenkraft bringen wenig. ([Weltwoche, 2022f](#))

The entire article is one long plea for the free market and innovation to solve the climate crisis. Solar and wind energy are portrayed as highly inefficient and the calculation upon which models rest are delegitimized through strawman arguments (like claiming that models are

based on the assumption that the sun constantly shines, and the wind constantly blows). The article focuses solely on economics and fails to address any ecological reasoning behind the push for green energy. Interestingly the green revolution is brought up as a prime example of how innovation can solve problems, without acknowledging any of the problems caused by it (e.g. severe soil degradation such as in the Punjab or Uttar Pradesh regions in India).

**20. Lebenselixier Kohlenstoff** – CO<sub>2</sub> ist der Schlüssel zur Belebung des Planeten. Seine Freisetzung macht die Erde zu einem besseren Ort. ([Häring, 2022a](#))

This article serves to discredit science and scientists, specifically regarding the negative connotation around CO<sub>2</sub>. It is implied that scientists do not know what they are talking about or that they severely misunderstand the role of CO<sub>2</sub> in nature. The article offers multiple reasons (all strawman arguments) for why CO<sub>2</sub> is – if anything – good for the environment, akin to the following statements, which while not wrong, fail to incorporate the line of reasoning behind the interest in reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions:

*«Für die Natur ist eine höhere CO<sub>2</sub>-Konzentration völlig unproblematisch. Für über 90 Prozent der Biomasse unseres Planeten ist CO<sub>2</sub> ein Grundnahrungsmittel und kein Schadstoff. Die pflanzliche Biomasse ist ihrerseits Nahrung für die übrigen Organismen, inklusive der Menschen.»* ([Häring, 2022a, p. 2](#))

*«Der Mensch, auch mit acht Milliarden Individuen, repräsentiert nur 0,01 Prozent der gesamten Biomasse. Und dieser will jetzt also vorgeben, was das richtige Mass an Wärme und CO<sub>2</sub>-Konzentration sein soll? Das ist schlicht vermessen.»* ([Häring, 2022a, p. 3](#))

**21. Gaskraftwerke ohne Gas, Gas in der Birne** – Das Winterloch der Schweiz beträgt 25 Milliarden Kilowattstunden Strom. ([Bodenmann, 2022d](#))

Criticizes nuclear energy as well as gas and wind as energy sources. Promotes solar and hydro energy. However, the article is overwhelmingly negatively received (1:9 like to dislike ratio).

**22. ESSAY Wie unser Finanzplatz zum grünen Magneten wird** – Anleger wollen beim Investieren immer mehr auf Umwelt und Soziales achten. Unsere Banken helfen ihnen, ihre Neigungen auszuleben. ([Rohner, 2022](#))

Neutral reporting on the benefits and downsides of our financial sector supporting sustainable investments. The previously observed pattern repeats where the neutral portrayal of CC-related subject matter finds no traction among *Die Weltwoche's* readership (two recorded interactions, no comments)

**23. Anders als gedacht** – Die Zementindustrie wird als «Klimakiller» gebrandmarkt. Dabei sind Zement und Beton in Wahrheit ebenfalls klimaneutral. ([Reichmuth, 2022b](#))

Covers the carbonization level of cement and argues that it is unfairly criticized for its CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. It is implied that this is being consciously ignored by the government and the EU, because it doesn't fit their agenda as implied by the following statements:

«Behörden stellen sich taub.» (Reichmuth, 2022b, p. 2)

«Doch das Bundesamt für Umwelt will davon nichts wissen. «Die Teilnahme am Emissionshandelssystem folgt europaweit nach einheitlich definierten Systemgrenzen», sagt es auf Anfrage. Die Aufnahme von CO<sub>2</sub> durch Karbonatisierung sei in den entsprechenden Regeln nicht enthalten.» (Reichmuth, 2022b, p. 3)

#### **24. Grüsse aus der Zukunft – Das neue Leben im Grünen.** (Eichenberger, 2022b)

Grüsse aus der Zukunft's articles are written from a future perspective and cover how we've solved environmental issues. This specific article claims that once the true costs of public transport had been realized and no longer manipulated, public transport was no longer subsidized. The SBB (Schweizerische Bundesbahnen) becomes the SSB (Schweizerisch Strassen-Betreiberin). A lot of other claims are raised such as that agriculture has shifted towards "true" sustainability, and that due to the free and fair market human liberty is abundant. How all of this is achieved, and why it would work is remarkably vague. This article is worth highlighting because it appears to resonate with how *Die Weltwoche* would like things to play out, while at the same time being written in a manner that *Die Weltwoche* would typically scrutinize as wishful thinking.

#### **25. CO<sub>2</sub> aus der Luft für heimisches Valsler Mineralwasser – Als weltweit erster Getränkehersteller setzt Coca-Cola in der Schweiz auf Kohlendioxid, das der Luft entzogen wird. Das Flüssiggas sorgt für die Bläschen im Mineralwasser.** (Schwab, 2022a)

Covers Clime Works, a new branch of the Coca-Cola industry that invests in carbon capture technology to infuse their products. An example of innovations, resulting from corporations, that could be a step in the right direction for addressing CC. Consequently, the portrayal is overwhelmingly positive.

#### **26. «Die Zukunft gehört der Kernenergie» – Der renommierte amerikanische Wissenschaftspublizist Michael Shellenberger skizziert, wie eine gute Energiepolitik aussehen müsste.** (Gygi, 2022f)

Interview whos primary subject is climate policy (in Glasgow) which is portrayed in an overtly negative manner. Nuclear energy is portrayed as the only viable solution and it is stated that the climate debate revolves around nothing, is inefficient, and that its supporters are incompetent as exemplified by the following statements:

«Es hat sich doch klar gezeigt, dass diese Uno-Klimagespräche eine Farce waren.» (Gygi, 2022f, p. 2)

«(...) das Glasgow-Treffen hat vielen gezeigt, dass man die Klimawandeldebatten der Uno nicht ernst nehmen kann.» (Gygi, 2022f, p. 3)

«(...) gleichzeitig hat diese Bewegung auch gezeigt, wie kraftlos und wie ziellos sie eigentlich ist. Die Aktivisten haben sich quer über den Globus als Bewegung organisiert, haben die ganze

weltweite Medienszene mehr oder weniger auf ihrer Seite, aber letztlich doch wenig Einfluss auf die Politik.» (Gygi, 2022f, p. 3)

## 27. Exorzismus grüner Lebenslügen (Matussek, 2022a)

Covers the plot of the book “Im Garten Eloi”. It tackles a dystopian future where the culture war has been lost and the green/communist/woke seeks to destroy the heterodox. The protagonist is raped by a group of dark-skinned refugees but is not allowed to press charges because of the outrage that would follow for turning against refugees. The summary ends with the statement:

«Dieser Roman ist der langersehnte Exorzismus grüner Besessenheiten und Lebenslügen.» (Matussek, 2022a, p. 4)

## 28. Inside Washington – Es herrscht Krieg, Grüne frohlocken (Holmes, 2022b)

US democrats are glad for the war in Ukraine. The rise in fuel costs helps them (Pete Buttigieg & Kamala Harris) push their agenda and promote electric vehicles. They are portrayed as profiteurs, and disassociated from the common folk as is exemplified by the following quotes:

«Doch was an den Zapfsäulen weh tut, lässt die Grünen frohlocken.» (Holmes, 2022b, p. 2)

«Die Regierung hofft, die gegenwärtige Krise könnte der amerikanischen Liebe zum Auto endlich den Garaus machen.» (Holmes, 2022b, p. 2)

«Die Biden-Regierung ist für Volkes Stimme offenbar völlig taub geworden.» (Holmes, 2022b, p. 2)

## 29. Ein Unglück kommt immer allein – Es bestätigt sich die alte Regel, dass in den Medien nie Platz für zwei gleichzeitige Katastrophen ist. (Zimmermann, 2022b)

Appeals to the fact that typically a single event dominates the news cycle. For example, the refugee crisis from 2015 was usurped by Donald Trump's election in 2016, which was overshadowed by Greta Thunberg and the FFF (Fridays-For-Future) movement, which was followed up by the pandemic in 2020 and now the Ukraine war. While there is truth to this observation Zimmermann portrays this in a manner that seems to discredit the severity of each of these events by appealing to herd behavior in media and the public. This is further intensified when the experts who inform the discussion in public media are presented as people no one has ever heard of, somewhat discrediting them. Relating to CC this helps establish the narrative that it is just one of these events that came and went. This plays well into the perceived alarmism/fearmongering/over-exaggeration of the mainstream CC narrative. This is exemplified by the introduction of the article:

«Wann haben Sie das letzte Mal einen dieser unzähligen Artikel gelesen, wonach die Klimakatastrophe die Menschheit demnächst in die Apokalypse stürzt? Ist lange her, es dürfte so gegen Ende 2019 gewesen sein. Seitdem gibt es in den Medien keine Klimakatastrophe mehr. Ihre Ikone Greta Thunberg schafft es gerade noch knapp in die Kurzmeldungen, wenn

*sie vor der russischen Botschaft in Stockholm gegen den Ukraine-Krieg demonstriert.»*  
(Zimmermann, 2022b, p. 1)

**30. Anti-Solar-U-Boot Z'Graggen** – Heidi Z'graggen wollte Bundesrätin werden. Jetzt kämpft die Ständerätin gegen alpine Solaranlagen und damit gegen die Interessen ihres Kantons. (Bodenmann, 2022a)

Covers the proposal of building a large photovoltaic power station in the small mountain village of Grengiols. The article is very supportive of the idea and openly criticizes politicians who oppose it. Extraordinary for *Die Weltwoche's* corpus is the direct critique of the SVP who are stated to be the party of the oligarchs and pro-Russian. The article has more traction than is typical for Bodenmann, however, the reception is again overwhelmingly negative with the comment section being exclusively dedicated to expressing opposition to the project in Grengiol and criticizing Bodenmann for his stance and expertise.

**31. Neuer Klima Bericht mit Polit-Agenda**

Short Article that covers the IPCC reports, specifically the summary for policymakers. It acknowledges the scientific viability of the actual report but uses the simplification found in the summary for policymakers to imply a political agenda. Firstly, the report is embedded in the “alarmism” narrative which serves to discredit the report from the get-go. Secondly, the politicians are implied to be too lazy to properly inform themselves.

*«Natürlich mit Worten wie «jetzt oder nie» und «Es ist ein Bericht der Schande» und «Wir sind auf dem direkten Weg ins Klimadesaster». Man kennt die Floskeln.»* (Häring, 2022b, p. 1)

*«Es ist schwer vorstellbar, dass sich Politiker durch die 63 Seiten Text mit überladenen Grafiken quälen. Die meisten werden sich auf die 28 Folien der Medienkonferenz beziehen. Dort überwiegt die politische Agenda (...)»* (Häring, 2022b, p. 2)

The problems associated with an increase in global temperature are questioned. While this is not further analyzed, the formulation paired with the usual CC narrative in *Die Weltwoche* implies the answer that the problems are exaggerated.

*«Ein Grad Celsius mehr: Problem? [...] Man mag es dem Bericht verzeihen, dass er nicht darauf eingeht, wie sehr die Menschheit seit Beginn der Industrialisierung unter der bisherigen Erwärmung um ein Grad Celsius gelitten oder vielleicht sogar profitiert hat. Darauf hätte nämlich der zweite Bericht mit dem Thema «Auswirkungen, Anpassung und Anfälligkeit» Bezug nehmen müssen. Umso unglaublicher, dass gemäss António Guterres eine Erwärmung um ein weiteres Grad im Desaster enden muss.»* (Häring, 2022b, p. 2)

**32. Wie wir Agrarland zurückgewinnen** – Von der Landwirtschaft hängt es ab, ob künftige Generationen genug zu essen haben. Die Bauern müssen alle Möglichkeiten zur Nahrungsmittelproduktion ausschöpfen. (Morris, 2022)

The article covers the importance of agriculture especially concerning the climate crisis. There are multiple appeals to innovative technology that can help regain farmland while acknowledging associated problems. The article shows little traction, with the few comments expressing opposition by either diminishing the climate-associated problems in agriculture, discrediting the mentioned NGOs by claiming they are under the influence of communist China, or claiming that the statements are not credible because the author is the CEO of an environmental protection organization.

**33. Weltfremde Rechnereien – Falsche Voraussagen können sehr teuer werden: In die Modelle fließen zahlreiche unbekannte Faktoren ein. (Weltwoche, 2022m)**

The primary goal of this article is to discredit the IPCC reports based on the models used in long-term climate forecasts. It is claimed that they are arbitrary and not based on scientific procedure as well as implying that the scientists adapt the models to fit the patterns they define (i.e., adapt observations to fit the CC “agenda”). The fact that over longer periods the prognosis is more scattered is used to further discredit the models. This is then tied to the immense costs associated with misdiagnosed developments to paint the picture that the reliance on (tailored) climate models will end up problematic due to misinformed investments.

*«Die Vielzahl an Modellen bewirkt unterschiedlichste Resultate. Wie wissen also die Uno oder die US-Regierung, welches die zuverlässige Prognose ist? Sie wissen es nicht. Stattdessen bilden sie den Durchschnitt der Prognosen – ein gefährliches Spiel und, wie nachfolgend ausgeführt wird, wissenschaftlich unsolide.» (Weltwoche, 2022m, p. 3)*

*«Einfach ausgedrückt: Die Modelle sind im Durchschnitt untauglich, aber sie kommen beim IPCC zum Einsatz.» (Weltwoche, 2022m, p. 5)*

*«Mit anderen Worten: Die führenden Klimaforscher definieren einen «akzeptablen Rahmen» für die Prognoseergebnisse und parametrisieren die Modelle so, dass sie sich in diesem «akzeptablen Rahmen» bewegen.» (Weltwoche, 2022m, p. 6)*

*«Vernünftigerweise ist daraus zu schliessen, dass es ernsthafte Gründe gibt, an der Objektivität der Modelle und ihrer Resultate zu zweifeln – und damit auch am IPCC.» (Weltwoche, 2022m, p. 6)*

**34. Umweltschutz braucht freie Menschen und Unternehmen – Die Modelle des Weltklimarats ergeben völlig unzuverlässige Voraussagen des Klimas. Die Wissenschaft taugt nicht als Rechtfertigung für Eingriffe in die Freiheitsrechte. (Kessler, 2022)**

This article is one of the most essential to this thesis because it is a prime example of CC denial within *Die Weltwoche's* corpus and thus deserves closer inspection. It is introduced by stating that governments limit personal freedom and rights for the sake of CC:

*«Weltweit greifen Staaten immer massiver in Freiheitsrechte ein, um den Klimawandel zu bekämpfen. Dennoch ertönen täglich Stimmen, die meinen, die jetzigen Massnahmen gingen*

zu wenig weit. Sie fordern noch mehr Kompetenzen für die Politik und folglich eine noch weitergehende Einengung der Bürger und Unternehmen.» (Kessler, 2022)

This is followed up by a strawman argument highlighting that the anthropogenic link is no longer questioned. Instead of seeing this as a consequence of scientific consensus, this tries to portray the climate debate as closeminded, unscientific, and indifferent to skepticism:

«Die These, wonach der Klimawandel hauptsächlich vom Menschen ausgehe und er diesen durch Massnahmen aufhalten könne, darüber wird in der medialen Debatte kaum noch diskutiert. Warum auch hinterfragen, was «wissenschaftlich bewiesen» ist? Gerade die Skepsis gegenüber weit herum geglaubten Annahmen ist aber eine wesentliche Quelle wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts, die nicht leichtfertig über Bord geworfen werden sollte.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 2)

Another Strawman argument is presented by stating that scientific observations/procedures do not translate because the atmosphere – unlike the laboratory – is a closed system and thus cannot be evaluated:

«Die Naturwissenschaft kann zwar die Wirkung von CO<sub>2</sub> auf die Temperatur in einem geschlossenen System (in einem Laborexperiment) feststellen. Unser Planet ist allerdings kein geschlossenes System. Es bestehen verschiedene Einflüsse auf die Temperatur wie etwa Sonnenaktivität, Luftfeuchtigkeit, Niederschlag, Wolken. Das bedeutet: Es handelt sich beim Weltklima nicht um ein beliebig wiederholbares Laborexperiment.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 2)

“Follow the science” is then presented as an argument from authority instead of acknowledging that it simply implies listening to the best-informed people (see chapter 1.2.2 Expertise – or lack thereof, specifically footnote number 3):

«Die oft gehörte Aufforderung «Follow the science» ist in diesem Zusammenhang schlicht unsolid, weil man die Menschen im Grunde auffordert, willkürlich auserlesenen Experten zu folgen und andere Expertenmeinungen zu ignorieren.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 3)

Another strawman is used to claim that due to the varying nature of influential factors it cannot be scientifically proven if humanity has any effect on the climate:

«Weil niemand mit Sicherheit sagen kann, welche Faktoren zu welcher Zeit wie stark auf das Weltklima einwirken, bleibt auch die Rolle des Menschen ungewiss. Es gibt schlichtweg keinen wissenschaftlichen Nachweis dafür, dass der Mensch hauptsächlich für den Klimawandel verantwortlich ist.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 3)

This claim finds further backing by stating that even if the scientific community agreed on the matter, this line of reasoning is fallacious because it is an argument from popularity:

«Selbst wenn eine grosse Mehrheit aller Klimawissenschaftler zur Ansicht gelangen sollte, dass der Mensch hauptsächlich dafür verantwortlich sei, bleibt diese Behauptung spekulativ. Historisch gibt es spektakuläre Fälle von weitreichender Bedeutung, in denen die Mehrheit irrt.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 3)



Further, it is implied that CC is not a priority issue. Firstly, it is implied that if anything global warming is desirable because the cold kills more people than the heat. This is followed up by offering other problems that kill more people annually and claiming that the CC agenda steals the resources that would otherwise be allocated to “real” problems:

*«Fakt ist: Für Menschen stellt Kälte ein deutlich grösseres Problem dar als Hitze. Weltweit betrachtet, sterben achtzehnmal mehr Menschen an Kälte als an Hitze. An Durchfall sterben jährlich fast 300-mal so viele Menschen wie an klimabedingten Katastrophen. Und 3500-mal so viele an Herz-Kreislauf-Erkrankungen. Wir sterben zu ziemlich genau 100 Prozent an anderen Ursachen als an Klimafolgen. Die Bekämpfung realer globaler Probleme wie Tuberkulose oder Durchfallerkrankungen wird durch die geforderte Konzentration aller Kräfte und Mittel auf die CO2-Reduktion behindert.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 4)*

This line of argument is extended and paired with a perceived attack on personal liberty, paired with a critique of environmentalism as the morally right thing to do:

*«Die Klimapolitik nötigt die Menschen, ihre Mittel anders zu verwenden, als sie es sonst getan hätten. Wer zum Beispiel Ressourcen lieber in die Krebsforschung investiert hätte, dem wird eine andere Prioritätensetzung aufgezwungen. Eine etatistische Klimapolitik ignoriert somit das inhärente Bedürfnis, ein selbstbestimmtes Leben zu führen, sich seine eigenen Ziele zu setzen und diese mit selbstdefinierten Mitteln zu erreichen – auch in Unternehmen. Es ist ein direkter Angriff auf die menschliche Würde und die Errungenschaften des Humanismus. Es ist erstaunlich, wie die Vertreter einer solchen Politik es schaffen, sich als moralisch überlegen darzustellen.» (Kessler, 2022)*

Toward the end of the article, it is claimed that there is no proof that state intervention can help the environment. To illustrate the opposite a peculiar case of nut picking is presented:

*«Ein grosser Irrtum ist es auch, dass Klima- und Umweltschutz staatlichen Eingreifens bedürfen. In der Wissenschaft gibt es keinerlei Hinweise darauf, dass ein Mehr an staatlicher Planung und Intervention einen besseren Umweltschutz zur Folge hätte. Ganz im Gegenteil. Ein Beispiel ist die DDR, die den Umweltschutz zur staatlichen Priorität machte und dennoch einen wesentlich höheren CO2-Ausstoss aufwies als die BRD und in der jeder zweite Fluss biologisch tot war. Umweltschutz braucht keine Bevormundung.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 4)*

Finally, the article concludes with the statement that only personal, economic, and corporate freedom can lead to ecology:

*«Wer sich also für die Ökologie engagieren will, muss sich für ein Wirtschaftssystem aussprechen, das den Lebensstandard möglichst vieler Menschen anhebt. Nur so können sich immer mehr Leute dem Umweltschutz widmen. Dabei spielen Unternehmen, die frei sind in der Suche nach Innovationen, eine Schlüsselrolle. Erfahrungsgemäss führt einzig eine Politik, die sich weitgehend aus dem Wirtschaftsleben heraushält, zu diesem Ergebnis. Was die Umwelt also braucht, sind liberale Reformen.» (Kessler, 2022, p. 5)*

**35. Grüsse aus der Zukunft** – Plötzlich wurde Abkühlung möglich (Eichenberger, 2022e)

Like other «Grüsse aus der Zukunft» articles it is written from a future perspective. Humanity has realized that reducing emissions by 2050 is impossible and thus from 2025 on the focus shifted toward adapting to the new climate instead of focusing on lowering emissions. This was especially helpful for developing countries because they no longer had to waste money on lowering emissions and could instead invest those resources in adapting to the new climate. By this point, CC is no longer a problem because, through innovation in geoengineering (like cloud production), humanity has reached the point where global temperatures can easily be manipulated and countries now must decide how much they want to cool the planet.

**36. Ich will das Klima nicht retten – Weil ich mit dieser Anmassung nichts anfangen kann. Und eine Ideologie-Allergie habe. Gegen den Machbarkeitswahn hilft im Grunde nur: Demut. (Schindler, 2022c)**

The article's primary focus lies on portraying CC as a quasi-religious and dogmatic ideology full of alarmism and fearmongering. Comparative examples given as proof of overexaggerated alarmism are the forest decline and the hole in the ozone layer<sup>49</sup>.

The quasi-religious and dogmatic nature behind climate activism is exemplified by the following statements:

«Nicht für Klima-Ideologen, die sich am Dogma des anthropogenen Einflusses festkrallen, inklusive Inanspruchnahme päpstlicher Unfehlbarkeit.» (Schindler, 2022c, p. 3)

«Worauf basiert der klimareligiöse Aktivistenterror tatsächlich?» (Schindler, 2022c, p. 4)

«Wenig verwunderlich also, dass ausgerechnet die Klima-Missionare sich in ihrem Moralismus nicht zügeln können – ihr Absolutismus verlangt radikale Unterwerfung. Allein: Wollen wir so miteinander leben? Als stünden wir permanent vor dem Jüngsten Öko-Gericht? Wozu das Fortbestehen der Menschheit sichern, wenn unser gesellschaftliches Zusammenleben auf Gängeln, Überwachen, Bestrafen basiert? Ergo: auf Herzlosigkeit.» (Schindler, 2022c, p. 5)

The fact that climate activists critique the pace of the democratic process is understood as a wish for a dictatorship:

«Gesinnungsgenossin Neubauer, gewohnt flapsig, beschwerte sich bei einem «Lanz»-Talk, dass demokratische Prozesse zu langsam seien, um den Klimawandel aufzuhalten. Wer allerdings eine «Ökodiktatur» wittert, wehe dem – und das ist noch freundlich – Ewiggestrigen.» (Schindler, 2022c, p. 4)

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<sup>49</sup> The ozone layer is of specific interest. It is a prime example of how science and politics can cooperate to identify and tackle an issue. Given the successful global effort in tackling the diminishing ozone layer this could be seen as proof of how science and politics can accomplish unprecedented feats of global cooperation. Instead – because the project was successful and thus the crisis averted – this is flipped into an example of false alarmism. In other words: A real threat, avoided through cooperation, is now perceived as non-problematic to begin with. While those counter measures are addressed, it is stated that their role in diminishing the ozone hole is not proven: “Inwieweit es an den Massnahmen lag, (...), ist disputabel.” (Schindler, 2022c, p. 3)

Lastly, it is worth taking note of the statement that claims that under the CC ideology, the youth is sterilizing itself to avoid carbon emissions from the children. While this is a bizarre and evident lie, it serves to further the narrative of how pervasive the ideology truly is:

«Es sind nicht einfach «Fridays for Future»-Flausen, wenn junge Frauen in den Gebärstreik gehen und junge Männer sich sterilisieren lassen, da sie eigene Kinder wegen ihres hohen CO<sub>2</sub>-Ausstosses ablehnen.» (Schindler, 2022c, p. 4)

### **37. Die Wirklichkeit ist besser als die Modelle (Weltwoche, 2022d)**

A short article that seeks to discredit IPCC models. It is claimed that they are severely exaggerated and that in reality, the globe isn't warming at the pace scientists want us to believe. Multiple claims of alarmism and fearmongering are given, and it is claimed that the scientific community is giving in to activists.

### **38. Die Standardmeinung – Mit seinen Berichten kanalisiert der Weltklimarat die weltweite Diskussion in Klimafragen. Die Kritik an der Auswahl der Wissenschaftler und Themen wird lauter. (Gygi, 2022e)**

The article seeks to discredit the IPCC based on it being too political and non-responsive to diverging opinions. The prognoses are presented as "certain" through the lens of climate activists, but "flimsy/unreliable" through the lens of critics. The fact that politicians mainly read the summary for policymakers is used to claim that the summary is inherently propaganda:

*«Die wenigsten werden jedoch die ganzen dicken Berichte lesen. Der Klimarat liefert deshalb immer auch eine «Zusammenfassung für Politiker» mit, die allerdings nicht nur eine Zusammenfassung ist, sondern auch eine propagandagerechte Dramatisierung, Zuspitzung und Verzerrung der Originalberichte.» (Gygi, 2022e)*

The IPCC is further discredited based on an anonymous source, who out of fear of repercussions does not want to be named. The conclusion is that the IPCC management is political and not scientific:

*«Die oberste Führungsebene wird also politisch, nicht wissenschaftlich bestimmt.» (Gygi, 2022e, p. 2)*

The IPCC is further discredited by claiming that the primary intent behind cooperation is gaining access to the climate funds which further alters the interests of the council:

*«Dass die Umweltministerien vieler Länder grün geprägt und der Grossteil der IPCC-Staaten Gelder aus dem Grünen Klimafonds der Uno erhalten, färbt auf die Zusammensetzung und die Interessenlage des Gremiums ab.» (Gygi, 2022e, p. 2)*

The last statement worth highlighting is the notion of diversity. It is stated that the council seeks diversity in gender and nativity but not in opinion, shutting down anyone who criticizes the alarmism. This connection pairs well with how *Die Weltwoche* perceives wokeness and

associates it with the CC movement. Enforced diversity in skin color and gender at all costs, but critique or difference in opinion are vehemently opposed:

*«Laut Schilderungen Involvierter gibt es zwar Diversität bei Geschlecht und regionaler Herkunft, aber nicht bezüglich Meinungsspektrum in der Klimadiskussion: Kritiker der Alarmlinie würden ausgegrenzt.» (Gygi, 2022e, p. 3)*

### **39. Anders als gedacht – Das Paradies geht nicht unter. (Reichmuth, 2022a)**

This article's primary focus lies in addressing the rising water levels and claiming this to be a hoax. It is implied that natives push this notion in the hopes of generating money through financial compensation by more prosperous countries:

*«Die Geschichte wird gerne von den Südseebewohnern selber verbreitet – mutmasslich, weil sie sich damit Ausgleichszahlungen aus wohlhabenden Staaten erhoffen.» (Reichmuth, 2022a, p. 2)*

Later in the article the notion of “sinking islands” is misunderstood by stating that the Maldives have grown due to coral reef expansion while failing to address the fact that corals are extremely vulnerable to temperature changes and that the rate of growth will thus not remain constant. The article concludes by stating that migration on these islands has been a constant since their inhabitation and that CC has nothing to do with it:

*«Umsiedlungen sind jedenfalls eine Realität, seit die Südseeinseln bewohnt sind. Mit dem Klimawandel hat das wenig zu tun.» (Reichmuth, 2022a, p. 3)*

### **40. Erdölaktien sind eine ethische Anlage – Die grüne Bürokratie kann Marktpreise noch so verbiegen, die Wirklichkeit ist stärker. (Gygi, 2022g)**

The article's primary focus is the EU taxonomy system for sustainable investment. As Gygi has done before (2. Operation Blackout) he applies a false sense of moralism by stating that the taxonomy distinguishes between good and *evil* investments (instead of good and bad). This helps further the notion that the reasoning behind the taxonomy is not environmentally or economically oriented, but is enforced through branding/demonization of the opposition:

*«Die Schweiz übernimmt diese Regulierung, welche die Wirtschaftswelt in Gut und Böse einteilt. Als sündig gelten naturgemäss die Aktien von Unternehmen, die mit fossilen Energieformen zu tun haben, mit Öl, Kohle, Gas (neben den Bereichen Rüstung, Alkohol, Drogen, Spiel).» (Gygi, 2022g, p. 2)*

*«Klar, Investoren können immer noch sagen, sie wollten tugendhaft, sauber sein und deshalb auf Aktien aus dem Sektor Fossile verzichten. Aber dann müssen sie höchstwahrscheinlich dafür bezahlen: mit schlechteren Erträgen, da die von der Taxonomie administrativ vorgesehenen Abschläge ein Klacks sind im Vergleich mit dem Kursplus für sündige Aktien. Moralisch auf der richtigen Seite zu stehen, ethisch anzulegen, kostet dann eben einiges.» (Gygi, 2022g, p. 3)*

**41. Grüner Albtraum** – Der «Klimaplan» der Schweizer Umweltschützer ist linksextrem und diktatorisch. Eine Umsetzung wäre eine Katastrophe für Wohlstand, Markt und Gesellschaft. (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022)

This article addresses the perceived CC agenda and portrays what that entails. As the subtitle implies, the agenda is perceived as extreme and dictatorial. Its consequences are portrayed as all-encompassingly negative. The article is initiated by the “commanded” tempo limitations in Zürich, which is portrayed as a direct invasion into everyday life and the economy:

*«Wieder einmal auf der breiten Ausfallstrasse in Zürich stadtauswärts geschlichen, mit Tempo dreissig, wie seit kurzem befohlen. Die rot-grünen Regierungen in den Schweizer Städten mischen sich immer konkreter ins Alltagsleben ein. Und ins Geschäftsleben, in die Wirtschaft.»* (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022, p. 2)

The will to reduce traffic is presented as an invasion not only into personal travel but personal property:

*«Also nicht nur der Individualverkehr, sondern auch das Individualeigentum wird bekämpft. Das alles sind Spielarten der Enteignung.»* (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022, p. 3)

The invasion into private life and especially the economy (with a focus on small corporations) evokes the hierarchical struggle between the political elite who enforce their agenda at the cost of the common folk:

*«Besonders einschneidend sind die Forderungen nach einem «grundlegenden Wandel» in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, nach drastischen Staatseingriffen. Es gehe um nicht weniger als die «historische Verantwortung an der globalen Klimaerwärmung» unseres Landes. Diese Verantwortung besteht bekanntlich aus einem Tausendstel des weltweiten menschengemachten CO2-Ausstosses, global irrelevant. Nur würde diese Erkenntnis auch die Grünen und deren Politik irrelevant machen. Grüne Politik heisst immer mehr Auflagen für Gebäude und Fahrzeuge, staatlich befohlene Beratungen, eine Bürokratisierung von allem, was mit Energieanwendungen zusammenhängt, und Hunderttausende schikanierte KMU.»* (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022, p. 4)

The necessity of environmental policy is downplayed through CC denial by claiming that in the preindustrial era, the climate fluctuated more than it does nowadays and that the Green Party purposefully left out this fact because it would ruin their case. Instead, the Green Party utilizes war, water scarcity, migration, and the economy to fit further their agenda by invoking alarmism across multiple topics:

*«Das Papier der Grünen verschweigt, dass schon die Temperaturen der vorindustriellen Zeit starken Schwankungen unterworfen waren und das heutige Wärmeniveau erheblich übertroffen haben. Die heutige Erwärmung ist im Rückblick auf die zurückliegenden Tausenden von Jahren weder einzigartig noch dramatisch. Der Bericht instrumentalisiert extreme Wetterereignisse, zeichnet die Apokalypse aus Wassermangel, Migration, Wirtschaftskrisen*

*und Kriegen. Dabei ist die Bedeutung des Klimawandels für die Migrantenströme absolut nicht nachgewiesen.» (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022, p. 5)*

Towards the end of the article, it is implied that the Green Party despises anything to do with the economy and wants to enforce contentment in the population:

*«Die Grüne Partei verachtet alles, was mit wirtschaftlich-schöpferischem Antrieb zu tun hat, und will vor allem Genügsamkeit, Einschränkung, Gürtel eng schnallen.» (Mörgeli & Gygi, 2022, p. 5)*

#### **42. Grüne Früchte, braune Wurzeln (Koydl, 2022b)**

The article tries to group the perceived leftist ideology (environmentalism, wokeness, feminism, veganism, vaccination, attack on Christian values) and portray it as a form of Nazism. This extreme comparison helps invoke the notion that the leftist ideology is overtly evil and must be opposed. This is done by first appealing to Hitler's popularity as an indirect appeal to the popularity of the leftist ideology:

*«Gewöhnungsbedürftig mag der Führerkult samt «deutschem Gruss» gewesen sein. Aber nennenswerter Widerstand war nicht zu beobachten. Im Gegenteil: Hitler hätte jeden Popularitätswettbewerb gewonnen.» (Koydl, 2022b, p. 2)*

The “parallels” of Christian persecution under the nazi regime<sup>50</sup> and the advent of feminism<sup>51</sup> are used for comparison:

*«Wirklich überraschend sind die Parallelen zwischen der Nazi-Ideologie und dem links-grünen Vormundstaat moderner Prägung, die der Autor – vermutlich unabsichtlich – aufdeckt. Da ist etwa die Entchristlichung des Weihnachtsfestes. Die Nationalsozialisten wollten es germanisieren, heute sollen christliche Symbole geopfert werden, um Muslimen entgegenzukommen. Oder die politische Instrumentalisierung der Frau. Es waren die Nazis, die den Muttertag zu einem Feiertag machten, es war der rot-rot-grüne Senat in Berlin, der den Internationalen Frauentag für arbeitsfrei erklärte.» (Koydl, 2022b, pp. 2–3)*

Next vaccination mandates, veganism, and environmentalism (via recycling) are addressed:

*«Ominöse Echos klangen während der Corona-Pandemie an, als Impfen, Masken oder Quarantäne zur quasinationalen Pflicht erhoben wurden. Das unterschied sich nicht wesentlich von dem Nazi-Motto, dass Krankheit ein «Pflichtversäumnis» eines jeden Volksgenossen sei. Der Volksgesundheit im Dritten Reich dienten auch staatliche Ernährungsvorschriften, wie etwa der Erlass, in Betriebskantinen Rohkost auf die Speisekarte zu setzen – der veggie day lässt grüssen. Recycling hiess Wertstoffgewinnung und war schon damals keine*

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<sup>50</sup> Note that Nazism was overtly Christian in nature. Hitler appealed to Christianity as the primary reason behind his actions as stated in “Mein Kampf”. Additionally, the Nazi regime had very close ties to the Vatican. To state that Christians were prosecuted under Nazism is historic denial. But portraying it as such fits *Die Weltwoche*'s narrative. Further note that the leftist ideology is claimed to persecute Christians as a way to accommodate muslims. This claim should by itself be sufficient to portray the folly of this argument.

<sup>51</sup> Which mostly resulted from a lack of labour personal.

*Privatangelegenheit, sondern diene dem Wohl des Volkes. Heute nimmt man es eine Nummer grösser: Wir trennen Müll, um den Planeten zu retten.»* (Koydl, 2022b, p. 3)

Lastly, gender quotas in the workplace are connected to Hitler awarding leading position based on character rather than merit:

*«Dazu gehört auch, klaglos Mitbewerbern den Vortritt zu lassen, wenn es eine Quote verlangt. Wie aktuell tönen da Hitlers Worte: «Für die Besetzung von führenden Stellen in Staat und Partei ist die charakterliche Haltung höher zu werten als die nur wissenschaftliche oder vermeintliche geistige Eignung.»»* (Koydl, 2022b, p. 3)

#### **43. Hitzetage des Wetterpropheten (Mörgeli, 2022e)**

The primary goal of this article is to attack/discredit Thomas Bucheli (head of the editorial office for SRF Meteo). He is portrayed as a political activist, and it is alluded that he is confusing climate with weather. It is further implied that the climate ideology simply does not want people to enjoy summer as exemplified by the following statement:

*«Die Klimaideologen und Erwärmungspädagogen mögen es uns ganz einfach nicht gönnen, wenn wir sommerliche Kleidung tragen, einen Grillplausch veranstalten oder uns in der Badi vergnügen.»* (Mörgeli, 2022e, p. 2)

It is stated that the only thing worth taking seriously about this form of politicized climate alarmism is the fearmongering aspect behind it. It is then stated we should be glad that it is warm and not a glacial period:

*«Wetterfrösche quaken, aber sie machen das Wetter nicht. Ernstzunehmen ist bei dieser medialen Miesmacherei einzig die Tatsache, dass sie so viele Mitmenschen in Angstzustände versetzt und in die psychiatrischen Kliniken treibt. Dabei sollten wir uns freuen, dass das Schweizer Mittelland nicht mehr unter einer eisigen Gletscherdecke liegt wie noch vor 18 000 Jahren.»* (Mörgeli, 2022e, p. 2)

#### **44. Grüne Kernenergie – Natur und Landschaftsbild verdienen eine offene Debatte über Energietechnologien. (Bigler, 2022)**

Neutral article which appeals to the viability of nuclear energy as an environmentally friendly and compatible source.

#### **45. Warum stirbt der Verbrenner so leise? – Die EU stösst mit ihrer Klimapolitik auf so wenig Widerstand, dass etwas nicht stimmen kann. (Gygi, 2022s)**

The primary subject is the EU outlawing the production of new vehicles with internal combustion engines from 2035 onwards. This is received as a direct invasion of the free market that shuts down competition:

*«Aber die Parlamentarier trauen sich doch so viel Fachkenntnis zu Motoren und Klima zu, um definitiv zu sagen, der Verbrennungstyp sei derart schlecht für die Zukunft der Menschheit, dass er eliminiert werden müsse. Einen Wettbewerb zwischen Technologien, bei dem die*

besseren Lösungen gewinnen, lassen sie nicht zu. Also keine Technologieneutralität.» (Gygi, 2022s, p. 3)

**46. Klimapolitik an der Tankstelle –** Bürgerliche Ständeräte aus ländlichen Kantonen lassen ihre Wähler im Stich. Sie unternehmen nichts gegen die rasant steigenden Benzinpreise. (Mooser, 2022g)

The primary topic is the high fuel prices resulting from the war in Ukraine. Politicians are portrayed as uninterested in the common folk, willing to let them suffer. This is compared to the EU (which is typically the antagonist). Typically, Swiss policy is portrayed as under the influence of the EU however in this case, the EU did approach individuals through fuel pricing, whereas Swiss politicians are unwilling to do so, thus betraying their constituents:

*«Wenn die EU-Staaten gegen Russland Sanktionen ergreifen, vollzieht die Schweiz sogleich eine Kehrtwende ihrer bisherigen Neutralitätspolitik und zieht mit. Wenn es um die Aufnahme von ukrainischen Flüchtlingen geht, sind wir solidarisch mit den EU-Staaten, obwohl einige dieser Länder nicht einmal annähernd so viele Kriegsvertriebene aufnehmen wie wir. Nur wenn es um Benzinpreissenkungen geht, ist die EU für uns plötzlich nicht mehr massgebend.»* (Mooser, 2022g, p. 2)

**47. SRF verträgt den Sommer nicht** (Millius, 2022b)

The article addresses the SRF's coverage of the current heatwave through ridicule by claiming this to be a natural occurrence in summer:

*«Ja, es ist heiss, und das schon seit einigen Tagen. Das wenig bekannte Phänomen wird in Fachkreisen als «Sommer» bezeichnet.»* (Millius, 2022b, p. 1)

Later in the article CC is indirectly implied to be a tool for population control via association with the pandemic, which fits the narrative that the state wants to take complete control over individual's lives by stripping them of their liberties:

*«Die Frau vom Tropeninstitut packt ihr ganzes Fachwissen aus. Ihr Rat: «Viel trinken und die Hitze vom Körper fernhalten.» Eine Zertifikats-App, die den Wasserkonsum der Schweizerinnen und Schweizer kontrolliert, schlägt die Epidemiologin aber noch nicht vor.»* (Millius, 2022b, p. 2)

This is followed up by the implication that SRF Meteo has been delegated to push the CC agenda:

*«Die beste Massnahme gegen die Hitze wäre sowieso das Ende des Klimawandels. Dieses Dossier hat SRF bekanntlich an die Wetter-Redaktion delegiert.»* (Millius, 2022b)

**48. Grüsse aus der Zukunft –** Reisen wurde superbillig. (Eichenberger, 2022f)

This edition of «Grüsse aus der Zukunft» focuses on mobility and travel. It is stated that humanity realized that bicycles are inefficient and thus promoted electric bicycles. Those became faster and frequently came into collision with pedestrians. Once the accidents



became too common bipedal vehicles were outlawed and humanity turned to autonomous electric vehicles. Those could easily travel because the SBB realized trains would no longer be popular and converted the railway system into streets thus becoming the SSB (as alluded to in a previous “Grüsse aus der Zukunft”). Now everyone can travel as much as they want and as far as they want because the previous misplaced investments in expanding electric capabilities now resulted in such an oversaturation that the state pays its citizens to waste energy.

Note that once again no explanation is given of how this miraculous transition happened. It just did and now everything is perfect. If it fits the notion that the current Climate Policy is misdirected, explanations appear to be superfluous.

**49. Anders als gedacht – Halber Klimaschutz reicht** ([Reichmuth, 2022d](#))

The article claims that only half the environmental protection is required to stabilize the environment. It is implied that carbon sinks will take care of the rest. While the article acknowledges that scientists state that the absorption capacity of carbon sinks is limited and that this argument only holds if emissions do not exceed a yearly increase of 2.6 ppm, these counterarguments are mentioned but not addressed. The article concludes by stating that CO<sub>2</sub> is beneficial for plant growth and thus emissions are – if anything – desirable.

**50. Nachhaltigkeitskiller Velo – Viele glauben, dass ÖV und Fahrrad die Gesellschaft weniger belasten als das Auto. Tatsächlich ist es genau umgekehrt.**

The article utilizes data from the Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung which calculates yearly external costs by mobility type, with public transport (bus/tram) ranking the highest (0.3 billion CHF/y), followed by rail traffic and bicycles (bicycles show high external costs due to their proneness to accidents) (both 0.6 billion CHF/y) and finally cars (7.3 billion CHF/y). The author claims that those numbers do not adequately account for transport services and thus need to be re-evaluated. Without providing any methodology the author claims that the *real* ranking goes cars (7.3 billion CHF/y), then railways (24.5 billion CHF/y), then bicycles (40.6 billion CHF/y), and lastly bus/tram (50.1 billion CHF/y). Finally, the article concludes by stating that bicycles are even more harmful if drivers consume meat because the energy required for driving a bicycle then comes out of an ecologically harmful source. In summary, it is a bizarre article that seeks to claim that bicycles and busses/trams are the least environmentally friendly means of transportation.

**51. Wo Wetter plötzlich Klima ist – Die «Meteo»-Macher missbrauchen die beliebte TV-Sendung für politischen Aktivismus. Allen voran der Chef, Redaktionsleiter Thomas Bucheli.** ([Millius, 2022c](#))

The article covers SRF Meteo and specifically Thomas Bucheli and implies that they overtly politicize CC. The article is initiated by covering an event where activists let a balloon with the message “Heiss? Klimaschutz!” fly into view of the ongoing Meteo broadcast. Although it is

acknowledged that SRF Meteo distanced themselves from this occurrence, it is implied that this is contrived:

«SRF distanzierte sich umgehend von der Aktion der grünen Aktivisten. Die Sendung sei für eine politische Kampagne missbraucht worden. Die Aufregung wirkte gekünstelt. Denn die Sendung wird schon seit Jahren missbraucht – von ihren eigenen Moderatoren.» (Millius, 2022c, p. 2)

The notion that SRF Meteo is being misused to push the CC agenda is addressed by this statement:

«Vorläufiger Höhepunkt: Mitte Juni 2022 forderte Moderator Gaudenz Flury vor laufender Kamera die «Durchsetzung von griffigen Klimamassnahmen». Aber der politische Aktivismus beschränkt sich nicht auf «Meteo». Interviews, Vorträge, Online-Beiträge: Die Macher der Wettersendung lassen keine Gelegenheit aus, um vor dem Klimawandel zu warnen und für dessen Bekämpfung zu werben.» (Millius, 2022c, p. 2)

The article then lists multiple occasions where SRF moderators allude to the fact that CC is changing weather patterns. The dogmatic nature is alluded to by highlighting that debate around the topic is prohibited as seen in the following passage:

«In einem Beitrag der «Meteo-Stories» auf Srf.ch hiess es im Mai 2022, dass die Zahl der Hitzetage weiterhin steigen werde, aber «mit ausgeprägten Klimaschutzmassnahmen liesse sich die Zunahme deutlich eindämmen». Und Gaudenz Flury erklärte in der Schweizer Familie: «Den Klimawandel gibt es, und der ist menschengemacht. Punkt. Das ist wissenschaftlich bewiesen, darüber lässt sich nicht diskutieren.» Keine Diskussion. Punkt.» (Millius, 2022c, p. 3)

The article concludes by highlighting that SRF Meteo is financed by the state, thus implying that taxpayer money is being wasted on leftist propaganda and reiterating that divergent opinions are silenced:

«Das ist die Haltung des gebührenfinanzierten Senders. Der Stammtisch soll gefälligst schweigen, ebenso Wissenschaftler, die etwas anderes sagen – und die gibt es durchaus.» (Millius, 2022c, p. 4)

Finally, it is implied that the people dislike this manipulation of taxpayers by referencing Bucheli stating that most reclamations come in when CC is addressed in the broadcast. This however is implied to be a diversion tactic such that failed prognoses do not attract attention:

«Nicht alle Zuschauer finden diese politische Beeinflussung des zahlenden Publikums lustig. Laut Thomas Bucheli gibt es nie so viele Beschwerden, wie wenn in seiner Sendung der Klimawandel thematisiert wurde. Vielleicht ist das der wahre Grund für das politische Engagement von «SRF Meteo»: ein Ablenkungsmanöver von gelegentlichen Fehlprognosen.» (Millius, 2022c, p. 4)

**52. Europa trocknet aus** – Meldungen über Dürren häufen sich. Oft ist der Wassermangel menschengemacht, aber mit dem Klimawandel hat es nichts zu tun. (Müller-plath, 2022)

This article addresses the increase in droughts and water scarcity and questions whether this can be linked to anthropogenic CC:

*«Was steckt dahinter? Werden Böden in Europa tatsächlich immer trockener, Flüsse wasserärmer, Waldbrände häufiger? Wie weit ist es eine natürliche oder eine vom Menschen verursachte Entwicklung? Seit Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts scheinen sich Dürrejahre zu häufen: Als besonders heiss und trocken gelten in Mitteleuropa 2003, 2015, 2018. Ist das klimatisch ungewöhnlich, oder gab es das früher auch?»* (Müller-plath, 2022)

The connection is relativized by alluding to the historic drought of 1540 which is used to discredit an anthropogenic cause:

*«Die bislang wohl schlimmste Dürrekatastrophe Mitteleuropas seit Menschengedenken, welche die Geschehnisse des 21. Jahrhunderts bei weitem übertraf, ereignete sich 1540.»* (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 2)

*«Dass es 1540 ohne den künstlich verstärkten Treibhauseffekt zu einer noch schlimmeren Hitze gekommen sei, relativiere die Beurteilung des menschlichen Einflusses auf das Wetter 2003.»* (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 3)

This is followed up by a strawman argument that if anything droughts result from shifting precipitation patterns while failing to recognize that those too are tied to anthropogenic CC:

*«Umgekehrt ist es mit genügend Regen auch bei hoher Temperatur nie zu einer Dürre gekommen; man vergleiche mit den Tropen. Daher erscheint es schwer vorstellbar, dass ein Temperaturtrend allein ohne Niederschlagsveränderungen zu einem Dürretrend führen kann.»* (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 6)

The article concludes by claiming that anthropogenic CC cannot be linked to droughts and forest fires or changes in precipitation patterns:

*«Zusammengefasst unterstützt die Empirie nicht die allenthalben geäusserte Behauptung, Dürren und Waldbrände seien Folgen des anthropogenen Klimawandels.»* (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 7)

*«Die Analyse der europäischen Dürregeschichte und der Wetterdaten der letzten 150 Jahre zeigt, dass die menschengemachten CO<sub>2</sub>-Emissionen kaum zu solchen Ereignissen beitragen können. Es fällt nicht weniger Regen als früher und auch nicht anders verteilt.»* (Müller-plath, 2022, p. 8)

**53. Waschlappen für Waschlappen** – Politiker können noch so abstruse Energiespartipps geben, der gute Deutsche hinterfragt nicht. (Schunke, 2022y)

This article opens with a critique of energy-saving tips. This is used to establish the notion that the left believes each problem to be solvable through good-will and morals. Initially, this notion is tied to migration:

*«Und schon ist er da, der gute Deutsche, der Post-Nazi, der seine innere Katharsis durch die bedingungslose Aufnahme aller Migrationswilligen dieser Welt vollzogen hat und seither dem Glauben verfallen ist, dass sich jedes politische und gesellschaftliche Problem mit der «richtigen» Moral lösen liesse.»* (Schunke, 2022y, p. 2)

This is then followed up with an association to CC and corona measures which helps further the notion of “wokeness” as an overarching umbrella term for anything that the left wants and *Die Weltwoche* opposes:

*«So wurde aus dem Flüchtlingsfreund und Antirassisten der Klimajünger. Und aus diesem Klimajünger entpuppte sich der Corona-Massnahmen-Liebhaber. Wenn wir Deutschen eines können, dann, dass wir uns an Regeln halten – mögen sie noch so unsinnig sein. Der gute Bürger hinterfragt nicht.»* (Schunke, 2022y, p. 2)

Later, this perceived obedience to what is morally right is associated with Nazism which furthers the notion that the leftist agenda is inherently socialist:

*«Das Fleisssternchen wurde für Deutsche erfunden. Deshalb funktionierte das mit dem Faschismus auch besonders gut. Deshalb ist der Post-Nazi im Wesen gar nicht weit entfernt vom echten.»* (Schunke, 2022y, p. 3)

*«Endlich wieder etwas, womit man sich Fleisssternchen erarbeiten kann: Wer hat kürzer geduscht? Wer war so mutig, für Gesäss und Gesicht denselben Waschlappen zu verwenden? Wer hält es länger ohne Heizung aus? Und wer hat mehr Nachbarn aufgeschrieben, die noch nach 22 Uhr heiss geduscht haben?»* (Schunke, 2022y, p. 3)

The paper concludes by implying that migrants do not care for German morals, because, unlike Germans, they do not work but instead profit from taxpayers and thus do not have to abide by the same rules:

*«Die anderen, vor allem die neuen Deutschen aus Syrien und Co., interessieren sich indes weit weniger für die deutschen Moral-Meisterschaften. [...]. Zumindest in Deutschland, wo nur der ermahnt wird, der für seinen Lebensunterhalt und ein bisschen daraus resultierender Selbstbestimmung arbeiten geht.»* (Schunke, 2022y, p. 3)

**54. Sonne, Wind und Kerne** – Die Energiewende mit Atomausstieg wurde auf wissenschaftlich unsolider Grundlage beschlossen. Eine Neuorientierung der Politik ist dringlich. (Thess, 2022)

This article addresses the folly of the nuclear phase-out. It portrays it as unscientific and misguided following the reasoning that nuclear energy does not emit CO<sub>2</sub><sup>52</sup>. This is one of the

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<sup>52</sup> Note that this is a form of a strawman argument. While it is true that nuclear energy is favourable when looking at CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, this was not the reasoning behind nuclear phase out. Nuclear phase out was not initiated

few articles that talk positively about the IPCC reports and the EU's taxonomy system, likely because it reaffirms *Die Weltwoche's* stance on nuclear energy as the go-to energy source.

**55. Niedrigwasser bei der Tagesschau** – Der Wetterbericht stand früher für sachliche Information. Das ist Regen und Schnee von gestern. (Zimmermann, 2022e)

The article's primary focus is the occurrence of floods in Switzerland. It misconstrues the occurrence of floods as counterevidence for droughts and portrays this as an event deliberately suppressed by state- and mainstream media. The alleged reason behind it is that it does not fit the CC agenda and would expose the lack of foundation behind it. This is done by first addressing the *Tagesschau* (Swiss state media outlet) by implying that it is biased for not covering floods in the same extent as droughts:

*«Ich wollte mich also über das historische Hochwasser informieren. Ich schaltete dazu die «Tagesschau» ein. Über das historische Hochwasser vom letzten Freitag sendete die «Tagesschau» nicht eine Sekunde. Das war erstaunlich. Denn über den gegenteiligen Fall, über den ebenso seltenen Fall von Niedrigwasser, hatte sich die «Tagesschau» in den Tagen zuvor geradezu überschlagen. Sendung für Sendung präsentierte sie irgendwelche Flussbetten, die zu wenig Wasser führten.»* (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 2)

This is followed up by implying that state media actively suppresses the event, thus requiring the author to turn to the free press. The *Tages-Anzeiger* (Swiss newspaper with widest circulation<sup>53</sup>) is mentioned, however it too did not cover the flood, furthering the notion that both state and mainstream media cannot be trusted:

*«Gut, dachte ich, wenn der Staatsfunk wichtige News unterdrückt, dann informiere ich mich halt in der freien Presse. Ich wandte mich also an den Tages-Anzeiger, das grösste Blatt des Landes, um mich über das historische Hochwasser zu informieren. Über das historische Hochwasser schrieb der Tages-Anzeiger nicht eine Zeile.»* (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 2)

What has been implied is now stated clearly; the reason for the lack of coverage is the left/green ideology that has infected the *Tages-Anzeiger* (and likely other media outlets):

*«Es ist klar, woher die eklatanten journalistischen Fehlleistungen rühren. Die Fehlleistungen sind ideologisch unterfüttert. Auf den Redaktionen von «Tagesschau» und Tages-Anzeiger arbeiten zu 70 Prozent oder mehr links-grüne Journalisten. Das merkt man.»* (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 3)

This is explained through the strawman argument that droughts fit the CC narrative, whereas floods do not. As comparison it is stated that the largest floods in recent history (in Switzerland) occurred in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and yet no one blamed CC at the time:

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because people disliked the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. I wholeheartedly agree that the nuclear phase out was a step in the wrong direction, however by misrepresenting the reasoning behind it, the argument brought forth by climate activists is actively manipulated and serves to portray them as unknowledgable/ignorant.

<sup>53</sup> Excluding free newspapers like *20Minuten* or *Blick*.

«Flüsse mit Niedrigwasser stützen die Weltsicht, wonach der überbordende Kapitalismus die Welt in die Klimakrise gestürzt und dies nun nur mit zentralstaatlicher Verbotspolitik korrigiert werden kann. Darum sind Flüsse mit Niedrigwasser ein Hammerthema, das hochgeschraubt werden muss.

Flüsse mit Hochwasser hingegen sind ideologisch störend, weil sie sich der Theorie entziehen, wonach die Erde systematisch verdorrt, und stattdessen zeigen, dass die Natur halt gelegentlich Kapriolen macht. Die drei schlimmsten Hochwasserkatastrophen der Neuzeit erlebte die Schweiz im 19. Jahrhundert. Damals schrieb kein Journalist von Klimawandel.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 3)

The article then disproves its implications by acknowledging that other media outlets did cover the flooding events (NZZ, Blick, TeleZüri, St. Galler Tagblatt, 10 vor 10). This however is construed in a manner to imply the severity of ideological journalism at the *Tages-Anzeiger*:

«Dass zu den ideologischen Ausreißern die «Tagesschau» gehört, ist wenig überraschend. Es ist ein gutes Beispiel dafür, wie die Informationspflicht, der sie unterliegt, für die Redaktion allzu oft nur noch lästig ist.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 3)

This line of reasoning is further strengthened by implying that CC has turned the weather forecast political instead of factual:

«Es zeigt sich darin auch ein grundlegender Trend: Das Wetter und der Wetterbericht wandelten sich im Journalismus von einem Thema zu einer Thematik. Mit dem Klimawandel wurde die nüchterne Perspektive abgelöst durch die politische Optik.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 3)

This is reiterated for the state-run SRF Meteo weather broadcast, which is accused of political activism and “cheap leftist propaganda”. The last sentence of the article however states that it is by no means cheap, implying that this state-run and thus tax-financed propaganda tool wastes the salary of twenty people for a mere three-minute broadcast:

«Zuletzt etwa forderte «Meteo»-Moderator Gaudenz Flury in der Sendung die «Durchsetzung von griffigen Klimamassnahmen». SVP-Nationalrat Christian Imark nahm die Steilvorlage natürlich sofort an. Es handle sich um «billige, linke Propaganda des Staatsfernsehens». In einem Punkt hatte Imark unrecht: Billig ist das nicht. Für drei, dreieinhalb Minuten «Meteo» arbeiten zwanzig Leute.» (Zimmermann, 2022e, p. 4)

## 56. Grüsse aus der Zukunft – Kaiser ohne Kleider (Eichenberger, 2022a)

This edition of «Grüsse aus der Zukunft» addresses different energy sources. Nuclear power is the primary energy source, accompanied by solar energy. Wind turbines were outlawed for environmental reasons and oil/gas are still in use. This shift towards energy abundance occurred after 2023. It is stated that historians still wonder how scientists were so misinformed in their climate policy prioritization:

«Der erste Anlauf zur Energiewende scheiterte hingegen kläglich und gilt heute als Lehrstück des Politikversagens. Die Forschung rätselt noch immer, wie so viele kluge Leute so falsch liegen konnten.» (Eichenberger, 2022a, p. 2)

Once again, the transformation of SBB to SSB is mentioned and used to help explain the shift toward energy abundance by clarifying that people opened their eyes and realized that trains and the railway system were the main problems for ecology. This “disillusion” is framed as the famous story of the emperor without clothes, which pushes the narrative that people before 2023 knew that climate policy was not going to work, but out of social repercussions were too afraid to stand by that.

**57. Flatterstrom – Was taugt Fotovoltaik? Die Winterlücke wird verdreifacht.** (Schlumpf, 2022)

This article covers the utilization of wind and solar energy to solve Switzerland's energy needs. It implies that even if implemented there would be less energy overall. The calculations provided are correct, so long as one assumes that the entire energy provided by nuclear plantations were to be exchanged for wind and solar plantations, thus misconstruing the notion of these projects whose primary aim is not to become the sole energy source overnight but to serve as supporting sources that are to be expanded over decades until they are viable for taking over as primary energy sources.

**58. Energie für viele Generationen – Die Kombination von erneuerbaren Energieformen wie Solar und Wind mit Kernkraft wäre ideal. Wenn neue Reaktortypen zum Zuge kommen, kann mit Atomkraft eine zuverlässige Versorgung auf extrem lange Zeit hinaus sichergestellt werden.** (Prasser, 2022a)

A lengthy article that makes a good case for nuclear energy as the primary energy source which could then be supported by alternative energy sources. Fair arguments are given and no manipulative language is used.

**59. Anders als gedacht – Eisbärenklima** (Reichmuth, 2022c)

The article covers a newly found polar bear population on glaciers in south-eastern Greenland. It implies that polar bears are more adaptable to the changing climate and that their usage as that their classification as vulnerable to CC is exaggerated. The primary line of reasoning behind it is that the estimated population has been on the rise since the 1970s. While the article acknowledges both the outlawing of hunting practices on both polar bears and their prey as well as acknowledging that the glaciers are already at a capacity as a habitat for polar bears, it still concludes by stating that the claims of endangerment are to be taken with caution because the polar bears have been around for millennia:

«Wie auch immer: Die Warnungen von Umweltschützern und vielen Forschern vor einem baldigen Aussterben der Eisbären sind mit Vorsicht zu genießen. Immerhin existiert die Tierart seit über 100 000 Jahren und hat manche Warmzeit überlebt, in der es wohl wenig bis kein Sommermeereis in der Arktis gab. Die Meldung über die vorgefundene Population in

*Südostgrönland zeigt, dass Eisbären offenbar viel anpassungsfähiger sind, als man gemeinhin glaubte.» (Reichmuth, 2022c, p. 3)*

**60. Die eherne Klimaregel – Roger Pielke und die wahren Kräfte in der Umweltpolitik (Gygi, 2022d)**

The article addresses the climate policies that focus on decarbonization and makes some fair arguments on the non-viability from an economic perspective. However, the argument revolves exclusively around the economy and furthers the notion that if one must choose between economy and ecology, the economy is to be prioritized<sup>54</sup>.

**61. Die dunkle Seite der Sonnenenergie – Klimapolitiker loben Fotovoltaik und Windräder als saubere Alternative zu fossilen Rohstoffen. Doch Produktion und Entsorgung bringen neue Probleme. (Heumann, 2022a)**

This article addresses the disposal of solar panels and wind turbines and uses this to establish the notion that Solar and Wind energy is thus bad for the environment. While some fair arguments are raised, especially regarding the real problem of proper disposal, this is only compared to nuclear power and fails to address fossil fuels and their ecological impact. The problems of disposal are portrayed as willingly ignored by “climate politicians”.

**62. Wie der Islam aus dem Klima kam – Im 6. Jahrhundert wurde der Süden der Arabischen Halbinsel von einer Dürre heimgesucht. Das erst ermöglichte den Durchbruch einer neuen Religion, wie Basler Forscher nun zeigen. (Heumann, 2022b)**

This article covers the emergence and spread of Islam and ties it to droughts in the 6<sup>th</sup> century. Admittedly I might be grasping at straws with my interpretation, but it seems that between the lines this line of reasoning does multiple things. Firstly, it pushes the notion that radical ideological shifts are facilitated through climatic events such as droughts. This can be adapted to the perceived ideological leftist/green movement of the 21<sup>st</sup> century which delegitimizes it as an exaggerated shift due to naturally occurring phenomena (given that the 6<sup>th</sup> century was not affected by anthropogenic CC). Further, given the arguably Islamophobic nature of *Die Weltwoche*, this parallel inspires opposition to the leftist/green agenda through association with Islam.

**63. «Meteo» trotz widrigem Wetter – Kurt W. Zimmermann kritisierte kürzlich «Meteo». Leider war schon der erste Satz seines Texts kreuzfalsch. (Bucheli, 2022)**

This article was written by Thomas Bucheli in response to Kurt W. Zimmermann’s misrepresentation of SRF Meteo (Zimmermann, 2022e). It corrects numerous mistakes and fallacies stated in Zimmermann’s article. However, this article is relevant for other reasons:

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<sup>54</sup> Note that this is not wrong per se. Economic viability is of utmost importance in our predominantly capitalistic world and should not be brushed aside. However, choosing to focus exclusively on the economy and not address any of the reasons behind why decarbonization is desirable fails to portray an accurate picture. No one wants decarbonization because of economic viability, but because of the impact the fossil fuel industry has on the climate. Thus, this isolated argumentative strand misconstrues the argument for decarbonization by looking at the notion through an exclusively economic lens.



First is the portrayal of *Die Weltwoche* as a fair magazine that corrects its mistakes and lets counter opinions be stated. Second is the effect this has, which is none. The article is received overwhelmingly negatively and 43/44 comments below the article critique/attack Bucheli, ranging from mild accusations such as “acknowledging” that he is a good actor, to plentiful ad hominem and claims of pushing leftist propaganda. The sole comment that acknowledges the legitimacy of Bucheli's counterargument has a 1:12 like to dislike ratio. This shows that even if *Die Weltwoche* misrepresents perceived “enemies” such as Thomas Bucheli, and even if he gets to point out the fallacies committed, this does not resonate with *Die Weltwoche*'s readership.

#### **64. Übertreiber und Untertreiber (Mörgeli, 2022g)**

The article addresses the perceived alarmism associated with CC. One of the arguments addressed is the decline in glacier volume. The author claims that this is all natural and has been occurring throughout the last millennia, which is a great showcase of how *Die Weltwoche* utilizes half-truths to sustain their arguments. No mention is made of the increased decline rate, the decreased accumulation rate, or the temporal lag present in glacier decline:

*«Der Rückgang der Gletscher dient als Beweis für die menschengemachte Klimaerwärmung. Dabei waren die Gletscher in der Hälfte der letzten 10000 Jahre kürzer als heute. Und die Alpen waren mehrheitlich grüner, als sie es heute sind.» (Mörgeli, 2022g, p. 2)*

Another argument addressed is that the current extraordinary heat is nothing special, by referring to the state of the earth over two billion years ago:

*«Noch nie sei es so unerträglich heiss gewesen, fantasieren die Journalisten. Dabei hätte man sich in der ersten Hälfte des Erdzeitalters beim Baden in einem Ozean mit 70 Grad Celsius verbrüht.» (Mörgeli, 2022g, p. 2)*

The article concludes by portraying the climate council as soothsayers but implies that their “prophecies” are not going to come true.

#### **65. Klimainvestition gegen die Bauern – Denkt der Vermögensverwalter Blackrock zu viel an sich und zu wenig an die Rendite? (Gygi, 2022m)**

This article is another case of pitting ecology against the economy. The opposition to Climate policy, stemming from asset management is introduced. Asset management is portrayed as a branch that properly calculates and experiences costs firsthand which indirectly implies that this is not the case for proponents of Climate policy:

*«Der Widerstand kommt von einer Branche, in der man genau rechnet und wo man Kosten und Erträge meist am eigenen Leib spürt: von der Vermögensverwaltung.» (Gygi, 2022m, p. 2)*

The article goes on to imply that in Switzerland pension funds are at the mercy of the UN and the EU's taxonomy. However, Switzerland lacks the strong-willed lawyers required to oppose such scrutiny:

*«Ist es in der Schweiz anders? Kaum, auch hier sind Pensionskassen und Betreuer schon im Korsett von Vorschriften zum «grünen Investieren», unter dem Einfluss der Uno und vor allem auch der Taxonomie der EU. [...]. Leider fehlen Staatsanwälte wie die amerikanischen, die eine harte Gegenwehr aufbauen.» (Gygi, 2022m, p. 4)*

**66. Angriff auf Natur und Demokratie** – Energiepolitik auf Abwegen: Mit erschreckender Selbstverständlichkeit und horrendem Tempo hat das Parlament den Landschaftsschutz und die Mitspracherechte der Bevölkerung ausgehebelt. (V. Weber, 2022)

The article covers the building of photovoltaic plantations in the Alps and portrays the prioritization of this project as harmful and ignorant. The article is introduced by stating that Swiss nature and landscape conservation are being sacrificed at the altar of climate protection. This phrasing not only implies the notion that the CC agenda is harmful to the environment but also furthers the notion that the CC agenda is a quasi-religious ideology:

*«Da wurden kurzerhand der Natur- und Landschaftsschutz sowie die Schweizer Alpen auf dem Altar der Energieversorgung und des Klimaschutzes geopfert.» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 2)*

The opposition to the project is further intensified by an appeal to nationalism by playing with imagery associated with the Swiss national hymn which can serve to intensify the animosity toward the CC agenda:

*«Der in der Nationalhymne besungene Alpenfirn soll sich in Zukunft nicht mehr röten, sondern im Strahlenmeer der Solarpanels ertrinken. Betet, freie Schweizer, betet!» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 2)*

The notion that fearmongering is used as a tool to establish the agenda is stated:

*«Angst und Panik zu schüren, hat sich als wirkungsvolle Methode etabliert, um dem Volk «aussergewöhnliche» Massnahmen «beliebt» zu machen.» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 2)*

This is followed up by implying that the situation is going to get worse because the timing of the advancement was strategically placed to avoid scrutiny. This statement is further clad in a dose of patriotism and the implication of destroying our most pristine environments:

*«Und dies ist erst der Anfang, denn in der Wintersession soll ein weiteres dringliches Gesetz «zur Beschleunigung von fortgeschrittenen Windparks und von grossen Vorhaben der Speicherwasserkraft» verabschiedet werden. Das ganze Vorgehen ist derart gut inszeniert, dass Medien wenig kritisch die Absicht des Bundesrates und des Parlaments flankieren, Tausende von Sonnenkollektoren und Windrädern in unseren schönsten Landschaften zu installieren.» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 2)*

While stomping out democratic procedures at a rapid pace which will lead to the destruction of our landscapes:

«Im Expresstempo wurden die üblichen demokratischen Prozesse in Grund und Boden gefahren.» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 3)

«Nachdem der Rechtsstaat unterlaufen und die direkte Demokratie demontiert wurde, befiehlt das Parlament den uneingeschränkten Angriff auf unsere (noch) intakte Natur und unsere wertvollen Landschaften, auf die wir viel dringender angewiesen sind als auf einen zufälligen Zusatz von elektrischem Strom.» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 3)

An additional appeal to emotion and nationalism is used to further cement the opposition to the project:

«Zudem brauchen wir Räume mit unberührter Natur für unsere Gesundheit und unser seelisches Gleichgewicht. In unserer zunehmend verstädterten Welt gewinnt der Erholungswert der Natur an Bedeutung, sie wird als Urlaubsziel, für Sonntagsausflüge oder zum Wandern gesucht und ist Teil unserer Identität. Die bereits erwähnte Schweizer Nationalhymne besingt die «Schönheiten des Vaterlandes, die zur ergriffenen Seele sprechen»» (V. Weber, 2022, p. 4)

Interestingly this article addresses the idea of utilizing existing infrastructure (like rooftops) to expand photovoltaic panels in a positive light. This is something Simmonetta Sommaruga has long advocated for and *Die Weltwoche* has ridiculed on numerous occasions.

**67. Was tut der Wind, wenn er nicht weht?** – Die Propaganda für die Windenergie unternimmt alles, um die Flauten zu verstecken. (Gygi, 2022t)

This article covers Wind energy and states that it is being pushed through propaganda as already implied in the subtitle. Gygi claims that the usage of average energy generated does not portray an accurate picture. For this, he uses his own calculations which admittedly confused me to the point that I'm still uncertain of what to do with them. Gygi offers the example of different capacities reached each day throughout a week and includes a day where no wind blew, i.e. zero energy was generated. Then he multiplies the values and gets zero due to multiplication and uses this for proof that wind turbines don't generate energy. By my estimation, there are three possible explanations. First is that Gygi doesn't understand his own metaphor which seems unlikely given that he is the one stating it. The second is that Gygi does not understand how math works and does not see that if there is no wind on one day of the week, that does not mean that the plantation didn't generate any energy throughout the week. This however also seems like a train of thought so utterly wrong that it is unlikely anyone would conclude that. This leads to the third and most likely explanation: Gygi is consciously manipulative and willfully misrepresenting the situation:

«Multiplizieren Sie die Zahlen (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,0) der Reihe nach miteinander:  $1 \times 2 \times 3 \dots$  Was erhalten Sie? Führt man dies so aus, ist man bei der 9 auf 362 880, dann die letzte Stufe: Multiplikation mit 0 – das heisst, der Schlusswert ist null. [...] Am 5. Januar bringt die Windanlage 80 Prozent der möglichen Leistung, am 6. Januar 90 Prozent, am 7. Januar 20 Prozent. Am 8. Januar 0 Prozent. Tags darauf 60 Prozent. Super! Im Durchschnitt 50 Prozent

*des Maximums. Windkraft kann was! Nein, eben nicht, sie hat einen Nuller in der Reihe.» (Gygi, 2022t, p. 2)*

**68. Propaganda Maschine ETH** – Professoren missbrauchen das Prestige der Spitzenhochschule zur politischen Einflussnahme. Die Tendenz geht zu Rot-Grün. (Mooser, 2022k)

This is a lengthy article whose primary focus lies in discrediting th ETH by portraying them as political operatives willing to spread propaganda and take the country hostage to gratify personal disappointments:

*«Gehört es zum Lehr- und Forschungsauftrag dieser Hochschulen, auch die Richtung für die EU-Politik vorzugeben? Die ETH Zürich scheint auf Abwege geraten zu sein. Schon länger nutzen Professoren dreist das Image und Prestige dieser Schule für politische Einflussnahme. Wie statthaft ist es, ein ganzes Land in Geiselhaft zu nehmen, damit ein paar Wissenschaftler sich besser fühlen?» (Mooser, 2022k)*

This train of thought continues paired with the lie that unlike Switzerland the EU has no highranking universities:

*«Die ETH nehme niemanden in Geiselhaft, wehrt sich eine Sprecherin auf Anfrage. Aber man dürfe sich zu Debatten äussern, die den Lehr- und Forschungsauftrag gefährdeten. Nun lässt sich darüber streiten, ob eine Nichtteilnahme am EU-Forschungsprogramm tatsächlich Lehre und Forschung hierzulande gefährdet. Jedenfalls gibt es keine Universität in der EU, die zur obersten Weltklasse zählt.» (Mooser, 2022k, p. 2)*

It is further implied that the ETH actively manipulates members of parliament and adds that this only finds tractions amongst SP, Grüne and glp, the three parties *Die Weltwoche* most opposes. Through this a link is established that implies that the educational elite is cooperating with the political elite to further an agenda which is perceived as harmful for the people:

*«Solche Ausführungen belegen aber vor allem eines: dass die ETH die Parlamentarier offenbar systematisch und erfolgreich bearbeitet. Das war wohl auch die Absicht Hengartners, als er die Brüssel-Visite nutzte, um Politiker der Bildungskommission des Nationalrates (WBK), die ebenfalls in die belgische Hauptstadt gereist waren, zu einem Gespräch einzuladen. Aber ausser Kommissionspräsident Fabien Fivaz (Grüne), der SP-Nationalrätin Valérie Piller Carrard und dem Grünliberalen Thomas Brunner zeigte niemand Interesse daran.» (Mooser, 2022k, p. 3)*

This notion is reiterated and strengthened by an appeal to the ivory tower:

*«Die Einmischung der Hochschule in die Politik geht aber längst über das europapolitische Engagement hinaus. Sie wird zunehmend zu einer Propagandamaschine für den rot-grünen Mainstream. Mit dem Klimawandel und der Corona-Pandemie sei die Stimme aus dem Elfenbeinturm der Universitäten so laut geworden wie seit den sechziger Jahren nicht mehr» (Mooser, 2022k, p. 3)*

As another example of political activism from the ETH the Trinkwasserinitiative<sup>55</sup> is used. It is implied that the scientist were very vocal in support of the initiative but haven't been heard from again since the initiative failed at the urn:

«So trat damals die Wasserforschungsanstalt der ETH, die Eawag, mit der These an die Öffentlichkeit, der Einsatz von Pestiziden in der Landwirtschaft gefährde die Wasserqualität in der Schweiz. «Negative Effekte auf Fortpflanzung, Entwicklung und Gesundheit von Pflanzen, Tieren und Mikroorganismen müssen befürchtet werden», war in einem Eawag-Faktenblatt zu lesen. Es gab etliche Stellungnahmen von ETH-Forschern in dieser Richtung, die unter dem Titel Wissenschaft für die Trinkwasserinitiative und die Pestizidinitiative trommelten. Besonders die Landwirte bekamen ihr Fett ab. Trotzdem wurden die Initiativen im Juni 2021 dann mit über 60 Prozent der Stimmen an der Urne verworfen. «Seither haben wir nichts mehr gehört über die angeblich schlechte Qualität des Trinkwassers»» (Mooser, 2022k, p. 4)

The missed prognosis for the spread of Corona is mentioned and associated with the CC movement seeking to discredit the accuracy of climate models. Religious vocabulary is used to further the notion of a quasi-religious ideology while also implying that the scientists want to garner a position of higher influence/power:

*«Obwohl sich in der Pandemie zeigte, wie weit die Modellbauer selbst bei kurzfristigen Prognosen danebenliegen können, wollen nun die ETH-Klimapropheten unter Führung ihres Medienstars Reto Knutti voraussagen, wie die klimatischen Verhältnisse auf der Erde in fünfzig Jahren sein werden. Knutti trat in jüngerer Zeit mehr als Klimaaktivist auf und weniger als Klimaforscher. Trotz seines Daueralarms fiel die Abstimmung übers CO<sub>2</sub>-Gesetz im Juni 2021 aber gegen ihn aus. Nun fordert er eine Klima-Task-Force, die den Bundesrat in Klimafragen beraten soll – wohl auch, um direkt auf Entscheide Einfluss nehmen zu können.»* (Mooser, 2022k, p. 5)

The article concludes by implying that ETH researchers are using fearmongering/soothsaying tactics to further their agenda by getting media on their side. This allows them to circumvent democratic processes and dictate how people have to heat their homes and drive their car, furthering the notion of a hierarchical divide where the elite (academic and political) dictate the lives of the common folk:

*«Derzeit sind die ETH-Glaziologen mit ihren Weltuntergangsszenarien hoch im Kurs, etwa Matthias Huss. Sie machen in den Medien Stimmung, um die Debatte über die Gletscherinitiative und einen Gegenvorschlag in die Richtung ihrer eigenen Forschung zu lenken. Unter dem Eindruck eines Medien-Bombardements über schwindende Gletscher und Wasserreserven hat das Parlament nun einen Gegenvorschlag gezimert, der faktisch die Umsetzung der Initiative ohne Abstimmung bedeutet. Finanziert wird die Forschung zu Klima und Gletscherschmelze mit beträchtlichen Geldmitteln aus Forschungsprogrammen wie*

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<sup>55</sup> See <https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/abstimmungen/20210613/volksinitiative-fur-sauberes-trinkwasser-und-gesunde-nahrung.html>

Horizon. Die Forscher liefern daraus die Ergebnisse, aufgrund deren die Regierung dem Volk dann vorschreiben kann, wie man heizen und Auto fahren soll.» (Mooser, 2022k, p. 5)

#### 69. Versuch und Irrtum – Klima am Schreibtisch (Gygi, 2022n)

The article covers how intrusive CC has become by stating that banks, asset management, insurance and advisory companies are under the heel of climate policy:

«Alles in allem sind Banken, Vermögensverwalter, Versicherungs- und Beratungsunternehmen in Kooperation mit Soft Law und Regulatoren zu einem privat-staatlichen Kraftwerk der Klimapolitik geworden.» (Gygi, 2022n, p. 2)

The article concludes by implying that climate alarmism has taken hold of banking as seen in the following statement:

##### «Klimaalarm im Bankgeschäft

Wie schwierig es ist, in der Finanzbranche Meinungsvielfalt zu bewahren, zeigte die Financial Times-Konferenz «Moral Money Summit Europe» im Mai. Stuart Kirk, Vertreter der Bank HSBC, referierte zu: «Warum Investoren sich keine Sorgen machen müssen über Klimarisiken». Er stellte in Frage, dass sich Finanzfirmen ums Klima kümmern müssten, und kritisierte die Vorrednerin Sharon Thorne von der Firma Deloitte wegen ihrer Behauptungen zu Weltuntergang und Klimakatastrophe. Die Menschheit habe es immer wieder geschafft, sich anzupassen. Thorne, bekannt für ihren dramatischen Klima-Alarmismus, wirkt noch bei Deloitte, Kirk dagegen ist bei HSBC weg.» (Gygi, 2022n, p. 3)

#### 70. Grüsse aus der Zukunft – Grosses Aufatmen (Eichenberger, 2022c)

This edition of «Grüsse aus der Zukunft» again covers the major transition in climate policy which occurs in 2022/23. The Swiss people have finally realized that oil-based generators in personal households, paired with nuclear energy will fix all problems:

«Es wurde klar, dass die beste Absicherung gegen Strom- und Gasausfall ganz simpel ist: ölbetriebene Stromgeneratoren.» (Eichenberger, 2022c, p. 2)

«Schliesslich hat sich mit dem Winter 2022/23 auch die Einstellung zum Klimawandel grundlegend gewandelt. Viele Bürger verstanden, dass die damalige Schweizer Klimapolitik extrem teuer war, aber dem Klima nur wenig brachte.» (Eichenberger, 2022c, p. 2)

They started accounting for migrants who increase energy consumption<sup>56</sup>.

«(...) so dass die Zuwanderung die Emissionsreduktionsanstrengungen nicht mehr unterließ» (Eichenberger, 2022c, p. 3)

The opposition to wind turbines is presented as the natural consequence given the Swiss setting as explained by the following segment:

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<sup>56</sup> It is unclear whether this changed calculations or whether migration was forbidden in the name of environmentalism.

*«In der windarmen, dichtbesiedelten und reichen Schweiz mit hoher Zahlungsbereitschaft für schöne Landschaft und gute Gesundheit, da, wo die Abwesenheit von Dauerlärm und Dauerbelastung durch Rotation wertvoll ist, da waren Windräder einfach hochsubventionierter, totaler gesellschaftlicher Unsinn.»* (Eichenberger, 2022c, p. 2)

The article concludes by stating that temperatures never exceeded those from 2022 and suddenly there were no more problems for the future:

*«Da aber die erwartete Erwärmung im Bereich derjenigen der Zeit von 1870 bis 2022 mit in der Schweiz bekanntlich 2,1 Grad blieb und diese damals kaum als Problem gesehen wurde, war vielen plötzlich unklar, was eigentlich in Zukunft das Problem ist.»* (Eichenberger, 2022c, p. 3)

**71. Fliegen hilft dem Klima** – Viele tun so, als ob Klimaschutz eine Sache der richtigen Moral sei. Das führt in die Irre, der Mensch funktioniert nach wirtschaftlichen Überlegungen. (Hank, 2022)

This article implies that the notion that flying is bad for the environment is false. Because of emission trading/carbon offsetting flying has no effect – or even is beneficial – for the environment. As the subtitle implies the notion that climate protection is the moral thing to do is discredited.

*«Der einzelne Flug ändert Europas CO2-Emissionen nicht, ist somit klimaneutral. Wenn Unternehmen für Flüge ihrer Mitarbeiter dann zusätzlich (nicht selten problematische) Ausgleichszahlungen zum Beispiel zur Aufforstung des Regenwaldes leisten, dann erwächst dadurch sogar ein echter Vorteil für das Klima. Fazit: «Aus Klimagründen sollte man anordnen, auf Zugreisen zu verzichten, und mehr mit dem Flugzeug zu reisen.»»* (Hank, 2022, p. 5)

**72. Mit Klimapolitik gegen Putin** – Europa kann den Weg aus dem Ukraine-Konflikt vorspüren. Ein kurzer, harter Sanktionsschlag würde Russlands Krieg die Grundlagen entziehen. (Blum, 2022)

The article states that we should utilize the economy and a shift in our energy sources to help combat the reliance on Russian Oil. The article is received overwhelmingly negatively (approx. 1:6 like:dislike ratio). All of the 114 comments express opposition of varying severity to the narrative of the article. The comments range from mere expressions of dislike to equating the Author with Joseph Goebbels.

**73. Apokalypse im Museum** - Klimaaktivisten beschädigen Kulturschätze. Warum tun sie das? Aus Frustration über sich selbst und aus Langeweile. (Shellenberger, 2022a)

This is one of the most noteworthy articles in the analyzed corpus. Its primary focus is the climate activists who throw paint over important works of art. However, the narrative quickly shifts to equate climate activists/leftists to Nazism.

The introduction of the article is dedicated to portraying climate activists as egotistical and disillusioned. This accumulates by equating them to social nihilism/social Darwinism, following an apocalyptic religion of climate fanaticism informed by elite institutions (universities):

*«In einer Reihe von Artikeln habe ich kürzlich argumentiert, dass hinter dem Klimafanatismus und dem Narzissmus eine apokalyptische Religion stecke, die aus dem Nihilismus geboren wurde. Die Macht der Wissenschaft, Erklärungen zu liefern zum Platz des Menschen im Universum (etwa mit Blick auf Urknall, Evolution durch natürliche Auslese), hat dazu geführt, dass in den Elite-Institutionen der Gesellschaft seit über hundert Jahren die Auffassung vorherrscht, dass das menschliche Leben keinen inhärenten Sinn oder Zweck habe. Das ist Nihilismus. Wir sind nur Tiere wie alle anderen auch.»* (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 3)

*«Diese deprimierende Geschichte führte dazu, dass die angeblich säkulare Elite, die an Universitäten ausgebildet und indoktriniert wird, die den Nihilismus als nicht hinterfragbares wissenschaftliches Evangelium lehren, dazu gebracht wurde, eine neue apokalyptische Religion – die der Klimakatastrophe – zu schaffen, und zwar in aller Vollständigkeit, mit einem neuen Opfergott (Natur), einem neuen Grund für Schuld (Sünden gegen die Natur) und einem Weg zur Erlösung (erneuerbare Energien und Niedrigenergie-Lebensweise). Sie und die breiter ausgerichtete Woke-Religion haben in der Zeit seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg von Denkern wie Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Malthus und Michel Foucault einigen intellektuellen Ballast erhalten.»* (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 3)

It is stated that this however is insufficient to portray the reasoning behind the fanaticism and thus raises the question of what inspires it and how it can be opposed:

*«Wer genau sind die Klimafanatiker? Und wie kann ihre Macht über das kulturelle und politische Leben des Westens verringert werden?»* (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 4)

For an answer to this question, the author turns to Eric Hoffer's "The True Believer", a book that covers communism and Nazism. The author states how many parallels can be drawn between Nazism/communism, modern climate fanaticism, and the woke craze:

*«Hoffer befasste sich hauptsächlich mit Nazis und Kommunisten, aber seine Beobachtungen sind unglaublich frisch und relevant. Ich habe den grössten Teil des Buches in einem einzigen Durchgang verschlungen, viele Sätze unterstrichen und mir zugerufen: «Ja! Das ist es!», als ich mir vergegenwärtigte, wie gut dies gerade auch den Klima-Fanatismus und den Woke-Wahn im weiteren Sinne beschreibt.»* (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 4)

This notion is further cemented via an indirect association with social studies and arts which are perceived as fundamental to the current leftists while claiming that fanaticism is born out of the frustration of the untalented:

*«Hoffer argumentiert, dass Fanatismus aus persönlicher Frustration geboren wird. Fanatiker sind Menschen mit mehr Ehrgeiz als Talent. Hoffer bemerkt: «Die meisten Nazi-Größen hatten künstlerische und literarische Ambitionen, die sie nicht verwirklichen konnten. Hitler versuchte sich in Malerei und Architektur, Goebbels in Drama, Roman und Dichtkunst, Rosenberg in*



*Architektur und Philosophie, von Schirach in Dichtkunst, Funk in Musik und Streicher in Malerei. Fast alle sind gescheitert, nicht nur nach dem üblichen ordinären Erfolgskriterium, sondern auch nach ihren eigenen künstlerischen Kriterien.»» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 4)*

The notion that the CC/leftist agenda is religious zealotry is stated as follows:

*«Alle Massenbewegungen seien religiöse Bewegungen, sagt Hoffer. Sowohl das Hakenkreuz als auch Hammer und Sichel sind Versionen des Kreuzes. «Das Zeremoniell der Aufmärsche ist wie das Zeremoniell einer religiösen Prozession.» Solche Bewegungen sind nicht nur religiös, sie können auch nationalistisch oder kommunistisch sein. Aber es sind Bewegungen, die ihren wahren Gläubigen das Gefühl der Unsterblichkeit vermitteln. Heute können wir solche religiösen Rituale in dem von «Black Lives Matter»-Aktivisten geförderten Niederknien sehen, auch (oder gerade) an säkularen Orten wie der übermässig woken Ausflugsinsel Martha's Vineyard.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 5)*

It is further implied that this fanaticism results from the boredom of elites who have no meaning in their lives because they don't pursue any meaningful labor. Prinz Harry and Meghan Markle are used as examples which further the notion of disassociation between *them* and *us*:

*«Bei den ersten Fanatikern handle es sich oft eher um gelangweilte Eliten als um ausgebeutete oder unterdrückte Opfer, schreibt Hoffer. Aber dies ist eine «Langeweile» der Nihilisten. «Das Bewusstsein einer öden, sinnlosen Existenz ist die Hauptquelle der Langeweile», schreibt er. Solchen Menschen fehlt die Erfahrung des «Flows», die sich aus der Beschäftigung mit einer fesselnden, sinnvollen Arbeit ergibt. Dreinschlagender Aktivismus bietet eine Art Hochgefühl. Es ist das Gefühl der Macht, das entsteht, wenn man die Regeln bricht. «Die Regeln sind für dich, nicht für mich», sagt der Gesetzesbrecher. Für einige, wie Prinz Harry und Herzogin Meghan Markle, die immer wieder dabei erwischt werden, wie sie zu Uno-Klimakonferenzen jetten, ist die Heuchelei das Entscheidende.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 6)*

The perception of feminism (i.e., the liberation of women such as the decreased force to get married) is used to further equate the woke/leftist agenda with Nazism:

*«Umgekehrt steht die Ehe dem Aktivismus entgegen, weil dieser den Frauen einen «neuen Lebenszweck, eine neue Zukunft und eine neue Identität bietet [ . . . ] Die Langeweile der Junggesellinnen und der Frauen, die in der Ehe keine Freude und Erfüllung mehr finden, rührt aus dem Bewusstsein eines unfruchtbaren, verwöhnten Lebens. [ . . . ] Hitler zog vollen Nutzen aus den abenteuerlustigen Damen der Gesellschaft, die ihr leeres Leben satthaben und keinen «Kick» mehr in Liebesaffären finden.»» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 7)*

The overtly negative portrayal that has been building up to this point is reiterated/summarized by the following passage:

*«Wer also sind dann die Klimafanatiker? Sie sind frustriert, bedürftig und einsam. Sie sind im Griff des Nihilismus und narzisstisch verwundet. Sie sind spirituelle Sucher und kreative Versager. Sie haben ein starkes Bedürfnis, sich besonders und mächtig zu fühlen, aber auch*

*sich in der Gruppe zu verlieren. Es sind Menschen, die sich verzweifelt vor der Auseinandersetzung mit sich selbst und der Konfrontation mit ihren inneren Dämonen drücken wollen, die für ihr persönliches Wachstum notwendig wäre.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 7)*

The last two passages worth highlighting are firstly the association of environmental protection agencies such as Greenpeace with Leninism/Stalinism:

*«Die malthusianischen und klimaapokalyptischen Institutionen (etwa Greenpeace, Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council / NRDC) bestehen seit über einem halben Jahrhundert. Lenin war ebenso ein Mann der Tat wie Stalin.» (Apokalypse im Museum, S. 8)*

Second is the quick mention of Black-lives-Matter. It is phrased in a way to portray the movement as “complaining even though things are good” while completely failing to address the racially motivated police brutality that led to the movement:

*««Black Lives Matter» begann 2015, als Amerika einen schwarzen Präsidenten hatte und die Wirtschaft sich seit sechs Jahren im Aufschwung befand.» (Shellenberger, 2022a, p. 8)*

**74. Alpenperle Zermatt** – Ein Bergdorf im Wallis trotz dem grünen Zeitgeist. Gäste aus aller Welt sind begeistert. (Odermatt, 2022a)

The article covers the problems encountered in Zermatt (famous CH-Ski resort) that are associated with CC. Notably, the article portrays Zermatt as defying the green Zeitgeist and CC alarmism/apocalypse. Interestingly the article disproves itself on multiple occasions by acknowledging the impossibility of holding Skiing events due to a lack of snowfall, offering multiple quotes of locals fully acknowledging the problem, and even stating that the sole reason skiing was possible that year was the reliance on manufactured snow. The article is introduced by appealing to state-appointed professors, statist politicians, and climate fanatics and portraying Zermatt as the opposition:

*«Während öffentlich bestellte Professoren, etatistische Politiker und fanatisierte Aktivisten (Letzte Generation) untentwegt von einer angeblich drohenden Klimakatastrophe reden, die nur durch unbarmherziges Eingreifen einer globalen Umweltbehörde noch zu verhindern sei, wirkt ein privatwirtschaftliches Projekt in den abgeschiedenen Walliser Alpen richtiggehend subversiv. [...]. Die Alpenperle Zermatt trotz dem grün-morbiden Zeitgeist.» (Odermatt, 2022a, p. 2)*

A strawman argument is raised by claiming that the lack of snowfall in spring relativizes the abundance of snowfall in autumn which is used to imply the folly CC association:

*«Es kam zu Verzögerungen, weil im Frühling 2021 ständige Schneefälle die Bauarbeiten verhinderten. Auch das relativiert die derzeitigen Meldungen vom Schneemangel im Herbst.» (Odermatt, 2022a, p. 3)*

As alluded to, the article uses quotes from Franz Julen, president of Zermatts Mountain Cableways who states:

«Dabei darf man sich keine Illusionen machen», sagt Julien. «Im letzten Winter wären wir ohne Beschneigung in Zermatt ausser auf dem Gletscher auf keinem Meter Ski gefahren. Ohne technischen Schnee können wir das Skifahren heute, morgen und erst recht übermorgen vergessen. Wollen das die Leute wirklich? Ich glaube kaum. [...] Wir nehmen die ökologische Nachhaltigkeit ernst, denn die Natur ist unser grösstes Kapital. Aber wir dürfen dabei die wirtschaftliche und die soziale Nachhaltigkeit nicht vergessen.» ([Alpenperle Zermatt, S. 5](#))

**75. Mit der Brechstange ins Eldorado** – Klima-Goldgräber hebeln Volksrechte aus und werfen mit Milliarden-Subventionen um sich. Die Politiker im Bundeshaus verändern die Schweiz im Schnellverfahren. ([Mooser, 2022i](#))

The article addresses the planned photovoltaic plants in the Alps, next to the villages Gremiol and Gondo. The article introduces their implementation by implying the politicians utilized the current uncertainty in the energy supply to push the projects at a time of crisis:

«Rieder nahm die unsichere Stromversorgungslage als Vorwand für eine Solarproduktion im grossen Stil für das Winterhalbjahr.» ([Mooser, 2022i, p. 2](#))

The *real* intentions of the projects are second-guessed and it is implied that they are cash grabs by corrupt politicians who utilize events like the Ukraine War, the uncertainty in energy supply, and the climate crisis (which was invented by the left) are used to push a project that otherwise wouldn't find any traction:

«Es stellt sich die Frage: Geht es bei all diesen Projekten tatsächlich um die Energieversorgung? Oder geht es ums Geldabholen in Bundesbern? Es entsteht der Eindruck, die Schweiz verkomme zum Eldorado von energiepolitischen Glücksrittern. Immer deutlicher zeigt sich, dass der Ukraine-Krieg, die Unsicherheit bei der Energieversorgung und eine von Linken erfundene Klimakrise für Vorhaben benutzt werden, die bei nüchternem Abwägen wohl durchfallen würden.» ([Mooser, 2022i, p. 2](#))

It is further implied that the government uses fabricated numbers from biased sources to legitimize the projects:

«Das Amt liefert dafür fabrizierte Argumente aus den «Werkstätten» des Unternehmens Meteotest zum Windkraftpotenzial.» ([Mooser, 2022i, p. 4](#))

The article concludes by implying that as long as the projects deal with solar or windpower Bern (i.e. Swiss politics) is not going to pose any questions and will be ready to throw around billions in taxpayer money:

«Doch wenn es um Sonnen- oder Windkraft geht, wird in Bern kaum noch etwas ernsthaft hinterfragt.» ([Mooser, 2022i, p. 4](#))

«(...) wer ist schon bereit, abseits zu stehen, wenn der Bund mit Milliarden-Subventionen um sich wirft?» ([Mooser, 2022i, p. 6](#))

**76. Die Grosse Kobaltlücke** – Eine Studie belegt: Erneuerbare Energien sind zum Scheitern verurteilt, denn die Erde hätte nie genügend Rohstoffe für Batterien. ([Koydl, 2022a](#))

The article implies that global mineral sources do not suffice to transition towards alternative energies. However, the article operates under the assumption that all of the energy provided globally, as well as every single vehicle in the world, are to transition and thus ignores the phase-out period, addition of other energy sources, increment in battery viability, lifetime or recyclability, etc. The entire article takes the form of a strawman argument and is thus not worth further consideration.

**77. Auf dem Posten** ([Thiel, 2022b](#))

This article portrays the (fictional) mistreatment of climate activists by police officers in a positive light. This not only portrays climate activism as a delegitimate form of protest that ought to be punished but also normalizes mistreatment by the executive branch of the government.

Personal declaration

I hereby declare that the submitted Thesis is the result of my own, independent work. All external sources are explicitly acknowledged in the Thesis.

*Jan Gadze*